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  1. Jan 27, 2014
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Remove transition / dyntransition from unconfined · fed8a2a4
      Nick Kralevich authored
      Require all domain transitions or dyntransitions to be
      explicitly specified in SELinux policy.
      
      healthd: Remove healthd_exec / init_daemon_domain().
      Healthd lives on the rootfs and has no unique file type.
      It should be treated consistent with other similar domains.
      
      Change-Id: Ief3c1167379cfb5383073fa33c9a95710a883b29
      fed8a2a4
  2. Jan 24, 2014
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Move shell into enforcing for everyone. · 5c9c3121
      Nick Kralevich authored
      Change-Id: Id1eb5f7524181aaa17d0ce26219167a5b05cfd4f
      5c9c3121
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      d233350b
    • Robert Craig's avatar
      Allow all appdomains to grab file attributes of wallpaper_file. · fc4c6b79
      Robert Craig authored
      
      When setting a static wallpaper on multiple devices the
      following denials were encountered.
         avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=1775 comm="llpaper_chooser" path="/data/system/users/0/wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=104679 scontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file
         avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=799 comm="ndroid.systemui" path="/data/system/users/0/wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=104679 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file
         avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=1909 comm=4173796E635461736B202332 path="/data/system/users/0/wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=586422 scontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file
      
      platform_app access is from the SystemUI app whereas the other
      denials are from the Launcher that is used on the particular
      device. For instance, Launcher2 triggers the shared_app denial
      whereas release_app (used by Launcher3) triggers the other denial.
      Because of this, add the rule to all appdomains.
      
      The static wallpaper is still set without this change. Just add
      the rule to avoid the noise in the logs.
      
      Change-Id: Ida84d1695d52379d67b87318403f629fd07109a4
      Signed-off-by: default avatarrpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
      fc4c6b79
  3. Jan 23, 2014
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Support running adbd in the su domain. · 7d0f955e
      Nick Kralevich authored
      When adbd runs as root, it transitions into the
      su domain. Add the various rules to support this.
      
      This is needed to run the adbd and shell domains in
      enforcing on userdebug / eng devices without breaking
      developer workflows.
      
      Change-Id: Ib33c0dd2dd6172035230514ac84fcaed2ecf44d6
      7d0f955e
  4. Jan 22, 2014
  5. Jan 21, 2014
    • rpcraig's avatar
      Allow mediaserver to create dirs under /data/mediadrm. · 129f8df9
      rpcraig authored
      
      Addresses the following denial.
        avc:  denied  { create } for  pid=605 comm="Binder_2" name="IDM1013" scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_data_file:s0 tclass=dir
      
      Witnessed denial on grouper. Policy change
      seems appropriate for core policy though. To
      reproduce:
      * erase data partition or just delete all dirs
        under /data/mediadrm
      * start netflix app and watch a movie
      
      Change-Id: I515a195d45223249847fae70dc2ea9c9b216042f
      Signed-off-by: default avatarrpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
      129f8df9
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Address bug report denials. · 2e7a301f
      Nick Kralevich authored
      Triggering a bug report via
      Settings > Developer Options > Take bug report
      generates a number of denials.
      
      Two bugs here:
      
      1) According to the "allowed" list in
      frameworks/native/cmds/servicemanager/service_manager.c ,
      media apps, nfc, radio, and apps with system/root UIDs can register
      as a binder service. However, they were not placed into the
      binder_service domain. Fix them.
      
      2) The bugreport mechanism queries all the services and java
      programs and asks them to write to a shell owned file. Grant the
      corresponding SELinux capability.
      
      Addresses the following denials:
      
      <5>[  149.342181] type=1400 audit(1389419775.872:17): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=4023 comm="dumpsys" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:keystore:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  149.371844] type=1400 audit(1389419775.902:18): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=4023 comm="dumpsys" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  149.980161] type=1400 audit(1389419776.512:22): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=4023 comm="dumpsys" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  150.095066] type=1400 audit(1389419776.622:23): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1514 comm="Binder_C" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  150.096748] type=1400 audit(1389419776.632:24): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=3178 comm="Binder_3" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  150.097090] type=1400 audit(1389419776.632:25): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1514 comm="Binder_C" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  154.545583] type=1400 audit(1389419781.072:43): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  156.000877] type=1400 audit(1389419782.532:44): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  156.022567] type=1400 audit(1389419782.552:45): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  156.043463] type=1400 audit(1389419782.572:46): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  156.062550] type=1400 audit(1389419782.592:47): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
      
      Change-Id: I365d530c38ce176617e48b620c05c4aae01324d3
      2e7a301f
  6. Jan 18, 2014
  7. Jan 16, 2014
  8. Jan 14, 2014
  9. Jan 13, 2014
  10. Jan 11, 2014
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      allow adbd setpcap · 40ce0bb8
      Nick Kralevich authored
      adbd uses setpcap to drop capabilities from the bounding
      set on user builds. See system/core commit
      080427e4e2b1b72718b660e16b6cf38b3a3c4e3f
      
      Change-Id: I6aec8d321b8210ea50a56aeee9bc94738514beab
      40ce0bb8
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Support forcing permissive domains to unconfined. · 623975fa
      Nick Kralevich authored
      Permissive domains are only intended for development.
      When a device launches, we want to ensure that all
      permissive domains are in, at a minimum, unconfined+enforcing.
      
      Add FORCE_PERMISSIVE_TO_UNCONFINED to Android.mk. During
      development, this flag is false, and permissive domains
      are allowed. When SELinux new feature development has been
      frozen immediately before release, this flag will be flipped
      to true. Any previously permissive domains will move into
      unconfined+enforcing.
      
      This will ensure that all SELinux domains have at least a
      minimal level of protection.
      
      Unconditionally enable this flag for all user builds.
      
      Change-Id: I1632f0da0022c80170d8eb57c82499ac13fd7858
      623975fa
  11. Jan 10, 2014
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