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###
### A domain for further sandboxing privileged apps.
###
type priv_app, domain, domain_deprecated;
app_domain(priv_app)
# Access the network.
net_domain(priv_app)
# Access bluetooth.
bluetooth_domain(priv_app)
# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out
# to their sandbox directory and then execute.
allow priv_app app_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
# android.process.media uses /dev/mtp_usb
allow priv_app mtp_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
# Allow the allocation and use of ptys
# Used by: https://play.privileged.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
create_pty(priv_app)
allow priv_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
allow priv_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
allow priv_app nfc_service:service_manager find;
allow priv_app radio_service:service_manager find;
allow priv_app surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
allow priv_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
allow priv_app system_api_service:service_manager find;
allow priv_app persistent_data_block_service:service_manager find;
# Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon
# TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider
allow priv_app mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
# Write to /cache.
allow priv_app cache_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow priv_app cache_file:file create_file_perms;
# Access to /data/media.
allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
# running "adb install foo.apk".
allow priv_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
allow priv_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
# Allow verifier to access staged apks.
allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file r_file_perms;
# b/18504118: Allow reads from /data/anr/traces.txt
allow priv_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored
# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all
# data stored in that directory to process them one by one.
userdebug_or_eng(`
allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms;
allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
')
# Allow GMS core to stat files and executables on
# the system partition
allow priv_app exec_type:file getattr;
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###
### neverallow rules
###
# Receive or send uevent messages.
neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
# Receive or send generic netlink messages
neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_socket *;
# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
neverallow priv_app debugfs:file read;
# Do not allow privileged apps to register services.
# Only trusted components of Android should be registering
# services.
neverallow priv_app service_manager_type:service_manager add;
# Do not allow privileged apps to connect to the property service
# or set properties. b/10243159
neverallow priv_app property_socket:sock_file write;
neverallow priv_app init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
neverallow priv_app property_type:property_service set;
# Do not allow priv_app to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
# This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
# enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls
# constraints. As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow
# on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork
# permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should
# never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject)
# and priv_app is allowed fork permission to itself.
neverallow priv_app mlstrustedsubject:process fork;
# Do not allow priv_app to hard link to any files.
# In particular, if priv_app links to other app data
# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
# bugs, so we want to ensure priv_app never has this
# capability.
neverallow priv_app file_type:file link;