app.te

###
### Domain for all zygote spawned apps
###
### This file is the base policy for all zygote spawned apps.
### Other policy files, such as isolated_app.te, untrusted_app.te, etc
### extend from this policy. Only policies which should apply to ALL
### zygote spawned apps should be added here.
###

# Dalvik Compiler JIT Mapping.
allow appdomain self:process execmem;
allow appdomain ashmem_device:chr_file execute;

# Allow apps to connect to the keystore
unix_socket_connect(appdomain, keystore, keystore)

# Receive and use open file descriptors inherited from zygote.
allow appdomain zygote:fd use;

# Needed to close the zygote socket, which involves getopt / getattr
# This should be deleted after b/12061011 is fixed
allow appdomain zygote:unix_stream_socket { getopt getattr };

# gdbserver for ndk-gdb reads the zygote.
allow appdomain zygote_exec:file r_file_perms;

# gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process.
allow appdomain self:process ptrace;

# Read system properties managed by zygote.
allow appdomain zygote_tmpfs:file read;

# Notify zygote of death;
allow appdomain zygote:process sigchld;

# Notify shell and adbd of death when spawned via runas for ndk-gdb.
allow appdomain shell:process sigchld;
allow appdomain adbd:process sigchld;

# child shell or gdbserver pty access for runas.
allow appdomain devpts:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };

# Communicate with system_server.
allow appdomain system_server:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow appdomain system_server:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt };
binder_call(appdomain, system_server)

# Communication with other apps via fifos
allow appdomain appdomain:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

# Communicate with surfaceflinger.
allow appdomain surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt };
binder_call(appdomain, surfaceflinger)

# App sandbox file accesses.
allow appdomain app_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow appdomain app_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;

# Read/write data files created by the platform apps if they
# were passed to the app via binder or local IPC.  Do not allow open.
allow appdomain platform_app_data_file:file { getattr read write };

# lib subdirectory of /data/data dir is system-owned.
allow appdomain system_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow appdomain system_data_file:file { execute execute_no_trans open };

# Execute the shell or other system executables.
allow appdomain shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
allow appdomain system_file:file rx_file_perms;

# Read/write wallpaper file (opened by system).
allow appdomain wallpaper_file:file { getattr read write };

# Write to /data/anr/traces.txt.
allow appdomain anr_data_file:dir search;
allow appdomain anr_data_file:file { open append };

# Allow apps to send dump information to dumpstate
allow appdomain dumpstate:fd use;
allow appdomain dumpstate:unix_stream_socket { read write getopt getattr };
allow appdomain shell_data_file:file { write getattr };

# Write to /proc/net/xt_qtaguid/ctrl file.
allow appdomain qtaguid_proc:file rw_file_perms;
# Everybody can read the xt_qtaguid resource tracking misc dev.
# So allow all apps to read from /dev/xt_qtaguid.
allow appdomain qtaguid_device:chr_file r_file_perms;

# Grant GPU access to all processes started by Zygote.
# They need that to render the standard UI.
allow appdomain gpu_device:chr_file { rw_file_perms execute };

# Use the Binder.
binder_use(appdomain)
# Perform binder IPC to binder services.
binder_call(appdomain, binderservicedomain)
# Perform binder IPC to other apps.
binder_call(appdomain, appdomain)

# Appdomain interaction with isolated apps
r_dir_file(appdomain, isolated_app)

# Already connected, unnamed sockets being passed over some other IPC
# hence no sock_file or connectto permission. This appears to be how
# Chrome works, may need to be updated as more apps using isolated services
# are examined.
allow appdomain isolated_app:unix_stream_socket { read write };

# Backup ability for every app. BMS opens and passes the fd
# to any app that has backup ability. Hence, no open permissions here.
allow appdomain backup_data_file:file { read write getattr };
allow appdomain cache_backup_file:file { read write getattr };
# Backup ability using 'adb backup'
allow appdomain system_data_file:lnk_file getattr;

# Allow all applications to read downloaded files
allow appdomain download_file:dir search;
allow appdomain download_file:file r_file_perms;

# Allow applications to communicate with netd via /dev/socket/dnsproxyd
# to do DNS resolution
unix_socket_connect(appdomain, dnsproxyd, netd)

# Allow applications to communicate with drmserver over binder
binder_call(appdomain, drmserver)

# Allow applications to communicate with mediaserver over binder
binder_call(appdomain, mediaserver)

# Allow applications to make outbound tcp connections to any port
allow appdomain port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;

# Allow apps to see changes to the routing table.
allow appdomain self:netlink_route_socket {
    read
    bind
    create
    nlmsg_read
    ioctl
    getattr
    setattr
    getopt
    setopt
    shutdown
};

# Allow apps to use rawip sockets. This is needed for apps which execute
# /system/bin/ping, for example.
allow appdomain self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms;

# Allow apps to use the USB Accessory interface.
# http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/usb/accessory.html
#
# USB devices are first opened by the system server (USBDeviceManagerService)
# and the file descriptor is passed to the right Activity via binder.
allow appdomain usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
allow appdomain usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };

# For art.
allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;

# For legacy unlabeled userdata on existing devices.
# See discussion of Unlabeled files in domain.te for more information.
allow appdomain unlabeled:file x_file_perms;

###
### CTS-specific rules
###

# For cts/tools/device-setup/TestDeviceSetup/src/android/tests/getinfo/RootProcessScanner.java.
# Reads /proc/pid/status and statm entries to check that
# no unexpected root processes are running.
# Also for cts/tests/tests/security/src/android/security/cts/VoldExploitTest.java
# Reads /proc/pid/cmdline of vold.
allow appdomain domain:dir { open read search getattr };
allow appdomain domain:{ file lnk_file } { open read getattr };

# For cts/tests/tests/permission/src/android/permission/cts/FileSystemPermissionTest.java.
# testRunAsHasCorrectCapabilities
allow appdomain runas_exec:file getattr;
# Others are either allowed elsewhere or not desired.

# For cts/tests/tests/security/src/android/security/cts/SELinuxTest.java
# Check SELinux policy and contexts.
selinux_check_access(appdomain)
selinux_check_context(appdomain)
# Validate that each process is running in the correct security context.
allow appdomain domain:process getattr;

###
### Neverallow rules
###
### These are things that Android apps should NEVER be able to do
###

# Superuser capabilities.
# bluetooth requires net_admin.
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain -bluetooth } self:capability *;
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } self:capability2 *;

# Block device access.
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } dev_type:blk_file { read write };

# Access to any of the following character devices.
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } {
    audio_device
    camera_device
    dm_device
    radio_device
    gps_device
    rpmsg_device
}:chr_file { read write };

# Note: Try expanding list of app domains in the future.
neverallow { untrusted_app isolated_app shell -unconfineddomain }
    graphics_device:chr_file { read write };

neverallow { appdomain -nfc -unconfineddomain } nfc_device:chr_file
    { read write };
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -unconfineddomain } hci_attach_dev:chr_file
    { read write };
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } tee_device:chr_file { read write };

# Set SELinux enforcing mode, booleans or any other SELinux settings.
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } kernel:security
    { setenforce setbool setsecparam setcheckreqprot };

# Load security policy.
neverallow appdomain kernel:security load_policy;

# Privileged netlink socket interfaces.
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain }
    self:{
        netlink_socket
        netlink_firewall_socket
        netlink_tcpdiag_socket
        netlink_nflog_socket
        netlink_xfrm_socket
        netlink_audit_socket
        netlink_ip6fw_socket
        netlink_dnrt_socket
        netlink_kobject_uevent_socket
    } *;

# Sockets under /dev/socket that are not specifically typed.
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } socket_device:sock_file write;

# Unix domain sockets.
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } adbd_socket:sock_file write;
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } installd_socket:sock_file write;
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -radio -shell -system_app -unconfineddomain }
    property_socket:sock_file write;
neverallow { appdomain -radio -unconfineddomain } rild_socket:sock_file write;
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } vold_socket:sock_file write;
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } zygote_socket:sock_file write;

# ptrace access to non-app domains.
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } { domain -appdomain }:process ptrace;

# Write access to /proc/pid entries for any non-app domain.
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } { domain -appdomain }:file write;

# signal access to non-app domains.
# sigchld allowed for parent death notification.
# signull allowed for kill(pid, 0) existence test.
# All others prohibited.
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } { domain -appdomain }:process
    { sigkill sigstop signal };

# Transition to a non-app domain.
# Exception for the shell domain, can transition to runas, etc.
neverallow { appdomain -shell -unconfineddomain } ~appdomain:process
    { transition dyntransition };

# Map low memory.
# Note: Take to domain.te and apply to all domains in the future.
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } self:memprotect mmap_zero;

# Write to rootfs.
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } rootfs:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };

# Write to /system.
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } system_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };

# Write to entrypoint executables.
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } exec_type:file
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };

# Write to system-owned parts of /data.
# This is the default type for anything under /data not otherwise
# specified in file_contexts.  Define a different type for portions
# that should be writable by apps.
# Exception for system_app for Settings.
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain -system_app }
    system_data_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };

# Write to various other parts of /data.
neverallow { appdomain -system_app -unconfineddomain }
    security_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } drm_data_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } gps_data_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app -unconfineddomain }
    apk_data_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app -unconfineddomain }
    apk_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app -unconfineddomain }
    apk_private_data_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app -unconfineddomain }
    apk_private_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -shell -unconfineddomain }
    shell_data_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -unconfineddomain }
    bluetooth_data_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain }
    keystore_data_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain }
    systemkeys_data_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain }
    wifi_data_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain }
    dhcp_data_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };

# Access to factory files.
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain }
    efs_file:dir_file_class_set { read write };

# Write to various pseudo file systems.
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -nfc -unconfineddomain }
    sysfs:dir_file_class_set write;
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain }
    proc:dir_file_class_set write;

# Access to syslog(2) or /proc/kmsg.
neverallow { appdomain -system_app -unconfineddomain }
    kernel:system { syslog_read syslog_mod syslog_console };

# Ability to perform any filesystem operation other than statfs(2).
# i.e. no mount(2), unmount(2), etc.
neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } fs_type:filesystem ~getattr;

# Ability to set system properties.
neverallow { appdomain -system_app -radio -shell -bluetooth -unconfineddomain }
    property_type:property_service set;