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Stephen Smalley authored
This is required for the restorecon /adb_keys in init.rc or for any other relabeling of rootfs files to more specific types on kernels that support setting security contexts on rootfs inodes. Addresses denials such as: avc: denied { relabelfrom } for comm="init" name="adb_keys" dev="rootfs" ino=1917 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 We do not need to prohibit relabelfrom of such files because our goal is to prevent writing to executable files, while relabeling the file to another type will take it to a non-executable (or non-writable) type. In contrast, relabelto must be prohibited by neverallow so that a modified file in a writable type cannot be made executable. Change-Id: I7595f615beaaa6fa524f3c32041918e197bfbebe Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Stephen Smalley authoredThis is required for the restorecon /adb_keys in init.rc or for any other relabeling of rootfs files to more specific types on kernels that support setting security contexts on rootfs inodes. Addresses denials such as: avc: denied { relabelfrom } for comm="init" name="adb_keys" dev="rootfs" ino=1917 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 We do not need to prohibit relabelfrom of such files because our goal is to prevent writing to executable files, while relabeling the file to another type will take it to a non-executable (or non-writable) type. In contrast, relabelto must be prohibited by neverallow so that a modified file in a writable type cannot be made executable. Change-Id: I7595f615beaaa6fa524f3c32041918e197bfbebe Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>