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Commit 685e2f9d authored by Nick Kralevich's avatar Nick Kralevich
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remove syslog_* from unconfined

As suggested in https://android-review.googlesource.com/95966 , remove
various syslog_* from unconfined. SELinux domains which want to use
syslog_* can declare it themselves.

Change-Id: I7a8335850d1b8d3463491b4ef8c657f57384cfa4
parent 27c702dd
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...@@ -317,9 +317,9 @@ neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain } ...@@ -317,9 +317,9 @@ neverallow { appdomain -unconfineddomain }
proc:dir_file_class_set write; proc:dir_file_class_set write;
# Access to syslog(2) or /proc/kmsg. # Access to syslog(2) or /proc/kmsg.
neverallow { appdomain -system_app -unconfineddomain } neverallow { appdomain -system_app }
kernel:system { syslog_mod syslog_console }; kernel:system { syslog_mod syslog_console };
neverallow { appdomain -system_app -unconfineddomain -shelldomain } neverallow { appdomain -system_app -shelldomain }
kernel:system syslog_read; kernel:system syslog_read;
# Ability to perform any filesystem operation other than statfs(2). # Ability to perform any filesystem operation other than statfs(2).
......
...@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ allow init dev_type:blk_file rw_file_perms; ...@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ allow init dev_type:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allow init fs_type:filesystem *; allow init fs_type:filesystem *;
allow init {fs_type dev_type file_type}:dir_file_class_set relabelto; allow init {fs_type dev_type file_type}:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
allow init kernel:security load_policy; allow init kernel:security load_policy;
allow init kernel:system syslog_mod;
allow init usermodehelper:file rw_file_perms; allow init usermodehelper:file rw_file_perms;
allow init proc_security:file rw_file_perms; allow init proc_security:file rw_file_perms;
......
...@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ ...@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
allow unconfineddomain self:capability ~{ sys_ptrace sys_rawio mknod sys_module audit_write audit_control linux_immutable }; allow unconfineddomain self:capability ~{ sys_ptrace sys_rawio mknod sys_module audit_write audit_control linux_immutable };
allow unconfineddomain self:capability2 ~{ mac_override mac_admin }; allow unconfineddomain self:capability2 ~{ mac_override mac_admin };
allow unconfineddomain kernel:security ~{ load_policy setenforce setcheckreqprot setbool setsecparam }; allow unconfineddomain kernel:security ~{ load_policy setenforce setcheckreqprot setbool setsecparam };
allow unconfineddomain kernel:system *; allow unconfineddomain kernel:system ~{ syslog_read syslog_mod syslog_console };
allow unconfineddomain domain:process ~{ execmem execstack execheap ptrace transition dyntransition setexec setfscreate setcurrent setkeycreate setsockcreate }; allow unconfineddomain domain:process ~{ execmem execstack execheap ptrace transition dyntransition setexec setfscreate setcurrent setkeycreate setsockcreate };
allow unconfineddomain domain:fd *; allow unconfineddomain domain:fd *;
allow unconfineddomain domain:dir r_dir_perms; allow unconfineddomain domain:dir r_dir_perms;
......
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