This reverts commit 248b6dc6.

Reason for revert: The dashboard complains that devices don't boot after this revert.

Change-Id: I6a4648b64b096cbaa97c67aae6bc38b76d54cb48

This reverts commit d1cf3a40.

Reason for revert: It breaks CTS b/69309298 and other platform tests which read pm.dexopt properties.

Change-Id: I5c7cde041113e9c19bb23218edd99f699fcf4a06

Test: system server does not crash with this change
Bug: 67415855
Bug: 63920015
Change-Id: I3d0982220743137098dbc683d5c4aded105648c2

Instead of removing the denial generating code, a dontaudit and a
service label will be provided so that the team working on this new
feature doesn't have to get slowed up with local revision patches.

The dontaudit should be removed upon resolution of the linked bug.

Bug: 67468181
Test: statscompanion denials aren't audited
Change-Id: Ib4554a7b6c714e7409ea504f5d0b82d5e1283cf7

Allow vold/system_server to call storaged service

Test: adb shell storaged -u
Bug: 63740245
Change-Id: I88219e32520006db20299468b7a8c7ce0bfa58e0
Merged-In: I88219e32520006db20299468b7a8c7ce0bfa58e0
(cherry picked from commit fa6c3d7c)

When we removed /data/dalvik-cache execute permission for system_server
(b/37214733, b/31780877), I forgot to fixup this neverallow rule.
Fix rule.

Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: I38b821a662e0d8304b8390a69a6d9e923211c31e

rw access to sysfs_power file is not enough; in some cases search access
is also needed

Bug: 67895406
Test: system_server can access memory power statistics
Change-Id: I471e8e60626e6eed35e74e25a0f4be470885a459

Bug: b/64399219
Test: Manual
Change-Id: I4f6c7e4e3339ae95e43299bf364edff40d07c796
(cherry picked from commit c8bd93d7)

New types:
sysfs_android_usb
sysfs_ipv4
sysfs_power
sysfs_rtc
sysfs_switch
sysfs_wakeup_reasons

Labeled:
/sys/class/android_usb, /sys/devices/virtual/android_usb ->sysfs_android_usb
/sys/class/rtc -> sysfs_rtc
/sys/class/switch, /sys/devices/virtual/switch -> sysfs_switch
/sys/power/state, /sys/power/wakeup_count -> sysfs_power
/sys/kernel/ipv4 -> sysfs_ipv4
/sys/kernel/wakeup_reasons -> sysfs_wakeup_reasons

Removed access to sysfs and sysfs_type from system_server and added
appropriate access to new types.

Bug: 65643247
Test: sailfish boots without violation from system_server or to new labels.
Change-Id: I27250fd537d76c8226defa138d84fe2a4ce2d5d5

Renamed this type:
proc_asound_cards -> proc_asound

Labeled /proc/asound/devices as proc_asound.

We now use proc_asound type to label files under /proc/asound which we
want to expose to system components.

Bug: 66988327
Test: Pixel 2 boots, can play sound with or without headphones, and
selinux denials to proc_asound are not seen.

Change-Id: I453d9bfdd70eb80931ec9e80f17c8fd0629db3d0

Bug: 37916906
Test: Builds 'n' boots.
Change-Id: Ia1d86264446ebecc1ca79f32f11354921bc77668
Merged-In: I208ec6a864127a059fb389417a9c6b259d7474cb

Bug: 63600413
Test: VTS, instrumentation, audit2allow
Test: after cherry-pick - it builds
Change-Id: I57c0150a52c13f1ce21f9ae2147e3814aad0fb7e
(cherry picked from commit 567b947d)

Switch from /data/misc/reboot/last_reboot_reason to persistent
Android property persist.sys.boot.reason for indicating why the
device is rebooted or shutdown.

Introduce protection for all boot reason properties

Protect the following properties with these labels

ro.boot.bootreason      u:object_r:bootloader_boot_reason_prop:s0
sys.boot.reason         u:object_r:sys_boot_reason_prop:s0
persist.sys.boot.reason u:object_r:last_boot_reason_prop:s0

Setup the current as-need access rules for each.

ToDo: Remove u:object_r:reboot_data_file after internal fixes.

Test: system/core/bootstat/boot_reason_test.sh
Bug: 64687998
Change-Id: I3771c73933e8ae2d94aee936c7a38b6282611b80

The only file in /proc/<pid>/ that is world writeable is
/proc/<pid>/timerslack_ns so granting selinux write permission to
a process's /proc/<pid>/ file only allows writing to timerslack_ns
(unless the process is running as system UID).

Addresses denials such as:
avc: denied { write } for comm="Binder:1117_2" name="timerslack_ns"
dev="proc" ino=27908 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0
tcontext=u:r:priv_app:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

Bug: 30675296
Test: build
Change-Id: I2cee8ce73a0dc05d771881c36da2fde5411859fb

long live domain.te!

Remove all references.

Bug: 28760354
Test: build
Merged-In: I99953ecc7d275fdbe8e56d8f47a27d1f9e1cc09a
Change-Id: I99953ecc7d275fdbe8e56d8f47a27d1f9e1cc09a

This should improve performance, as file_contexts is slower than
genfs_contexts.

Bug: 62413700
Test: Built, flashed, and booted Sailfish.  Verified that the
files have the correct context and that wifi, web, and atrace work.

Merged-In: Ia28707ec565a0792bc882fbffe9e8ab9968535f5
Change-Id: I9546f3af3c95e3443684ae4764881b69987611ef

type=1400 audit(0.0:6): avc: denied { read } for comm="Thread-5"
name="cache" dev="dm-0" ino=13 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file permissive=0

Bug: 64067152
Test: build
Change-Id: Ie90c0343a834aa87b7ded41f503e05d9b63b3244

This is needed for timerslack functionality which should be present in
most kernels going forward

Test: system_server can write to cameraserver files
Change-Id: I85797128b1467d92eb354364de8eb60f8e45c931

Test: tested taking bugreport, sensor HAL traces show up in
      "VM TRACES JUST NOW"
Test: tested trigger ANR by `adb shell am hang --allow-restart`,
      sensor HAL traces shows up in /data/anr/traces.txt
Bug: 63096400
Change-Id: I1d012b9d9810f987be7aaf9d68abfd9c3184ac5c

Bug: 62706738
Bug: 34133340
Test: Check that uid_time_in_state can't be read from
the shell without root permissions and that
"dumpsys batterystats --checkin| grep ctf" shows frequency
data (system_server was able to read uid_time_in_state)

Change-Id: Ic6a54da4ebcc9e10b0e3af8f14a45d7408e8686e
(cherry picked from commit 4dc88795)

avc: denied { read write } scontext=u:r:ipacm:s0
tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_netfilter_socket
avc: denied { setopt } scontext=u:r:ipacm:s0
tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_netfilter_socket
avc: denied { getattr } scontext=u:r:ipacm:s0
tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_netfilter_socket
avc: denied { create } for scontext=u:r:system_server:s0
tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_netfilter_socket

Bug: 29337859
Bug: 32163131
Test: adb shell getenforce
Enforcing
adb shell dumpsys connectivity tethering
Tethering:
  ...
  Log:
    ...
    06-28 11:46:58.841 - SET master tether settings: ON
    06-28 11:46:58.857 - [OffloadController] tethering offload started
And logs show some signs of happiness:
    06-28 11:46:58.853   816   947 I IPAHALService: IPACM was provided two FDs (18, 19)
    06-28 11:46:58.853  1200  1571 I zygote64: Looking for service android.hardware.tetheroffload.control@1.0::IOffloadControl/default
Change-Id: I0c63bd2de334b4ca40e54efb9df4ed4904667e21

avc:  denied  { find } for
interface=android.hardware.configstore::ISurfaceFlingerConfigs
scontext=u:r:system_server:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs:s0
tclass=hwservice_manager permissive=0

Bug: 35197529
Test: Device boots without this denial
Change-Id: Ia43bc5879e03a1f2056e373b17cc6533636f98b1

NOTE: This change is marked dnma because we don't want it on
oc-dr1-dev-plus-aosp or any other downstream branch. Moreover,
oc-dr1-dev-plus-aosp is the only outgoing merger from oc-dr1-dev for
this project.

This reverts commit 11bfcc1e.

Bug: 62908344
Test: make
Change-Id: Ide61829cf99f15777c46f657a0e140d594f88243

In libprocessgroup, we want to only send signals once to processes,
particularly for SIGTERM.  We must send the signal both to all
processes within a POSIX process group and a cgroup.  To ensure that
we do not duplicate the signals being sent, we check the processes in
the cgroup to see if they're in the POSIX process groups that we're
killing.  If they are, we skip sending a second signal.  This requires
getpgid permissions, hence this SELinux change.

avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process permissive=1

Bug: 37853905
Bug: 62418791
Test: Boot, kill zygote, reboot
Change-Id: Ib6c265dbaac8833c47145ae28fb6594ca8545570
(cherry picked from commit c59eb4d8)

In libprocessgroup, we want to only send signals once to processes,
particularly for SIGTERM.  We must send the signal both to all
processes within a POSIX process group and a cgroup.  To ensure that
we do not duplicate the signals being sent, we check the processes in
the cgroup to see if they're in the POSIX process groups that we're
killing.  If they are, we skip sending a second signal.  This requires
getpgid permissions, hence this SELinux change.

avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process permissive=1

Bug: 37853905
Bug: 62418791
Test: Boot, kill zygote, reboot
Change-Id: Ib6c265dbaac8833c47145ae28fb6594ca8545570

tombstoned allows dumpstate to install "intercepts" to java trace
requests for a given process. When an "intercept" is installed, all
trace output is redirected to a pipe provided by dumpstate instead
of the default location (usually in /data/anr or /data/tombstone).

Note that these processes are already granted "write" and "getattr"
on dumpstate:fifo_file in order to communicate with dumpstate; this
change adds "append" to the existing set of permissions.

Bug: 32064548
Test: manual
Change-Id: Iccbd78c59071252fef318589f3e55ece51a3c64c

Applications connect to tombstoned via a unix domain socket and request
an open FD to which they can write their traces. This socket has a new
label (tombstoned_java_trace_socket) and appdomain and system_server are
given permissions to connect and write to it.

Apps no longer need permissions to open files under /data/anr/ and
these permissions will be withdrawn in a future change.

Bug: 32064548
Test: Manual

(cherry picked from commit a8832dabc7f3b7b2381760d2b95f81abf78db709)

(cherry picked from commit 11bfcc1e)

Change-Id: Icc60d227331c8eee70a9389ff1e7e78772f37e6f

Applications connect to tombstoned via a unix domain socket and request
an open FD to which they can write their traces. This socket has a new
label (tombstoned_java_trace_socket) and appdomain and system_server are
given permissions to connect and write to it.

Apps no longer need permissions to open files under /data/anr/ and
these permissions will be withdrawn in a future change.

Bug: 32064548
Test: Manual

Merged-In: I70a3e6e230268d12b454e849fa88418082269c4f
Change-Id: Ib4b73fc130f4993c44d96c8d68f61b6d9bb2c7d5

Applications connect to tombstoned via a unix domain socket and request
an open FD to which they can write their traces. This socket has a new
label (tombstoned_java_trace_socket) and appdomain and system_server are
given permissions to connect and write to it.

Apps no longer need permissions to open files under /data/anr/ and
these permissions will be withdrawn in a future change.

Bug: 32064548
Test: Manual

(cherry picked from commit a8832dabc7f3b7b2381760d2b95f81abf78db709)

Change-Id: I70a3e6e230268d12b454e849fa88418082269c4f

Update SE Policy to allow calls to and callbacks for the Tether Offload HAL
HIDL binderized service.

Bug: 38417260
Test: New functionality. So we don't have any tests.
Change-Id: I2c95b290523c55c081afa1bca091f368559c9125
(cherry picked from commit 722249b3)

Update SE Policy to allow calls to and callbacks for the Tether Offload HAL
HIDL binderized service.

Bug: 38417260
Test: New functionality. So we don't have any tests.
Change-Id: I2c95b290523c55c081afa1bca091f368559c9125

Test: Boot sailfish with shared system image
Bug: 36814984
Change-Id: I2937c20c3b6ca7bf4edab66a74742c48e76c7687

Update SE Policy to allow calls to and callbacks from Wifi Offload HAL
HIDL binderized service.
Combined cherry pick from d56aa1982d15acfc2408271138dac43f1e5dc987
and 66e27bf5

Bug: 32842314
Test: Unit tests, Mannual test to ensure Wifi can be brought up and
connected to an AP, ensure that Offload HAL service is running and that
that wificond can get the service handle by calling hwservicemanager.

Change-Id: I0fc51a4152f1891c8d88967e75d45ded115e766e

Bug: 35628284
Change-Id: I08877ac117212325b1259f7d90a4c0cb1dac2d9f
Fix: 38233550
Test: Build and boot
Merged-In: I4cdacb601e0eea1f5f0e721c568c7ee04298704f

Bug: 34766843
Change-Id: I5be615d818ecf999fec6514ce9b89ff6a7f13cd6
Fix: 38232801
Test: Build and boot
Merged-In: Ice78aedfdbe82477a84252499a76dad37887fe6b

With build/core eaa9d88cf, system_server should not be loading code
from /data.

https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=955

Bug: 37214733
Bug: 31780877
Test: Device boots and no obvious problems.
Test: No collected SELinux denials for build-server generated builds.
Change-Id: I37b1e9e6c4555c937730ab491b6c38801b38ad38

Under ASAN, allow system-server to execute app_process. This is
required for wrap-property execution.

Bug: 36138508
Test: m && SANITIZE_TARGET m
Change-Id: Ic637e5205ea86e0edcd66ab387e89b27afef6b99

Test: bit FrameworksCoreTests:android.view.textclassifier.TextClassificationManagerTest
Bug: 34780396
Change-Id: I8b98fef913df571e55474ea2529f71750874941c

Bluetooth needs the capability to set audio-related threads to be RT
scheduled.  Grant it sys_nice.

system_server needs to set priority for the Bluetooth HAL.  Allow it.

Bug 37518404
Test:  Play Bluetooth audio, confirm RT scheduling with systrace
Merged-In: Iaf7b85a11a51883744d72a50addfd320b6fbbc2f
Change-Id: Iaf7b85a11a51883744d72a50addfd320b6fbbc2f

(cherry picked from commit 6eee6eb2)

Bluetooth needs the capability to set audio-related threads to be RT
scheduled.  Grant it sys_nice.

system_server needs to set priority for the Bluetooth HAL.  Allow it.

Bug 37518404
Test:  Play Bluetooth audio, confirm RT scheduling with systrace
Change-Id: Iaf7b85a11a51883744d72a50addfd320b6fbbc2f