This restricts access to ro.serialno and ro.boot.serialno, the two
system properties which contain the device's serial number, to a
select few SELinux domains which need the access. In particular, this
removes access to these properties from Android apps. Apps can access
the serial number via the public android.os.Build API. System
properties are not public API for apps.

The reason for the restriction is that serial number is a globally
unique identifier which cannot be reset by the user. Thus, it can be
used as a super-cookie by apps. Apps need to wean themselves off of
identifiers not resettable by the user.

Test: Set up fresh GMS device, install some apps via Play, update some apps, use Chrome
Test: Access the device via ADB (ADBD exposes serial number)
Test: Enable MTP over USB, use mtp-detect to confirm that serial number is reported in MTP DeviceInfo
Bug: 31402365
Bug: 33700679
Change-Id: I4713133b8d78dbc63d8272503e80cd2ffd63a2a7

media framework analytics are gathered in a separate service.
define a context for this new service, allow various
media-related services and libraries to access this new service.

Bug: 30267133
Test: ran media CTS, watched for selinux denials.
Change-Id: I5aa5aaa5aa9e82465b8024f87ed32d6ba4db35ca

Allow SurfaceFlinger to call into IAllocator, and allow everyone to access
IAllocator's fd.

Specifically,

hwbinder_use(...) for
avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=1
avc: denied { transfer } for scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=1

allow ... ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms for
avc: denied { read } for name="ion" dev="tmpfs" ino=15014 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:ion_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1
avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/ion" dev="tmpfs" ino=15014 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:ion_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1
avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/dev/ion" dev="tmpfs" ino=15014 ioctlcmd=4900 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:ion_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1

allow ... gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; for
avc: denied { read write } for name="kgsl-3d0" dev="tmpfs" ino=14956 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1
avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/kgsl-3d0" dev="tmpfs" ino=14956 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1
avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/dev/kgsl-3d0" dev="tmpfs" ino=14956 ioctlcmd=940 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1

binder_call(surfaceflinger, ...) for
avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tclass=binder permissive=1

allow ... ...:fd use for
avc: denied { use } for path="anon_inode:dmabuf" dev="anon_inodefs" ino=12794 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tclass=fd permissive=1

Bug: 32021161
Test: make bootimage
Change-Id: Ie7700142313407ac438c43dd1a85544dc4c67f13

Divide policy into public and private components.  This is the first
step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
policies.  The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
in non-platform policy creation.  Backwards compatibility with it will
be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
version.

Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
and the need for attributes is minimal.  For now, almost all types and
avrules are left in public.

Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.

Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c

(cherry picked from commit d2dbc899)

bug: 30087072
bug: 29937024
Change-Id: I8bf3032b8455556ff5332f538f43aeb514d3b290

bug: 30087072
bug: 29937024
Change-Id: I8bf3032b8455556ff5332f538f43aeb514d3b290

Needed to support session reclaiming

bug: 27916039
Change-Id: I464e6db5b9bc4e83f85cb4623eeca340e1efd603

bug: 26782004
Change-Id: Ie3d9289d15446efa160550185a2d565e3be2980f

Remove from unpriv_socket_ioctls but grant each user of unpriv_socket_ioctls
use of unpriv_tty_ioctls

Bug: 26990688
Change-Id: I998e09091de5a7234ad0049758d5dad0b35722f7

Part of media security hardening

This is an intermediate step toward moving
mediadrm to a new service separate from mediaserver.
This first step allows mediadrmservice to run based
on the system property media.mediadrmservice.enable
so it can be selectively enabled on devices that
support using native_handles for secure buffers.

bug: 22990512
Change-Id: I2208c1e87a6bd8d5bfaed06b1fdcb0509c11cff2