Addresses the following error when running CTS on master:
junit.framework.AssertionFailedError: The following errors were encountered when validating the SELinuxneverallow rule:
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } self:capability *;
/tmp/SELinuxHostTest5593810182495331783.tmp: error while loading shared libraries: libc++.so: cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory

Also indicate that none of the sepolicy tools need c++ std lib.

(cherry-pick of 0cdb0517be696c0dc6882d289eedd45bf2da918c now made possible by
addition of commit: 28b72eddd54cb1287dd7daae853e8e4b78fa17eb)

Bug: 19617220
Change-Id: I2c5b7ab1ddeb0e02cbaad2b7d5430a0974524a89

A common source of mistakes when authoring sepolicy is properly
setting up property sets. This is a 3 part step of:
1. Allowing the unix domain connection to the init/property service
2. Allowing write on the property_socket file
3. Allowing the set on class property_service

The macro unix_socket_connect() handled 1 and 2, but could be
confusing for first time policy authors. 3 had to be explicitly
added.

To correct this, we introduce a new macros:
set_prop(sourcedomain, targetprop)

This macro handles steps 1, 2 and 3.

No difference in sediff is expected.

Change-Id: I630ba0178439c935d08062892990d43a3cc1239e
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@linux.intel.com>

Files on the /oem partition are weird. The /oem partition is an ext4
partition, built in the Android tree using the "oem_image" build target
added in build/ commit b8888432f0bc0706d5e00e971dde3ac2e986f2af. Since
it's an ext4 image, it requires SELinux labels to be defined at build
time. However, the partition is mounted using context=u:object_r:oemfs:s0,
which ignores the labels on the filesystem.

Assign all the files on the /oem image to be oemfs, which is consistent
with how they'll be mounted when /oem is mounted.

Other options would be to use an "unlabeled" label, or try to fix the
build system to not require SELinux labels for /oem images.

Bug: 20816563
Change-Id: Ibe8d9ff626eace8a2d5d02c3f06290105baa59fe

The default label for files on /system is already system_file. No
need to explicitly specify it.

Change-Id: If0c92a0da4119a0d8f83b4a3e05101cfcdb9a82d

Bug: 19483574
Change-Id: I7e4c0cf748d2b216dcb3aede3803883552b58b64

Addresses the following denials:

  avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1 comm="init" path=2F6465762F5F5F6B6D73675F5F202864656C6574656429 dev="tmpfs" ino=7214 scontext=u:r:kernel:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tmpfs:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0
  avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1 comm="init" name="sysrq-trigger" dev="proc" ino=4026534153 scontext=u:r:kernel:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_sysrq:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
  avc:  denied  { sys_boot } for  pid=1 comm="init" capability=22  scontext=u:r:kernel:s0 tcontext=u:r:kernel:s0 tclass=capability permissive=0

Change-Id: I46be370d520c4492d97c6ed7ccdc55cc20b22c49

The Settings app contains a SystemPropPoker class which notifies every service
on the system that a property has changed.

Address the following denial:
avc:  denied  { list } for service=NULL scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tclass=service_manager

Bug: 20762975
Change-Id: I81926e8833c1abcb17a4d49687fc89619b416d6c

Bug: http://b/19483574

Change-Id: I594f04004cccd2cbfadbd0f9d1bbb9815a2ea59d

Prevent defining any process types without the domain attribute
so that all allow and neverallow rules written on domain are
applied to all processes.

Prevent defining any app process types without the appdomain
attribute so that all allow and neverallow rules written on
appdomain are applied to all app processes.

Change-Id: I4cb565314fd40e1e82c4360efb671b175a1ee389
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

As an optimization, installd is now moving previously-installed
applications between attached storage volumes.  This is effectively
copying to the new location, then deleting the old location.

Since OAT files can now live under /data/app directories, we also
need the ability to relabel those files.

avc: denied { create } for name="base.apk" scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
avc: denied { write } for path="/data/app/com.example.playground-2/base.apk" dev="mmcblk0p16" ino=40570 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
avc: denied { setattr } for name="base.apk" dev="mmcblk0p16" ino=40570 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
avc: denied { relabelfrom } for name="base.odex" dev="mmcblk0p16" ino=40574 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
avc: denied { relabelto } for name="base.odex" dev="mmcblk0p16" ino=40574 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

Bug: 19993667, 20275578
Change-Id: I52bb29ed9f57b3216657eb757d78b06eeaf53458

This is one of three changes to enable this functionality:
  https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/146259/
  https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/146264/
  https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/146265/

Bug: 18151196

Change-Id: I6ce4bc977a548df93ea5c09430f93eef5ee1f9fa

deviceidle service should be accessible to all non third-party apps.

Change-Id: Ia410fe0027f212009cc2abeaabc64c7c87841daa

This enables access to gatekeeperd for anybody who invokes Android
framework APIs. This is necessary because the AndroidKeyStore
abstraction offered by the framework API occasionally communicates
with gatekeeperd from the calling process.

Bug: 20526234
Change-Id: I3362ba07d1a7e5f1c47fe7e9ba6aec5ac3fec747

Move all key management into vold
Reuse vold's existing key management through the crypto footer
to manage the device wide keys.

Use ro.crypto.type flag to determine crypto type, which prevents
any issues when running in block encrypted mode, as well as speeding
up boot in block or no encryption.

This is one of four changes to enable this functionality:
  https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/148586/
  https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/148604/
  https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/148606/
  https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/148607/

Bug: 18151196

Change-Id: I3208b76147df9da83d34cf9034675b0689b6c3a5

This reverts commit 5287d9a8.

Change-Id: I9ec0db0718da7088dc2b66f5b1749b8fb069575a

This change removes the link, but moves key management to
vold, so we need to adjust permissions alternately.

This is one of four changes to enable this functionality:
  https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/144586/
  https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/144663/
  https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/144672/
  https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/144673/

Bug: 18151196
Change-Id: I58d3200ae0837ccdf1b8d0d6717566a677974cf1

Don't allow init to mount on top of /proc. See
https://android-review.googlesource.com/148295 for details.

Change-Id: I65f66b39f3a5bfb72facb9f716f4537ac2237af1

This enables an optimization of bypassing the FUSE overhead when
migrating emulated storage between volumes.

avc: denied { write } for path="/mnt/expand/6cba9b95-4fc8-4096-b51f-bdb2c007d059/media/obb/.nomedia" dev="dm-0" ino=387843 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

Bug: 19993667
Change-Id: I2bb9aaca50ed988ded6afec6d7fbe190903707e0

Change-Id: I1c9fa4da442aa47ae4b7341eab6f788f0329d2d2

This reverts commit bbd56b71.

Change-Id: I3e295f785aa62de3a04b2f201be97dd7ef0c207f

Change-Id: I9ba4952230ec1b811b8ec6cd19c0286ee791bf08

This reverts commit c450759e.

There was nothing wrong with this change originally --- the companion
change in init was broken.

Bug: http://b/19702273
Change-Id: I9d806f6ac251734a61aa90c0741bec7118ea0387

shamu isn't booting.

This reverts commit 46e832f5.

Change-Id: Ib697745a9a1618061bc72f8fddd7ee88c1ac5eca

Needed for https://android-review.googlesource.com/147730

Change-Id: Iceb87f210e4c5d0f39426cc6c96a216a4644eaa9

Change-Id: I5eca4f1f0f691be7c25e463563e0a4d2ac737448

Users can pick files from vfat devices through the Storage Access
Framework, which are returned through ParcelFileDescriptors.  Grant
apps write access to those files.  (Direct access to the files on
disk is still controlled through normal filesystem permissions.)

avc: denied { write } for pid=3235 comm="Binder_1" path=2F6D6E742F6D656469615F72772F373243322D303446392F6D656F772F6D79206469722F706963322E706E67 dev="sdb1" ino=87 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:vfat:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 19993667
Change-Id: I24b4d8826f0a35825b2abc63d1cfe851e1c1bfe9

Raw physical storage devices are mounted by vold under /mnt/media_rw
and then wrapped in a FUSE daemon that presents them under /storage.

Normal apps only have access through /storage, but platform apps
(such as ExternalStorageProvider) often bypass the FUSE daemon for
performance reasons.

avc: denied { search } for pid=6411 comm="Binder_1" name="media_rw" dev="tmpfs" ino=6666 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_media_rw_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { write } for pid=3701 comm="Binder_2" name="PANO_20131016_162457.jpg" dev="sda1" ino=127 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c522,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:vfat:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 19993667
Change-Id: I66df236eade3ca25a10749dd43d173ff4628cfad

Use a more specific label for /data/misc/gatekeeper

Rearrange some other rules.

Change-Id: Ib634e52526cf31a8f0a0e6d12bbf0f69dff8f6b5

Change-Id: Ia9df151cc64ad74133db2095a935220ef9f3ea8e

Change-Id: I77ce4331d70edebcecc753b2e67ffab1de3ae98e