Remove /data/security and setprop selinux.reload_policy access
from unconfineddomain, and only add back what is needed to
init (system_server already gets the required allow rules via
the selinux_manage_policy macro).

init (via init.rc post-fs-data) originally creates /data/security
and may later restorecon it.  init also sets the property (also from
init.rc post-fs-data) to trigger a reload once /data is mounted.
The system_server (SELinuxPolicyInstallReceiver in particular) creates
subdirectories under /data/security for updates, writes files to these
subdirectories, creates the /data/security/current symlink to the update
directory, and sets the property to trigger a reload when an update bundle
is received.

Add neverallow rules to ensure that we do not allow undesired access
to security_file or security_prop.

This is only truly meaningful if the support for /data/security policies
is restored, but is harmless otherwise.

Also drop the persist.mmac property_contexts entry; it was never used in
AOSP, only in our tree (for middleware MAC) and is obsolete.

Change-Id: I5ad5e3b6fc7abaafd314d31723f37b708d8fcf89
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

As suggested in https://android-review.googlesource.com/95966 , remove
various syslog_* from unconfined. SELinux domains which want to use
syslog_* can declare it themselves.

Change-Id: I7a8335850d1b8d3463491b4ef8c657f57384cfa4

Allow the shell user to see the dmesg output. This data is already
available via "adb bugreport", but isn't easy to access.

Bug: 10020939
Change-Id: I9d4bbbd41cb02b707cdfee79f826a39c1ec2f177

Define a domain and appropriate access rules for shared RELRO files
(used for loading the WebView native library). Any app is permitted to
read the files as they are public data, but only the shared_relro
process is permitted to create/update them.

Bug: 13005501
Change-Id: I9d5ba9e9eedb9b8c80fe6f84a3fc85a68553d52e

On userdebug / eng builds, Android supports the concept of app wrapping.
You can run an app wrapped by another process. This is traditionally used
to run valgrind on apps, looking for memory leaks and other problems.

App wrapping is enabled by running the following command:

  adb shell setprop wrap.com.android.foo "TMPDIR=/data/data/com.android.foo logwrapper valgrind"

Valgrind attempts to mmap exec /system/bin/app_process, which is being denied
by SELinux. Allow app_process exec.

Addresses the following denial:

  <4>[   82.643790] type=1400 audit(16301075.079:26): avc:  denied  { execute } for  pid=1519 comm="memcheck-arm-li" path="/system/bin/app_process32" dev="mmcblk0p25" ino=61 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:zygote_exec:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 15146424

Change-Id: I65394938c53da9252ea57856d9f2de465bb30c25

Commit: 7ffb9972 added protection against low
memory mapping for all domains, a superset of appdomain.  Remove the same,
redundant neverallow rule from appdomain.

Change-Id: Ia41c02763f6b5a260c56d10adfbab649d9f3f97c

Should no longer be required due to restorecon_recursive of /data
by init.rc (covers /data/dalvik-cache and /data/app-lib) and due to
restorecon_recursive of /data/data by installd (covers /data/data
directories).

Change-Id: Icb217c0735852db7cca8583e381264ef8cd8839c
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

ADF is a modern replacement for fbdev.

ADF's device nodes (/dev/adf[X]), interface nodes
(/dev/adf-interface[X].[Y]), and overlay engine nodes
(/dev/adf-overlay-engine[X].[Y]) are collectively used in similar
contexts as fbdev nodes.  Vendor HW composers (via SurfaceFlinger) and
healthd will need to send R/W ioctls to these nodes to prepare and
update the display.

Ordinary apps should not talk to ADF directly.

Change-Id: Ic0a76b1e82c0cc1e8f240f219928af1783e79343
Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>

We were using system_data_file for the /data/data directories of
system UID apps to match the DAC ownership of system UID shared with
other system files.  However, we are seeing cases where files created
in these directories must be writable by other apps, and we would like
to avoid allowing write to system data files outside of these directories.
So introduce a separate system_app_data_file type and assign it.
This should also help protect against arbitrary writes by system UID
apps to other system data directories.

This resolves the following denial when cropping or taking a user photo
for secondary users:
avc:  denied  { write } for  path="/data/data/com.android.settings/cache/TakeEditUserPhoto2.jpg" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82120 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file

avc:  denied  { write } for path="/data/data/com.android.settings/cache/CropEditUserPhoto.jpg" dev="mmcblk0p30" ino=602905 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 14604553
Change-Id: Ifa10e3283b07f6bd6ecc16eceeb663edfd756cea
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Commit 3fbc536d allowed untrusted
app to read radio data files passed via binder, but didn't allow
write access. Write access is needed when sending MMS messages.

Steps to reproduce:
1) have some photos on the device
2) Launch messaging app
3) Attach a MMS (Picture, capture video, capture picture, audio recording etc..)
4) Send

EXPECTED RESULTS:
No crash

OBSERVED RESULTS:
- Messaging crashes on sending MMS
- messages are stuck in sending state

Additional details:
  05-05 10:14:01.196  2457  2457 W Binder_3: type=1400 audit(0.0:20): avc:  denied  { write } for  path="/data/data/com.android.providers.telephony/app_parts/PART_1399310041183_temp.jpg" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=604417 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0 tclass=file
  05-05 10:14:01.202 27809 28219 E JavaBinder: !!! FAILED BINDER TRANSACTION !!!
  05-05 10:14:01.203 27809 28219 E PduPersister: Failed to open Input/Output stream.
  05-05 10:14:01.203 27809 28219 E PduPersister: java.io.FileNotFoundException: Failed opening content provider: content://mms/part/4
  05-05 10:14:01.203 27809 28219 E PduPersister:        at android.content.ContentResolver.openAssetFileDescriptor(ContentResolver.java:966)
  05-05 10:14:01.203 27809 28219 E PduPersister:        at android.content.ContentResolver.openOutputStream(ContentResolver.java:674)
  05-05 10:14:01.203 27809 28219 E PduPersister:        at android.content.ContentResolver.openOutputStream(ContentResolver.java:650)
  05-05 10:14:01.203 27809 28219 E PduPersister:        at com.google.android.mms.pdu.PduPersister.persistData(PduPersister.java:837)
  05-05 10:14:01.203 27809 28219 E PduPersister:        at com.google.android.mms.pdu.PduPersister.persistPart(PduPersister.java:761)
  05-05 10:14:01.203 27809 28219 E PduPersister:        at com.google.android.mms.pdu.PduPersister.persist(PduPersister.java:1398)
  05-05 10:14:01.203 27809 28219 E PduPersister:        at com.android.mms.data.WorkingMessage.createDraftMmsMessage(WorkingMessage.java:1577)
  05-05 10:14:01.203 27809 28219 E PduPersister:        at com.android.mms.data.WorkingMessage.sendMmsWorker(WorkingMessage.java:1431)
  05-05 10:14:01.203 27809 28219 E PduPersister:        at com.android.mms.data.WorkingMessage.access$700(WorkingMessage.java:82)
  05-05 10:14:01.203 27809 28219 E PduPersister:        at com.android.mms.data.WorkingMessage$2.run(WorkingMessage.java:1228)
  05-05 10:14:01.203 27809 28219 E PduPersister:        at java.lang.Thread.run(Thread.java:818)
  05-05 10:14:01.221 27809 28219 E AndroidRuntime: FATAL EXCEPTION: WorkingMessage.send MMS
  05-05 10:14:01.221 27809 28219 E AndroidRuntime: Process: com.android.mms, PID: 27809
  05-05 10:14:01.221 27809 28219 E AndroidRuntime: java.lang.NullPointerException: Attempt to invoke virtual method 'java.lang.String android.net.Uri.getLastPathSegment()' on a null object reference
  05-05 10:14:01.221 27809 28219 E AndroidRuntime:      at android.content.ContentUris.parseId(ContentUris.java:85)
  05-05 10:14:01.221 27809 28219 E AndroidRuntime:      at com.android.mms.model.SlideshowModel.finalResize(SlideshowModel.java:691)
  05-05 10:14:01.221 27809 28219 E AndroidRuntime:      at com.android.mms.data.WorkingMessage.sendMmsWorker(WorkingMessage.java:1448)
  05-05 10:14:01.221 27809 28219 E AndroidRuntime:      at com.android.mms.data.WorkingMessage.access$700(WorkingMessage.java:82)
  05-05 10:14:01.221 27809 28219 E AndroidRuntime:      at com.android.mms.data.WorkingMessage$2.run(WorkingMessage.java:1228)
  05-05 10:14:01.221 27809 28219 E AndroidRuntime:      at java.lang.Thread.run(Thread.java:818)
  05-05 10:14:01.222   659  5253 W ActivityManager:   Force finishing activity com.android.mms/.ui.ComposeMessageActivity

Bug: 14562421
Change-Id: Iba6914eeec4bf0c8c04ee83584327a4824c0a9a9

Bug: 13340779
Change-Id: I6151b6b61ddf90327d51815d13fd65be561be587

To see whether we can safely remove these allow rules on unlabeled files
since we now have restorecon_recursive /data in init.rc to fully relabel
legacy userdata partitions, audit all accesses on such files.

Exclude the init domain since it performs the restorecon_recursive /data
and therefore will read unlabeled directories, stat unlabeled files,
and relabel unlabeled directories and files on upgrade.  init may also
create/write unlabeled files in /data prior to the restorecon_recursive
/data being called.

Exclude the kernel domain for search on unlabeled:dir as this happens
during cgroup filesystem initialization in the kernel as a side effect
of populating the cgroup directory during the superblock initialization
before SELinux has set the label on the root directory.

Change-Id: Ieb5d807f529db9a4bf3e6c93e6b37c9648c04633
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

I9b8e59e3bd7df8a1bf60fa7ffd376a24ba0eb42f added a profiles
subdirectory to /data/dalvik-cache with files that must be
app-writable.  As a result, we have denials such as:
W/Profiler( 3328): type=1400 audit(0.0:199): avc:  denied  { write } for  name="com.google.android.setupwizard" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=106067 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=file
W/Profiler( 3328): type=1300 audit(0.0:199): arch=40000028 syscall=322 per=800000 success=yes exit=33 a0=ffffff9c a1=b8362708 a2=20002 a3=0 items=1 ppid=194 auid=4294967295 uid=10019 gid=10019 euid=10019 suid=10019 fsuid=10019 egid=10019 sgid=10019 fsgid=10019 tty=(none) ses=4294967295 exe="/system/bin/app_process" subj=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 key=(null)
W/auditd  (  286): type=1307 audit(0.0:199):  cwd="/"
W/auditd  (  286): type=1302 audit(0.0:199): item=0 name="/data/dalvik-cache/profiles/com.google.android.setupwizard" inode=106067 dev=b3:1c mode=0100664 ouid=1012 ogid=50019 rdev=00:00 obj=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0

We do not want to allow untrusted app domains to write to the
existing type on other /data/dalvik-cache files as that could be used
for code injection into another app domain, the zygote or the system_server.
So define a new type for this subdirectory.  The restorecon_recursive /data
in init.rc will fix the labeling on devices that already have a profiles
directory created.  For correct labeling on first creation, we also need
a separate change to installd under the same change id.

Bug: 13927667
Change-Id: I4857d031f9e7e60d48b8c72fcb22a81b3a2ebaaa
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

This change folds the shared_app, media_app, and release_app
domains into untrusted_app, reducing the set of app domains down
to just distinct domains for the fixed UID apps (e.g. system_app, bluetooth,
nfc, radio), a single domain for apps signed by the platform key
(platform_app), and a single domain for all other apps (untrusted_app).
Thus, SELinux only distinguishes when already distinguished by a predefined
Android ID (AID) or by the platform certificate (which get the signature-only
Android permissions and thus may require special OS-level accesses).

It is still possible to introduce specific app domains for specific
apps by adding signer and package stanzas to mac_permissions.xml,
but this can be done on an as-needed basis for specialized apps that
require particular OS-level permissions outside the usual set.

As there is now only a single platform app domains, get rid of the
platformappdomain attribute and platform_app_domain() macro.  We used
to add mlstrustedsubject to those domains but drop this since we are not
using MLS in AOSP presently; we can revisit which domains need it if/when
we use MLS.

Since we are dropping the shared, media, and release seinfo entries from
seapp_contexts, drop them from mac_permissions.xml as well.  However,
we leave the keys.conf entries in case someone wants to add a signer
entry in the future for specific apps signed by those keys to
mac_permissions.xml.

Change-Id: I877192cca07360c4a3c0ef475f016cc273e1d968
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Addresses denials such as:
 avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=5114 comm="le.android.talk" path="/data/data/com.android.providers.telephony/app_parts/PART_1394223232515_recording88476874.amr" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=64522 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0 tclass=file
 avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=29199 comm="Binder_4" path="/data/data/com.android.providers.telephony/app_parts/PART_1394223232515_recording88476874.amr" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=64522 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0 tclass=file
 avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=29199 comm="Binder_4" path="/data/data/com.android.providers.telephony/app_parts/PART_1394223232515_recording88476874.amr" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=64522 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0 tclass=file
 avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=9338 comm="MediaLoader" path="/data/data/com.android.providers.telephony/app_parts/PART_1394848620510_image.jpg" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=287374 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0 tclass=file
 avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=9896 comm="Binder_7" path="/data/data/com.android.providers.telephony/app_parts/PART_1394594346187_image.jpg" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=287522 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0 tclass=file

This does not allow write denials such as:
 avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1728 comm="Binder_4" path="/data/data/com.android.providers.telephony/app_parts/PART_1394818738798_image.jpg" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82279 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Need to understand whether write access is in fact required.

Change-Id: I7693d16cb4f9855909d790d3f16f8bf281764468
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

This appears to have been created to allow untrusted_app to
access DownloadProvider cache files without needing to allow
open access to platform_app_data_file.  Now that platform_app_data_file
is gone, there is no benefit to having this type.

Retain a typealias for download_file to app_data_file until
restorecon /data/data support is in place to provide compatibility.

This change depends on:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/87801/



Change-Id: Iab3c99d7d5448bdaa5c1e03a98fb6163804e1ec4
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

The original concept was to allow separation between /data/data/<pkgdir>
files of "platform" apps (signed by one of the four build keys) and
untrusted apps.  But we had to allow read/write to support passing of
open files via Binder or local socket for compatibilty, and it seems
that direct open by pathname is in fact used in Android as well,
only passing the pathname via Binder or local socket.  So there is no
real benefit to keeping it as a separate type.

Retain a type alias for platform_app_data_file to app_data_file until
restorecon /data/data support is in place to provide compatibility.

Change-Id: Ic15066f48765322ad40500b2ba2801bb3ced5489
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

We already have neverallow rules for all domains about
loading policy, setting enforcing mode, and setting
checkreqprot, so we can drop redundant ones from netd and appdomain.
Add neverallow rules to domain.te for setbool and setsecparam
and exclude them from unconfined to allow fully eliminating
separate neverallow rules on the :security class from anything
other than domain.te.

Change-Id: I0122e23ccb2b243f4c5376893e0c894f01f548fc
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Coalesce a number of allow rules replicated among multiple
app domains.

Get rid of duplicated rules already covered by domain, appdomain,
or platformappdomain rules.

Split the platformappdomain rules to their own platformappdomain.te
file, document them more fully, and note the inheritance in each
of the relevant *_app.te files.

Generalize isolated app unix_stream_socket rules to all app domains
to resolve denials such as:

avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=11897 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[203881]" dev="sockfs" ino=203881 scontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket

avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=11990 comm=4173796E635461736B202334 path="socket:[203881]" dev="sockfs" ino=203881 scontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket

avc:  denied  { getopt } for  pid=11990 comm=4173796E635461736B202334 scontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket

avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=6890 comm="Binder_10" path="socket:[205010]" dev="sockfs" ino=205010 scontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket

avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=11990 comm=4173796E635461736B202334 path="socket:[205010]" dev="sockfs" ino=205010 scontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket

avc:  denied  { getopt } for  pid=11990 comm=4173796E635461736B202334 scontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket

Change-Id: I770d7d51d498b15447219083739153265d951fe5
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Label /proc/sysrq-trigger and allow access.
Label /dev/socket/mtpd and allow access.

Resolves denials such as:
avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket

avc:  denied  { call } for  pid=1007 comm="Binder_8" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=binder

avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1024 comm="watchdog" name="sysrq-trigger" dev="proc" ino=4026533682 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file

avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=11567 comm="LegacyVpnRunner" name="mtpd" dev="tmpfs" ino=36627 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:socket_device:s0 tclass=sock_file

avc:  denied  { ptrace } for  pid=10924 comm=5369676E616C2043617463686572 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process

avc:  denied  { sigkill } for  pid=26077 comm="NativeCrashRepo" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process

avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1024 comm="android.bg" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_socket

avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[11467]" dev="sockfs" ino=11467 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket

avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[12076]" dev="sockfs" ino=12076 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserv
er:s0 tclass=udp_socket

avc:  denied  { getopt } for  pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" laddr=192.168.159.172 lport=51576 faddr=93.127.173.40 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket

avc:  denied  { getopt } for  pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" lport=15658 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket

avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[443742]"
dev="sockfs" ino=443742 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s
0 tclass=tcp_socket

avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[444842]" dev="sockfs" ino=444842 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket

avc:  denied  { setopt } for  pid=1326 comm="Binder_9" lport=16216 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket

avc:  denied  { setopt } for  pid=1676 comm="Binder_6" laddr=192.168.156.130 lport=51044 faddr=74.125.214.81 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket

avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=10915 comm="system_server" path="/dev/mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file

avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=10915 comm="system_server" name="mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file

avc:  denied  { unlink } for  pid=14866 comm="system_server" name="wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=285715 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file

avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket

avc:  denied  { getopt } for  pid=32300 comm="Binder_1" laddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 lport=4939 faddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 fport=53318 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket

avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=10840 comm="pool-17-thread-" path="socket:[205990]" dev="sockfs" ino=205990 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket

avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=20817 comm="dumpsys" path="/mnt/shell/emulated/0/aupt-output/bugreport-2014-02-22-11-17-16.txt.tmp" dev="fuse" ino=3100784040 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: I481ac26667b487031a5d3317b0a028a027a8e641
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Resolves denials such as:
avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=23862 comm="Binder_4" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/.thumbnails/1390499643135.jpg" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=171695 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file

avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=26800 comm="ImageLoader" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/.thumbnails/1390499643135.jpg" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=171695 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: I8221359123ecc41ea28e4fcbce4912b42a6510f0
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

A number of binder_call rules are duplicated by other rules
written in terms of attributes/sets (e.g. appdomain, binderservicedomain).
Get rid of the duplicates.

Also use binder_use() in racoon.te rather than manually writing the
base rule for communicating with the servicemanager.

Change-Id: I5a459cc2154b1466bcde6eccef253dfcdcb44e0a
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Change I6dacdc43bcc1a56e47655e37e825ee6a205eb56b switched
the keystore to using binder instead of a socket, so this
socket type and rules have been unused for a while.  The type
was only ever assigned to a /dev/socket socket file (tmpfs) so
there is no issue with removing the type (no persistent files
will have this xattr value).

Change-Id: Id584233c58f6276774c3432ea76878aca28d6280
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

There is some overlap between socket rules in app.te and the net.te rules,
but they aren't quite identical since not all app domains presently include
the net_domain() macro and because the rules in app.te allow more permissions
for netlink_route_socket and allow rawip_socket permissions for ping.
The current app.te rules prevent one from ever creating a non-networked app
domain.  Resolve this overlap by:

1) Adding the missing permissions allowed by app.te to net.te for
netlink_route_socket and rawip_socket.
2) Adding net_domain() calls to all existing app domains that do not already
have it.
3) Deleting the redundant socket rules from app.te.

Then we'll have no effective change in what is allowed for apps but
allow one to define app domains in the future that are not allowed
network access.

Also cleanup net.te to use the create_socket_perms macro rather than *
and add macros for stream socket permissions.

Change-Id: I6e80d65b0ccbd48bd2b7272c083a4473e2b588a9
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

In order to prevent Zygote descriptors from leaking into the child
environment, they should be closed by the forked-off child process
before the child switches to the application UID.  These changes close
the descriptors via dup2(), substituting a descriptor open to
/dev/null in their place; this allows the Zygote Java code to close
the FileDescriptor objects cleanly.

This is a multi-project change: dalvik, art, libcore, frameworks/base,
and external/sepolicy are affected.  The CLs need to be approved
together, lest the build break or the software fail to boot.

Bug: 12114500
Change-Id: Ie45ddf6d661a1ea8570cd49dfea76421f2cadf72

- Add write_logd, read_logd and control_logd macros added along
  with contexts for user space logd.
- Specify above on domain wide, or service-by-service basis
- Add logd rules.
- deprecate access_logcat as unused.
- 'allow <domain> zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;' rule added to
  deal with fd inheritance. ToDo: investigate means to allow
  references to close, and reopen in context of application
  or call setsockcreatecon() to label them in child context.

Change-Id: I35dbb9d5122c5ed9b8c8f128abf24a871d6b26d8

Rather, enforce that a relabel should be done. This
tightens an existing assertion.

Change-Id: I0500e3dc483e6bf97e5b017043e358bcbdc69904

When setting a static wallpaper on multiple devices the
following denials were encountered.
   avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=1775 comm="llpaper_chooser" path="/data/system/users/0/wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=104679 scontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file
   avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=799 comm="ndroid.systemui" path="/data/system/users/0/wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=104679 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file
   avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=1909 comm=4173796E635461736B202332 path="/data/system/users/0/wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=586422 scontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file

platform_app access is from the SystemUI app whereas the other
denials are from the Launcher that is used on the particular
device. For instance, Launcher2 triggers the shared_app denial
whereas release_app (used by Launcher3) triggers the other denial.
Because of this, add the rule to all appdomains.

The static wallpaper is still set without this change. Just add
the rule to avoid the noise in the logs.

Change-Id: Ida84d1695d52379d67b87318403f629fd07109a4
Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>

Triggering a bug report via
Settings > Developer Options > Take bug report
generates a number of denials.

Two bugs here:

1) According to the "allowed" list in
frameworks/native/cmds/servicemanager/service_manager.c ,
media apps, nfc, radio, and apps with system/root UIDs can register
as a binder service. However, they were not placed into the
binder_service domain. Fix them.

2) The bugreport mechanism queries all the services and java
programs and asks them to write to a shell owned file. Grant the
corresponding SELinux capability.

Addresses the following denials:

<5>[  149.342181] type=1400 audit(1389419775.872:17): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=4023 comm="dumpsys" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:keystore:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  149.371844] type=1400 audit(1389419775.902:18): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=4023 comm="dumpsys" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  149.980161] type=1400 audit(1389419776.512:22): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=4023 comm="dumpsys" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  150.095066] type=1400 audit(1389419776.622:23): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1514 comm="Binder_C" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  150.096748] type=1400 audit(1389419776.632:24): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=3178 comm="Binder_3" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  150.097090] type=1400 audit(1389419776.632:25): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1514 comm="Binder_C" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  154.545583] type=1400 audit(1389419781.072:43): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  156.000877] type=1400 audit(1389419782.532:44): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  156.022567] type=1400 audit(1389419782.552:45): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  156.043463] type=1400 audit(1389419782.572:46): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  156.062550] type=1400 audit(1389419782.592:47): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: I365d530c38ce176617e48b620c05c4aae01324d3

Re-purpose the existing bluetooth_socket type, originally
for /dev/socket/bluetooth used by bluetoothd in the old
bluetooth stack, for sockets created by bluedroid under
/data/misc/bluedroid, and allow mediaserver to connect
to such sockets.  This is required for playing audio
on paired BT devices.

Based on b/12417855.

Change-Id: I24ecdf407d066e7c4939ed2a0edb97222a1879f6
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

This is required for the grouper sepolicy, where we must allow
bluetooth domain to write to the base sysfs type due to a kernel bug.

Change-Id: I14b0530387edce1097387223f0def9b59e4292e0
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Otherwise all domains can create/write files that are executable
by all other domains.  If I understand correctly, this should
only be necessary for app domains executing content from legacy
unlabeled userdata partitions on existing devices and zygote
and system_server mappings of dalvikcache files, so only allow
it for those domains.

If required for others, add it to the individual
domain .te file, not for all domains.

Change-Id: I6f5715eb1ecf2911e70772b9ab4e531feea18819
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

ping in Android no longer requires any additional privileges beyond
the caller.  Drop the ping domain and executable file type entirely.

Also add net_domain() to shell domain so that it can create and
use network sockets.

Change-Id: If51734abe572aecf8f510f1a55782159222e5a67
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

tmpfs_domain() macro defines a per-domain type and
allows access for tmpfs-backed files, including ashmem
regions.  execute-related permissions crept into it,
thereby allowing write + execute to ashmem regions for
most domains.  Move the execute permission out of tmpfs_domain()
to app_domain() and specific domains as required.
Drop execmod for now we are not seeing it.

Similarly, execute permission for /dev/ashmem crept into
binder_use() as it was common to many binder using domains.
Move it out of binder_use() to app_domain() and specific domains
as required.

Change-Id: I66f1dcd02932123eea5d0d8aaaa14d1b32f715bb
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

execmem permission controls the ability to make an anonymous
mapping executable or to make a private file mapping writable
and executable.  Remove this permission from domain (i.e.
all domains) by default, and add it explicitly to app domains.
It is already allowed in other specific .te files as required.
There may be additional cases in device-specific policy where
it is required for proprietary binaries.

Change-Id: I902ac6f8cf2e93d46b3a976bc4dabefa3905fce6
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

system_server and app domains need to map dalvik-cache files with PROT_EXEC.

type=1400 msg=audit(13574814.073:132): avc: denied { execute } for pid=589 comm="system_server" path="/data/dalvik-cache/system@priv-app@SettingsProvider.apk@classes.dex" dev="mmcblk0p30" ino=684132 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Apps need to map cached dex files with PROT_EXEC.  We already allow this
for untrusted_app to support packaging of shared objects as assets
but not for the platform app domains.

type=1400 audit(1387810571.697:14): avc:  denied  { execute } for  pid=7822 comm="android.youtube" path="/data/data/com.google.android.youtube/cache/ads1747714305.dex" dev="mmcblk0p30" ino=603259 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:platform_app_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: I309907d591ea6044e3e6aeb57bde7508e426c033
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Change-Id: I184458af1f40de6f1ab99452e76ba586dad1319e
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

The closure of /dev/socket/zygote occurs in the zygote child
process, after Zygote has dropped privileges and changed
SELinux domains. In Google's internal tree, socket closures
are following a different path, which is causing getopt/getattr
to be used on the file descriptor. This is generating a large
number of denials.

Allow the operations for now. getopt/getattr are fairly harmless.
Long term, we shouldn't be performing these operations on the
zygote socket.

Addresses the following denials:

18.352783   type=1400 audit(1386374111.043:7): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=682 comm="ndroid.systemui" path="socket:[9287]" dev="sockfs" ino=9287 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
18.353088   type=1400 audit(1386374111.043:8): avc:  denied  { getopt } for  pid=682 comm="ndroid.systemui" path="/dev/socket/zygote" scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
18.833251   type=1400 audit(1386374111.524:9): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=761 comm="d.process.acore" path="socket:[9287]" dev="sockfs" ino=9287 scontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
18.833557   type=1400 audit(1386374111.524:10): avc:  denied  { getopt } for  pid=761 comm="d.process.acore" path="/dev/socket/zygote" scontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
19.042419   type=1400 audit(1386374111.734:11): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=806 comm="d.process.media" path="socket:[9287]" dev="sockfs" ino=9287 scontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
19.042724   type=1400 audit(1386374111.734:12): avc:  denied  { getopt } for  pid=806 comm="d.process.media" path="/dev/socket/zygote" scontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
19.182830   type=1400 audit(1386374111.874:14): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=825 comm="putmethod.latin" path="socket:[9287]" dev="sockfs" ino=9287 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
19.183105   type=1400 audit(1386374111.874:15): avc:  denied  { getopt } for  pid=825 comm="putmethod.latin" path="/dev/socket/zygote" scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
19.235473   type=1400 audit(1386374111.924:16): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=840 comm="ndroid.settings" path="socket:[9287]" dev="sockfs" ino=9287 scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket

Bug: 12061011
Change-Id: Ie1ec7636185aba7954656802e5eed735f49830c9

Add the necessary rules to support dumpstate.
Start off initially in permissive until it has more testing.

Dumpstate is triggered by running "adb bugreport"

Change-Id: Ic17a60cca1f6f40daa4f2c51e9ad6009ef36cfbd

Change-Id: I3ce0b4bd25e078698a1c50242aaed414bf5cb517
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>