This new type will allow us to write finer-grained
policy concerning asec containers. Some files of
these containers need to be world readable.

Change-Id: Iefee74214d664acd262edecbb4f981d633ff96ce
Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>

So that we do not relabel them on a restorecon -R /data.

Change-Id: I8dd915d9bb80067339621b905ea2b4ea0fa8d71e
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

This will ensure that any sockets created in this directory
will default to wpa_socket unless a type_transition is defined.
Define a type transition for system_server to keep its separate
system_wpa_socket type assigned for its socket.  Allow wpa
to create and unlink sockets in the directory.  We leave the
already existing rules for wifi_data_file in place for compatibility
with existing devices that have wifi_data_file on /data/misc/wifi/sockets.

Change-Id: I9e35cc93abf89ce3594860aa3193f84a3b42ea6e
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

- Add write_logd, read_logd and control_logd macros added along
  with contexts for user space logd.
- Specify above on domain wide, or service-by-service basis
- Add logd rules.
- deprecate access_logcat as unused.
- 'allow <domain> zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;' rule added to
  deal with fd inheritance. ToDo: investigate means to allow
  references to close, and reopen in context of application
  or call setsockcreatecon() to label them in child context.

Change-Id: I35dbb9d5122c5ed9b8c8f128abf24a871d6b26d8

Re-purpose the existing bluetooth_socket type, originally
for /dev/socket/bluetooth used by bluetoothd in the old
bluetooth stack, for sockets created by bluedroid under
/data/misc/bluedroid, and allow mediaserver to connect
to such sockets.  This is required for playing audio
on paired BT devices.

Based on b/12417855.

Change-Id: I24ecdf407d066e7c4939ed2a0edb97222a1879f6
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

These are all symlinks. The restorecon in /sys doesn't follow
symlinks, so these lines have absolutely no effect, and just
serve to confuse people.

Remove them.

Change-Id: I24373fa0308ec700011ed19b1ce29a491d1feff3

powervr_device is obsoleted by the more general gpu_device.
akm_device and accelerometer_device are obsoleted by the more
general sensors_device.

We could also drop the file_contexts entries altogether and
take them to device-specific policy (in this case, they all
came from crespo, so that is obsolete for master).

Change-Id: I63cef43b0d66bc99b80b64655416cc050f443e7d
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

/data/mediadrm is appearing on devices but is
receiving the system_data_file type. Use the
media_data_file label to help classify these files.
This new label will help with the following denials.
with exisiting allow rules for mediaserver are already
in place.

type=1400 msg=audit(1389139139.551:308): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=179 comm="mediaserver" name="ay64.dat" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=136819 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file
type=1400 msg=audit(1389139140.783:309): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=179 comm="mediaserver" name="IDM1013" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=136818 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir
type=1400 msg=audit(1389139140.783:310): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=179 comm="mediaserver" name="IDM1013" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=136818 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir

Change-Id: I84ac78517fdbb0264cf07379120a62675505fc95
Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>

They serve no purpose; these directories/files are normally accessible
in the same way as the rest of /system.  Also one of them has the wrong
attributes (data_file_type), thereby making it writable by some domains,
and under current policy, shell and apps cannot do ls -l /etc/ppp /etc/dhcpcd.

Change-Id: I0c1baa434fe78373684f4eaab40a41fddf2bdd79
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

ping in Android no longer requires any additional privileges beyond
the caller.  Drop the ping domain and executable file type entirely.

Also add net_domain() to shell domain so that it can create and
use network sockets.

Change-Id: If51734abe572aecf8f510f1a55782159222e5a67
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

/data/media presently is left in system_data_file, which requires
anything that wants to write to it to be able to write to system_data_file.
Introduce a new type for /data/media, media_rw_data_file (to match
the media_rw UID assigned to it and distinguish it from /data/misc/media
which has media UID and media_data_file type), and allow access to it.

We allow this for all platform app domains as WRITE_MEDIA_STORAGE permission is granted
to signature|system.  We should not have to allow it to untrusted_app.

Set up type transitions in sdcardd to automatically label any directories
or files it creates with the new type.

Change-Id: I5c7e6245b854a9213099e40a41d9583755d37d42
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Add the necessary rules to support dumpstate.
Start off initially in permissive until it has more testing.

Dumpstate is triggered by running "adb bugreport"

Change-Id: Ic17a60cca1f6f40daa4f2c51e9ad6009ef36cfbd

Add a placeholder domain for inputflinger.
Mark it initially unconfined and enforcing.

Change-Id: I433fd9e1954486136cb8abb084b4e19bb7fc2f19

And allow any SELinux domain to read these timezone
related files.

Addresses the following denial:
<5>[    4.746399] type=1400 audit(3430294.470:7): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=197 comm="time_daemon" name="tzdata" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=618992 scontext=u:r:time:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: Iff32465e62729d7aad8c79607848d89ce0aede86

Alphabetize the entries for the /data/misc subdirectories.

Change-Id: I3690085cbb99c225545545668dedd66341a14edb

Leave the domain permissive initially until it gets more testing.

Change-Id: I9d88d76d1ffdc79a2eff4545d37a9e615482df50
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

lmkd low memory killer daemon

The kernel low memory killer logic has been moved to a new daemon
called lmkd.  ActivityManager communicates with this daemon over a
named socket.

This is just a placeholder policy, starting off in unconfined_domain.

Change-Id: Ia3f9a18432c2ae37d4f5526850e11432fd633e10

Limit the ability to write to the files that configure kernel
usermodehelpers and security-sensitive proc settings to the init domain.
Permissive domains can also continue to set these values.

The current list is not exhaustive, just an initial set.
Not all of these files will exist on all kernels/devices.
Controlling access to certain kernel usermodehelpers, e.g. cgroup
release_agent, will require kernel changes to support and cannot be
addressed here.

Expected output on e.g. flo after the change:
ls -Z /sys/kernel/uevent_helper /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern /proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict /proc/sys/kernel/poweroff_cmd /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space /proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper
-rw-r--r-- root     root              u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 uevent_helper
-rw-r--r-- root     root              u:object_r:proc_security:s0 suid_dumpable
-rw-r--r-- root     root              u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 core_pattern
-rw-r--r-- root     root              u:object_r:proc_security:s0 dmesg_restrict
-rw-r--r-- root     root              u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 hotplug
-rw-r--r-- root     root              u:object_r:proc_security:s0 kptr_restrict
-rw-r--r-- root     root              u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 poweroff_cmd
-rw-r--r-- root     root              u:object_r:proc_security:s0 randomize_va_space
-rw------- root     root              u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 bset
-rw------- root     root              u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 inheritable

Change-Id: I3f24b4bb90f0916ead863be6afd66d15ac5e8de0
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

This label was originally used for Motorola
Xoom devices. nvmap is the tegra gpu memory
manager and the various nvhost drivers are
for tegra graphics related functionality,
i.e. display serial interface, image signal
processor, or media processing stuff.

Only grouper and tilapia presently need this
policy.

Change-Id: I2a7000f69abf3185724d88d428e8237e0ca436ec

Otherwise sockets that have no specific entry match the /dev(/.*) entry
instead, leaving them in device type rather than socket_device type.
Every socket should get its own entry regardless, but this at least puts
it into a more specific type by default.

Change-Id: I97f7999af7f9f83484d3a51440dda791d3726f1a
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Use more general type names for the contents of /data/misc/camera and
/data/misc/audio.  These were the names used in our policy until 4.3
was released, at which point we switched to be consistent with AOSP.
However, the Galaxy S4 4.2.2 image, Galaxy S4 4.3 image, and
Galaxy Note 3 4.3 image all shipped with policies using _data_file names
because they were based on our older policy.  So we may as well switch
AOSP to these names.

Not sure if in fact these could be all coalesced to the new media_data_file
type for /data/misc/media introduced by
Ic374488f8b62bd4f8b3c90f30da0e8d1ed1a7343.

Options to fix already existing devices, which would only apply
to Nexus devices with 4.3 or 4.4 at this point:
1) Add restorecon_recursive /data/misc/audio /data/misc/camera to either
the system/core init.rc or to the device-specific init.*.rc files.
-or-
2) Add a typealias declaration in the policy to remap the old type names.
to the new ones.  Then existing types on persistent storage will be
remapped internally to the new ones.
-or-
3) Some sort of relabeld.

Option #2 is implemented by this change.

Change-Id: Id36203f5bb66b5200efc1205630b5b260ef97496
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Otherwise you get denials such as:
type=1400 audit(1383590310.430:623): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=1629 comm="Thread-78" path="/dev/fscklogs/log" dev="tmpfs" ino=1642 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:device:s0 tclass=file
type=1400 audit(1383590310.430:624): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=1629 comm="Thread-78" name="log" dev="tmpfs" ino=1642 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:device:s0 tclass=file
type=1400 audit(1383590310.430:625): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1629 comm="Thread-78" name="fscklogs" dev="tmpfs" ino=1628 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:device:s0 tclass=dir
type=1400 audit(1383590310.430:625): avc:  denied  { remove_name } for  pid=1629 comm="Thread-78" name="log" dev="tmpfs" ino=1642 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:device:s0 tclass=dir
type=1400 audit(1383590310.430:625): avc:  denied  { unlink } for  pid=1629 comm="Thread-78" name="log" dev="tmpfs" ino=1642 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:device:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: Ia7ae06a6d4cc5d2a59b8b85a5fb93cc31074fd37
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Otherwise we get denials like these on 4.4:

type=1400 audit(1383590170.360:29): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=61 comm="mediaserver" name="media" dev="mtdblock1" ino=6416 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir
type=1400 audit(1383590170.360:29): avc:  denied  { add_name } for  pid=61 comm="mediaserver" name="emulator.camera.hotplug.0" scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir
type=1400 audit(1383590170.360:29): avc:  denied  { create } for  pid=61 comm="mediaserver" name="emulator.camera.hotplug.0" scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file
type=1400 audit(1383590170.360:29): avc:  denied  { write open } for  pid=61 comm="mediaserver" name="emulator.camera.hotplug.0" dev="mtdblock1" ino=6431 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file
type=1400 audit(1383590255.100:231): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=832 comm="mediaserver" name="emulator.camera.hotplug.0" dev="mtdblock1" ino=6431 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file
type=1400 audit(1383590255.100:231): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=832 comm="mediaserver" name="emulator.camera.hotplug.0" dev="mtdblock1" ino=6431 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: Ic374488f8b62bd4f8b3c90f30da0e8d1ed1a7343
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Long live /system/bin/sh!

Change-Id: I5af63c1bdc3585835ee273ed9995d8fac14792da

Change-Id:  Ib8c96ab9e19d34e8e34a4c859528345763be4906
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

/dev/uinput is accessed in the same way as /dev/uhid,
and unlike /dev/input/*.  bluetooth requires access to
the former and not to the latter, while shell requires access
to the latter and not the former.  This is also consistent
with their DAC group ownerships (net_bt_stack for /dev/uinput
and /dev/uhid vs input for /dev/input/*).

Change-Id: I0059d832a7fe036ed888c91e1fb96f3e6e0bd2d4
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Every device has a CPU. This is not device specific.

Allow every domain to read these files/directories.
For unknown reasons, these files are accessed by A LOT
of processes.

Allow ueventd to write to these files. This addresses
the following denials seen on mako:

<5>[    4.935602] type=1400 audit(1383167737.512:4): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=140 comm="ueventd" name="cpu0" dev="sysfs" ino=3163 scontext=u:r:ueventd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[    4.935785] type=1400 audit(1383167737.512:5): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=140 comm="ueventd" name="cpu0" dev="sysfs" ino=3163 scontext=u:r:ueventd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[    4.935937] type=1400 audit(1383167737.512:6): avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=140 comm="ueventd" name="cpu0" dev="sysfs" ino=3163 scontext=u:r:ueventd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[    4.936120] type=1400 audit(1383167737.512:7): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=140 comm="ueventd" name="uevent" dev="sysfs" ino=3164 scontext=u:r:ueventd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tclass=file
<5>[    4.936303] type=1400 audit(1383167737.512:8): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=140 comm="ueventd" name="uevent" dev="sysfs" ino=3164 scontext=u:r:ueventd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: I4766dc571762d8fae06aa8c26828c070b80f5936

Change-Id: Ie0ee266e9e6facb2ab2abd652f68765239a41af1

/dev/hw_random is accessed only by init and by EntropyMixer (which
runs inside system_server). Other domains are denied access because
apps/services should be obtaining randomness from the Linux RNG.

Change-Id: Ifde851004301ffd41b2189151a64a0c5989c630f

The /adb_keys entry will only take effect if a restorecon is
applied by init.rc on a kernel that includes the rootfs labeling
support, but does no harm otherwise.

The /data/misc/adb labeling ensures correct labeling of the adb_keys
file created if the device has ro.adb.secure=1 set.

Allow adbd to read the file.

Change-Id: I97b3d86a69681330bba549491a2fb39df6cf20ef
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Change-Id I027f76cff6df90e9909711cb81fbd17db95233c1 added a
/data/local/tmp/selinux entry at the same time domains were made
permissive.  I do not know why, and do not see how this is used.
So remove it.

Change-Id: I3218cc18de9781bc65ae403f2cf4c234847ef5f5
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

These device nodes were specific to crespo / Nexus S and
if ever needed again, should be re-introduced in the per-device
sepolicy, not here.

Change-Id: I8366de83967974122c33937f470d586d49c34652
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

The type was already defined and used in type transitions for cases
where the gps socket is created at runtime by gpsd, but on some devices
it is created by init based on an init.<board>.rc socket entry and therefore
needs a file_contexts entry.

Before:
$ ls -Z /dev/socket/gps
srw-rw---- gps      system            u:object_r:device:s0 gps

After:
$ ls -Z /dev/socket/gps
srw-rw---- gps      system            u:object_r:gps_socket:s0 gps

Change-Id: I8eef08d80e965fc4f3e9dd09d4fa446aaed82624
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Otherwise it gets left in the general device type, and we get denials such
as:
type=1400 msg=audit(1379617262.940:102): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=579 comm="mDnsConnector" name="mdns" dev="tmpfs" ino=3213 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:device:s0 tclass=sock_file

This of course only shows up if using a confined system_server.

Change-Id: I2456dd7aa4d72e6fd15b55c251245186eb54a80a
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Change-Id: I9652284bd34d07bd47e2e7df66fcbe5db185ab3f
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Change-Id: I153b0aa8a747d6c79839d06fc04b3923eacfa213
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Otherwise we have different security contexts but the same DAC
permissions:
-rw-rw-rw- root     root              u:object_r:sysfs_writable:s0 process_name
-rw-rw-rw- root     root              u:object_r:sysfs:s0 state
-rw-rw-rw- root     root              u:object_r:sysfs:s0 symbol

This change fixes denials such as:
type=1400 msg=audit(1379096020.770:144): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=85 comm="SurfaceFlinger" name="symbol" dev="sysfs" ino=47 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: I261c7751da3778ee9241ec6b5476e8d9f96ba5ed
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Bug: 10175701
Change-Id: I185df22bdbaafd56725760ec6c71340b67455046

/sys was getting labeled as a rootfs file, but according to
genfs_contexts, it's really a sysfs file. This conflict is causing
problems when patch f29c533c49ab1c90eae612b1c454f2c6879a6658 from
system/core is applied.

Change-Id: I3f34c9ee68bedb171ebebfcd356e924c987b58ff

This change does several things:

1) Restore domain.te to the version present at
cd516a32 . This is the version
currently being distributed in AOSP.

2) Add "allow domain properties_device:file r_file_perms;" to
domain.te, to allow all domains to read /dev/__properties__ .
This change was missing from AOSP.

3) Restore netd.te to the version present at
80c9ba52 . This is the version
currently being distributed in AOSP.

4) Remove anything involving module loading from netd.te. CTS
enforces that Android kernels can't have module loading enabled.

5) Add several new capabilities, plus data file rules, to
netd.te, since netd needs to write to files owned by wifi.

6) Add a new unconfined domain called dnsmasq.te, and allow
transitions from netd to that domain. Over time, we'll tighten up
the dnsmasq.te domain.

7) Add a new unconfined domain called hostapd.te, and allow
transitions from netd to that domain. Over time, we'll tighten up
the hostapd.te domain.

The net effect of these changes is to re-enable SELinux protections
for netd. The policy is FAR from perfect, and allows a lot of wiggle
room, but we can improve it over time.

Testing: as much as possible, I've exercised networking related
functionality, including turning on and off wifi, entering airplane
mode, and enabling tethering and portable wifi hotspots. It's quite
possible I've missed something, and if we experience problems, I
can roll back this change.

Bug: 9618347
Change-Id: I23ff3eebcef629bc7baabcf6962f25f116c4a3c0