- Nov 08, 2016
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Nick Kralevich authored
The underlying ioctl denial was fixed in device-specific policy. It's not needed in core policy. A search of SELinux denials shows no reported denials, other than the ones showing up on marlin. This reverts commit ec3285cd. (cherrypicked from commit 863ce3e7) Test: AndroiTS GPS Test app shows GPS data, no SELinux denials. Bug: 32290392 Change-Id: I1ba7bad43a2cdd7cdebbe1c8543a71eee765621d
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Nick Kralevich authored
Addresses the following auditallow spam: avc: granted { read open } for comm="profman" path="/system/lib/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1368 scontext=u:r:profman:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read open } for comm="debuggerd64" path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1897 scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { getattr } for comm="debuggerd64" path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1837 scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file Test: Policy compiles. Not a tightening of rules. Change-Id: I501b0a6a343c61b3ca6283647a18a9a15deddf2a
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Polina Bondarenko authored
Bug: 32022261 Test: manual Change-Id: I664a3b5c37f6a3a36e4e5beb91b384a9599c83f8
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Nick Kralevich authored
Allow installd to read through files, directories, and symlinks on /system. This is needed to support installd using files in /system/app and /system/priv-app Addresses the following auditallow spam: avc: granted { getattr } for comm="installd" path="/system/app/Bluetooth/lib/arm/libbluetooth_jni.so" dev="mmcblk0p41" ino=19 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file avc: granted { getattr } for comm="installd" path="/system/priv-app/MtpDocumentsProvider/lib/arm64/libappfuse_jni.so" dev="dm-0" ino=2305 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file avc: granted { read open } for comm="installd" path="/system/priv-app/TelephonyProvider" dev="mmcblk0p43" ino=1839 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { read } for comm="installd" name="Velvet" dev="mmcblk0p43" ino=1841 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { read open } for comm="installd" path="/system/priv-app/GoogleOneTimeInitializer" dev="mmcblk0p43" ino=1778 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { read open } for comm="installd" path="/system/app/PlayAutoInstallConfig" dev="mmcblk0p43" ino=112 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir Test: policy compiles Change-Id: I5d14ea2cd7d281f949d0651b9723d5b7fae2e1f2
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- Nov 07, 2016
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Treehugger Robot authored
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Roshan Pius authored
Adding back the binder permission to access keystore from wpa_supplicant. This was removed by mistake in the previous patch (commit#: 6caeac) to add hwbinder permissions. Denials in logs: 11-03 14:37:54.831 9011 9011 I auditd : type=1400 audit(0.0:1490): avc: denied { call } for comm="wpa_supplicant" scontext=u:r:wpa:s0 tcontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0 11-03 14:37:54.831 9011 9011 W wpa_supplicant: type=1400 audit(0.0:1490): avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:wpa:s0 tcontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0 11-03 14:37:55.838 9011 9011 I ServiceManager: Waiting for service android.security.keystore... 11-03 14:37:55.834 9011 9011 I auditd : type=1400 audit(0.0:1491): avc: denied { call } for comm="wpa_supplicant" scontext=u:r:wpa:s0 tcontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0 11-03 14:37:55.834 9011 9011 W wpa_supplicant: type=1400 audit(0.0:1491): avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:wpa:s0 tcontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0 11-03 14:37:56.838 9011 9011 I ServiceManager: Waiting for service android.security.keystore... 11-03 14:37:56.834 9011 9011 I auditd : type=1400 audit(0.0:1492): avc: denied { call } for comm="wpa_supplicant" scontext=u:r:wpa:s0 tcontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0 11-03 14:37:56.834 9011 9011 W wpa_supplicant: type=1400 audit(0.0:1492): avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:wpa:s0 tcontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0 11-03 14:37:57.839 9011 9011 I ServiceManager: Waiting for service android.security.keystore... 11-03 14:37:57.834 9011 9011 I auditd : type=1400 audit(0.0:1493): avc: denied { call } for comm="wpa_supplicant" scontext=u:r:wpa:s0 tcontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0 11-03 14:37:57.834 9011 9011 W wpa_supplicant: type=1400 audit(0.0:1493): avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:wpa:s0 tcontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0 Bug: 32655747 Test: Compiles. Will send for integration testing. Change-Id: Ic57a5bf0e6ea15770efc0d09f68d04b2db9ec1b8
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- Nov 06, 2016
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Etan Cohen authored
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- Nov 05, 2016
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Etan Cohen authored
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- Nov 04, 2016
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Etan Cohen authored
Finish NAN -> Aware rename process. Removes old NAN service. Bug: 32263750 Test: device boots and all Wi-Fi unit-tests pass Change-Id: I2f0d9595efea2494b56074752194e7a6e66070f2
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Etan Cohen authored
Add Aware service - new name for NAN. But do not remove NAN yet. Enables smooth transition. Bug: 32263750 Test: device boots and all Wi-Fi unit-tests pass Change-Id: Ieb9f1ebf1d2f31ee27f228562b4601023da5282d
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dcashman authored
Bug: 32290392 Test: Builds. Change-Id: I46e8af202b41131cfc9bb280f04a214859c9b0de
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- Nov 03, 2016
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Ruchi Kandoi authored
Bug: 31180823 Test: reduced sepolicy errors Change-Id: Ibfba2efa903adec340e37abec2afb3b94a262678 Signed-off-by:
Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
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Ruchi Kandoi authored
Bug: 31177288 Test: reduced sepolicy errors Change-Id: I29556276ee14c341ac8f472875e6b69f903851ff Signed-off-by:
Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
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- Nov 01, 2016
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Steven Moreland authored
Bug: 32022100 Test: end to end Change-Id: I5dd9b64c98a5c549fdaf9e47d5a92fa6963370c7
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Dianne Hackborn authored
Test: N/A Change-Id: Ib3c85118bf752152f5ca75ec13371073fc2873cc
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Treehugger Robot authored
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Treehugger Robot authored
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Jorge Lucangeli Obes authored
This is required for https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/295748 so that init can drop the capability bounding set for services. Bug: 32438163 Test: With 295748 and a test service using ambient capabilities. Change-Id: I57788517cfe2ef0e7a2f1dfab94d0cb967ede065
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Felipe Leme authored
- Allow dumpstate to create the dumpservice service. - Allow System Server and Shell to find that service. - Don't allow anyone else to create that service. - Don't allow anyone else to find that service. BUG: 31636879 Test: manual verification Change-Id: I642fe873560a2b123e6bafde645467d45a5f5711
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- Oct 31, 2016
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Treehugger Robot authored
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Treehugger Robot authored
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Nick Kralevich authored
The kernel domain exists solely on boot, and is used by kernel threads. Because of the way the system starts, there is never an entrypoint for that domain, not even a file on rootfs. So tighten up the neverallow restriction. Remove an obsolete comment. The *.rc files no longer have a setcon statement, and the transition from the kernel domain to init occurs because init re-execs itself. The statement no longer applies. Test: bullhead policy compiles. Change-Id: Ibe75f3d25804453507dbb05c7a07bba1d37a1c7b
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- Oct 29, 2016
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Nick Kralevich authored
system_server is currently allowed write (but not open) access to various app file descriptor types, to allow it to perform write operations on file descriptors passed to it from Android processes. However, system_server was not allowed to handle file descriptors open only for append operations. Write operations are a superset of that allowed by appendable operations, so it makes no sense to deny system_server the use of appendable file descriptors. Allow it for app data types, as well as a few other types (for robustness). Addresses the following denial generated when adb bugreport is run: type=1400 audit(0.0:12): avc: denied { append } for path="/data/user_de/0/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-MASTER-2016-10-29-08-13-50-dumpstate_log-6214.txt" dev="dm-2" ino=384984 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 Bug: 32246161 Test: policy compiles Test: No more append denials when running adb shell am bug-report --progress Change-Id: Ia4e81cb0b3c3580fa9130952eedaed9cab3e8487
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Nick Kralevich authored
Addresses the following audit messages: [ 7.984957] type=1400 audit(33873666.610:40): avc: granted { getattr } for pid=1 comm="init" name="system@framework@boot-ext.art" dev="dm-2" ino=106324 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=file [ 65.528068] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:96): avc: granted { search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12428 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir [ 65.530425] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:97): avc: granted { search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12428 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir [ 65.530487] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:98): avc: granted { open } for pid=6330 comm="main" path="/dev/cpuctl/tasks" dev="cgroup" ino=12429 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=file [ 65.530800] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:98): avc: granted { open } for pid=6330 comm="main" path="/dev/cpuctl/tasks" dev="cgroup" ino=12429 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=file [ 65.530842] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:99): avc: granted { search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12428 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir [ 65.531138] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:99): avc: granted { search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12428 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir [ 65.531176] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:100): avc: granted { search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="bg_non_interactive" dev="cgroup" ino=12444 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir [ 65.531465] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:100): avc: granted { search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="bg_non_interactive" dev="cgroup" ino=12444 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir [ 65.531502] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:101): avc: granted { open } for pid=6330 comm="main" path="/dev/cpuctl/bg_non_interactive/tasks" dev="cgroup" ino=12445 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=file [ 65.531789] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:101): avc: granted { open } for pid=6330 comm="main" path="/dev/cpuctl/bg_non_interactive/tasks" dev="cgroup" ino=12445 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=file [ 65.531827] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:102): avc: granted { search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12459 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir [ 65.713056] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:102): avc: granted { search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12459 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir Bug: 32246161 Test: policy compiles Test: dumpstate no longer generates the audit messages above. Change-Id: Id5afe2ebeb24f8a7407aac1a0a09806b1521b0e4
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- Oct 28, 2016
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Treehugger Robot authored
* changes: wifi_hal: Rename to 'hal_wifi' wpa: Add permissions for hwbinder
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Nick Kralevich authored
Fixes the following SELinux messages when running adb bugreport: avc: granted { read } for name="libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read open } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { getattr } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read execute } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { search } for name="dalvik-cache" dev="dm-2" ino=106289 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { getattr } for path="/data/dalvik-cache/arm64" dev="dm-2" ino=106290 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { search } for name="dalvik-cache" dev="dm-2" ino=106289 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { search } for name="arm64" dev="dm-2" ino=106290 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { getattr } for path="/data/dalvik-cache/arm64/system@framework@boot.art" dev="dm-2" ino=106318 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { search } for name="dalvik-cache" dev="dm-2" ino=106289 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { search } for name="arm64" dev="dm-2" ino=106290 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { read } for name="system@framework@boot.art" dev="dm-2" ino=106318 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read open } for path="/data/dalvik-cache/arm64/system@framework@boot.art" dev="dm-2" ino=106318 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { search } for name="dalvik-cache" dev="dm-2" ino=106289 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=dir [ 169.349480] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:129): avc: granted { read } for pid=6413 comm="main" name="ipv6_route" dev="proc" ino=4026535947 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.350030] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:130): avc: granted { read open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/ipv6_route" dev="proc" ino=4026535947 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.350361] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:130): avc: granted { read open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/ipv6_route" dev="proc" ino=4026535947 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.350399] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:131): avc: granted { getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/ipv6_route" dev="proc" ino=4026535947 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.350963] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:131): avc: granted { getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/ipv6_route" dev="proc" ino=4026535947 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.351002] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:132): avc: granted { read } for pid=6413 comm="main" name="if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.351330] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:132): avc: granted { read } for pid=6413 comm="main" name="if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.351366] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:133): avc: granted { read open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.351861] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:133): avc: granted { read open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.351910] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:134): avc: granted { getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.353105] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:134): avc: granted { getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.353186] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:135): avc: granted { read } for pid=6413 comm="main" name="if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.353594] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:135): avc: granted { read } for pid=6413 comm="main" name="if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.353636] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:136): avc: granted { read open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.354230] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:136): avc: granted { read open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.354437] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:137): avc: granted { getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.395359] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:137): avc: granted { getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file Test: policy compiles Test: adb bugreport runs without auditallow messages above. Bug: 32246161 Change-Id: Ie0ab2ed3c6babc1f93d3b8ae47c92dd905ebc93a
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Roshan Pius authored
Renaming the wifi HIDL implementation to 'hal_wifi' from 'wifi_hal_legacy' to conform with HIDL style guide. Denials: 01-01 21:55:23.896 2865 2865 I android.hardware.wifi@1.0-service: wifi_hal_legacy is starting up... 01-01 21:55:23.898 2865 2865 W android.hardware.wifi@1.0-service: /odm/lib64/hw/ does not exit. 01-01 21:55:23.899 2865 2865 F android.hardware.wifi@1.0-service: service.cpp:59] Check failed: service->registerAsService("wifi") == android::NO_ERROR (service->registerAsService("wifi")=-2147483646, android::NO_ERROR=0) Failed to register wifi HAL 01-01 21:55:23.899 2865 2865 F libc : Fatal signal 6 (SIGABRT), code -6 in tid 2865 (android.hardwar) 01-01 21:55:23.901 377 377 W : debuggerd: handling request: pid=2865 uid=2000 gid=2000 tid=2865 01-01 21:55:23.907 2867 2867 E : debuggerd: Unable to connect to activity manager (connect failed: Connection refused) 01-01 21:55:23.908 2867 2867 F DEBUG : *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 01-01 21:55:23.908 2867 2867 F DEBUG : Build fingerprint: 'Android/aosp_angler/angler:7.0/NYC/rpius10031052:userdebug/test-keys' 01-01 21:55:23.908 2867 2867 F DEBUG : Revision: '0' 01-01 21:55:23.908 2867 2867 F DEBUG : ABI: 'arm64' 01-01 21:55:23.908 2867 2867 F DEBUG : pid: 2865, tid: 2865, name: android.hardwar >>> /system/bin/hw/android.hardware.wifi@1.0-service <<< 01-01 21:55:23.909 2867 2867 F DEBUG : signal 6 (SIGABRT), code -6 (SI_TKILL), fault addr -------- 01-01 21:55:23.910 2867 2867 F DEBUG : Abort message: 'service.cpp:59] Check failed: service->registerAsService("wifi") == android::NO_ERROR (service->registerAsService("wifi")=-2147483646, android::NO_ERROR=0) Failed to register wifi HAL' Bug: 31821133 Test: Compiled and ensured that the selinux denials are no longer present in logs. Change-Id: I5bbbcad307e9bb9e59fff87e2926751b3aecc813
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- Oct 27, 2016
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Treehugger Robot authored
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William Roberts authored
Filesystem capabilities should only be set by the build tools or by recovery during an update. Place a neverallow ensuring this property. Change-Id: I136c5cc16dff0c0faa3799d0ab5e29b43454a610 Signed-off-by:
William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
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- Oct 26, 2016
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Roshan Pius authored
Modify permissions for wpa_supplicant to use hwbinder (for HIDL), instead of binder. Denials: 01-15 14:31:58.573 541 541 W wpa_supplicant: type=1400 audit(0.0:10): avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:wpa:s0 tcontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0 01-15 14:31:58.573 541 541 W wpa_supplicant: type=1400 audit(0.0:11): avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:wpa:s0 tcontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0 BUG: 31365276 Test: Compiled and ensured that the selinux denials are no longer present in logs. Change-Id: Ifa4630edea6ec5a916b3940f9a03ef9dc6fc9af2
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Treehugger Robot authored
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Test: builds Bug: 32243668 Change-Id: I1ad4b53003462e932cf80b6972db1520dc66d735
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Bug: 32123421 Test: build Hikey Change-Id: Iaf02626f3f3a94104c0f9d746c3cf5f20751a27d
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- Oct 25, 2016
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Connor O'Brien authored
Bug: 31864052 Test: Logging confirms service runs on boot Merged-In: I41e9e5c45d2d42886cdf7ff6d364e9e6e3df1ff4 Change-Id: I41e9e5c45d2d42886cdf7ff6d364e9e6e3df1ff4 Signed-off-by:
Connor O'Brien <connoro@google.com>
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Treehugger Robot authored
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- Oct 24, 2016
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Treehugger Robot authored
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- Oct 21, 2016
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Treehugger Robot authored
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Mikhail Naganov authored
Change-Id: Iaa9907ed516c947175a59bf49938c0ee03b4f6d1
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Remove and neverallow isolated_app access to external storage and USB accessories. Test: aosp_angler-userdebug builds Bug: 21643067 Change-Id: Ie912706a954a38610f2afd742b1ab4b8cd4b1f36
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Treehugger Robot authored
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