- Dec 15, 2016
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Treehugger Robot authored
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Nick Kralevich authored
am: c6bcdbdf Change-Id: Ic7045b9dbb99cda3edb30f47ed9ecdbf542da92e
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Nick Kralevich authored
am: 320e821e Change-Id: I0bbb2bcc523e079650753f577f68b983b7086a39
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Nick Kralevich authored
am: 62f0b8ea Change-Id: I5c0d607d92f7ba76e113f4c5aaf746e48ddd2718
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dcashman authored
Bug: 31363362 Test: Bullhead and Sailfish both build and boot w/out new denials. Change-Id: If6a451ddaab8c9b78a618c49b116a7ed766d0710
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Treehugger Robot authored
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Steven Moreland authored
am: c4ee4ca6 Change-Id: Ic57956bc6f897ea24584702a32bab52432e2d010
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Steven Moreland authored
am: 5529f036 Change-Id: Ib9812cb072ad33e974dfb625fdaf421be01fea42
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Steven Moreland authored
am: 5b8d87b2 Change-Id: I7e28e34027887dde44d2c160891117596133700d
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Steven Moreland authored
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Nick Kralevich authored
Add a compile time assertion that only authorized SELinux domains are allowed to touch the metadata_block_device. This domain may be wiped at will, and we want to ensure that we're not inadvertently destroying other people's data. Test: policy compiles. Change-Id: I9854b527c3d83e17f717d6cc8a1c6b50e0e373b6
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Ajay Panicker authored
am: 27eb6492 Change-Id: Ifbea25c85e2eae67f0da3a9dfd19a1e6bb873c80
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Ajay Panicker authored
am: cea7171f Change-Id: I54073aa11166a38b6d280e894ebbd459954ddedf
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Ajay Panicker authored
am: 7a2107c1 Change-Id: I8ce6d21c0df0002fd0f0f62da3aafd9652a39f24
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Chad Brubaker authored
am: 393b96e3 Change-Id: Ib556294ff0b0a64db1088c5e790a3eec6dd4f58a
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Chad Brubaker authored
am: 377e50d7 Change-Id: I405de2d676bf01053bf1e36049edd348675d183a
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Chad Brubaker authored
am: 0046853f Change-Id: Ib21c9b4dad410270ef280786a7eca0db21069e88
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Chad Brubaker authored
- Dec 14, 2016
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Nick Kralevich authored
am: 1b0ec79f Change-Id: Ib4d85189639a4ef7228f9b8dd639b6a2eb59ea39
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Nick Kralevich authored
am: 18f61a0f Change-Id: I05a0657ab76f1143f0fd808de7948bfc2e7b21f8
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Nick Kralevich authored
am: bb9a3888 Change-Id: I6f9175baa166d7f8b887b12fbc6266e602f24173
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Nick Kralevich authored
system/core commit 331cf2fb7c16b5b25064f8d2f00284105a9b413f created a number of new properties of the form: [ro.boottime.init]: [5294587604] [ro.boottime.InputEventFind]: [10278767840] [ro.boottime.adbd]: [8359267180] ... These properties were assigned the default_prop SELinux label because a better label did not exist. Properties labeled with the default_prop label are readable to any SELinux domain, which is overly broad. bullhead:/ $ getprop -Z ro.boottime.adbd u:object_r:default_prop:s0 Instead, create a new label for the ro.boottime.* properties so we can apply more fine grain read access control to these properties. bullhead:/ $ getprop -Z ro.boottime.adbd u:object_r:boottime_prop:s0 New SELinux property labels have minimal permissions by default. As a result, after this change, ro.boottime.* properties will only be readable to system_server, bootstat, init (because it manages the property space), and "adb root" (because no SELinux permissions are enforced there). Additional read access can be granted as-needed. This is part of a larger effort to implement fine-grain access control on the properties managed by init. Test: Device boots and no SELinux denials on boot. Change-Id: Ibf981cb81898f4356fdc5c1b6f15dd93c0d6d84d
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Chad Brubaker authored
Address denial type=1400 audit(0.0:42): avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:r:ephemeral_app:s0:c207,c258,c512,c768 tclass=binder Test: Above denial no longer happens Change-Id: I351269ee4671cfd51c981d3db5d0f3944d14e702
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Nick Kralevich authored
am: 5bfa8509 Change-Id: Idb6a5e42bff4bab0781db7bad1a497e9b2c169e5
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Nick Kralevich authored
am: f13dcbb4 Change-Id: Ife8946bdd99b4121b6ad80a21c345d9ee0af1777
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Nick Kralevich authored
am: d57dd813 Change-Id: I5e911f7d301ba8421184b80f485e043178f225fb
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Treehugger Robot authored
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Steven Moreland authored
Bug: 32123421 Bug: 32905206 Test: compiles, nfc works Change-Id: Ibf72ef70255573e4df0863ea640354b3c37eb47d
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Nick Kralevich authored
core_property_type is an attribute which was given to all existing properties known to core SELinux policy. Any property with this label is readable to all SELinux domains, which is overly broad. The long term goal is to remove the core_property_type attribute entirely. Add a neverallow rule prohibiting the introduction of new properties with the core_property_type attribute. Device specific properties, or new properties in core SELinux policy, should not have this attribute. Test: policy compiles Change-Id: Ie89a9f0d81c8561616001ff8451496ce2278dbb2
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- Dec 13, 2016
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Connor O'Brien authored
am: 5f50fd90 Change-Id: I643d05381fd866f43717dc37b55ad5beb589a2bc
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