mmi-based products insists on running persistent logcat directly.

Test: build
Bug: 30566487
Change-Id: I6397f5faedb2a4a5e2f4cfc5387977ae9c54b2d4

Enabling/disabling sepolicy based on ENABLE_TREBLE is not granular
enough (ref: b/32978887 #4).

Bug: 32978887
Test: compiles, doesn't cause any additional denials on device. Nothing
depends on these things I'm removing.
Change-Id: I10acbde16e5e2093f2c9205ed79cd20caed7f44d

Generate a compile time error if someone unexpectedly tries to
transition into logpersist or logd domain.

Test: compile
Bug: 30566487
Change-Id: Ib55f301f104ad63de5ac513cdc9dc9937e3ba48d

- transition to logpersist from init
- sort some overlapping negative references
- intention is to allow logpersist to be used by vendor
  userdebug logging

Test: gTest liblog-unit-tests, logd-unit-tests & logcat-unit-tests
Bug: 30566487
Change-Id: I7806f5a2548cbe0c1f257a0ba2855f2eb69d8e7c

auditallow (added in commit 758e6b36)
has been in place for about 2 weeks now, and no hits. Remove
execute_no_trans.

The net effect of this change is that priv_apps won't be able to exec()
a file from their home directory, but dlopen() and friends will still
work.

Test: Compiles and boots successfully.
Test: No auditallow messages received via SELinux denial collection.
Change-Id: I60fcdc260d12e1bcc2355ca4dd912de7e6d0a145

Test: It's a comment -- no impact on build
Change-Id: Ibd7ff0dcd9d4c3d526ca20ab35dd4bac70d14f0a

Bug: 31077138
Test: Device boots, coverage service works when tested manually.
Change-Id: Ia855cfefd5c25be5d1d8db48908c04b3616b5504

init switch from a setcon() based transition to an exec() based
transition in bug 19702273. Fixup stale comment.

Test: comment only change. Policy compiles.
Bug: 19702273
Change-Id: I6e1b4b3680193453adafa8952a7ea343d2977505

Bug: http://b/32905206



Test: Boot sailfish and no new selinux failures observed in logs

Change-Id: Id9a46180074a61f8cf8d176a7b2ebc995a13b9f9
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

This reverts commit cf5c6ecb.

Change-Id: Ie86a6ac20ab5a1611efc0e167c0430eb9df9482e

Prevent sepolicy and sepolicy.recover from showing up in the root
filesystem when they will not be created as part of it.  Also make
sure both are added as dependencies to version_policy to ensure the
neverallow checks are run.

Bug: 31363362
Test: Builds and boots, including recovery, without additional
  denials.  Neverallow violations still caught at build time.

Change-Id: I39e3cbc150551c9316952523927d057538cd00a7

avc: denied { getattr } for path="/data/dalvik-cache/arm64/system@framework@boot-core-libart.oat" dev="sda35" ino=1581062 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file permissive=0

Test: builds, boots, quota stats match manual stats
Bug: 27948817
Change-Id: I65fb581a4732e03c46ac705f6693080c5f3be184

Bug: https://b/32733887



Change-Id: Ie22756509b53b6e78a95c5a7763b48773cd52fd7
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

- Also allow dumpstate to talk to hal_dumpstate.

Bug: 31982882
Test: compiles
Change-Id: Ib9cf0027ee7e71fa40b9ccc29fc8dccea6977e5c

And do some clean up:
Replace LOCAL_TARGET_ARCH with global arch specifier that won't get
clobbered, clean up sepolicy.recovery's eng specification, ensure that
build macros are applied across all policy generation, not just
plat_policy, and make sure that all private variables are cleared and
alphabetized at the end.

Bug: 31363362
Bug: 31369363
Test: Boot into recovery and observe no selinux denials.
Change-Id: Ibc15b097f6d19acf01f6b22bee0e083b15f4ef75

Test: Boot charge-only and android on sailfish

Bug: https://b/33672744



Change-Id: I6a25e90a716ec0ca46b5ba5edad860aa0eebafef
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3b25e384)

Test: tested with default health HAL on angler running as service.
Bug: b/32754732

Change-Id: Ie0b70d43cb23cd0878e1b7b99b9bebdbd70d17c7
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit ef62fd91)

- allows binder calls to hwservicemanager
- allows healthd to read system_file for passthrough HAL

Test: Tested healthd with and without a board specific health HAL on
Angler.

Bug: b/32724915

Change-Id: Icf621859f715cb44bce5d8d3b60320ef495d1543
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit 32cacb42)

healthd is being split into 'charger' and 'healthd' processes, that
will never run together. 'charger' is to be run only in charge-only
and recovery, while healthd runs with Android.

While they both share much of battery monitoring code, they both now
have reduced scope. E.g. 'charger', doesn't need to use binder anymore
and healthd doesn't need to do charging ui animation. So, amend the
SEPolicy for healthd to reduce it's scope and add a new one for charger.

Test: Tested all modes {recovery, charger-only, android} with new policy

Change-Id: If7f81875c605f7f07da4d23a313f308b9dde9ce8
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit c73d0022)

In order for hal clients to use IServiceManager::registerForNotifications,
the hwservicemanager needs to be able to call into client processes.

Test: WIP
Bug: 33383725
Change-Id: I59470e9cd5cbeafda010fedc0b91eeb41280e0a1

To support upcoming disk usage calculation optimizations, this change
grants installd access to work with filesystem quotas.

avc: denied { search } for name="block" dev="tmpfs" ino=15279 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:block_device:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
avc: denied { sys_admin } for capability=21 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:r:installd:s0 tclass=capability permissive=1
avc: denied { quotaget } for scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:labeledfs:s0 tclass=filesystem permissive=1

Test: builds
Bug: 27948817
Change-Id: Ic166e8ced30e15ce84223576729888a824037691

Bug: 31363362
Test: Bullhead and Sailfish both build and boot w/out new denials.
Change-Id: If6a451ddaab8c9b78a618c49b116a7ed766d0710

Add a compile time assertion that only authorized SELinux domains are
allowed to touch the metadata_block_device. This domain may be wiped at
will, and we want to ensure that we're not inadvertently destroying
other people's data.

Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: I9854b527c3d83e17f717d6cc8a1c6b50e0e373b6

system/core commit 331cf2fb7c16b5b25064f8d2f00284105a9b413f created a
number of new properties of the form:

  [ro.boottime.init]: [5294587604]
  [ro.boottime.InputEventFind]: [10278767840]
  [ro.boottime.adbd]: [8359267180]
  ...

These properties were assigned the default_prop SELinux label because a
better label did not exist. Properties labeled with the default_prop
label are readable to any SELinux domain, which is overly broad.

  bullhead:/ $ getprop -Z ro.boottime.adbd
  u:object_r:default_prop:s0

Instead, create a new label for the ro.boottime.* properties so we can
apply more fine grain read access control to these properties.

  bullhead:/ $ getprop -Z ro.boottime.adbd
  u:object_r:boottime_prop:s0

New SELinux property labels have minimal permissions by default. As a
result, after this change, ro.boottime.* properties will only be
readable to system_server, bootstat, init (because it manages the property
space), and "adb root" (because no SELinux permissions are enforced there).

Additional read access can be granted as-needed.

This is part of a larger effort to implement fine-grain access control
on the properties managed by init.

Test: Device boots and no SELinux denials on boot.
Change-Id: Ibf981cb81898f4356fdc5c1b6f15dd93c0d6d84d