Remove the ioctl permission for most socket types. For others, such as
tcp/udp/rawip/unix_dgram/unix_stream set a default unprivileged whitelist
that individual domains may extend (except where neverallowed like
untrusted_app). Enforce via a neverallowxperm rule.

Change-Id: I15548d830f8eff1fd4d64005c5769ca2be8d4ffe

auditallow says no denials.

Change-Id: Ib4e38f5393d3f3ba67277017abc848f5e7c04efd

Motivation: Domain is overly permissive. Start removing permissions
from domain and assign them to the domain_deprecated attribute.
Domain_deprecated and domain can initially be assigned to all
domains. The goal is to not assign domain_deprecated to new domains
and to start removing domain_deprecated where it is not required or
reassigning the appropriate permissions to the inheriting domain
when necessary.

Bug: 25433265
Change-Id: I8b11cb137df7bdd382629c98d916a73fe276413c

When the toolbox domain was introduced, we allowed all domains to exec it
to avoid breakage.  However, only domains that were previously allowed the
ability to exec /system files would have been able to do this prior to the
introduction of the toolbox domain.  Remove the rule from domain.te and add
rules to all domains that are already allowed execute_no_trans to system_file.
Requires coordination with device-specific policy changes with the same Change-Id.

Change-Id: Ie46209f0412f9914857dc3d7c6b0917b7031aae5
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Change-Id: If6b85fbb2332f7a03b603f2d46bd2f73c778ecf9
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Resolves denials such as:
avc:  denied  { read write } for  path="socket:[33571]" dev="sockfs" ino=33571 scontext=u:r:ppp:s0 tcontext=u:r:mtp:s0 tclass=unix_dgram_socket

Change-Id: Icb1ee00d8513179039bfb738647f49480e836f25
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Replace * or any permission set containing create with
create_socket_perms or create_stream_socket_perms.

Add net_domain() to all domains using network sockets and
delete rules already covered by domain.te or net.te.

For netlink_route_socket, only nlmsg_write needs to be separately
granted to specific domains that are permitted to modify the routing
table.   Clarification:  read/write permissions are just ability to
perform read/recv() or write/send() on the socket, whereas nlmsg_read/
nlmsg_write permissions control ability to observe or modify the
underlying kernel state accessed via the socket.
See security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c in the kernel for the mapping of
netlink message types to nlmsg_read or nlmsg_write.

Delete legacy rule for b/12061011.

This change does not touch any rules where only read/write were allowed
to a socket created by another domain (inherited across exec or
received across socket or binder IPC).  We may wish to rewrite some or all
of those rules with the rw_socket_perms macro but that is a separate
change.

Change-Id: Ib0637ab86f6d388043eff928e5d96beb02e5450e
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Also add rules from our policy.

Change-Id: I6f552538cc4f6b28b2883aa74832230944cbdb7a
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

They serve no purpose; these directories/files are normally accessible
in the same way as the rest of /system.  Also one of them has the wrong
attributes (data_file_type), thereby making it writable by some domains,
and under current policy, shell and apps cannot do ls -l /etc/ppp /etc/dhcpcd.

Change-Id: I0c1baa434fe78373684f4eaab40a41fddf2bdd79
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

This change removes the permissive line from unconfined
domains. Unconfined domains can do (mostly) anything, so moving
these domains into enforcing should be a no-op.

The following domains were deliberately NOT changed:
1) kernel
2) init

In the future, this gives us the ability to tighten up the
rules in unconfined, and have those tightened rules actually
work.

When we're ready to tighten up the rules for these domains,
we can:

1) Remove unconfined_domain and re-add the permissive line.
2) Submit the domain in permissive but NOT unconfined.
3) Remove the permissive line
4) Wait a few days and submit the no-permissive change.

For instance, if we were ready to do this for adb, we'd identify
a list of possible rules which allow adbd to work, re-add
the permissive line, and then upload those changes to AOSP.
After sufficient testing, we'd then move adb to enforcing.
We'd repeat this for each domain until everything is enforcing
and out of unconfined.

Change-Id: If674190de3262969322fb2e93d9a0e734f8b9245

This prevents denials from being generated by the base policy.
Over time, these rules will be incrementally tightened to improve
security.

Change-Id: I4be1c987a5d69ac784a56d42fc2c9063c402de11

Bug: 4070557
Change-Id: I027f76cff6df90e9909711cb81fbd17db95233c1

Initial policy for Point-to-Point tunneling and
tunneling manager services.