Remove a fixed bug from bug_map.

Bug: 62140539
Test: Built policy.
Change-Id: I2ce9e48de92975b6e37ca4a3a4c53f9478b006ef
(cherry picked from commit f3f93eaf)

This reverts commit 54a86e2b.

Reason for revert: Broke user builds, see go/twqpd

system/sepolicy/private/traced_probes.te:46:ERROR 'unknown type atrace' at token ';' on line 34879:
# scontext=u:r:atrace:s0 tcontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tclass=fd
allow atrace traced_probes:fd use;
checkpolicy: error(s) encountered while parsing configuration
out/host/linux-x86/bin/checkpolicy: loading policy configuration from out/target/product/taimen/obj/ETC/sepolicy_neverallows_intermediates/policy.conf

Change-Id: I24440e1928700530b63b70b658c63046cdcdc5de

ADB is being separated from USB service since it's not tied to the USB
transport. This duplicates the usb_service's settings to adb_service for
this purpose.

Bug: 63820489
Test: make
Change-Id: Idbcfbe470d7568f9cba51f0c8d4a8ee9503db93d

Bug: 72177715
Bug: 72384374
Test: flash device and make sure incidentd is getting data without SELinux denials
Change-Id: I684fe014e19c936017a466ec2d6cd2e1f03022c0

With the new patches backported to 4.9 kernels, the bpf file system now
take the same file open flag as bpf_obj_get. So system server now need
read permission only for both bpf map and fs_bpf since we do not need
system server to edit the map. Also, the netd will always pass stdin
stdout fd to the process forked by it and do allow it will cause the
fork and execev fail. We just allow it pass the fd to bpfloader for now
until we have a better option.

Test: bpfloader start successful on devices with 4.9 kernel.
      run cts -m CtsNetTestCases -t android.net.cts.TrafficStatsTest
Bug: 74096311
Bug: 30950746

Change-Id: I747a51cb05ae495c155e7625a3021fc77f921e0d

This CL adds the SELinux permissions required to execute
atrace and get userspace tracing events from system services.
This is to enable tracing of events coming from surfaceflinger,
audio HAL, etc.
atrace, when executed, sets a bunch of debug.atrace. properties
and sends an IPC via binder/hwbinder to tell the services to
reload that property.

Change-Id: I2b0a66dcb519cb296e1d0e6e3f15a425dc809089
Bug: 73340039

UsbDeviceManager in system_server now
helps set up the endpoint files.

Bug: 72877174
Test: No selinux denials
Change-Id: I96b11ee68799ac29b756d2034e7f5e4660dbed98

We already grant rw file access, but without dir search it's not much
use.

denied { search } for name="vibrator" dev="sysfs" ino=49606 scontext=u:r:hal_vibrator_default:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_vibrator:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0

Bug: 72643420
Test: Builds, denial gone
Change-Id: I3513c0a14f0ac1e60517009046e2654f1fc45c66

Bug: 73952536
Test: run cts -m CtsCameraTestCases -t android.hardware.camera2.cts.IdleUidTest#testCameraAccessBecomingInactiveUid
Change-Id: I508352671367dfa106e80108c3a5c0255b5273b2

The kernel is unusual in that it's both a core process, but vendor
provided. Exempt it from the restriction against accessing files from
on /vendor. Also, rework the neverallow rule so that it disallows
opening/modifying files, but allows reading files passed over IPC.

Bug: 68213100
Test: build (this is a build-time test)
Change-Id: I2f6b2698ec45d2e8480dc1de47bf12b9b53c4446

avc: denied { getattr } for path="/vendor/framework"
scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vendor_framework_file:s0
tclass=dir

Bug: 68826235
Test: boot Taimen, verify denials no longer occur.
Change-Id: Id4b311fd423342c8d6399c3b724417aff9d1cd88

Allow hal audio to use vndbinder

Change-Id: I83fc8d5b873bfc4e36f44e423d5740cb5e9739ee

Now that Bluetooth supports delay reporting, audioserver needs
access to Bluetooth Properties in order to determine whether the
feature is enabled or disabled.

Bug: 32755225
Test: Enable the property and see that there was no error accessing it
Change-Id: I519d49deb2df4efb3cc2cce9c6d497db18b50c13

* changes:
  Enable treble_sepolicy_tests against 27.0 release.
  Refactor build rule for treble sepolicy tests.

persist.sys.zram_enabled is set in vendor/build.prop in taimen and walleye,
which was added after the initial whitelist.
go/treble-sysprop-compatibility requires whitelisting such a property to
allow it to be overridden by vendor/{default|build}.prop.

Bug: 73905119
Test: succeeded building and test with taimen
Change-Id: I931182aa05eb90c14df6e2c7cc26913f3874fa18

Bug: 69390067
Test: build sepolicy
Change-Id: I4fc7438e4f825281d93a2849be9d2db819bea4ca

Bug: 69390067
Test: policy builds
Change-Id: I9b29a88ec071a17fc429892b5a8720b15fcbcf32

Remove a fixed bug from bug_map.

Bug: 73068008
Test: Built policy.
Change-Id: Id0072788953cb6b939a11caace0158da7799f540

The sheer volume of these can cause confusion.

Sample denials (repeated for many processes):
denied { getattr } for path="/proc/1/status" dev="proc" ino=24427 scontext=u:r:performanced:s0 tcontext=u:r:init:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
denied { open } for path="/proc/1" dev="proc" ino=18608 scontext=u:r:performanced:s0 tcontext=u:r:init:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
denied { open } for path="/proc/1/status" dev="proc" ino=24427 scontext=u:r:performanced:s0 tcontext=u:r:init:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
denied { read } for name="status" dev="proc" ino=24427 scontext=u:r:performanced:s0 tcontext=u:r:init:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

Bug: 72643420
Test: Denials no longer present in permissive mode.
Change-Id: Ic07b9b0b59ca2122c4843095b63075ab8fd2c70b

The write is here: https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/master/rootdir/init.rc#257.

Denials (on a device with the sysfs_vibrator label properly applied):
denied { write } for name="vibrator" dev="sysfs" ino=49613 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_vibrator:s0 tclass=dir
denied { write } for name="trigger" dev="sysfs" ino=49620 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_vibrator:s0 tclass=file
denied { open } for path="/sys/devices/<redacted>/vibrator/trigger" dev="sysfs" ino=49620 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_vibrator:s0 tclass=file

Bug: b/72643420
Test: Device boots, denials gone

Change-Id: Ib50d9a8533303daccb1330685e3204bea3fbd8a8

Updates statsd sepolicy so it can use the thermal hal.

Test: verified these policies solved sepolicy issues with thermal hal.
Change-Id: I36839a72494b084d5742c4d83c3ce9814102b974

ro.radio.noril is used for modem-less products including emulator.

Bug: 73871799
Test: succeeded building and tested with taimen
Change-Id: I2270374a2523889aa4874840594d8267614f93ad

Bug: 69390067
Test: manual run of treble_sepolicy_tests
Change-Id: I19252eb743e6527cbe262b1e066a3f67f7186994

These two selinux policy violations keep showing up from statsd's CTS
tests, although statsd and the CTS test seemed to function fine despite
them. Nonetheless, they seem reasonable to add to the list.

Bug: 73548694
Test: N/A. It didn't seem to be causing any issues in the first place.
Change-Id: Id36c5229c0d7de83675166caeb07c87b719dc374

After 9 amazing years with Android, it's time to try something new.
I've moved over to Fuchsia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Fuchsia)
where I'll be helping define security for a new, experimental operating
system.

My time in Android has been the most rewarding of my life. I couldn't
be more proud of our work in creating a trustworthy operating system
used by billions(!) of people, from rich to poor. It's quotes like this
which give me the warm fuzzies:

  https://threatpost.com/whats-new-in-android-8-0-oreo-security/128061/

  "Android O is a big step forward," said Duo Security’s Lady.
  He said with O, Google closes the security gap on the iPhone.
  "It used to be if you cared about security you had to pay a
  premium and buy an iPhone. Soon, even a $50 Android device
  running O will be on par with a $1,000 iPhone X when it comes
  to security."

The platform team is in good hands, with Rene Mayrhofer now leading the
charge to make Android the most secure, privacy preserving operating
system in existence. And thank you to the rest of the team for making
my time in Android so wonderful.

And a special thank you to Stephen Smalley of the Trusted Systems
Research Group for his leadership and guidance. Android Security would
not be where it is today without you.

=====

Keeping with the principle of least privilege, this change removes
myself from the OWNERS file for system/sepolicy. Let us always strive to
build systems so strong that we ourselves cannot even break into them,
and so private that people can trust us with their most sensitive data.

=====

Test: Tested every day by billions of users. ;-)
Change-Id: Ia7d0f3f75fdbd69cc720d02fd5a9b9e92ae607ae

Relevant denies:

[    2.560660] type=1400 audit(1519404055.529:9): avc: denied { read }
for pid=896 comm=traced_probes name=system dev=sda22 ino=17
scontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0
tclass=dir permissive=0

Allowing only read then gives:
[    2.554718] type=1400 audit(1519404863.506:9): avc: denied { open }
for pid=890 comm="traced_probes" path="/system" dev="sda22" ino=17
scontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0
tclass=dir permissive=0

Test: flashed and ran directory listing code.
Bug: 73625480