Skip to content
Snippets Groups Projects
  1. Jan 26, 2017
    • William Roberts's avatar
      te_macros: introduce add_service() macro · 606d2fd6
      William Roberts authored
      
      Introduce the add_service() macro which wraps up add/find
      permissions for the source domain with a neverallow preventing
      others from adding it. Only a particular domain should
      add a particular service.
      
      Use the add_service() macro to automatically add a neverallow
      that prevents other domains from adding the service.
      
      mediadrmserver was adding services labeled mediaserver_service.
      Drop the add permission as it should just need the find
      permission.
      
      Additionally, the macro adds the { add find } permission which
      causes some existing neverallow's to assert. Adjust those
      neverallow's so "self" can always find.
      
      Test: compile and run on hikey and emulator. No new denials were
      found, and all services, where applicable, seem to be running OK.
      
      Change-Id: Ibbd2a5304edd5f8b877bc86852b0694732be993c
      Signed-off-by: default avatarWilliam Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
      606d2fd6
  2. Nov 28, 2016
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Add directory read permissions to certain domains. · 49e35884
      Nick Kralevich authored
      Addresses the following denials and auditallows:
      
      avc: denied { read } for pid=561 comm="hwservicemanage" name="hw"
      dev="dm-0" ino=1883 scontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0
      tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
      
      avc: denied { read } for pid=748 comm="gatekeeperd" name="hw" dev="dm-0"
      ino=1883 scontext=u:r:gatekeeperd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0
      tclass=dir permissive=0
      
      avc: granted { read open } for pid=735 comm="fingerprintd"
      path="/system/lib64/hw" dev="dm-0" ino=1883 scontext=u:r:fingerprintd:s0
      tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir
      
      Test: no denials on boot
      Change-Id: Ic363497e3ae5078e564d7195f3739a654860a32f
      49e35884
  3. Oct 06, 2016
    • dcashman's avatar
      Split general policy into public and private components. · cc39f637
      dcashman authored
      Divide policy into public and private components.  This is the first
      step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
      policies.  The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
      in non-platform policy creation.  Backwards compatibility with it will
      be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
      policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
      file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
      maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
      version.
      
      Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
      platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
      and the need for attributes is minimal.  For now, almost all types and
      avrules are left in public.
      
      Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.
      
      Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c
      cc39f637
  4. Sep 10, 2016
  5. Aug 29, 2016
  6. Dec 17, 2015
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Revert "fingerprintd.te: neverallow fingerprint data file access" · cf7ee8a8
      Nick Kralevich authored
      Both angler and bullhead violate these SELinux rules.
      
      Bullhead: tee has access to these files
      Angler: system_server has read/write access to these files.
      
      Fixes the following compile time error:
      
        libsepol.report_failure: neverallow on line 32 of external/sepolicy/fingerprintd.te (or line 6704 of policy.conf) violated by allow tee fingerprintd_data_file:file { ioctl read write create setattr lock append rename open };
        libsepol.check_assertions: 1 neverallow failures occurred
        Error while expanding policy
        out/host/linux-x86/bin/checkpolicy:  loading policy configuration from out/target/product/bullhead/obj/ETC/sepolicy_intermediates/policy.conf
      
      This reverts commit 604a8cae.
      
      Change-Id: Iabb8f2e9de96f9082cd6a790d1af80cbc6a569b1
      cf7ee8a8
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      fingerprintd.te: neverallow fingerprint data file access · 604a8cae
      Nick Kralevich authored
      Only fingerprintd should be creating/reading/writing/etc from
      /data/system/users/[0-9]+/fpdata(/.*)? . Add a neverallow rule
      (compile time assertion + CTS test) to ensure no regressions.
      
      Change-Id: I30261a4bd880f5c4f3d90d1686a6267f60bdd413
      604a8cae
  7. Nov 03, 2015
    • Jeff Vander Stoep's avatar
      Create attribute for moving perms out of domain · d22987b4
      Jeff Vander Stoep authored
      Motivation: Domain is overly permissive. Start removing permissions
      from domain and assign them to the domain_deprecated attribute.
      Domain_deprecated and domain can initially be assigned to all
      domains. The goal is to not assign domain_deprecated to new domains
      and to start removing domain_deprecated where it is not required or
      reassigning the appropriate permissions to the inheriting domain
      when necessary.
      
      Bug: 25433265
      Change-Id: I8b11cb137df7bdd382629c98d916a73fe276413c
      d22987b4
  8. May 20, 2015
Loading