Broke the dragon build:

libsepol.report_failure: neverallow on line 304 of system/sepolicy/public/domain.te (or line 8638 of policy.conf) violated by allow kernel device:chr_file { create setattr };
libsepol.check_assertions: 1 neverallow failures occurred
Error while expanding policy

This reverts commit ed0b4eb3.

Change-Id: I5d55ab59ed72ce7c19a10ddbb374f9f3b3fae4fd

By default, files created in /dev are labeled with the "device" label
unless a different label has been assigned. The direct use of this
generic label is discouraged (and in many cases neverallowed) because
rules involving this label tend to be overly broad and permissive.

Today, generically labeled character devices can only be opened, read,
or written to by init and ueventd.

  $ sesearch --allow -t device -c chr_file -p open,read,write out/target/product/marlin/root/sepolicy
  allow init device:chr_file { setattr read lock getattr write ioctl open append };
  allow ueventd device:chr_file { read lock getattr write ioctl open append };

this is enforced by the following SELinux neverallow rule (compile time
assertion + CTS test):

  neverallow { domain -init -ueventd } device:chr_file { open read write };

Start auditallowing ueventd access to /dev character device files with the
default SELinux label. This doesn't appear to be used, but let's prove it.
While ueventd is expected to create files in /dev, it has no need to open
most of the files it creates.

Note, however, that because ueventd has mknod + setfscreate permissions,
a malicious or compromised ueventd can always create a device node under
an incorrect label, and gain access that way.

The goal of this change is to prove that no process other than init are
accessing generically labeled files in /dev.

While I'm here, tighten up the compile time assertion for
device:chr_file to include more permissions.

Test: policy compiles + device boots with no granted messages.
Change-Id: Ic98b0ddc631b49b09e58698d9f40738ccedd1fd0

Only init and ueventd have any access to /dev/port, and neither should
have any use for it. As it stands, leaving port in just represents
additional attack surface with no useful functionality, so it should be
removed if possible, not only from Pixel devices, but from all Android
devices.

Test: The phone boots successfully

Bug:33301618
Change-Id: Iedc51590f1ffda02444587d647889ead9bdece3f

In general, apps shouldn't be executing data from their writable data
directories. Allowing this is a security risk and use cases for this are
almost always anti-patterns where saner alternatives are available such
as using one of the standard systems for shipping libraries (extracted
by the package manager or aligned/uncompressed in the apk) or using the
existing package system to handle plugins. It's reasonable for the
untrusted_app domain to have this (not just for backwards compatibility)
for priv_app should be held to a higher standard.

Ideally, untrusted apps would be able to opt-in to disabling this and
then the default could then be switched at a new API level. It could do
more than just hardening apps not requiring it by having documentation
explain the risks and offer alternatives to reduce 'legitimate' use. The
base system could disable it for all of the bundled untrusted apps.

Change-Id: I4efcfaf01c6b6c33c39e98c22a1934e8892e2147

Test: none
Bug: 32020264
Change-Id: If5f22dad672895b3684b8e44209c5a1eae16ba47

media framework analytics are gathered in a separate service.
define a context for this new service, allow various
media-related services and libraries to access this new service.

Bug: 30267133
Test: ran media CTS, watched for selinux denials.
Change-Id: I5aa5aaa5aa9e82465b8024f87ed32d6ba4db35ca

Test: m
Test: angler boots

Bug: 21643067
Change-Id: I7530120385766506405a318caac8ef143e71cce7

Historically we pushed all system_server SD card interactions through
DefaultContainerService to avoid holding open FDs, but it's safe to
measure disk usage for internal emulated storage when looking
directly at /data/media, since there is no risk of unsafe ejection.

These rule changes give us just enough access to measure statistics.

avc: denied { getattr } for path="/data/media/0/DCIM/.thumbnails" dev="sda35" ino=589892 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=dir permissive=1
avc: denied { open } for path="/data/media/0/DCIM/.thumbnails" dev="sda35" ino=589892 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=dir permissive=1
avc: denied { read } for name="0" dev="sda35" ino=589827 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1

Test: builds, boots, and access allowed
Bug: 33298975
Change-Id: I9748608a5c1169d542e763c5a8f79c4f26f7a382

Remove /proc/net access to domain_deprecated. Add it to domains where it
was missing before.

Other than these domains, SELinux denial monitoring hasn't picked up any
denials related to /proc/net

Bug: 28760354
Test: Device boots
Test: No unexpected denials in denial collection logs.
Change-Id: Ie5bfa4bc0070793c1e8bf3b00676fd31c08d426a

Vold shouldn't have this selinux permission, so this will be left in for
a few weeks to keep track of if removing it would be an issue to any
other processes. If not, then a follow-up CL will remove both the rule
and the auditallow

Test: This CL is a test in itself, auditallow rules shouldn't change
behavior of SELinux policy by themselves
Bug: 26901147
Change-Id: Ib076448863bd54278df59a3b514c9e877eb22ee5

Bug: 33067126
Test: Dumpstate vibrator works.
Change-Id: I46ff453218ba77f156e13b448e3cba9a291df0e7

Sdcardfs now supports bind mounts and remounts
instead of needing several separate mounts

bug: 30954918
Test: Enable Sdcardfs, verify mounts
Change-Id: Id94713752a08ceeb6aea7d3c29a29d3293a9b0c8

Addresses the following denials and auditallows:

avc: denied { read } for pid=561 comm="hwservicemanage" name="hw"
dev="dm-0" ino=1883 scontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0

avc: denied { read } for pid=748 comm="gatekeeperd" name="hw" dev="dm-0"
ino=1883 scontext=u:r:gatekeeperd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0
tclass=dir permissive=0

avc: granted { read open } for pid=735 comm="fingerprintd"
path="/system/lib64/hw" dev="dm-0" ino=1883 scontext=u:r:fingerprintd:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir

Test: no denials on boot
Change-Id: Ic363497e3ae5078e564d7195f3739a654860a32f

commit 221938cb
introduces a fix that uses braces around a single item.
This is not within the normal style of no brace around
a single item. Drop the braces.

Change-Id: Ibeee1e682c0face97f18d5e5177be13834485676
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>

Never used.

Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: I0ce6c46bb05925a4b3eda83531b28f873b0c9b99

As of system/core commit a742d1027784a54c535cff69b375a9f560893155, this
functionality is no longer used.

Test: device boots and no obvious problems.
Change-Id: Ia3ad8add92f1cdaaff36f4935be8b03458fed7f2

No denials showing up in collected audit logs.

Bug: 28760354
Test: Device boots
Test: No unexpected denials in denial collection logs.
Change-Id: I5a0d4f3c51d296bfa04e71fc226a01dcf5b5b508

No unexpected usages.

Bug: 28760354
Test: Device boots
Test: No unexpected denials in denial collection logs.
Change-Id: I43226fd0b8103afb1b25b1eb21445c04bc79954e

auditallow has been in place since Apr 2016
(f84b7981) and no SELinux denials have
been generated / collected. Remove unused functionality.

Test: Device boots with no problems.
Test: no SELinux denials of this type collected.
Bug: 28035297
Change-Id: I52414832abb5780a1645a4df723c6f0c758eb5e6

In particular, get rid of TIOCSTI, which is only ever used for exploits.

http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/09/26/14

Bug: 33073072
Bug: 7530569
Test: "adb shell" works
Test: "adb install package" works
Test: jackpal terminal emulator from
      https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm&hl=en
      works
Change-Id: I96b5e7059d106ce57ff55ca6e458edf5a4c393bf

recovery (update_binary) may need to set up cpufreq during an update.

avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=335 comm="update_binary" name="scaling_max_freq" dev="sysfs" ino=7410 scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tclass=file permissive=0

Bug: 32463933
Test: Build a recovery image and apply an OTA package that writes to
      /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0/cpufreq/scaling_max_freq.

Change-Id: Ia90af9dd15e162dd94bcd4722b66aa296e3058c5

Lock in the gains we've made so far in restricting access to generically
labeled /proc files. There's more we can do here, but let's avoid
inadvertent regressions.

Test: policy compiles. Only compile time assertions added.
Bug: 26813932
Change-Id: If354c2ddc1c59beed7f0eb4bcbd3f0d9971c3b8a

/data/bugreports is moving to /bugreports

Bug: 27262109
Bug: 27204904
Bug: 32799236
Test: new symlink is in /bugreports and is labeled correctly
Change-Id: Ib6a492fba8388bf43debad28cfc851679f8c6151

Description stolen from
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/42a9699a9fa179c0054ea3cf5ad3cc67104a6162

Remove unused permission definitions from SELinux.
Many of these were only ever used in pre-mainline
versions of SELinux, prior to Linux 2.6.0.  Some of them
were used in the legacy network or compat_net=1 checks
that were disabled by default in Linux 2.6.18 and
fully removed in Linux 2.6.30.

Permissions never used in mainline Linux:
file swapon
filesystem transition
tcp_socket { connectto newconn acceptfrom }
node enforce_dest
unix_stream_socket { newconn acceptfrom }

Legacy network checks, removed in 2.6.30:
socket { recv_msg send_msg }
node { tcp_recv tcp_send udp_recv udp_send rawip_recv rawip_send dccp_recv dccp_send }
netif { tcp_recv tcp_send udp_recv udp_send rawip_recv rawip_send dccp_recv dccp_send }

Test: policy compiles and no boot errors (marlin)
Change-Id: Idaef2567666f80db39c3e3cee70e760e1dac73ec