- Jan 17, 2017
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Alex Klyubin authored
This marks all HAL domain implementations with the haldomain attribute so that rules can be written which apply to all HAL implementations. This follows the pattern used for appdomain, netdomain and bluetoothdomain. Test: No change to policy according to sesearch. Bug: 34180936 Change-Id: I0cfe599b0d49feed36538503c226dfce41eb65f6
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Mikhail Naganov authored
This is to ensure that hal_audio can access memory shared by audioserver. Bug: 34261005 Change-Id: I84103b0d4692fd10afc56846fb116fec6a7b3dc7
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- Jan 13, 2017
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Jim Miller authored
Move from fingerprintd to new fingerprint_hal and update SeLinux policy. Test: Boot with no errors related to fingerprint sepolicy Bug: 33199080 Change-Id: Idfde0cb0530e75e705033042f64f3040f6df22d6
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Hridya Valsaraju authored
The following are the avc denials that are addressed: avc: denied { call } for pid=889 comm="system_server" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:hal_gnss_default:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0 avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:hal_gnss_default:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0 avc: denied { read } for name="hw" dev="mmcblk0p43" ino=1837 scontext=u:r:hal_gnss_default:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0 avc: denied { open } for path="/system/lib64/hw" dev="mmcblk0p43" ino=1837 scontext=u:r:hal_gnss_default:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0 Bug:31974439 Test: Checked that there no more related avc denial messages related to the GNSS HAL in dmesg. Change-Id: I5b43dc088017a5568dd8e442726d2bf52e95b1d5
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Max Bires authored
It seems likely that there is no reason to keep around a number of devices that are configured to be included into the pixel kernels. Init and ueventd should be the only processes with r/w access to these devices, so auditallow rules have been added to ensure that they aren't actually used. /dev/keychord was given its own type since it's one of the few character devices that's actually legitimately used and would cause log spam in the auditallow otherwise. Bug: 33347297 Test: The phone boots without any apparent log spam. Change-Id: I3dd9557df8a9218b8c802e33ff549d15849216fb
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- Jan 12, 2017
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Myles Watson authored
Test: run a gtest in /data/nativetest/ with no permission denial Change-Id: Id644ed7dbea59becaf84b6073c9144711ad07c10
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Sandeep Patil authored
Bug: 34231014 Test: Boot angler to ensure no additional denials are reported. Change-Id: Ic2372d55f7072c65e7ea17036a8eb40dc531d60e Signed-off-by:
Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
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- Jan 11, 2017
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Josh Gao authored
Bug: http://b/34228376 Test: m Change-Id: I1321ada1521bb3e3fd08105f1a41d519ee486683
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Jeff Sharkey authored
Test: builds Bug: 32206268 Change-Id: I236105b029178f96da519c2295c66c686dcae7cb
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- Jan 10, 2017
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Andre Eisenbach authored
Bug: 31972505 Test: VTS test passes, Bluetooth starts/stops Change-Id: Ic068c9fca7c50e63c5b6e3d86a2ee6cc53207e08
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Mikhail Naganov authored
Bug: 30222631 Change-Id: I30ad019872881e21f61a53e4397112ea0e99688b
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- Jan 09, 2017
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Alex Klyubin authored
This leaves only the existence of ephemeral_app domain as public API. All other rules are implementation details of this domain's policy and are thus now private. There are a few rules, defined by other domains' files remaining in the public policy until the rules from these domains also move to the private policy: allow ephemeral_app_current appdomain:binder transfer; allow ephemeral_app_current audioserver_current:binder transfer; allow ephemeral_app_current drmserver_current:binder transfer; allow ephemeral_app_current dumpstate_current:binder transfer; allow ephemeral_app_current mediaserver_current:binder transfer; allow ephemeral_app_current surfaceflinger_current:binder transfer; allow ephemeral_app_current system_server_current:binder transfer; Test: No change to policy according to sesearch, except for disappearance of all allow rules from platform_app_current attribute (as expected). Bug: 31364497 Change-Id: I98687181434a98a141469ef676c461fcd1db2d4e
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Alex Klyubin authored
This leaves only the existence of platform_app domain as public API. All other rules are implementation details of this domain's policy and are thus now private. Test: No change to policy according to sesearch, except for disappearance of all allow rules from platform_app_current attribute (as expected). Bug: 31364497 Change-Id: I47bb59fdfc07878c91fd5e207735cd0c07a128da
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Nick Kralevich authored
No relevant collected denials. Test: device boots and no obvious problems. Test: no collected denials. Bug: 28760354 Change-Id: Idcf939b3cbdb1dec835d59150181047d062e6c48
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- Jan 07, 2017
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ynwang authored
Allow storaged to read /proc/[pid]/io Grant binder access to storaged Add storaged service Grant storaged_exec access to dumpstate Grant storaged binder_call to dumpstate Bug: 32221677 Change-Id: Iecc9dba266c5566817a99ac6251eb943a0bac630
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ynwang authored
Allowing storaged for reading from pseudo filesystems and debugfs. Bug: 32221677 Change-Id: I837cead9a68f0b399703b64d724cb9c4b205c335
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Nick Kralevich authored
No denials collected. Bug: 28760354 Test: no denials collected. Test: device boots and no obvious problems Change-Id: I7fc053ecae2db3bb2ca7c298634453e930713bec
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- Jan 06, 2017
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Nick Kralevich authored
No audits have been recorded for these rules. Remove them. Originally added for backwards compatibility in 549ccf77 as part of the split between cache_file and cache_recovery_file. Bug: 25351711 Test: No audit records recorded Change-Id: I5133028b5fcc99a731aabea90305171dee0edf47
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Nick Kralevich authored
Don't allow processes to list out the contents of the directory /dev/__properties__. This is an implementation specific detail that shouldn't be visible to processes. Test: Device boots and no problems reading individual properties. Test: ls -la /dev/__properties__ fails Change-Id: I4df6a829b0d22e30fb2c38030c690fc4a356f6a3
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Alex Klyubin authored
This leaves only the existence of system_app domain as public API. All other rules are implementation details of this domain's policy and are thus now private. Test: No change to policy according to sesearch, except for disappearance of all allow rules from system_app_current attribute (as expected). Bug: 31364497 Change-Id: Ifc7d350ed9749a32b0c38a78ac5f41c819dbdb96
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Alex Klyubin authored
This leaves only the existence of isolated_app domain as public API. All other rules are implementation details of this domain's policy and are thus now private. Test: No change to policy according to sesearch, except for disappearance of all allow rules from isolated_app_current attribute (as expected). Bug: 31364497 Change-Id: I499a648e515628932b7bcd188ecbfbe4a247f2f3
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- Jan 05, 2017
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Alex Klyubin authored
This leaves the existence of priv_app domain as public API. All other rules are implementation details of this domain's policy and are thus now private. Test: No change to policy according to sesearch, except for disappearance of all allow rules from priv_app_current attribute (as expected) except for allow priv_app_current update_engine_current:binder transfer; which is caused by public update_engine.te rules and will go away once update_engine rules go private. Bug: 31364497 Change-Id: Iea583127fbf0a19c37dd42bf1ef2ae0454793391
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Alex Klyubin authored
This leaves only the existence of untrusted_app domain as public API. All other rules are implementation details of this domain's policy and are thus now private. Test: No change to policy according to sesearch, except for disappearance of all allow rules from untrusted_domain_current attribute (as expected). Bug: 31364497 Change-Id: Ief71fa16cfc38437cbe5c58100bba48b9a497c92
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Nick Kralevich authored
Commit fee49159 introduced the net_radio_prop and system_radio_prop properties, and added allow rules for backwards compatibility. In addition, auditallow rules were added to see if the allow rules were necessary. The auditallow rules for radio net_radio_prop are triggering, so it's clear these properties are being set by the radio process. Drop the auditallow statement. Test: policy compiles. Change-Id: I7fa6df18ed4dd4cb8e0c9098373cc28134615330
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- Jan 04, 2017
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Nick Kralevich authored
/proc/tty/drivers is read by applications to figure out if they are running in an emulated environment. Specifically, they look for the string "goldfish" within that file. Arguably this is not an Android API, and really shouldn't be exposed to applications, but: 1) A largish number of applications break if they can't read this file; 2) The information here isn't particularly sensitive While we could spend a bunch of time trying to get applications fixed, there are bigger fish to fry. It's not worth the battle. Test: "ls -laZ /proc/tty/drivers" is labeled properly. Bug: 33214085 Bug: 33814662 Bug: 33791054 Bug: 33211769 Bug: 26813932 Change-Id: Icc05bdc1c917547a6dca7d76636a1009369bde49
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- Jan 03, 2017
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Alexey Polyudov authored
Change-Id: I79a305407c3a362d7be11f4c026f31f1e9666f1c Signed-off-by:
Alexey Polyudov <apolyudov@google.com>
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Nick Kralevich authored
Allow init to send userspace generated SELinux denials to the kernel audit subsystem. Test: "setprop asdf asdf" from the unprivileged adb shell user generated an SELinux denial processed by logd. Bug: 27878170 Change-Id: I0ecd0601408bbda8227802c13689f98e507282d1
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- Dec 29, 2016
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Mark Salyzyn authored
We allow domains to manually transition to logpersist for userdebug or eng debug logging permissions that would be counter to monitoring limits on a released user build. Test: compile Bug: 30566487 Change-Id: I03a81c75cbd2b44617e4b27c4c083a26a0e0fa87
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Steven Moreland authored
Bug: 31982882 Test: works with wip bullhead binderized dumpstate implementation Change-Id: Iae964f49b3c2704688ded8e7366d89ace35a92aa
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Ashutosh Joshi authored
Adding sepoilcy for sensors. Test: Sensors work. Change-Id: Ibbf0c1a22654a17b1573e3761ea9ccd816150255
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Alex Klyubin authored
6e4508e6 inadvertently removed access to ro.serialno and ro.boot.serialno from ADB shell. This is needed for CTS. This commit thus reinstates the access. Test: adb shell getprop ro.serialno Bug: 33700679 Change-Id: I62de44b1631c03fcd64ceabaf33bbaeb869c2851
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- Dec 28, 2016
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Ashutosh Joshi authored
Adding sepolicty for contexthub service. Test: GTS tests pass. Change-Id: I2576b8028d12a31151d7b7869679b853eb16c75e
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Richard Uhler authored
Test: make checkbuild, aosp_bullhead-userdebug boots. Bug: 33192586 Change-Id: I386df8b6c04fb162f79a4409801ce3e882026ea8
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Alex Klyubin authored
This removes access to Bluetooth system properties from arbitrary SELinux domains. Access remains granted to init, bluetooth, and system_app domains. neverallow rules / CTS enforce that access is not granted to Zygote and processes spawned from Zygote expcept for system_app and bluetooth. The reason is that some of these properties may leak persistent identifiers not resettable by the user. Test: Bluetooth pairing and data transfer works Bug: 33700679 Change-Id: Icdcb3927a423c4011a62942340a498cc1b302472
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- Dec 27, 2016
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Amit Mahajan authored
Test: Verified that WIP telephony and BT SAP CLs work fine with this change https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/q/topic:%22Basic+radio+service+and+client%22+(status:open+OR+status:merged) https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/q/topic:%22SAP+HAL%22+(status:open+OR+status:merged) Bug: 32020264 Change-Id: If15820d43e324d80e35808a292ee811f98d499cc
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Alex Klyubin authored
ro.runtime.firstboot system property is only used internally by system_server to distinguish between first start after boot from consecutive starts (for example, this happens when full-disk encryption is enabled). The value of the property is a millisecond-precise timestamp which can help track individual device. Thus apps should not have access to this property. Test: Device boots fine, reading ro.runtime.firstboot from an app results in an error and SELinux denial. Bug: 33700679 Change-Id: I4c3c26a35c5dd840bced3a3e53d071f45317f63c
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Alex Klyubin authored
SELinux policy compiler complained about a quote inside the recovery_only section of recovery.te. This section's contents are inside quotes and thus can't contain quotes. Test: mmm system/sepolicy produces no warnings Bug: 33700679 Change-Id: I5bf943166f4f514d04472f7e59b025a9723eb1b8
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- Dec 22, 2016
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Steven Moreland authored
Bug: 32123421 Test: full build/test of allocator hal using hidl_test Change-Id: I253b4599b6fe6e7f4a2f5f55b34cdeed9e5d769b
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Alex Klyubin authored
This restricts access to ro.serialno and ro.boot.serialno, the two system properties which contain the device's serial number, to a select few SELinux domains which need the access. In particular, this removes access to these properties from Android apps. Apps can access the serial number via the public android.os.Build API. System properties are not public API for apps. The reason for the restriction is that serial number is a globally unique identifier which cannot be reset by the user. Thus, it can be used as a super-cookie by apps. Apps need to wean themselves off of identifiers not resettable by the user. Test: Set up fresh GMS device, install some apps via Play, update some apps, use Chrome Test: Access the device via ADB (ADBD exposes serial number) Test: Enable MTP over USB, use mtp-detect to confirm that serial number is reported in MTP DeviceInfo Bug: 31402365 Bug: 33700679 Change-Id: I4713133b8d78dbc63d8272503e80cd2ffd63a2a7
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Mikhail Naganov authored
Audio HAL server needs to set SCHED_FIFO scheduling policy for its threads that communicate with FastMixer threads of AudioFlinger that use the same scheduler. Bug: 30222631 Change-Id: I405a69d097a6bfed455e3483365b27c4004e1063
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