Bug: 77589980
Test: diff -r system/sepolicy/public system/sepolicy/prebuilts/api/28.0/public is empty
Change-Id: I5ecb003e893d87e36e096208e505ad1264c288aa

Bug: 77588754
Test: builds
Change-Id: I61ceb438cd532584847ddd55c0eeaefebdcfa51c

Bug: 37916906
Test: Builds 'n' boots.
Change-Id: Ia1d86264446ebecc1ca79f32f11354921bc77668
Merged-In: I208ec6a864127a059fb389417a9c6b259d7474cb

The secondary dex files are application dex files which gets reported
back to the framework when using BaseDexClassLoader.

Also, give dex2oat lock permissions as it needs to lock the profile
during compilation.

Example of SElinux denial:
03-15 12:38:46.967  7529  7529 I profman : type=1400 audit(0.0:225):
avc: denied { read } for
path="/data/data/com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox/files/velour/verified_jars/JDM5LaUbYP1JPOLzJ81GLzg_1.jar.prof"
dev="sda35" ino=877915 scontext=u:r:profman:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file permissive=1

Test: adb shell cmd package bg-dexopt-job works for sercondary dex files
Bug: 26719109
Change-Id: Ie1890d8e36c062450bd6c54f4399fc0730767dbf

Since it was introduced it caused quite a few issues and it spams the
SElinux logs unnecessary.

The end goal of the audit was to whitelist the access to the
interpreter. However that's unfeasible for now given the complexity.

Test: devices boots and everything works as expected
      no more auditallow logs

Bug: 29795519
Bug: 32871170
Change-Id: I9a7a65835e1e1d3f81be635bed2a3acf75a264f6

Addresses the following auditallow spam:

avc: granted { read open } for comm="profman"
path="/system/lib/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1368 scontext=u:r:profman:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file

avc: granted { read open } for comm="debuggerd64"
path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1897
scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file

avc: granted { getattr } for comm="debuggerd64"
path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1837
scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file

Test: Policy compiles. Not a tightening of rules.
Change-Id: I501b0a6a343c61b3ca6283647a18a9a15deddf2a

Divide policy into public and private components.  This is the first
step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
policies.  The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
in non-platform policy creation.  Backwards compatibility with it will
be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
version.

Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
and the need for attributes is minimal.  For now, almost all types and
avrules are left in public.

Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.

Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c

Bug: 28748264
Change-Id: I848c448e43d48d245d998ff22547bc67a640ab96

Bug: 28748264
Change-Id: I872c25666707beb737f3ce7a4f706c0135df7ad5

We do a bit more work checks in the runtime for the profiles and call
stat on the files to see if they exists and their are not empty.

SElinux error
[  297.842210] type=1400 audit(1459106986.097:7): avc: denied { getattr
} for pid=4504 comm="profman"
path="/data/misc/profiles/cur/0/com.google.android.youtube/primary.prof"
dev="dm-1" ino=636936 scontext=u:r:profman:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:user_profile_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file
permissive=0

Bug: 27860201
Change-Id: Ic97882e6057a4b5c3a16089b9b99b64bc1a3cd98

Bug: 26719109
Bug: 26563023

Change-Id: Ie0ca764467c874c061752cbbc73e1bacead9b995