Configstore HAL uses a seccomp filter which blocks the standard
path of execing crash_dump to collect crash data. Add permission
to use crash_dump's fallback mechanism.

Allowing configstore to write to the socket provided by tombstoned
required either exempting configstore from a neverallow rule, or
removing the neverallow rule entirely. Since the neverallow rule
could potentially prevent partners for doing security hardening,
it has been removed.

Bug: 64768925
Bug: 36453956

Test: killall -ABRT android.hardware.configstore@1.1-service
    Results in a call stack in logcat, and tombstone in
    /data/tombstones
Test: configstore runs without crashing
Test: SANITIZE_TARGET="address coverage" make vts -j64
    vts-tradefedrun commandAndExit vts --skip-all-system-status-check \
    -primary-abi-only --skip-preconditions -l VERBOSE --module \
    VtsHalConfigstoreV1_0IfaceFuzzer

Change-Id: I1ed5265f173c760288d856adb9292c4026da43d6
(cherry picked from commit 9924d782)

A new API [getNamesForUids] was recently added to the PackageManager
and this API needs to be accessible to native code. However, there
were two constraints:
1) Instead of hand-rolling the binder, we wanted to auto generate
the bindings directly from the AIDL compiler.
2) We didn't want to expose/annotate all 180+ PackageManager APIs
when only a single API is needed.
So, we chose to create a parallel API that can be used explicitly
for native bindings without exposing the entirety of the
PackageManager.

Bug: 62805090
Test: Manual
Test: Create a native application that calls into the new service
Test: See the call works and data and returned
Change-Id: I0d469854eeddfa1a4fd04b5c53b7a71ba3ab1f41

Add sepolicy for thermalserviced daemon, IThermalService binder
service, IThermalCallback hwservice, and Thermal HAL revision 1.1.

Test: manual: marlin with modified thermal-engine.conf
Bug: 30982366
Change-Id: I207fa0f922a4e658338af91dea28c497781e8fe9
(cherry picked from commit ec3b6b7e)

This hidl service provides functionality for oem networking
configuration to vendor services which is required by
at least some vendor radio modules.

Test: VtsHalNetNetdV1_0TargetTest, netd_integration_test, netd_unit_test
Test: no denials
Bug: 36682246
Change-Id: I86ac9082166b406b2fc814972375ba737460ad7b

avc: denied { read } for pid=1704 comm="top" name="stat" dev="proc" ino=4026532297 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_stat:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
avc: denied { read } for pid=1636 comm="dumpstate" name="lcd-backlight" dev="sysfs" ino=16592 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_leds:s0 tclass=lnk_file permissive=0
avc: denied { call } for pid=2230 comm="dumpsys" scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:r:installd:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0
avc: denied { create } for pid=1700 comm="ip" scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tclass=netlink_xfrm_socket permissive=0

Bug: 62410287
Bug: 35350306
Change-Id: I65be3678c64214ebeb544e0e155bce88b21adf02
Signed-off-by: Tim Kryger <tkryger@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit b7e1f2dd)

Relax neverallow rule restricting binder access to/from netd so that
netd can export hwbinder services to vendor components.

Continue to disallow app access to netd via binder.

Bug: 36682246
Test: build
Merged-In: I8e558ea1add6c36b966ec1da204062ea82df3f3f
Change-Id: I063df6dded94d8b0f5214b2c94c4f46bdafb03d7

Relax neverallow rule restricting binder access to/from netd so that
netd can export hwbinder services to vendor components.

Continue to disallow app access to netd via binder.

Bug: 36682246
Test: build
Change-Id: I8e558ea1add6c36b966ec1da204062ea82df3f3f
(cherry picked from commit 07c650eb)

Addresses:
avc:  denied  { find } for
interface=android.hardware.configstore::ISurfaceFlingerConfigs pid=603
scontext=u:r:bootanim:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs:s0
tclass=hwservice_manager permissive=0

Bug: 64067152
Test: build
Change-Id: I0605ab8ba07a46a3dc6909307e6f0b2fde68a7ba

Bug: 63905942
Test: mm -j40
Change-Id: I354ee863475aedd2dc9d2b436a00bcd82931456f
(cherry picked from commit 4fc5fb5e521347d65dc921f8c1fb751c66f9a92c)

Allow mediacodec/mediaextractor to write to system_server pipes during
ANR dumps.

Addresses the following denials:
avc: denied { write } for comm="mediaextractor" path="pipe:[1177610]" dev="pipefs" ino=1177610 scontext=u:r:mediaextractor:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=fifo_file permissive=0
avc: denied { write } for comm="omx@1.0-service" path="pipe:[1175808]" dev="pipefs" ino=1175808 scontext=u:r:mediacodec:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=fifo_file permissive=0

Bug: http://b/63801592
Test: treehugger
Change-Id: I944b1fa76c70402607ccd903be17dbddeaa73201
(cherry picked from commit 3c9b9197)

To be replaced by commit 1e149967
seapp_context: explicitly label all seapp context files

Test: build policy
Change-Id: I8d30bd1d50b9e4a55f878c25d134907d4458cf59
Merged-In: I0f0e937e56721d458e250d48ce62f80e3694900f

Fixes:
neverallow hal_audio domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
Warning!  Type or attribute hal_audio used in neverallow undefined in
policy being checked.

hal_audio_client is not used in neverallows and was mistakenly marked
as expandattribute false instead of hal_audio. Fix this.

Bug: 63809360
Test: build policy
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
    android.cts.security.SELinuxNeverallowRulesTest

    No more:
    Warning!  Type or attribute hal_audio used in neverallow
    undefined in policy being checked.

Change-Id: Iedf1b80f669f95537ed201cbdbb0626e7e32be81

The denial message:
update_engine: type=1400 audit(0.0:15213): avc: denied { getattr } for
path="/postinstall" dev="dm-0" ino=38 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:postinstall_mnt_dir:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0

update_engine: type=1400 audit(0.0:15214): avc: denied { sys_rawio } for
capability=17 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:r:update_engine:s0
tclass=capability permissive=0

auditd  : type=1400 audit(0.0:15213): avc: denied { getattr } for
comm="update_engine" path="/postinstall" dev="dm-0" ino=38
scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:postinstall_mnt_dir:s0
tclass=dir permissive=0

update_engine: [0428/070905:ERROR:utils.cc(716)] Error stat'ing /postinstall: Permission denied

Bug: 37760573
Test: apply an update and UE reads postinstall_mnt_dir without denial.
Change-Id: I55506f5e8544233f60ccf7c1df846c9c93946a25

This was previously relying on domain_deprecated rules deleted in
change I588a1e7ea7ef984907b79a5a391efb2dcd6e6431.

Bug: 28760354
Test: unbreaks networking on AOSP bullhead
Change-Id: I873e1f08f72104dee7509e45b1db0b284ca56085

This change must only be submitted when device-specific policies
have been reverted.

This reverts commit 07e631d2.

Bug: 17613910
Test: builds
Change-Id: Ie33e293107bf1eba2498f2422d941544c76b8cad
Merged-In: I356c39a5dc955b3d7c28d8c7baf2887a17beb272

Remove RILD accessing system data file as its not allowed
Move RILD accessing radio data file to vendor policy

Test: Verified radio works fine and no denials

Bug: 36740743
Change-Id: I66a7cf98738fbfe9512925d3dec0c1eb09a44185

Test: tested taking bugreport, sensor HAL traces show up in
      "VM TRACES JUST NOW"
Test: tested trigger ANR by `adb shell am hang --allow-restart`,
      sensor HAL traces shows up in /data/anr/traces.txt
Bug: 63096400
Change-Id: I1d012b9d9810f987be7aaf9d68abfd9c3184ac5c

Prevent files in /proc from incorrectly having sysfs_type attribute.

Rework neverallows so that ueventd has write access to all of
/sys which it needs to handle uevents.

Bug: 63147833
Test: Build. Flash angler, verify files are correctly labeled and no
    new denials are in the logs.

Change-Id: Ib94d44e78cee0e83e2ac924f1c72e611e8e73558

This reverts commit 5bf94caf.

Remove this temporary workaround.

Bug: 63147833
Test: Build policy

This re-adds netd_stable_secret_prop to core sepolicy. It was
temporarily reverted so it could be added to device-specific
policy in oc-dr1-dev.

DO NOT SUBMIT until http://ag/2528214 has automerged to master.

This reverts commit 9fa11b77.

Bug: 17613910
Test: make -j64 bootimage
Change-Id: I356c39a5dc955b3d7c28d8c7baf2887a17beb272

Logs indicate that these rules have already been moved to the
domains that need them.

Bug: 28760354
Test: build
Merged-In: I588a1e7ea7ef984907b79a5a391efb2dcd6e6431
Change-Id: I588a1e7ea7ef984907b79a5a391efb2dcd6e6431

Observed audited access to rootfs moved to individual domains in
commit a12aad45

Bug: 28760354
Test: build
Change-Id: Ie5e991d66668e70df69f21334032be6d574bf5c8

Ueventd needs write access to all files in /sys to generate uevents.

Bug: 63147833
Test: build. Verify no ueventd denials in the logs.
Change-Id: I89d33aab158dd192e761f14eff8afa1c71594bca

This change did not make it into core sepolicy in time for O.
The revert allows devices to define these selinux policies in
vendor-specific sepolicy instead of core sepolicy. It is
necessary because:

1. It is too late to change property_contexts in O.
2. Adding the netd_stable_secret prop to vendor sepolicy results
   in a duplicate definition error at compile time.
3. Defining a new vendor-specific context (such as
   net_stable_secret_vendor_prop) and applying it to
   persist.netd.stable_secret results in the device not booting
   due to attempting to apply two different contexts to the same
   property.

Lack of the sepolicy no longer breaks wifi connectivity now that
IpManager no longer considers failure to set the stable secret to
be a fatal error.

Once all interested devices have adopted the vendor sepolicy,
this policy can safely be reinstated by reverting said vendor
sepolicies in internal master.

This reverts commit abb1ba65.

Bug: 17613910
Test: bullhead builds, boots, connects to wifi
Change-Id: Idffcf78491171c54bca9f93cb920eab9b1c47709

Grant audited permissions collected in logs.

tcontext=platform_app
avc: granted { getattr } for comm=496E666C6174657254687265616420
path="/" dev="dm-0" ino=2 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768
tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=dir

tcontext=system_app
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="android:ui" path="/" dev="dm-0"
scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=dir
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="android:ui" path="/" dev="dm-0"
scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=dir

tcontext=update_engine
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="update_engine" path="/" dev="dm-0"
ino=2 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0
tclass=dir
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="update_engine" path="/fstab.foo"
dev="dm-0" ino=25 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read open } for comm="update_engine" path="/fstab.foo"
dev="dm-0" ino=25 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 28760354
Test: build
Change-Id: I6135eea1d10b903a4a7e69da468097f495484665

Logs indicate that all processes that require read access
have already been granted it.

Bug: 28760354
Test: build policy
Merged-In: I5826c45f54af32e3d4296df904c8523bb5df5e62
Change-Id: I5826c45f54af32e3d4296df904c8523bb5df5e62

Address the "granted" permissions observed in the logs including:

tcontext=uncrypt
avc: granted { search } for comm="uncrypt" name="/" dev="mmcblk0p40"
ino=2 scontext=u:r:uncrypt:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0
tclass=dir

tcontext=install_recovery
avc: granted { search } for comm="applypatch" name="saved.file"
scontext=u:r:install_recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0
tclass=dir
avc: granted { read } for comm="applypatch" name="saved.file"
dev="mmcblk0p6" ino=14 scontext=u:r:install_recovery:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="applypatch" path="/cache/saved.file"
dev="mmcblk0p6" ino=14 scontext=u:r:install_recovery:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=file

tcontext=update_engine
avc: granted { search } for comm="update_engine" name="cache"
dev="sda35" ino=1409025 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=dir"
avc: granted { read } for comm="update_engine" name="update.zip"
dev="sda35" ino=1409037 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file
avc: granted { read } for comm="update_engine" name="cache" dev="dm-0"
ino=16 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0
tclass=lnk_file

Bug: 28760354
Test: build policy.
Merged-In: Ia13fe47268df904bd4f815c429a0acac961aed1e
Change-Id: Ia13fe47268df904bd4f815c429a0acac961aed1e

Kernel commit 3ba4bf5f1e2c ("selinux: add a map permission check for mmap")
added a map permission check on mmap so that we can
distinguish memory mapped access (since it has different implications
for revocation).  The purpose of a separate map permission check on
mmap(2) is to permit policy to prohibit memory mapping of specific files
for which we need to ensure that every access is revalidated, particularly
useful for scenarios where we expect the file to be relabeled at runtime
in order to reflect state changes (e.g. cross-domain solution, assured
pipeline without data copying).  The kernel commit is anticipated to
be included in Linux 4.13.

This change defines map permission for the Android policy.  It mirrors
the definition in the kernel classmap by adding it to the common
definitions for files and sockets.  This will break compatibility for
kernels that predate the dynamic class/perm mapping support (< 2.6.33);
on such kernels, one would instead need to add map permission
to the end of each file and socket access vector.

This change also adds map permission to the global macro definitions for
file permissions, thereby allowing it in any allow rule that uses these
macros, and to specific rules allowing mapping of files from /system
and executable types. This should cover most cases where it is needed,
although it may still need to be added to specific allow rules when the
global macros are not used.

Test: Policy builds

Change-Id: Iab3ccd2b6587618e68ecab58218838749fe5e7f5
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

This CL was accidentally reverted a second time by commit:
cb5129f9.  Submit it for the third,
and final, time.

Bug: 62102757
Test: Builds and boots.

Address the "granted" permissions observed in the logs including:

tcontext=uncrypt
avc: granted { search } for comm="uncrypt" name="/" dev="mmcblk0p40"
ino=2 scontext=u:r:uncrypt:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0
tclass=dir

tcontext=install_recovery
avc: granted { search } for comm="applypatch" name="saved.file"
scontext=u:r:install_recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0
tclass=dir
avc: granted { read } for comm="applypatch" name="saved.file"
dev="mmcblk0p6" ino=14 scontext=u:r:install_recovery:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="applypatch" path="/cache/saved.file"
dev="mmcblk0p6" ino=14 scontext=u:r:install_recovery:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=file

tcontext=update_engine
avc: granted { search } for comm="update_engine" name="cache"
dev="sda35" ino=1409025 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=dir"
avc: granted { read } for comm="update_engine" name="update.zip"
dev="sda35" ino=1409037 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file
avc: granted { read } for comm="update_engine" name="cache" dev="dm-0"
ino=16 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0
tclass=lnk_file

Bug: 28760354
Test: build policy.

Change-Id: Ia13fe47268df904bd4f815c429a0acac961aed1e
(cherry picked from commit 5fd60597d7d04c1861e7d8f3938384efb0384386)

This change did not make it into core sepolicy in time for O.
The revert allows devices to define these selinux policies in
vendor-specific sepolicy instead of core sepolicy. It is
necessary because:

1. It is too late to change property_contexts in O.
2. Adding the netd_stable_secret prop to vendor sepolicy results
   in a duplicate definition error at compile time.
3. Defining a new vendor-specific context (such as
   net_stable_secret_vendor_prop) and applying it to
   persist.netd.stable_secret results in the device not booting
   due to attempting to apply two different contexts to the same
   property.

Lack of the sepolicy no longer breaks wifi connectivity now that
IpManager no longer considers failure to set the stable secret to
be a fatal error.

Once all interested devices have adopted the vendor sepolicy,
this policy can safely be reinstated by reverting said vendor
sepolicies in internal master.

This reverts commit abb1ba65.

Bug: 17613910
Test: bullhead builds, boots, connects to wifi
Change-Id: Idffcf78491171c54bca9f93cb920eab9b1c47709

Logs indicate that all processes that require access already have it.

Bug: 28760354
Test: build
Merged-In: I3dfa16bf4fba7f653c5f8525e8c565e9e24334a8
Change-Id: I3dfa16bf4fba7f653c5f8525e8c565e9e24334a8

Clean up "granted" logspam. Grant the observered audited permissions
including:

tcontext=cache_file
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="df" path="/cache" dev="mmcblk0p9"
ino=2 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0
tclass=dir
avc: granted { search } for comm="Binder:8559_2" name="cache"
dev="sda13" ino=1654785 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: granted { read } for comm="Binder:8559_2" name="cache" dev="dm-0"
ino=23 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0
tclass=lnk_file

tcontext=proc
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="Binder:14529_2"
path="/proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size" dev="proc" ino=247742
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0
tclass=file
avc: granted { read } for comm="Binder:22671_2" name="cmdline"
dev="proc" ino=4026532100 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read open } for comm="dumpstate"
path="/proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size" dev="proc" ino=105621
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0
tclass=file

tcontext=sysfs
avc: granted { read open } for comm="Binder:14459_2"
path="/sys/devices/virtual/block/md0/stat" dev="sysfs" ino=51101
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read open } for comm="Binder:21377_2"
path="/sys/devices/soc/1da4000.ufshc/host0/target0:0:0/0:0:0:1/block/sdb/sdb1"
dev="sysfs" ino=40888 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=dir
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="dumpstate" dev="sysfs" ino=40456
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file

tcontext=proc_meminfo
avc: granted { read } for comm="top" name="meminfo" dev="proc"
ino=4026532106 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_meminfo:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read open } for comm="top" path="/proc/meminfo"
dev="proc" ino=4026532106 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_meminfo:s0 tclass=file

tcontext=rootfs
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="df" path="/" dev="dm-0" ino=2
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=dir
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="ip" path="/vendor" dev="rootfs"
ino=99 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0
tclass=lnk_file

tcontext=selinuxfs
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="df" path="/sys/fs/selinux"
dev="selinuxfs" ino=1 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:selinuxfs:s0 tclass=dir

tcontext=system_file
avc: granted { read open } for comm="dumpstate" path="/system/lib64/hw"
dev="dm-0" ino=1947 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir

tcontext=system_data_file
avc: granted { read } for comm="ip" path="/data/misc/net/rt_tables"
dev="sda10" ino=1458261 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="ip" path="/data/misc/net/rt_tables"
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0
tclass=file

Bug: 28760354
Test: Build policy
Change-Id: Iae69f710d6b6dc6158cf6bb6ff61168c8df11263

Addresses:
avc: granted { read } for name="pipe-max-size" dev="proc" ino=470942 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read open } for path="/proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size" dev="proc" ino=470942 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file

Test: build policy
Change-Id: I7d8721c73c4f3c51b3885a97c697510e61d1221b
(cherry picked from commit f44002b3)

Enforce that configstore remains unprivileged.

Bug: 36453956
Test: build
Change-Id: Ifae8da26228efec9e556c8c3c0c50fb21b819951

Address "granted" audit messages for dumpstate use of df.

avc: granted { getattr } for comm="df" path="/mnt" dev="tmpfs"
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tmpfs:s0
tclass=dir
avc: granted { search } for comm="df" name="/" dev="tmpfs"
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tmpfs:s0
tclass=dir

Bug: 28760354
Test: Build, check logs.
Change-Id: I920948a5f0bce1b4bd2f15779730df8b3b1fea5a

Change fb889f23 "Force expand all hal_* attributes" annotated all
hal_* attributes to be expanded to their associated types. However
some of these attributes are used in CTS for neverallow checking.
Mark these attributes to be preserved.

In addition, remove the hacky workaround introduced in oc-dev
for b/62658302 where extraneous neverallow rules were introduced
to prevent unused or negated attributes from being auto-expanded
from policy.

Bug: 62658302
Bug: 63135903
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
    android.cts.security.SELinuxNeverallowRulesTest

    armeabi-v7a CtsSecurityHostTestCases completed in 4s.
    501 passed, 0 failed, 0 not executed
Merged-In: I989def70a16f66e7a18bef1191510793fbe9cb8c
Change-Id: I989def70a16f66e7a18bef1191510793fbe9cb8c

Change fb889f23 "Force expand all hal_* attributes" annotated all
hal_* attributes to be expanded to their associated types. However
some of these attributes are used in CTS for neverallow checking.
Mark these attributes to be preserved.

In addition, remove the hacky workaround introduced in oc-dev
for b/62658302 where extraneous neverallow rules were introduced
to prevent unused or negated attributes from being auto-expanded
from policy.

Bug: 62658302
Bug: 63135903
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
    android.cts.security.SELinuxNeverallowRulesTest

    armeabi-v7a CtsSecurityHostTestCases completed in 4s.
    501 passed, 0 failed, 0 not executed
Change-Id: I989def70a16f66e7a18bef1191510793fbe9cb8c

This reverts commit 7e577318.

avc: granted { search } scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: granted { getattr } scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read } scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read open } scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read } scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read open } scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { search } scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tmpfs:s0 tclass=dir

Fixes: 62619253
Test: policy builds, no more "granted" messages in dmesg for recovery.
Merged-In: I3f6d8ceee80307a01a8fd40cb4f8362a9825b1a3
Change-Id: I3f6d8ceee80307a01a8fd40cb4f8362a9825b1a3
(cherry picked from commit ea1d6e7d)