Change-Id: I0e63f90cafc5b1ca9cc112e852e172046b16a17e
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>

toolbox_exec is executed by dhcpcd-run-hooks.

Addresses the following auditallow log spam:

  avc: granted { read open } for comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" path="/system/bin/toybox" dev="dm-0" ino=650 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file
  avc: granted { read } for comm="setprop" name="toybox" dev="dm-0" ino=650 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file
  avc: granted { execute } for comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="toybox" dev="dm-0" ino=650 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file
  avc: granted { execute_no_trans } for comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" path="/system/bin/toybox" dev="dm-0" ino=650 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file
  avc: granted { read execute } for comm="setprop" path="/system/bin/toybox" dev="dm-0" ino=639 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: Ib83c291961a5573397830032a67a2f6861ae2e71

Bug: 26219114
Change-Id: I300899d610258704eb2d45488700eadb7a686606

Address the following denial when running CTS:
avc: denied { search } for comm=73657276696365203136 name="/" dev="selinuxfs" ino=1 scontext=u:r:adbd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:selinuxfs:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0

Bug: 26290097
Change-Id: Icf51061a65a5fda15f7e7ef78200a62ffbd1ca9b

Currently, properties that begin with "ro." are special cased to skip
over the "ro." part of the prefix before matching with entries in
property_contexts.  A change to init is removing this special case and
therefore, the "ro." prefixes must be explicitly added to
property_contexts.

Bug 26425619

Change-Id: I343f139a39abef99924e84e0d27699284f335d63

Previously granted to only untrusted_app, allow all apps except
isolated_app read write permissions to tun_device.

avc: denied { read write } for path="/dev/tun" dev="tmpfs" ino=8906 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:tun_device:s0 tclass=chr_file

Bug: 26462997
Change-Id: Id6f5b09cda26dc6c8651eb76f6791fb95640e4c7

and as a consequence open up for other appdomains (e.g. platform_app)
to write system properties.

Change-Id: Ie6ad4d17247165564456e5b0d78f705a82cdcde7

priv_app reads from /cache/recovery, but I'm still not sure if
it writes. Eliminate the read auditallow rules and allow the
writes to show up (if any).

Eliminates the following auditallow messages:

  avc: granted { search } for comm="IntentService[S" name="recovery" dev="mmcblk0p38" ino=12 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_recovery_file:s0 tclass=dir
  avc: granted { getattr } for comm="Thread-1" path="/cache/recovery/last_install" dev="mmcblk0p27" ino=29891 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c525,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_recovery_file:s0 tclass=file
  avc: granted { read open } for comm="Thread-1" name="recovery" dev="mmcblk0p27" ino=29889 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c525,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_recovery_file:s0 tclass=dir

Change-Id: Ibc0640f5366aae50e3fd09d17657374390b24a5c

su is in permissive all the time. We don't want SELinux log
spam from this domain.

Addresses the following logspam:

  avc: granted { getattr } for comm="lsof" path="/sys/devices/virtual/graphics/fb0/vsync_event" dev="sysfs" ino=10815 scontext=u:r:su:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file
  avc: granted { getattr } for comm="lsof" path="/sys/devices/virtual/thermal/thermal_zone2/temp" dev="sysfs" ino=15368 scontext=u:r:su:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file
  avc: granted { read } for comm="sh" name="emmc_therm" dev="sysfs" ino=17583 scontext=u:r:su:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: I8e17d3814e41b497b25ce00cd72698f0d22b3ab0

Address the following denial:
avc: denied { read } for name="battery" dev="sysfs" ino=17945 scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=lnk_file permissive=0

Bug: 26219114
Change-Id: I862b40a6514bffaa455dd7f06368acf9bcdc4782

Not actually needed as demonstrated by the auditallow rule.

Change-Id: Ia92c82ec237ab3490a1d51fa3371778e43e09504

This will allow init to terminate services cleanly (SIGTERM, wait,
SIGKILL) when needed.

Bug: 26216447
Test: manual: init is able to send a SIGTERM signal without denials.

Change-Id: Id2471ca08c0b011be64a36956628e965bc999bc6

auditallow shows no hits.

Change-Id: I5ae33d34cd4bfa48f4384926fcafd84bec60e899

Ordering matters in fc files; the last match wins. In builds where
many BOARD_SEPOLICY_DIRS are set, the order of that list becomes
increasingly important in order to maintain a cohesive built
file_contexts.

To correct this, we sort the device specific file_contexts entries
with the upstream fc_sort tool.

Change-Id: Id79cc6f434c41179d5c0d0d739c4718918b0b1dc
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>

- Moves policy of what to do with buffer size changes to logd

Bug: 23685592
Change-Id: I0b12c452e01b94d264d12b30f9040f646e609340

Recovery uses /cache/recovery. Exclude it from auditallow coverage.

Addresses the following SELinux log spam:

  avc:  granted  { search } for  pid=323 comm="recovery" name="recovery" dev="mmcblk0p38" ino=12 scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_recovery_file:s0 tclass=dir
  avc:  granted  { read } for  pid=323 comm="recovery" name="block.map" dev="mmcblk0p38" ino=26 scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_recovery_file:s0 tclass=file
  avc:  granted  { getattr } for  pid=323 comm="recovery" path="/cache/recovery/block.map" dev="mmcblk0p38" ino=26 scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_recovery_file:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: Ib6c7b44ac23fccaf2ea506429fb760ee85e87c76

No longer necessary after android.process.media moved to the
priv_app domain. Verified no new denials via audit2allow rule.

Bug: 25085347
Change-Id: I2d9498d5d92e79ddabd002b4a5c6f918e1eb9bcc

Shell user needs to be able to get current device battery_level via
/sys/class/power_supply/battery/capacity.  Create a global label and
corresponding policy for accessing this.  Rely on each device to label
the appropriate sysfs entry.

Bug: 26219114
Change-Id: I2c5ef489a9db2fdf7bbd5afd04278214b814351c

Bug: http://b/25195825
Change-Id: I70257d5e40332f315020547baaa77a92fdfc58b0

Bug: 22032619
Change-Id: Ic160e0beef353c6dc5fb5e2d6a09a5628f067fe3

This permission was created mostly for dumpstate (so it can include
recovery files on bugreports when an OTA fails), but it was applied to
uncrypt and recovery as well (since it had a wider access before).

Grant access to cache_recovery_file where we previously granted access
to cache_file. Add auditallow rules to determine if this is really
needed.

BUG: 25351711
Change-Id: I07745181dbb4f0bde75694ea31b3ab79a4682f18

Address following denials:
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/sys/devices/virtual/block/zram0/disksize" dev="sysfs" ino=14958 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_zram:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
avc: denied { search } for name="zram0" dev="sysfs" ino=14903 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_zram:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
avc: denied { read } for name="mem_used_total" dev="sysfs" ino=14970 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_zram:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
avc: denied { write } for name="uevent" dev="sysfs" ino=14904 scontext=u:r:ueventd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_zram:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
avc: denied { open } for path="/sys/devices/virtual/block/zram0/uevent" dev="sysfs" ino=14904 scontext=u:r:ueventd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_zram:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
avc: denied { read } for pid=348 comm="vold" name="zram0" dev="sysfs" ino=15223 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_zram:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
avc: denied { search } for pid=3494 comm="ContactsProvide" name="zram0"dev="sysfs" ino=15223 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_zram:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0

Bug: 22032619
Change-Id: I40cf918b7cafdba6cb3d42b04b1616a84e4ce158

* changes:
  Android.mk: cleanse all set but not unset variables
  Android.mk: clean dependencies and clear variables

No functional changes.

Change-Id: Ib6246932a2b491b77bafb1ce19e7b2285abec65e

Discovered by diffing the set of "set variables" with
the set of "cleared variables".

Script:

mydir=$(mktemp -d)

grep -E '(^[a-z].)[a-z0-9_\.]*\s*:?=.' Android.mk  | cut -d' ' -f 1-1 | sort | uniq > $mydir/set_vars
grep -E '(^[a-z].)[a-z0-9_\.]*\s*:?=$' Android.mk | cut -d' ' -f1-1 | sort | uniq > $mydir/unset_vars
diff $mydir/set_vars $mydir/unset_vars
rm -rf $mydir

Change-Id: Ib50abac6b417a1bcc1894d9a7bafdbdca371006a
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>

Dependencies being built with newline files in between
were also including the list of files without the newlines,
thus make would have to process 3n-1 files instead of 2n-1
where n is the number of files to process.

Additionally the *_with_nl variables were not being cleared
out and polluting Make's global name-space.

Change-Id: I76ea1a3dfae994b32991730aea7e4308da52a583
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>

The new rules are used to allow to mount FUSE file system for priv-app.

Change-Id: I5ce2d261be501e2b3fef09b7666f1e5d1cddbe52

Bug: 26178938
Change-Id: I07eebf9f3854aa447950909b6e97a565b2846644

Access to /proc/cpuinfo was moved to domain_deprecated in commit
6e3506e1. Restore access to everyone.

Allow the shell user to stat() /dev, and vfsstat() /proc and other
labeled filesystems such as /system and /data.

Access to /proc/cpuinfo was explicitly granted to bootanim, but is no
longer required after moving it back to domain.te. Delete the redundant
entry.

Commit 4e2d2245 restored access to
/sys/devices/system/cpu for all domains, but forgot to remove the
redundant entry from bootanim.te. Cleanup the redundant entry.

Addresses the following denials:

  avc: denied { getattr } for pid=23648 comm="bionic-unit-tes" name="/" dev="proc" ino=1 scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=filesystem permissive=0
  avc: denied { read } for name="cpuinfo" dev="proc" ino=4026533615 scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_cpuinfo:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
  avc: denied { getattr } for pid=23713 comm="bionic-unit-tes" path="/dev" dev="tmpfs" ino=11405 scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:device:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
  avc: denied { getattr } for name="/" dev="mmcblk0p30" ino=2 scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:labeledfs:s0 tclass=filesystem permissive=0

Bug: 26295417
Change-Id: Ia85ac91cbd43235c0f8fe0aebafffb8046cc77ec

By convention, allow rules should be placed before neverallow rules.

Change-Id: Icb9155bcce1f77bebbf9dc83a8c7b97e161c88a5

Don't allow access to the generic debugfs label. Instead, force
relabeling to a more specific type. system_server and dumpstate
are excluded from this until I have time to fix them.

Tighten up the neverallow rules for untrusted_app. It should never
be reading any file on /sys/kernel/debug, regardless of the label.

Change-Id: Ic7feff9ba3aca450f1e0b6f253f0b56c7918d0fa