- Apr 25, 2017
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Joel Scherpelz authored
am: 7a1074d2 Change-Id: I2dc21f2e4cb0fee5f072779728bb0a9394915d08
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Joel Scherpelz authored
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nharold authored
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Joel Scherpelz authored
iptables recently changed its behavior to strictly require xtables.lock. dumpstate selinux policy must be updated to allow access. Bug: 37648320 Test: dumpstate succeeds with no avc: denied ... xtables.lock messages Change-Id: Ic7e243739f375a60fa14fe67fac910d31d978ffd
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Alex Klyubin authored
am: 3f6b7ff0 Change-Id: I0639248d7f1e2ed1012a563c9b0b4db1fb651bb4
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TreeHugger Robot authored
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Alex Klyubin authored
am: f84989e5 Change-Id: I4391c7b44d495efadf39b8f14cfccfe2d966b419
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TreeHugger Robot authored
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- Apr 24, 2017
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Jeffrey Vander Stoep authored
am: e5f4d874 Change-Id: Ibd9708b1db37e54946c856b7c52c1e1a7eb7c58d
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Jeffrey Vander Stoep authored
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Bug: 37646565 Test: build marlin-userdebug Change-Id: I3325d027fa7bdafb48f1f53ac052f2a68352c1dc
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
am: 4d71b96e Change-Id: I363c0ce1fc27d560da94b857d54a5149467d56ba
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TreeHugger Robot authored
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Alex Klyubin authored
This adds a neverallow rules which checks that SELinux app domains which host arbitrary code are not allowed to access hwservicemanager operations other than "find" operation for which there already are strict neverallow rules in the policy. Test: mmm system/sepolicy -- neverallow-only change Bug: 34454312 Change-Id: I3b80c6ae2c254495704e0409e0c5c88f6ce3a6a7
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Alex Klyubin authored
Test: mmm system/sepolicy -- this is just a comment change Bug: 37640900 Change-Id: I7c96dde15f74822a19ecc1b28665913b54b3973b
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Alex Klyubin authored
am: 2a7f4fb0 Change-Id: Ia77557e2ef5aa124cb0d4a9e5f05300005a97bfd
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Fixes issue where attributes used exlusively in neverallow rules were removed from policy. For on-device compile use the -N flag to skip neverallow tests. Policy size increases: vendor/etc/selinux/nonplat_sepolicy.cil 547849 -> 635637 vendor/etc/selinux/precompiled_sepolicy 440248 -> 441076 system/etc/selinux/plat_sepolicy.cil 567664 -> 745230 For a total increase in system/vendor: 266182. Boot time changes: Pixel uses precompiled policy so boot time is not impacted. When forcing on-device compile on Marlin selinux policy compile time increases 510-520 ms -> 550-560 ms. Bug: 37357742 Test: Build and boot Marlin. Test: Verify both precompiled and on-device compile work. Change-Id: Ib3cb53d376a96e34f55ac27d651a6ce2fabf6ba7
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Alex Klyubin authored
App domains which host arbitrary code must not have access to arbitrary HwBinder services. Such access unnecessarily increases the attack surface. The reason is twofold: 1. HwBinder servers do not perform client authentication because HIDL currently does not expose caller UID information and, even if it did, many HwBinder services either operate at a layer below that of apps (e.g., HALs) or must not rely on app identity for authorization. Thus, to be safe, the default assumption is that a HwBinder service treats all its clients as equally authorized to perform operations offered by the service. 2. HAL servers (a subset of HwBinder services) contain code with higher incidence rate of security issues than system/core components and have access to lower layes of the stack (all the way down to hardware) thus increasing opportunities for bypassing the Android security model. HwBinder services offered by core components (as opposed to vendor components) are considered safer because of point #2 above. Always same-process aka always-passthrough HwBinder services are considered safe for access by these apps. This is because these HALs by definition do not offer any additional access beyond what its client already as, because these services run in the process of the client. This commit thus introduces these two categories of HwBinder services in neverallow rules. Test: mmm system/sepolicy -- this does not change on-device policy Bug: 34454312 Change-Id: I4f5f4dd10b3fc3bb9d262dda532d4a23dcdf061d
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- Apr 22, 2017
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TreeHugger Robot authored
- Apr 21, 2017
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Alex Klyubin authored
am: 586598b6 Change-Id: I7c65133028d233914b852cdd4e3c4f6f2fc99718
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Alex Klyubin authored
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Sandeep Patil authored
am: 177cb0be Change-Id: I456f31f2c674608a1e7188ec19f711512a761436
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Alex Klyubin authored
On fugu, surfaceflinger is Graphics Allocator HAL. surfaceflinger needs access to video_device. This commit thus relaxes the neverallow rule which says that out of all HALs, only Camera HAL can access video_device. The rule is relaxed to exclude HALs offered by framework/system image. Test: fugu boots Bug: 37575062 Change-Id: I9b9be55fe0bf3928f1a6342113a7d6f9a2eb0260
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TreeHugger Robot authored
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Sandeep Patil authored
am: 393c8e94 Change-Id: I82e1a41e1bd5c9195b5c4c21e7aa0848bc270ee5
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TreeHugger Robot authored
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Sandeep Patil authored
The types need to be exported so userdebug system.img can still build the policy with a user vendor.img at boot time. All permissions and attributes for these types are still kept under conditional userdebug_or_eng macro Bug: 37433251 Test: Boot sailfish-user build with generic_arm64_ab system.img on sailfish and make sure sepolicy compilation succeeds Change-Id: I98e8428c414546dfc74641700d4846edcf9355b1 Signed-off-by:
Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
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Chia-I Wu authored
Bug: 37152880 Bug: 37554633 Test: adb shell am hang --allow-restart Test: adb shell dumpstate Change-Id: Ie68607f3e3245a40056bdde7dd810ddf212b4295
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Alex Klyubin authored
am: 8d567da2 Change-Id: I365cd6682093f1ef1148b1ac3b911ae5c2c46871
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Alex Klyubin authored
am: 7dace9ae Change-Id: I1cee56f20312833ba50a00a1a75331ce53aa2978
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Alex Klyubin authored
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Alex Klyubin authored
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
am: 5b8e9f55 Change-Id: If677c4091bf45a09cdecf6c990099590e10a51a5
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TreeHugger Robot authored
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Sandeep Patil authored
Bug: 37541374 Test: Build and boot sailfish Change-Id: I8afe9463070cca45b3f1029cc168a3bf00ed7cdc Signed-off-by:
Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
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Pavel Grafov authored
am: 97903c05 Change-Id: Ida88d74292875a7f218e84d623d17b6e1286278d
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