Previously, we'd restricted WifiService's use of
the kernel's tracing feature to just userdebug_or_eng
builds.

This restriction was in place because the feature
had not yet been reviewed from a privacy perspective.
Now that the feature has passed privacy review, enable
the feature on all builds.

Note that other safeguards remain in place (on all
builds):
- The set of events to be monitored is configured by
  init, rather than WifiService (part of system_server).
  This privilege separation prevents a compromised
  system_server from tracing additional information.
- The trace events are kept only in RAM, until/unless
  WifiService receives a dump request. (This would happen,
  for example, in the case of adb dumpsys, or generating
  a bugreport.)

Bug: 35679234
Test: manual (see below)

Manual test details:
- flash device
- connect device to a wifi network
$ adb shell dumpsys wifi | grep rdev_connect
  [should see at least one matching line]

Change-Id: I85070054857d75177d0bcdeb9b2c95bfd7e3b6bc

Test: Basic telephony sanity
Bug: 35672432
Change-Id: I7d17cc7efda9902013c21d508cefc77baccc06a8

Label /proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_bits so it is only readable and writable by
init. This also tightens the neverallow restrictions for proc_security.

Bug: 33563834
Test: run cts -m CtsPermissionTestCases -t \
      android.permission.cts.FileSystemPermissionTest#testProcfsMmapRndBitsExistsAndSane

Change-Id: Ie7af39ddbf23806d4ffa35e7b19d30fec7b6d410

Apps definitely need access to ion ioctls. Remove audit statement.

Test: build marlin
Bug: 35715385
Change-Id: I777d3e9a88065a5f711315a7da6d63587744b408

When clearing cache, installd should be able to search for and delete
files in /data/preloads/file_cache

Test: Manually trigger installd freeCache
Bug: 31008665
Change-Id: I4c345cc8b0f7a6a8702a55f4720d21283c9d502a

This switches Keymaster HAL policy to the design which enables us to
conditionally remove unnecessary rules from domains which are clients
of Keymaster HAL.

Domains which are clients of Keymaster HAL, such as keystore and vold
domains, are granted rules targeting hal_keymaster only when the
Keymaster HAL runs in passthrough mode (i.e., inside the client's
process). When the HAL runs in binderized mode (i.e., in another
process/domain, with clients talking to the HAL over HwBinder IPC),
rules targeting hal_keymaster are not granted to client domains.

Domains which offer a binderized implementation of Keymaster HAL, such
as hal_keymaster_default domain, are always granted rules targeting
hal_keymaster.

Test: Password-protected sailfish boots up and lock screen unlocks --
      this exercises vold -> Keymaster HAL interaction
Test: All Android Keystore CTS tests pass -- this exercises keystore ->
      Keymaster HAL interaction:
      make cts cts-tradefed
      cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info \
      --skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check --abi arm64-v8a \
      --module CtsKeystoreTestCases
Bug: 34170079

Change-Id: I2254d0fdee72145721654d6c9e6e8d3331920ec7

This switches Wi-Fi HAL policy to the design which enables us to
conditionally remove unnecessary rules from domains which are clients
of Wi-Fi HAL.

Domains which are clients of Wi-Fi HAL, such as system_server domain,
are granted rules targeting hal_wifi only when the Wi-Fi HAL runs in
passthrough mode (i.e., inside the client's process). When the HAL
runs in binderized mode (i.e., in another process/domain, with clients
talking to the HAL over HwBinder IPC), rules targeting hal_wifi are
not granted to client domains.

Domains which offer a binderized implementation of Wi-Fi HAL, such as
hal_wifi_default domain, are always granted rules targeting hal_wifi.

Test: Setup Wizard (incl. adding a Google Account) completes fine with
      Wi-Fi connectivity only
Test: Toggle Wi-Fi off, on, off, on
Test: Use System UI to see list of WLANs and connect to one which does
      not require a password, and to one which requries a PSK
Test: ip6.me loads fine in Chrome over Wi-Fi
Bug: 34170079

Change-Id: I7a216a06727c88b7f2c23d529f67307e83bed17f

Bug: 35657600
Test: user build of Marlin starts with BT
Change-Id: Ic2380da66467b9b1c385da7d7fa10fddf4c7fae1

The 'overlay' service is the Overlay Manager Service, which tracks
packages and their Runtime Resource Overlay overlay packages.

Change-Id: I897dea6a32c653d31be88a7b3fc56ee4538cf178
Co-authored-by: Martin Wallgren <martin.wallgren@sonymobile.com>
Signed-off-by: Zoran Jovanovic <zoran.jovanovic@sonymobile.com>
Bug: 31052947
Test: boot the Android framework

This switches Dumpstate HAL policy to the design which enables us to
conditionally remove unnecessary rules from domains which are clients
of Dumpstate HAL.

Domains which are clients of Dumpstate HAL, such as dumpstate domain,
are granted rules targeting hal_dumpstate only when the Dumpstate HAL
runs in passthrough mode (i.e., inside the client's process). When the
HAL runs in binderized mode (i.e., in another process/domain, with
clients talking to the HAL over HwBinder IPC), rules targeting
hal_dumpstate are not granted to client domains.

Domains which offer a binderized implementation of Dumpstate HAL, such
as hal_dumpstate_default domain, are always granted rules targeting
hal_dumpstate.

Test: adb bugreport
Test: Take bugreport through system UI
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: I3e827534af03cdfa876921c5fa4af3a53025ba27

Bug: 35632346
Test: build and boot aosp_marlin
Change-Id: Ia2d019b0160e9b512f3e3a70ded70504fe4fea0c

In the master external/ipsec-tools/{main.c, racoon.rc},
racoon doesn't call setuid, and doesn't have the setuid capability.

Bug: 35642293
Signed-off-by: Lucas Duffey <lucas.duffey@invapid.org>

This switches Fingerprint HAL policy to the design which enables us to
conditionally remove unnecessary rules from domains which are clients
of Bluetooth HAL.

Domains which are clients of Fingerprint HAL, such as system_server
domain, are granted rules targeting hal_fingerprint only when the
Fingerprint HAL runs in passthrough mode (i.e., inside the client's
process). When the HAL runs in binderized mode (i.e., in another
process/domain, with clients talking to the HAL over HwBinder IPC),
rules targeting hal_fingerprint are not granted to client domains.

Domains which offer a binderized implementation of Fingerprint HAL,
such as hal_fingerprint_default domain, are always granted rules
targeting hal_fingerprint.

NOTE: This commit also removes unnecessary allow rules from
Fingerprint HAL, such access to servicemanager (not hwservicemanager)
and access to keystore daemon over Binder IPC. Fingerprint HAL does
not use this functionality anyway and shouldn't use it either.

Test: Enable fingerprint + PIN secure lock screen, confirm it unlocks
      with fingerprint or PIN
Test: Disable PIN (and thus fingerprint) secure lock screen
Test: make FingerprintDialog, install, make a fake purchase
Test: Add fingerprint_hidl_hal_test to device.mk, build & add to device,
      adb shell stop,
      adb shell /data/nativetest64/fingerprint_hidl_hal_test/fingerprint_hidl_hal_test -- all tests pass
Bug: 34170079

Change-Id: I6951c0f0640194c743ff7049357c77f5f21b71a1

The preview surface will run in app process and hal_camera will
need to wait on FD generated by preview surface.

Test: the denial is gone, able to take photo in
      messenger/hangout/drive application.
Bug: 35589980
Bug: 35485227
Change-Id: I1977174369b104617156065ff25203a17265b707

untrusted_v2_app is basically a refinement of untrusted_app with legacy
capabilities removed and potentially backwards incompatible changes.

This is not currently hooked up to anything.

Bug: 33350220
Test: builds
Change-Id: Ic9fad57476bc2b6022b1eaca8667bf6d844753c2

This removes the compile-time deprecation warning about
hal_impl_domain macro. The warning was introduced in
86e87806f5777a7fc09ea962e694442297e4f8d6. We don't want to spam all
Android platform developers about something internal to the ongoing
SELinux policy restructuring.

Test: Policy compiles without any warnings
Test: Google Play Movies plays back movies (i.e., DRM HAL works)
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: Icbd4d1283196f7ccc84c2a041c5601113d3c9f21

For early mount we end up creating the device nodes for partitions
under /dev/block before selinux is initialized. Which means, that
restorecon_recursive on /dev/block will have to relabel these nodes
and their symlinks.

This change adds the rule to allow init do the same.

b/27805372

Test: boot marlin / sailfish with early mount device node creation
but mount partitions using the default 'mountall' without any selinux
denials.

Change-Id: Ib9335f3f961d485d2120a175dbdbf85d6f70b160
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

dumpstate has CAP_SYS_PTRACE solely for the purpose of reading sensitive
/proc/PID files, not for using ptrace attach. Add an assert to ensure
that's the case.

Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: I975308fae3f8e9a039b9efdc0e9605192b405ce7

This switches DRM HAL policy to the design which enables us to
conditionally remove unnecessary rules from domains which are clients
of DRM HAL.

Domains which are clients of DRM HAL, such as mediadrmserver domain,
are granted rules targeting hal_drm only when the DRM HAL runs in
passthrough mode (i.e., inside the client's process). When the HAL
runs in binderized mode (i.e., in another process/domain, with
clients talking to the HAL over HwBinder IPC), rules targeting hal_drm
are not granted to client domains.

Domains which offer a binderized implementation of DRM HAL, such as
hal_drm_default domain, are always granted rules targeting hal_drm.

Test: Play movie using Google Play Movies
Test: Play movie using Netflix
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: I3ab0e84818ccd61e54b90f7ade3509b7dbf86fb9

Better document the reasons behind the neverallow for tcp/udp sockets.

Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: Iee386af3be6fc7495addc9300b5628d0fe61c8e9

Test: hidl_test, device boots with allocator
Bug: 35327976

Merged-In: I6232a2823ff16058c70f173ec2332772048563f4
Change-Id: I6232a2823ff16058c70f173ec2332772048563f4

To determine if it is safe to run fsck on a filesystem, e2fsck
must first determine if the filesystem is mounted. To do that,
e2fsck scans through /proc/mounts and collects all the mounted
block devices. With that information, it runs stat() on each block
device, comparing the major and minor numbers to the filesystem
passed in on the command line. If there is a match, then the filesystem
is currently mounted and running fsck is dangerous.
Allow stat access to all block devices so that fsck can compare
major/minor values.

Addresses the following denials:

avc: denied { getattr } for comm="e2fsck" path="/dev/block/sde5"
dev="tmpfs" ino=15649 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:metadata_block_device:s0 tclass=blk_file
permissive=0

avc: denied { getattr } for comm="e2fsck" path="/dev/block/sda25"
dev="tmpfs" ino=15528 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:modem_block_device:s0 tclass=blk_file permissive=0

avc: denied { getattr } for comm="e2fsck" path="/dev/block/sda31"
dev="tmpfs" ino=15552 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:system_block_device:s0 tclass=blk_file permissive=0

avc: denied { getattr } for comm="e2fsck" path="/dev/block/sdd3"
dev="tmpfs" ino=15600 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:block_device:s0 tclass=blk_file permissive=0

Bug: 35324014
Bug: 33781554
Test: device boots and no SELinux denials.
Change-Id: I5af4a334ec41952887914eec4eee5c60cc441a66