Create a macro of unprivileged ioctls including
- All common socket ioctls except MAC address
- All wireless extensions ioctls except get/set ESSID
- Some commonly used tty ioctls

Bug: 21657002
Change-Id: Ib08be9cb70d08c1fa2c8bddbae519e7c2df5293c

As an optimization, platform components like MediaProvider may choose
to shortcut past the FUSE daemon and return open file descriptors
directly pointing at the underlying storage device.

Now that we have a specific label for /mnt/media_rw, we need to grant
search access to untrusted apps like MediaProvider.  The actual
access control is still managed by POSIX permissions on that
directory.

avc: denied { search } for name="media_rw" dev="tmpfs" ino=4150 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_media_rw_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0

Bug: 21017105
Change-Id: I6d51939668b39b43b91b1f0c24c98bc2205bf511

Allow tty ioctls TIOCOUTQ 0x5411 and FIOCLEX 0x5451.

Allow/audit all wireless extension ioctls.

Bug: 21120188
Change-Id: Icd447ee40351c615c236f041931d210751e0f0c3

Programs routinely scan through /system, looking at the files there.
Don't generate an SELinux denial when it happens.

Bug: 21120228
Change-Id: I85367406e7ffbb3e24ddab6f97448704df990603

Bug: 19483574
(cherry picked from commit 7d66f783)

Change-Id: If617e29b6fd36c88c157941bc9e11cf41329da48

MAC address access is no longer allowed via the java API. Deny access
from native code.

Bug: 17787238
Change-Id: Ia337317d5927349b243bbbd5c2cf393911771cdf

This enables access to gatekeeperd for anybody who invokes Android
framework APIs. This is necessary because the AndroidKeyStore
abstraction offered by the framework API occasionally communicates
with gatekeeperd from the calling process.

(cherry picked from commit effcac7d)

Bug: 20526234
Change-Id: I450242cd085259b3f82f36f359ee65ff27bebd13

Use a more specific label for /data/misc/gatekeeper

Rearrange some other rules.

Change-Id: Ib634e52526cf31a8f0a0e6d12bbf0f69dff8f6b5

Move the remaining services from tmp_system_server_service to appropriate
attributes and remove tmp_system_server and associated logging:

registry
restrictions
rttmanager
scheduling_policy
search
sensorservice
serial
servicediscovery
statusbar
task
textservices
telecom_service
trust_service
uimode
updatelock
usagestats
usb
user
vibrator
voiceinteraction
wallpaper
webviewupdate
wifip2p
wifi
window

Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Ia0a6d47099d82c53ba403af394537db6fbc71ca0

Move the following services from tmp_system_server_service to appropriate
attributes:

network_management
network_score
notification
package
permission
persistent
power
print
processinfo
procstats

Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: I9dfb41fa41cde72ef0059668410a2e9eb1af491c

Move the following services from tmp_system_server_service to appropriate
attributes:

jobscheduler
launcherapps
location
lock_settings
media_projection
media_router
media_session
mount
netpolicy
netstats

Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Ia82d475ec41f658851f945173c968f4abf57e7e1

Move the following services from tmp_system_server_service to appropriate
attributes:

diskstats
display
dreams
dropbox
ethernet
fingerprint
graphicstats
hardware
hdmi_control
input_method
input_service

Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Iadd8aab9e78d9d39fb00cf0b5a95fa1927d02095

Move the following services from tmp_system_server_service to appropriate
attributes:

battery
bluetooth_manager
clipboard
commontime_management
connectivity
content
country_detector
device_policy
deviceidle

Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: I0d0f2a075c0509a783631d88ba453ac13399cdf2

Assign the alarm, appwidget, assetatlas, audio, backup and batterystats services
the appropriate service access levels and move into enforcing.

Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: If3210bb25f3076edfdb6eec36ef6521ace1bd8d7

Move accessibility, account, appops and activity services into enforcing with
app_api_service level of access, with additional grants to mediaserver and
isolated app.

Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: I1d5a79b9223026415f1690e8e9325ec4c270e3dd

System services differ in designed access level.  Add attributes reflecting this
distinction and label services appropriately.  Begin moving access to the newly
labeled services by removing them from tmp_system_server_service into the newly
made system_server_service attribute.  Reflect the move of system_server_service
from a type to an attribute by removing access to system_server_service where
appropriate.

Change-Id: I7fd06823328daaea6d6f96e4d6bd00332382230b

Get ready to switch system_server service lookups into enforcing.

Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Iefd4b2eee6cdd680f5ab423d15cc72a2a30e27cf

Change-Id: I156b139b57f46c695ece35b7b26a3087d87b25df

Modify create_file_perms and create_dir_perms so it doesn't have
the "link" permission. This permission controls whether hard links
are allowed or not on the given file label. Hard links are a common
source of security bugs, and isn't something we want to support by
default.

Get rid of link_file_perms and move the necessary permissions into
create_file_perms and create_dir_perms. Nobody is using this macro,
so it's pointless to keep it around.

Get rid of unlink on directories. It returns EISDIR if you attempt to
do it, independent of SELinux permissions.

SELinux domains which have a need for hard linking for a particular
file type can add it back to their permission set on an as-needed basis.

Add a compile time assertion (neverallow rule) for untrusted_app.
It's particularly dangerous for untrusted_app to ever have hard
link capabilities, and the neverallow rule will prevent regressions.

Bug: 19953790
Change-Id: I5e9493d2bf5da460d074f0bc5ad8ba7c14dec6e0

Assigning mlstrustedsubject to untrusted_app would undermine
the per-user isolation model being enforced via levelFrom=user
in seapp_contexts and the mls constraints.  There is no direct
way to specify a neverallow on attribute assignment, but this
makes use of a particular property of the fork permission to
prevent ever adding mlstrustedsubject to untrusted_app.

A similar restriction for app_data_file and mlstrustedobject
is also important for the same reason, but cannot be expressed
as a neverallow.

Change-Id: I5170cadc55cc614aef0cd5f6491de8f69a4fa2a0
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

There were a few instances where allow rules were appended
after the neverallow rules stanza in the .te file.  Also
there were some regular allow rules inserted into the CTS-specific
rules section of app.te.  Just move the rules as appropriate.
Should be no change in policy.

Change-Id: Iec76f32d4b531d245bbf5dd9f621a71ff5c71f3e
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: I80b574f73d53439dd710ccdb8f05cc2f9e9a10b4

The GMS core feedback agent runs as untrusted_app, and needs
the ability to read /data/anr/traces.txt to report ANR information.

Allow all untrusted_apps to read /data/anr/traces.txt so that GMS core
can access it.

Longer term, we need to move GMS core into it's own domain, but that's
a longer term change.

Addresses the following denial:

W/ndroid.feedback(17825): type=1400 audit(0.0:68004): avc: denied { read } for name="traces.txt" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=325762 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:anr_data_file:s0 tclass=file

(cherrypick from commit e2547c3b)

Bug: 18504118
Bug: 18340553
Change-Id: I8b472b6ab7dfe2a73154033e0a088b8e26396fa8

Change-Id: I5ae9606023ef7f3489f44e6657766e922160c470

Also formally allow dumpstate access to all services and grant system_server
access to address the following non-system_server_service entries:

avc:  granted  { find } for service=drm.drmManager scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:drmserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
avc:  granted  { find } for service=nfc scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:nfc_service:s0 tclass=service_manager

Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Iad16b36acf44bce52c4824f8b53c0e7731c25602

Encountered when certinstaller tries to talk to keystore:
ComponentInfo{com.android.certinstaller/com.android.certinstaller.CertInstaller}: java.lang.NullPointerException: Attempt to invoke interface method 'int android.security.IKeystoreService.test()' on a null object reference

Address the following denial:
avc:  denied  { find } for service=android.security.keystore scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:keystore_service:s0 tclass=service_manager

Bug: 19347232
Change-Id: I35b46da3c78b384cf04216be937c6b5bfa86452d

Relax the neverallow netlink restrictions for app domains.
In particular, some non-AOSP app domains may use netlink sockets
to communicate with a kernel driver.

Continue to neverallow generic netlink sockets for untrusted_app.
The intention here is that only app domains which explicitly need
this functionality should be able to request it.

This change does not add or remove any SELinux rules. Rather, it
just changes SELinux compile time assertions, as well as allowing
this behavior in CTS.

Modify other neverallow rules to use "domain" instead of "self".
Apps shouldn't be able to handle netlink sockets, even those
created in other SELinux domains.

(cherry picked from commit d31936f8)

Change-Id: I4763cb0c9510220693c506636dbb7584712b67e2

Relax the neverallow netlink restrictions for app domains.
In particular, some non-AOSP app domains may use netlink sockets
to communicate with a kernel driver.

Continue to neverallow generic netlink sockets for untrusted_app.
The intention here is that only app domains which explicitly need
this functionality should be able to request it.

This change does not add or remove any SELinux rules. Rather, it
just changes SELinux compile time assertions, as well as allowing
this behavior in CTS.

Modify other neverallow rules to use "domain" instead of "self".
Apps shouldn't be able to handle netlink sockets, even those
created in other SELinux domains.

(cherry picked from commit d31936f8)

Bug: 19198997
Change-Id: Icfed1ee66f082df1117b090341f62981f01bc849

Relax the neverallow netlink restrictions for app domains.
In particular, some non-AOSP app domains may use netlink sockets
to communicate with a kernel driver.

Continue to neverallow generic netlink sockets for untrusted_app.
The intention here is that only app domains which explicitly need
this functionality should be able to request it.

This change does not add or remove any SELinux rules. Rather, it
just changes SELinux compile time assertions, as well as allowing
this behavior in CTS.

Modify other neverallow rules to use "domain" instead of "self".
Apps shouldn't be able to handle netlink sockets, even those
created in other SELinux domains.

Change-Id: I40de0ae28134ce71e808e5ef4a39779b71897571

Reduce logspam and record further observed service connections.

Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: I9a57e4bb8f1c8e066861719fb208c691498842a8

Address observed  audit logs of the form:
granted  { find } for service=XXX scontext=u:r:YYY:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:XXX_service:s0 tclass=service_manager

in order to record existing relationships with services.

Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: I99a68f329c17ba67ebf3b87729b8405bdc925ef4

Temporarily give every system_server_service its own
domain in preparation for splitting it and identifying
special services or classes of services.

Change-Id: I81ffbdbf5eea05e0146fd7fd245f01639b1ae0ef

All domains are currently granted list and find service_manager
permissions, but this is not necessary.  Pare the permissions
which did not trigger any of the auditallow reporting.

Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Ie0ce8de2af8af2cbe4ce388a2dcf4534694c994a

Required for Settings to show name/icon of apps on sd card
(permission copied from untrusted_app)

Also removed duplicate permission (from domain) in untrusted_app

(cherry picked from commit c06ed8f7)

Bug: 18730865
Change-Id: I725d088d1d4a1256e3bfe49bc32796a54889f925

Required for Settings to show name/icon of apps on sd card
(permission copied from untrusted_app)

Also removed duplicate permission (from domain) in untrusted_app

Change-Id: Ib2b3bee4dfb54ad5e45b392fd9bfd65add4a00bf

The GMS core feedback agent runs as untrusted_app, and needs
the ability to read /data/anr/traces.txt to report ANR information.

Allow all untrusted_apps to read /data/anr/traces.txt so that GMS core
can access it.

Longer term, we need to move GMS core into it's own domain, but that's
a longer term change.

Addresses the following denial:

W/ndroid.feedback(17825): type=1400 audit(0.0:68004): avc: denied { read } for name="traces.txt" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=325762 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:anr_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 18504118
Bug: 18340553
Change-Id: Ia9fac599befc3a3b6e5282be15ec8fd04bb23385

Change-Id: I2911d2b5d1931c6f6245cc54465458a8a3c2b2bb

Netlink uevent sockets are used by the kernel to inform userspace
when certain events occur, for example, when new hardware is added
or removed. This allows userspace to take some action based on those
messages.

Relax the neverallow rule for NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT sockets.
Certain device specific app domains, such as system_app, may have a
need to receive messages from this socket type.

Continue to neverallow NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT sockets for untrusted_app.
These sockets have been the source of rooting attacks in Android
in the past, and it doesn't make sense to expose this to untrusted_apps.

No new SELinux rules are introduced by this change. This is an
adjustment of compile time assertions only.

Bug: 17525863

(cherry picked from commit 642b8042)

Change-Id: I35f3dc8b1ead9f427645a13fb202e760d1e68e64

Netlink uevent sockets are used by the kernel to inform userspace
when certain events occur, for example, when new hardware is added
or removed. This allows userspace to take some action based on those
messages.

Relax the neverallow rule for NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT sockets.
Certain device specific app domains, such as system_app, may have a
need to receive messages from this socket type.

Continue to neverallow NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT sockets for untrusted_app.
These sockets have been the source of rooting attacks in Android
in the past, and it doesn't make sense to expose this to untrusted_apps.

No new SELinux rules are introduced by this change. This is an
adjustment of compile time assertions only.

Bug: 17525863
Change-Id: I3e538dc8096dc23b9678bcd20e3c1e742c21c967

Before actual installation, apks are put in a staging area where they are
scanned by a verifier before completing the install flow.  This verifier runs as
a priv-app, which is in the untrusted_app domain.  Allow untrusted_app
read-access to these files.

Bug: 16515815

Change-Id: Ifedc12a33b1f53b62f45013e7b253dbc79b02a4e