- Jul 12, 2017
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
This reverts commit 5bf94caf. Remove this temporary workaround. Bug: 63147833 Test: Build policy
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Observed audited access to rootfs moved to individual domains in commit a12aad45 Bug: 28760354 Test: build Change-Id: Ie5e991d66668e70df69f21334032be6d574bf5c8
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- Jul 11, 2017
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Ueventd needs write access to all files in /sys to generate uevents. Bug: 63147833 Test: build. Verify no ueventd denials in the logs. Change-Id: I89d33aab158dd192e761f14eff8afa1c71594bca
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Lorenzo Colitti authored
This change did not make it into core sepolicy in time for O. The revert allows devices to define these selinux policies in vendor-specific sepolicy instead of core sepolicy. It is necessary because: 1. It is too late to change property_contexts in O. 2. Adding the netd_stable_secret prop to vendor sepolicy results in a duplicate definition error at compile time. 3. Defining a new vendor-specific context (such as net_stable_secret_vendor_prop) and applying it to persist.netd.stable_secret results in the device not booting due to attempting to apply two different contexts to the same property. Lack of the sepolicy no longer breaks wifi connectivity now that IpManager no longer considers failure to set the stable secret to be a fatal error. Once all interested devices have adopted the vendor sepolicy, this policy can safely be reinstated by reverting said vendor sepolicies in internal master. This reverts commit abb1ba65. Bug: 17613910 Test: bullhead builds, boots, connects to wifi Change-Id: Idffcf78491171c54bca9f93cb920eab9b1c47709
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Grant audited permissions collected in logs. tcontext=platform_app avc: granted { getattr } for comm=496E666C6174657254687265616420 path="/" dev="dm-0" ino=2 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=dir tcontext=system_app avc: granted { getattr } for comm="android:ui" path="/" dev="dm-0" scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { getattr } for comm="android:ui" path="/" dev="dm-0" scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=dir tcontext=update_engine avc: granted { getattr } for comm="update_engine" path="/" dev="dm-0" ino=2 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { getattr } for comm="update_engine" path="/fstab.foo" dev="dm-0" ino=25 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read open } for comm="update_engine" path="/fstab.foo" dev="dm-0" ino=25 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file Bug: 28760354 Test: build Change-Id: I6135eea1d10b903a4a7e69da468097f495484665
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- Jul 10, 2017
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Logs indicate that all processes that require read access have already been granted it. Bug: 28760354 Test: build policy Merged-In: I5826c45f54af32e3d4296df904c8523bb5df5e62 Change-Id: I5826c45f54af32e3d4296df904c8523bb5df5e62
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Address the "granted" permissions observed in the logs including: tcontext=uncrypt avc: granted { search } for comm="uncrypt" name="/" dev="mmcblk0p40" ino=2 scontext=u:r:uncrypt:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=dir tcontext=install_recovery avc: granted { search } for comm="applypatch" name="saved.file" scontext=u:r:install_recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { read } for comm="applypatch" name="saved.file" dev="mmcblk0p6" ino=14 scontext=u:r:install_recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { getattr } for comm="applypatch" path="/cache/saved.file" dev="mmcblk0p6" ino=14 scontext=u:r:install_recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=file tcontext=update_engine avc: granted { search } for comm="update_engine" name="cache" dev="sda35" ino=1409025 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=dir" avc: granted { read } for comm="update_engine" name="update.zip" dev="sda35" ino=1409037 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file avc: granted { read } for comm="update_engine" name="cache" dev="dm-0" ino=16 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file Bug: 28760354 Test: build policy. Merged-In: Ia13fe47268df904bd4f815c429a0acac961aed1e Change-Id: Ia13fe47268df904bd4f815c429a0acac961aed1e
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Dan Cashman authored
This CL was accidentally reverted a second time by commit: cb5129f9. Submit it for the third, and final, time. Bug: 62102757 Test: Builds and boots.
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Address the "granted" permissions observed in the logs including: tcontext=uncrypt avc: granted { search } for comm="uncrypt" name="/" dev="mmcblk0p40" ino=2 scontext=u:r:uncrypt:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=dir tcontext=install_recovery avc: granted { search } for comm="applypatch" name="saved.file" scontext=u:r:install_recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { read } for comm="applypatch" name="saved.file" dev="mmcblk0p6" ino=14 scontext=u:r:install_recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { getattr } for comm="applypatch" path="/cache/saved.file" dev="mmcblk0p6" ino=14 scontext=u:r:install_recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=file tcontext=update_engine avc: granted { search } for comm="update_engine" name="cache" dev="sda35" ino=1409025 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=dir" avc: granted { read } for comm="update_engine" name="update.zip" dev="sda35" ino=1409037 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file avc: granted { read } for comm="update_engine" name="cache" dev="dm-0" ino=16 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file Bug: 28760354 Test: build policy. Change-Id: Ia13fe47268df904bd4f815c429a0acac961aed1e (cherry picked from commit 5fd60597d7d04c1861e7d8f3938384efb0384386)
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Lorenzo Colitti authored
This change did not make it into core sepolicy in time for O. The revert allows devices to define these selinux policies in vendor-specific sepolicy instead of core sepolicy. It is necessary because: 1. It is too late to change property_contexts in O. 2. Adding the netd_stable_secret prop to vendor sepolicy results in a duplicate definition error at compile time. 3. Defining a new vendor-specific context (such as net_stable_secret_vendor_prop) and applying it to persist.netd.stable_secret results in the device not booting due to attempting to apply two different contexts to the same property. Lack of the sepolicy no longer breaks wifi connectivity now that IpManager no longer considers failure to set the stable secret to be a fatal error. Once all interested devices have adopted the vendor sepolicy, this policy can safely be reinstated by reverting said vendor sepolicies in internal master. This reverts commit abb1ba65. Bug: 17613910 Test: bullhead builds, boots, connects to wifi Change-Id: Idffcf78491171c54bca9f93cb920eab9b1c47709
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Logs indicate that all processes that require access already have it. Bug: 28760354 Test: build Merged-In: I3dfa16bf4fba7f653c5f8525e8c565e9e24334a8 Change-Id: I3dfa16bf4fba7f653c5f8525e8c565e9e24334a8
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Clean up "granted" logspam. Grant the observered audited permissions including: tcontext=cache_file avc: granted { getattr } for comm="df" path="/cache" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=2 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { search } for comm="Binder:8559_2" name="cache" dev="sda13" ino=1654785 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { read } for comm="Binder:8559_2" name="cache" dev="dm-0" ino=23 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file tcontext=proc avc: granted { getattr } for comm="Binder:14529_2" path="/proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size" dev="proc" ino=247742 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read } for comm="Binder:22671_2" name="cmdline" dev="proc" ino=4026532100 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read open } for comm="dumpstate" path="/proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size" dev="proc" ino=105621 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file tcontext=sysfs avc: granted { read open } for comm="Binder:14459_2" path="/sys/devices/virtual/block/md0/stat" dev="sysfs" ino=51101 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read open } for comm="Binder:21377_2" path="/sys/devices/soc/1da4000.ufshc/host0/target0:0:0/0:0:0:1/block/sdb/sdb1" dev="sysfs" ino=40888 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { getattr } for comm="dumpstate" dev="sysfs" ino=40456 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file tcontext=proc_meminfo avc: granted { read } for comm="top" name="meminfo" dev="proc" ino=4026532106 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_meminfo:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read open } for comm="top" path="/proc/meminfo" dev="proc" ino=4026532106 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_meminfo:s0 tclass=file tcontext=rootfs avc: granted { getattr } for comm="df" path="/" dev="dm-0" ino=2 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { getattr } for comm="ip" path="/vendor" dev="rootfs" ino=99 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=lnk_file tcontext=selinuxfs avc: granted { getattr } for comm="df" path="/sys/fs/selinux" dev="selinuxfs" ino=1 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:selinuxfs:s0 tclass=dir tcontext=system_file avc: granted { read open } for comm="dumpstate" path="/system/lib64/hw" dev="dm-0" ino=1947 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir tcontext=system_data_file avc: granted { read } for comm="ip" path="/data/misc/net/rt_tables" dev="sda10" ino=1458261 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { getattr } for comm="ip" path="/data/misc/net/rt_tables" scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file Bug: 28760354 Test: Build policy Change-Id: Iae69f710d6b6dc6158cf6bb6ff61168c8df11263
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Addresses: avc: granted { read } for name="pipe-max-size" dev="proc" ino=470942 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read open } for path="/proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size" dev="proc" ino=470942 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file Test: build policy Change-Id: I7d8721c73c4f3c51b3885a97c697510e61d1221b (cherry picked from commit f44002b3)
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- Jul 06, 2017
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Address "granted" audit messages for dumpstate use of df. avc: granted { getattr } for comm="df" path="/mnt" dev="tmpfs" scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tmpfs:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { search } for comm="df" name="/" dev="tmpfs" scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tmpfs:s0 tclass=dir Bug: 28760354 Test: Build, check logs. Change-Id: I920948a5f0bce1b4bd2f15779730df8b3b1fea5a
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- Jul 05, 2017
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Change fb889f23 "Force expand all hal_* attributes" annotated all hal_* attributes to be expanded to their associated types. However some of these attributes are used in CTS for neverallow checking. Mark these attributes to be preserved. In addition, remove the hacky workaround introduced in oc-dev for b/62658302 where extraneous neverallow rules were introduced to prevent unused or negated attributes from being auto-expanded from policy. Bug: 62658302 Bug: 63135903 Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \ android.cts.security.SELinuxNeverallowRulesTest armeabi-v7a CtsSecurityHostTestCases completed in 4s. 501 passed, 0 failed, 0 not executed Merged-In: I989def70a16f66e7a18bef1191510793fbe9cb8c Change-Id: I989def70a16f66e7a18bef1191510793fbe9cb8c
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Change fb889f23 "Force expand all hal_* attributes" annotated all hal_* attributes to be expanded to their associated types. However some of these attributes are used in CTS for neverallow checking. Mark these attributes to be preserved. In addition, remove the hacky workaround introduced in oc-dev for b/62658302 where extraneous neverallow rules were introduced to prevent unused or negated attributes from being auto-expanded from policy. Bug: 62658302 Bug: 63135903 Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \ android.cts.security.SELinuxNeverallowRulesTest armeabi-v7a CtsSecurityHostTestCases completed in 4s. 501 passed, 0 failed, 0 not executed Change-Id: I989def70a16f66e7a18bef1191510793fbe9cb8c
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- Jul 03, 2017
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
avc: granted { search } scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { getattr } scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read } scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read open } scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read } scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read open } scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { search } scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tmpfs:s0 tclass=dir Fixes: 62619253 Test: policy builds, no more "granted" messages in dmesg for recovery. Merged-In: I3f6d8ceee80307a01a8fd40cb4f8362a9825b1a3 Change-Id: I3f6d8ceee80307a01a8fd40cb4f8362a9825b1a3 (cherry picked from commit ea1d6e7d)
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Jeff Sharkey authored
When installd clears cached files on external storage, the sdcardfs kernel filesystem needs to be kept in the loop to release any cached dentries that it's holding onto. (Otherwise the underlying disk space isn't actually released.) installd can already delete the underlying files directly (via the media_rw_data_file rules), so this technically isn't expanding its capabilities. avc: granted { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6897 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tmpfs:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { open } for path="/mnt/runtime/default/emulated/0/Android/data" dev="sdcardfs" ino=589830 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcardfs:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { write } for name="com.google.android.inputmethod.japanese" dev="sdcardfs" ino=590040 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcardfs:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0 avc: denied { remove_name } for name="cache_r.m" dev="sdcardfs" ino=589868 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcardfs:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0 avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/runtime/default/emulated/0/Android/data/.nomedia" dev="sdcardfs" ino=589831 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcardfs:s0 tclass=file permissive=1 Test: cts-tradefed run commandAndExit cts-dev -m CtsAppSecurityHostTestCases -t android.appsecurity.cts.StorageHostTest Bug: 37486230 Change-Id: Icfd00a9ba379b1f50c48fe85849304cf9859bcb2 (cherry picked from commit 72f4c619)
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Logs show that only dumpstate requires access. avc: granted { read open } for comm="screencap" path="/dev/ion" dev="tmpfs" ino=14324 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:ion_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: granted { ioctl } for comm="screencap" path="/dev/ion" dev="tmpfs" ino=14324 ioctlcmd=4906 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:ion_device:s0 tclass=chr_file Grant ion permission to dumpstate which uses it for screencap feature. Bug: 28760354 Test: build. Check logs. Change-Id: I6435b7dbf7656669dac5dcfb205cf0aeda93991b
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- Jul 01, 2017
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Logs indicate no usage of these permissions. Bug: 28760354 Test: check logs. Change-Id: I3d75aea6afd4e326f705274ab2790e5d0bbdb367
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Logs indicate apps, system_server, and runas are the only domains that require this permission. Bug: 28760354 Test: check logs. Change-Id: I93dc53ec2d892bb91c0cd6f5d7e9cbf76b9bcd9f
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Andres Oportus authored
Bug: 62706738 Bug: 34133340 Test: Check that uid_time_in_state can't be read from the shell without root permissions and that "dumpsys batterystats --checkin| grep ctf" shows frequency data (system_server was able to read uid_time_in_state) Change-Id: Ic6a54da4ebcc9e10b0e3af8f14a45d7408e8686e (cherry picked from commit 4dc88795)
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Tomasz Wasilczyk authored
Bug: b/36863239 Test: manual Change-Id: I7e929926efbb1570ea9723ef3810a511c71dc11a (cherry picked from commit 38f0928f)
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- Jun 29, 2017
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
avc: denied { read write } scontext=u:r:ipacm:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_netfilter_socket avc: denied { setopt } scontext=u:r:ipacm:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_netfilter_socket avc: denied { getattr } scontext=u:r:ipacm:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_netfilter_socket avc: denied { create } for scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_netfilter_socket Bug: 29337859 Bug: 32163131 Test: adb shell getenforce Enforcing adb shell dumpsys connectivity tethering Tethering: ... Log: ... 06-28 11:46:58.841 - SET master tether settings: ON 06-28 11:46:58.857 - [OffloadController] tethering offload started And logs show some signs of happiness: 06-28 11:46:58.853 816 947 I IPAHALService: IPACM was provided two FDs (18, 19) 06-28 11:46:58.853 1200 1571 I zygote64: Looking for service android.hardware.tetheroffload.control@1.0::IOffloadControl/default Change-Id: I0c63bd2de334b4ca40e54efb9df4ed4904667e21
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- Jun 28, 2017
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Pavel Grafov authored
This is a revert of http://ag/741434 Bug: 38259874 Test: manually, using ConfirmCredential sample app. Change-Id: I0cbb955110935de605cb90e26a6a1d851a93a4b8
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- Jun 27, 2017
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Andreas Gampe authored
rc-style powerctl has beem removed. Accordingly, asan_extract now needs access to sys.powerctl directly. (orginally commit: 82672089) Bug: 36458146 Bug: 38241921 Test: Builds and boots. Change-Id: I7d6e583f5e98b671986a2071abf157c86e288a10
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Neil Fuller authored
This reinstates the selinux changes for the timezone service that were reverted on oc-dr1-dev and undesirably merged down to master. This reverts commit 96c619c8. Test: make Bug: 31008728 Change-Id: Ief2129c409de09b2782881a6556d918af59badd9
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Tom Cherry authored
This was marked deprecated in 2014 and removed in 2015, let's remove the sepolicy now too. (Originally submitted in commit: 8c60f74d) Bug: 38242876 Test: Builds and boots. Change-Id: I4caa0dbf77956fcbc61a07897242b951c275b502
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- Jun 26, 2017
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Su runs in permissive mode and denials should be suppressed. avc: denied { getattr } for scontext=u:r:su:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:pdx_display_client_endpoint_socket:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket permissive=1 avc: denied { getattr } for scontext=u:r:su:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:pdx_display_manager_endpoint_socket:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket permissive=1 avc: denied { getattr } for scontext=u:r:su:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:pdx_display_vsync_endpoint_socket:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket permissive=1 avc: denied { getattr } for scontext=u:r:su:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:pdx_bufferhub_client_endpoint_socket:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket permissive=1 avc: denied { getattr } for scontext=u:r:su:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:pdx_performance_client_endpoint_socket:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket permissive=1 Bug: 35197529 Test: policy builds Change-Id: Ia643c6e776e5e5bd473d857d523c3be91d32c40a
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Stephen Smalley authored
Linux kernel commit da69a5306ab9 ("selinux: support distinctions among all network address families") triggers a build error if a new address family is added without defining a corresponding SELinux security class. As a result, the smc_socket class was added to the kernel to resolve a build failure as part of merge commit 3051bf36c25d that introduced AF_SMC circa Linux 4.11. Define this security class and its access vector, add it to the socket_class_set macro, and exclude it from webview_zygote like other socket classes. Test: Policy builds Change-Id: Idbb8139bb09c6d1c47f1a76bd10f4ce1e9d939cb Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Due to the massively increased number of attributes in SELinux policy as part of the treble changes, we have had to remove attributes from policy for performance reasons. Unfortunately, some attributes are required to be in policy to ensure that our neverallow rules are being properly enforced. Usually this is not a problem, since neverallow rules indicate that an attribute should be kept, but this is not currently the case when the attribute is part of a negation in a group. This is particularly problematic with treble since some attributes may exist for HALs that have no implementation, and thus no types. In particular, this has caused an issue with the neverallows added in our macros. Add an extraneous neverallow rule to each of those auto-generated neverallow rules to make sure that they are not removed from policy, until the policy compiler is fixed to avoid this. Also add corresponding rules for other types which have been removed due to no corresponding rules. Bug: 62658302 Bug: 62999603 Test: Build Marlin policy. Test: verify attribute exists in policy using sepolicy-analyze. sepolicy-analyze $OUT/vendor/etc/selinux/precompiled_sepolicy \ attribute hal_tetheroffload_server Test: CTS neverallow tests pass. cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \ android.cts.security.SELinuxNeverallowRulesTest Change-Id: I62596ba8198ffdcbb4315df639a834e4becaf249
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- Jun 25, 2017
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Test: build policy Change-Id: If13838e8da6e3fe14bb5c7c7ade6f8ac0d5d1982
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- Jun 23, 2017
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Jeff Sharkey authored
When adopting SD cards, vold partitions and formats those devices; this had been working fine with the older make_ext4fs utility, but newer devices are switching over to mke2fs, which has a different SELinux label. avc: denied { execute } for name="mke2fs" dev="dm-0" ino=456 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=1 avc: denied { read open } for path="/system/bin/mke2fs" dev="dm-0" ino=456 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=1 avc: denied { execute_no_trans } for path="/system/bin/mke2fs" dev="dm-0" ino=456 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=1 avc: denied { getattr } for path="/system/bin/mke2fs" dev="dm-0" ino=456 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=1 Test: cts-tradefed run commandAndExit cts-dev --abi armeabi-v7a -m CtsAppSecurityHostTestCases -t android.appsecurity.cts.AdoptableHostTest Bug: 36757864, 37436961 Change-Id: Ifb96dfca076ea58650eb32f89e850f20ae2ac102
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
avc: denied { find } for interface=android.hardware.configstore::ISurfaceFlingerConfigs scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs:s0 tclass=hwservice_manager permissive=0 Bug: 35197529 Test: Device boots without this denial Change-Id: Ia43bc5879e03a1f2056e373b17cc6533636f98b1
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Narayan Kamath authored
NOTE: This change is marked dnma because we don't want it on oc-dr1-dev-plus-aosp or any other downstream branch. Moreover, oc-dr1-dev-plus-aosp is the only outgoing merger from oc-dr1-dev for this project. This reverts commit 11bfcc1e. Bug: 62908344 Test: make Change-Id: Ide61829cf99f15777c46f657a0e140d594f88243
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- Jun 22, 2017
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Tomasz Wasilczyk authored
Bug: b/36863239 Test: manual Change-Id: I7e929926efbb1570ea9723ef3810a511c71dc11a
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- Jun 21, 2017
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Dan Cashman authored
This reverts commit 3e307a4d. Test: Builds - neverallow change only. Bug: 62806062 Change-Id: Id3aa1b425cf48fc8586890c9850a74594584922d
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
The tetheroffload hal must be able to use network sockets as part of its job. Bug: 62870833 Test: neverallow-only change builds. Change-Id: I630b36340796a5ecb5db08e732b0978dd82835c7
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