This will be used to populate rt_tables (a mapping from routing table numbers to
table names) that's read by the iproute2 utilities.

Change-Id: I69deb1a64d5d6647470823405bf0cc55b24b22de

Introduce a net_radio_prop type for net. properties that can be
set by radio or system.
Introduce a system_radio_prop type for sys. properties that can be
set by radio or system.
Introduce a dhcp_prop type for properties that can be set by dhcp or system.
Drop the rild_prop vs radio_prop distinction; this was an early
experiment to see if we could separate properties settable by rild
versus other radio UID processes but it did not pan out.

Remove the ability to set properties from unconfineddomain.
Allow init to set any property.  Allow recovery to set ctl_default_prop
to restart adbd.

Change-Id: I5ccafcb31ec4004dfefcec8718907f6b6f3e0dfd
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

(cherry picked from commit 7d51096d4106a441a15741592d9ccdd0bfaca907)

Change-Id: Ib6198e19dbc306521a26fcecfdf6e8424d163fc9

Change-Id: Ib6198e19dbc306521a26fcecfdf6e8424d163fc9

The ctl_default_prop label is a bit too generic for some
of the priveleged domains when describing access rights.
Instead, be explicit about which services are being started
and stopped by introducing new ctl property keys.

Change-Id: I1d0c6f6b3e8bd63da30bd6c7b084da44f063246a
Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>

We already have neverallow rules for all domains about
loading policy, setting enforcing mode, and setting
checkreqprot, so we can drop redundant ones from netd and appdomain.
Add neverallow rules to domain.te for setbool and setsecparam
and exclude them from unconfined to allow fully eliminating
separate neverallow rules on the :security class from anything
other than domain.te.

Change-Id: I0122e23ccb2b243f4c5376893e0c894f01f548fc
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

(cherry picked from commit 96ff4c05)

Change-Id: Idfd734f07687925c1f35d2629d4b59d46822d0d4

Replace * or any permission set containing create with
create_socket_perms or create_stream_socket_perms.

Add net_domain() to all domains using network sockets and
delete rules already covered by domain.te or net.te.

For netlink_route_socket, only nlmsg_write needs to be separately
granted to specific domains that are permitted to modify the routing
table.   Clarification:  read/write permissions are just ability to
perform read/recv() or write/send() on the socket, whereas nlmsg_read/
nlmsg_write permissions control ability to observe or modify the
underlying kernel state accessed via the socket.
See security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c in the kernel for the mapping of
netlink message types to nlmsg_read or nlmsg_write.

Delete legacy rule for b/12061011.

This change does not touch any rules where only read/write were allowed
to a socket created by another domain (inherited across exec or
received across socket or binder IPC).  We may wish to rewrite some or all
of those rules with the rw_socket_perms macro but that is a separate
change.

Change-Id: Ib0637ab86f6d388043eff928e5d96beb02e5450e
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Change-Id: I0a06fa32a46e515671b4e9a6f68e1a3f8b2c21a8
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

fsetid checks are triggered by chmod on a directory or file owned by
a group other than one of the groups assigned to the current process
to see if the setgid bit should be cleared, regardless of whether the
setgid bit was even set.  We do not appear to truly need this
capability for netd to operate, so remove it.  Potential dontaudit
candidate.

Change-Id: I5ab4fbaaa056dcd1c7e60ec28632e7bc06f826bf
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

/proc/sys/net could use its own type to help distinguish
among some of the proc access rules. Fix dhcp and netd
because of this.

Change-Id: I6e16cba660f07bc25f437bf43e1eba851a88d538
Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>

This addresses the review comments from
https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/69855/

Change-Id: I4d4633db711695c7f959b60f247772b0ac67931f

The patch in 36a5d109 wasn't
sufficient to address DNS over TCP. We also need to allow
name_connect.

Fixes the following denial:

<5>[   82.120746] type=1400 audit(1830030.349:5): avc:  denied  { name_connect } for  pid=1457 comm="netd" dest=53 scontext=u:r:netd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:port:s0 tclass=tcp_socket

Public Bug: https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=62196
Bug: 11097631

(cherry picked from commit 91ebcf33)

Change-Id: I62bba8777a5c8af1c0143e7ca2d915129ef38798

The patch in 36a5d109 wasn't
sufficient to address DNS over TCP. We also need to allow
name_connect.

Fixes the following denial:

<5>[   82.120746] type=1400 audit(1830030.349:5): avc:  denied  { name_connect } for  pid=1457 comm="netd" dest=53 scontext=u:r:netd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:port:s0 tclass=tcp_socket

Public Bug: https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=62196
Bug: 11097631

Change-Id: I688d6923b78782e2183a9d69b7e74f95d6e3f893

DNS can use TCP connections, in addition to UDP connections.
Allow TCP connections.

Addresses the following denial:

[ 1831.586826] type=1400 audit(1384129166.563:173): avc:  denied  { create } for  pid=11406 comm="netd" scontext=u:r:netd:s0 tcontext=u:r:netd:s0 tclass=tcp_socket

Public Bug: https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=62196
Bug: 11097631

(cherry picked from commit 36a5d109)

Change-Id: Id2e383e1c74a26ef7e56499a33bf2b06b869c12b

DNS can use TCP connections, in addition to UDP connections.
Allow TCP connections.

Addresses the following denial:

[ 1831.586826] type=1400 audit(1384129166.563:173): avc:  denied  { create } for  pid=11406 comm="netd" scontext=u:r:netd:s0 tcontext=u:r:netd:s0 tclass=tcp_socket

Public Bug: https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=62196
Change-Id: Ia542a9df3e466a8d409955bab6a23a524ff3d07b
Bug: 11097631

Change-Id: If26baa947ff462f5bb09b75918a4130097de5ef4

The specific denials we see are:

denied  { getattr } for  pid=169 comm=""installd"" path=""/data/data/com.android.providers.downloads/cache/downloadfile.jpeg"" dev=""mmcblk0p23"" ino=602861 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:download_file:s0 tclass=file
denied  { fsetid } for  pid=598 comm=""netd"" capability=4  scontext=u:r:netd:s0 tcontext=u:r:netd:s0 tclass=capability
denied  { read } for  pid=209 comm=""installd"" name=""cache"" dev=""mmcblk0p28"" ino=81694 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:download_file:s0 tclass=dir

Bug: 10786017
Change-Id: Ia5d0b6337f3de6a168ac0d5a77df2a1ac419ec29

Change-Id: I6b27418507ebd0113a97bea81f37e4dc1de6da14
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Bug: 10175701
Change-Id: I185df22bdbaafd56725760ec6c71340b67455046

Remove "self:process ptrace" from all SELinux enforced domains.
In general, a process should never need to ptrace itself.
We can add this back to more narrowly scoped domains as needed.

Add a bunch of neverallow assertions to netd.te, to verify that netd
never gets unexpected capabilities.

Change-Id: Ie862dc95bec84068536bb64705667e36210c5f4e

Allow netd to set ctl.* properties. Currently, mdnsd is broken because
it can't set this property.

Bug: 9777774
Change-Id: I2f32504d77b651e66e0a0067e65a5ed44b427f5a

This change does several things:

1) Restore domain.te to the version present at
cd516a32 . This is the version
currently being distributed in AOSP.

2) Add "allow domain properties_device:file r_file_perms;" to
domain.te, to allow all domains to read /dev/__properties__ .
This change was missing from AOSP.

3) Restore netd.te to the version present at
80c9ba52 . This is the version
currently being distributed in AOSP.

4) Remove anything involving module loading from netd.te. CTS
enforces that Android kernels can't have module loading enabled.

5) Add several new capabilities, plus data file rules, to
netd.te, since netd needs to write to files owned by wifi.

6) Add a new unconfined domain called dnsmasq.te, and allow
transitions from netd to that domain. Over time, we'll tighten up
the dnsmasq.te domain.

7) Add a new unconfined domain called hostapd.te, and allow
transitions from netd to that domain. Over time, we'll tighten up
the hostapd.te domain.

The net effect of these changes is to re-enable SELinux protections
for netd. The policy is FAR from perfect, and allows a lot of wiggle
room, but we can improve it over time.

Testing: as much as possible, I've exercised networking related
functionality, including turning on and off wifi, entering airplane
mode, and enabling tethering and portable wifi hotspots. It's quite
possible I've missed something, and if we experience problems, I
can roll back this change.

Bug: 9618347
Change-Id: I23ff3eebcef629bc7baabcf6962f25f116c4a3c0

This prevents denials from being generated by the base policy.
Over time, these rules will be incrementally tightened to improve
security.

Change-Id: I4be1c987a5d69ac784a56d42fc2c9063c402de11

Bug: 4070557
Change-Id: I027f76cff6df90e9909711cb81fbd17db95233c1

Change-Id: I013e08bcd82a9e2311a958e1c98931f53f6720c9
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Change-Id: I013e08bcd82a9e2311a958e1c98931f53f6720c9
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Policy to allow bluetooth tethering.

Change-Id: Ic24c97b0e1dc93395b8381b78ca4929baa30337c
Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>