- Apr 06, 2017
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Alex Klyubin authored
am: 7c3dbfeb Change-Id: I5480d47059b876ceffdf029ea14f6480516b43ef
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Alex Klyubin authored
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Alex Klyubin authored
am: cfcffa9a Change-Id: I5979d4ea8a54944a7762cee2db04a078d0bd66bd
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TreeHugger Robot authored
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Sandeep Patil authored
am: 37792cec Change-Id: I469f6de852f10515148ef824c85ff2febf31322e
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Andreas Gampe authored
am: 82071b68 Change-Id: Ia3bd034033f82aaed63b173e5205e7449e2743ef
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TreeHugger Robot authored
* changes: sepolicy: relabel /vendor Sepolicy: Add ASAN-Extract
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Nathan Harold authored
am: 516c9abf Change-Id: I59f1abcdb1f7184fc795c2164a5799e7ff7f4772
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Nathan Harold authored
am: 63a93156 Change-Id: I26a67ce475de966ec979cf4dfddd8b3210802552
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Nathan Harold authored
* changes: Add IpSecService SEPolicy Update Common NetD SEPolicy to allow Netlink XFRM
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- Apr 05, 2017
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Sandeep Patil authored
The CL splits /vendor labeling from /system. Which was allowing all processes read, execute access to /vendor. Following directories will remain world readable /vendor/etc /vendor/lib(64)/hw/ Following are currently world readable but their scope will be minimized to platform processes that require access /vendor/app /vendor/framework/ /vendor/overlay Files labelled with 'same_process_hal_file' are allowed to be read + executed from by the world. This is for Same process HALs and their dependencies. Bug: 36527360 Bug: 36832490 Bug: 36681210 Bug: 36680116 Bug: 36690845 Bug: 36697328 Bug: 36696623 Bug: 36806861 Bug: 36656392 Bug: 36696623 Bug: 36792803 All of the tests were done on sailfish, angler, bullhead, dragon Test: Boot and connect to wifi Test: Run chrome and load websites, play video in youtube, load maps w/ current location, take pictures and record video in camera, playback recorded video. Test: Connect to BT headset and ensure BT audio playback works. Test: OTA sideload using recovery Test: CTS SELinuxHostTest pass Change-Id: I278435b72f7551a28f3c229f720ca608b77a7029 Signed-off-by:
Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
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Andreas Gampe authored
Add selinux policies for init script and shell script to unzip a tar containing ASAN libraries on boot. Bug: 36458146 Test: m && m SANITIZE_TARGET=address Test: manual (build steps for tar missing) Change-Id: I5c3cb233aae93ee9985431090af902b0e3c1b0a7 (cherry picked from commit 0b743050) Merged-In: I5c3cb233aae93ee9985431090af902b0e3c1b0a7
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Steven Moreland authored
am: 6821bb40 Change-Id: I90f1ae5f671cbf7bcdcab728dd0bfac673f95050
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TreeHugger Robot authored
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Steven Moreland authored
Test: adbd_test (with and without adb root) Note: one test fails without root with and without this change because of an unrelated shell selinux denial. Test: adb screencap, pull, and verify Test: Android Studio screenshot Bug: 36643190 Change-Id: Ib534240bc9bb3a1f32b8865ca66db988902a0f4a
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Nick Kralevich authored
am: 6f108fd8 Change-Id: I98a793c05260b9f469902c17375693ef7c68b238
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Nick Kralevich authored
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Tianjie Xu authored
am: c0e6cb58 Change-Id: If2cc73c4f4b14fb46273b97aae151e735ccddaa0
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TreeHugger Robot authored
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Nick Kralevich authored
Remove system_file:file { lock ioctl } from domain_deprecated. The only domains triggering this were dex2oat and netd, which are fixed in this change. Addresses the following logspam similar to: avc: granted { lock } for comm="iptables" path="/system/etc/xtables.lock" dev="sda22" ino=3745 scontext=u:r:netd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { lock } for comm="dex2oat" path="/system/framework/arm/boot-okhttp.art" dev="dm-0" ino=1295 scontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=file Test: device boots and no obvious problems. Bug: 28760354 Bug: 36879751 Change-Id: Iac851c0e49a52ce4000fdfe16e68c17ff819693f
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- Apr 04, 2017
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Steven Moreland authored
am: ccbea503 Change-Id: I55fab2ec9b63c5d9393bd18d9c340030ee9f1cc5
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TreeHugger Robot authored
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Yifan Hong authored
am: abaf415c Change-Id: I89396424e62a09f8e111212b920fc0897b6a517e
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TreeHugger Robot authored
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Alex Klyubin authored
am: e311d669 Change-Id: Ibeb5854ca377048726b01288030a421e7f1a9bc2
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TreeHugger Robot authored
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Ray Essick authored
am: 72f6219f Change-Id: I93bd189fc07ee4386b1a1c14cf345ca739f9f64b
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Ray Essick authored
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Amit Mahajan authored
am: 8b080ee2 Change-Id: Ieba9f9055b78d349c883ca1132336c318e490b17
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Alex Klyubin authored
Wifi Keystore HAL is a HwBinder service (currently offered by keystore daemon) which is used by Wifi Supplicant HAL. This commit thus switches the SELinux policy of Wifi Keystore HAL to the approach used for non-HAL HwBinder services. The basic idea is simimilar to how we express Binder services in the policy, with two tweaks: (1) we don't have 'hwservicemanager find' and thus there's no add_hwservice macro, and (2) we need loosen the coupling between core and vendor components. For example, it should be possible to move a HwBinder service offered by a core component into another core component, without having to update the SELinux policy of the vendor image. We thus annotate all components offering HwBinder service x across the core-vendor boundary with x_server, which enables the policy of clients to contain rules of the form: binder_call(mydomain, x_server), and, if the service uses IPC callbacks, also binder_call(x_server, mydomain). Test: mmm system/sepolicy Test: sesearch indicates to changes to binder { call transfer} between keystore and hal_wifi_supplicant_default domains Bug: 36896667 Change-Id: I45c4ce8159b63869d7bb6df5c812c5291776d892
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Mark Salyzyn authored
am: 0dd37a3b Change-Id: I91a8cfce767c1b280bbea788038cc8a24363f662
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Mark Salyzyn authored
am: 8da8e872 Change-Id: I84e2d4d81892ee48d0e3db3875c9dd0b49f3ce2d
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Mark Salyzyn authored
am: b5b6e0c5 Change-Id: Ie55c6153a4484921cf85bff0fc64e2b345715ae1
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Treehugger Robot authored
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Alex Klyubin authored
SELinux policy no longer has allow rules which permit core/non-vendor domains to communicate with tee domain over sockets. This commit thus removes tee from the list of temporary exceptions for the socket communications prohibition. Test: mmm system/sepolicy Bug: 36714625 Bug: 36715266 Change-Id: Iccbd9ea0555b0c9f1cb6c5e0f5a6c0d3f8730b4d
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Tianjie Xu authored
Currently update_verifier only verifies the blocks when dm-verity is in 'enforcing' mode; and dm-verity will reboot the device upon detection of errors. However, sometimes the verity mode is not guaranteed to be correct. When mode is 'eio' for example, dm-verity will not trigger a reboot but rather fail the read. So update_verifier need to take the responsibility to reboot the device. Otherwise the device will continue to boot without setting the flag "isSlotMarkedSuccessful". Denial message: update_verifier: type=1400 audit(0.0:18): avc: denied { write } for name="property_service" dev="tmpfs" ino=14678 scontext=u:r:update_verifier:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:property_socket:s0 tclass=sock_file permissive=0 Bug: 36260064 Test: powerctl property sets successfully Change-Id: I1260e60f2ef4db50573e515ba95c332512c8ae62 (cherry picked from commit 0d8c1e0a)
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Amit Mahajan authored
Test: manual (verified no denials in basic telephony operations) Bug: 36613472 Change-Id: I31274adee2cb6293102446cd2d6d547c50616836
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Alex Klyubin authored
am: ea53e29f Change-Id: Ic6aa9fa02e28a6f35ad76a8387593ecd566929a7
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Tianjie Xu authored
am: 64c8aa96 Change-Id: I1260e60f2ef4db50573e515ba95c332512c8ae62
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Tianjie Xu authored
am: 6429e000 Change-Id: I14d24ef85a8409adaffe4073e3697d21a2c2f05f
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