- Jan 21, 2016
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Only used in AOSP by flounder. No denials when running Google Maps. Change-Id: I9902c263016b4d38f1b3ed0be0bc7c4cd17ee471
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- Nov 03, 2015
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Motivation: Domain is overly permissive. Start removing permissions from domain and assign them to the domain_deprecated attribute. Domain_deprecated and domain can initially be assigned to all domains. The goal is to not assign domain_deprecated to new domains and to start removing domain_deprecated where it is not required or reassigning the appropriate permissions to the inheriting domain when necessary. Bug: 25433265 Change-Id: I8b11cb137df7bdd382629c98d916a73fe276413c
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- Aug 25, 2015
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Stephen Smalley authored
When the toolbox domain was introduced, we allowed all domains to exec it to avoid breakage. However, only domains that were previously allowed the ability to exec /system files would have been able to do this prior to the introduction of the toolbox domain. Remove the rule from domain.te and add rules to all domains that are already allowed execute_no_trans to system_file. Requires coordination with device-specific policy changes with the same Change-Id. Change-Id: Ie46209f0412f9914857dc3d7c6b0917b7031aae5 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- Mar 24, 2015
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Nick Kralevich authored
Add a compile time assertion that gpsd never has capabilities other than block_suspend. Bug: 19908228 Change-Id: Iaaf83191902ed04fe9df52c1ed44248fb1ce732d
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- Mar 14, 2014
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Stephen Smalley authored
Change-Id: I68a8f37576d0d04d0f9df9ef8991407b6846ba15 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- Jan 14, 2014
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Stephen Smalley authored
Change-Id: Ie7414b49eac92f7d57789cc3082dbce774561126 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- Oct 21, 2013
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Nick Kralevich authored
This change removes the permissive line from unconfined domains. Unconfined domains can do (mostly) anything, so moving these domains into enforcing should be a no-op. The following domains were deliberately NOT changed: 1) kernel 2) init In the future, this gives us the ability to tighten up the rules in unconfined, and have those tightened rules actually work. When we're ready to tighten up the rules for these domains, we can: 1) Remove unconfined_domain and re-add the permissive line. 2) Submit the domain in permissive but NOT unconfined. 3) Remove the permissive line 4) Wait a few days and submit the no-permissive change. For instance, if we were ready to do this for adb, we'd identify a list of possible rules which allow adbd to work, re-add the permissive line, and then upload those changes to AOSP. After sufficient testing, we'd then move adb to enforcing. We'd repeat this for each domain until everything is enforcing and out of unconfined. Change-Id: If674190de3262969322fb2e93d9a0e734f8b9245
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- May 20, 2013
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repo sync authored
This prevents denials from being generated by the base policy. Over time, these rules will be incrementally tightened to improve security. Change-Id: I4be1c987a5d69ac784a56d42fc2c9063c402de11
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- May 15, 2013
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repo sync authored
Bug: 4070557 Change-Id: I027f76cff6df90e9909711cb81fbd17db95233c1
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- Aug 13, 2012
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rpcraig authored
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- Jan 04, 2012
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Stephen Smalley authored
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