Bug: 36562029
Test: m -j40 and CEC functionality works well
Change-Id: I5a693e65abdd5139a848d939149a475056cc41e8

* changes:
  sepolicy: relabel /vendor
  Sepolicy: Add ASAN-Extract

* changes:
  Add IpSecService SEPolicy
  Update Common NetD SEPolicy to allow Netlink XFRM

The CL splits /vendor labeling from /system. Which was allowing all
processes read, execute access to /vendor.

Following directories will remain world readable
 /vendor/etc
 /vendor/lib(64)/hw/

Following are currently world readable but their scope
will be minimized to platform processes that require access
 /vendor/app
 /vendor/framework/
 /vendor/overlay

Files labelled with 'same_process_hal_file' are allowed to be
read + executed from by the world. This is for Same process HALs and
their dependencies.

Bug: 36527360
Bug: 36832490
Bug: 36681210
Bug: 36680116
Bug: 36690845
Bug: 36697328
Bug: 36696623
Bug: 36806861
Bug: 36656392
Bug: 36696623
Bug: 36792803

All of the tests were done on sailfish, angler, bullhead, dragon
Test: Boot and connect to wifi
Test: Run chrome and load websites, play video in youtube, load maps w/
      current location, take pictures and record video in camera,
      playback recorded video.
Test: Connect to BT headset and ensure BT audio playback works.
Test: OTA sideload using recovery
Test: CTS SELinuxHostTest pass

Change-Id: I278435b72f7551a28f3c229f720ca608b77a7029
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

Add selinux policies for init script and shell script to unzip a tar
containing ASAN libraries on boot.

Bug: 36458146
Test: m && m SANITIZE_TARGET=address
Test: manual (build steps for tar missing)
Change-Id: I5c3cb233aae93ee9985431090af902b0e3c1b0a7
(cherry picked from commit 0b743050)
Merged-In: I5c3cb233aae93ee9985431090af902b0e3c1b0a7

Test: adbd_test (with and without adb root)
  Note: one test fails without root with and without this change
        because of an unrelated shell selinux denial.
Test: adb screencap, pull, and verify
Test: Android Studio screenshot
Bug: 36643190
Change-Id: Ib534240bc9bb3a1f32b8865ca66db988902a0f4a

Remove system_file:file { lock ioctl } from domain_deprecated. The only
domains triggering this were dex2oat and netd, which are fixed in this
change.

Addresses the following logspam similar to:

  avc: granted { lock } for comm="iptables"
  path="/system/etc/xtables.lock" dev="sda22" ino=3745
  scontext=u:r:netd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=file

  avc: granted { lock } for comm="dex2oat"
  path="/system/framework/arm/boot-okhttp.art" dev="dm-0" ino=1295
  scontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=file

Test: device boots and no obvious problems.
Bug: 28760354
Bug: 36879751
Change-Id: Iac851c0e49a52ce4000fdfe16e68c17ff819693f

Wifi Keystore HAL is a HwBinder service (currently offered by keystore
daemon) which is used by Wifi Supplicant HAL. This commit thus
switches the SELinux policy of Wifi Keystore HAL to the approach used
for non-HAL HwBinder services.

The basic idea is simimilar to how we express Binder services in the
policy, with two tweaks: (1) we don't have 'hwservicemanager find' and
thus there's no add_hwservice macro, and (2) we need loosen the
coupling between core and vendor components. For example, it should be
possible to move a HwBinder service offered by a core component into
another core component, without having to update the SELinux policy of
the vendor image. We thus annotate all components offering HwBinder
service x across the core-vendor boundary with x_server, which enables
the policy of clients to contain rules of the form:
binder_call(mydomain, x_server), and, if the service uses IPC
callbacks, also binder_call(x_server, mydomain).

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Test: sesearch indicates to changes to binder { call transfer} between
      keystore and hal_wifi_supplicant_default domains
Bug: 36896667

Change-Id: I45c4ce8159b63869d7bb6df5c812c5291776d892

SELinux policy no longer has allow rules which permit core/non-vendor
domains to communicate with tee domain over sockets. This commit thus
removes tee from the list of temporary exceptions for the socket
communications prohibition.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 36714625
Bug: 36715266
Change-Id: Iccbd9ea0555b0c9f1cb6c5e0f5a6c0d3f8730b4d

Currently update_verifier only verifies the blocks when dm-verity is in
'enforcing' mode; and dm-verity will reboot the device upon detection of
errors. However, sometimes the verity mode is not guaranteed to be
correct. When mode is 'eio' for example, dm-verity will not trigger
a reboot but rather fail the read. So update_verifier need to take the
responsibility to reboot the device. Otherwise the device will continue
to boot without setting the flag "isSlotMarkedSuccessful".

Denial message:
update_verifier: type=1400 audit(0.0:18): avc: denied { write } for
name="property_service" dev="tmpfs" ino=14678 scontext=u:r:update_verifier:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:property_socket:s0 tclass=sock_file permissive=0

Bug: 36260064
Test: powerctl property sets successfully

Change-Id: I1260e60f2ef4db50573e515ba95c332512c8ae62
(cherry picked from commit 0d8c1e0a)

Test: manual (verified no denials in basic telephony operations)
Bug: 36613472
Change-Id: I31274adee2cb6293102446cd2d6d547c50616836

android.framework.sensorservice@1.0 pass a file
descriptor from hidl_memory into
android.hardware.sensors@1.0, hence requiring the latter
to use the file descriptor.

Test: VtsHalSensorManagerV1_0TargetTest under selinux
enforcing mode
Bug: 35219747
Change-Id: I0185c8af0714776842c90ebb687b684324b55cd8

This removes hwservicemanager from halserverdomain, because
halserverdomain is only for domains which offer a HAL service.
hwservicemanager offers HwBinder services, but those are not HAL
services.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Test: Device boots, no new denials.
Bug: 36494354
Bug: 36896667
Change-Id: I002e047ee1dd98f44429ab3dfe31f66dc63a8a1c

when GMSCore collects information for uploading via 'dumpsys
media.metrics', it provides the metrics service with a file descriptor
to hold the data, which is post-processed by the log collecting code
in GMScore.  This temp file lives in /data/, a place where our
restrictive policies for media.metrics doesn't allow any writing.

This relaxes the restrictions -- allowing media.metrics to
write to already open file descriptors it might be given on that
partition.

Bug: 36660639
Test: build/boot
Change-Id: Icbaa76b04ecf731014b6b1bb1283bc2951a6ae4b

Test: works on internal marlin
Bug: 34274385
Change-Id: Idd35e5cdccb595b4e5994eb1d78fdeece0aec0a6

Test: Test: make cts && \
      cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info \
      --skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check --abi arm64-v8a \
      --module CtsSecurityHostTestCases \
      -t android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testNoExemptionsForBinderInVendorBan
      Fails as expected.
Bug: 36002573

Change-Id: I298c526789b25734d5f18666c64497e5d1e181d0

So we can limit vndservicemanager access to
just vndservice_contexts.

Bug: 36052864
Test: servicemanager,vndservicemanager work
Change-Id: I7b132d4f616ba1edd0daf7be750d4b7174c4e188

The tee domain is a vendor domain. Thus it cannot be accessed by
non-vendor components over Unix domain sockets.

It appears that the rules granting this access are not needed.

Test: Flash a clean build with this change. Confirm that bullhead,
      angler, sailfish, ryu, boot without new denials.
      Confirm that YouTube, Netflix, Google Play Movies play back
      videos without new denials.
Bug: 36714625
Bug: 36715266

Change-Id: I639cecd07c9a3cfb257e62622b51b7823613472a

"tee" domain is a vendor domain. Hence its rules should live on the
vendor image.

What's left as public API is that:
1. tee domain exists and that it is permitted to sys_rawio capability,
2. tee_device type exists and apps are not permitted to access
   character devices labeled tee_device.

If you were relying on system/sepolicy automatically labeling
/dev/tf_driver as tee_device or labeling /system/bin/tf_daemon as
tee_exec, then you need to add these rules to your device-specific
file_contexts.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Test: bullhead, angler, and sailfish boot up without new denials
Bug: 36714625
Bug: 36714625
Bug: 36720355
Change-Id: Ie21619ff3c44ef58675c369061b4afdd7e8501c6

Bug: 36855921
Test: compile, wifi works with toggling
Change-Id: Ib0819a2d552472e482e192a69530441cfc2c0fd7