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  1. Dec 15, 2014
    • dcashman's avatar
      Restrict service_manager find and list access. · cd82557d
      dcashman authored
      All domains are currently granted list and find service_manager
      permissions, but this is not necessary.  Pare the permissions
      which did not trigger any of the auditallow reporting.
      
      Bug: 18106000
      Change-Id: Ie0ce8de2af8af2cbe4ce388a2dcf4534694c994a
      cd82557d
  2. Oct 22, 2014
  3. Jul 25, 2014
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Resync lmp-dev-plus-aosp with master · d065f048
      Nick Kralevich authored
      A DO NOT MERGE change merged from lmp-dev to lmp-dev-plus-aosp.
      This is expected, but it's causing unnecessary merge conflicts
      when handling AOSP contributions.
      
      Resolve those conflicts.
      
      This is essentially a revert of bf696327
      for lmp-dev-plus-aosp only.
      
      Change-Id: Icc66def7113ab45176ae015f659cb442d53bce5c
      d065f048
  4. Jul 18, 2014
  5. Jul 15, 2014
    • Riley Spahn's avatar
      Add access control for each service_manager action. · 344fc109
      Riley Spahn authored
      Add SELinux MAC for the service manager actions list
      and find. Add the list and find verbs to the
      service_manager class. Add policy requirements for
      service_manager to enforce policies to binder_use
      macro.
      
      (cherry picked from commit b8511e0d)
      
      Change-Id: I980d4a8acf6a0c6e99a3a7905961eb5564b1be15
      344fc109
  6. Jul 14, 2014
    • Riley Spahn's avatar
      Add access control for each service_manager action. · b8511e0d
      Riley Spahn authored
      Add SELinux MAC for the service manager actions list
      and find. Add the list and find verbs to the
      service_manager class. Add policy requirements for
      service_manager to enforce policies to binder_use
      macro.
      
      Change-Id: I224b1c6a6e21e3cdeb23badfc35c82a37558f964
      b8511e0d
  7. Jun 26, 2014
    • Riley Spahn's avatar
      Adding policies for KeyStore MAC. · 1196d2a5
      Riley Spahn authored
      Add keystore_key class and an action for each action supported
      by keystore. Add policies that replicate the access control that
      already exists in keystore. Add auditallow rules for actions
      not known to be used frequently. Add macro for those domains
      wishing to access keystore.
      
      Change-Id: Iddd8672b9e9b72b45ee208e6eda608cc9dc61edc
      1196d2a5
  8. Jun 12, 2014
    • Riley Spahn's avatar
      Add SELinux rules for service_manager. · f90c41f6
      Riley Spahn authored
      Add a service_mananger class with the verb add.
      Add a type that groups the services for each of the
      processes that is allowed to start services in service.te
      and an attribute for all services controlled by the service
      manager. Add the service_contexts file which maps service
      name to target label.
      
      Bug: 12909011
      Change-Id: I017032a50bc90c57b536e80b972118016d340c7d
      f90c41f6
  9. May 20, 2014
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Don't allow ptrace on keystore · 8aa754c9
      Nick Kralevich authored
      keystore may hold sensitive information in it's memory. Don't
      allow anyone to ptrace keystore.
      
      Change-Id: I4e3717e482b9fd128d38ce687c03122d41678b6f
      8aa754c9
  10. May 09, 2014
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Protect keystore's files. · cd905ec0
      Nick Kralevich authored
      Only keystore itself should be reading / writing it's files.
      Remove keystore file access from other SELinux domains, including
      unconfined. Add neverallow rules to protect against regressions.
      Allow init limited access to recurse into keystore's directory.
      
      Change-Id: I0bb5de7804f4314997c16fac18507933014bcadf
      cd905ec0
  11. Jan 08, 2014
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Allow keystore to talk to the tee · b23d2876
      Nick Kralevich authored
      On manta, the keystore CTS tests are failing, because
      keystore isn't allowed to talk to the tee. Allow it.
      
      I've only seen this bug on manta, but it seems appropriate
      for all domains.
      
      Fixes the following denial:
      
      <5>[  286.249563] type=1400 audit(1389210059.924:6): avc:  denied  { connectto } for  pid=126 comm="keystore" path=006D636461656D6F6E scontext=u:r:keystore:s0 tcontext=u:r:tee:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
      
      Bug: 12450710
      Change-Id: I07133d9abeaf967392118ba478a5a391cf0c5fa5
      b23d2876
  12. Nov 06, 2013
  13. Nov 05, 2013
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Revert "Make the keystore domain enforcing." · 2d8dcb73
      Nick Kralevich authored
      This is causing runtime restarts on flo/deb when uninstalling
      some APKs. Revert while I investigate it.
      
      11-04 21:52:41.487   687   704 I ActivityManager: Force stopping com.android.development appid=10078 user=-1: uninstall pkg
      11-04 21:52:41.487   687   712 W PackageManager: Couldn't delete native library directory /data/app-lib/com.android.development
      11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 W dalvikvm: threadid=20: thread exiting with uncaught exception (group=0x959dfae8)
      11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime: *** FATAL EXCEPTION IN SYSTEM PROCESS: PackageManager
      11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime: java.lang.NullPointerException
      11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at android.security.KeyStore.clearUid(KeyStore.java:327)
      11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at com.android.server.pm.PackageManagerService.removeKeystoreDataIfNeeded(PackageManagerService.java:9787)
      11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at com.android.server.pm.PackageManagerService.removePackageDataLI(PackageManagerService.java:9384)
      11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at com.android.server.pm.PackageManagerService.deleteInstalledPackageLI(PackageManagerService.java:9503)
      11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at com.android.server.pm.PackageManagerService.deletePackageLI(PackageManagerService.java:9612)
      11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at com.android.server.pm.PackageManagerService.deletePackageX(PackageManagerService.java:9239)
      11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at com.android.server.pm.PackageManagerService.access$4100(PackageManagerService.java:178)
      11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at com.android.server.pm.PackageManagerService$7.run(PackageManagerService.java:9173)
      11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at android.os.Handler.handleCallback(Handler.java:733)
      11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at android.os.Handler.dispatchMessage(Handler.java:95)
      11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at android.os.Looper.loop(Looper.java:136)
      11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at android.os.HandlerThread.run(HandlerThread.java:61)
      11-04 21:52:41.567   687   712 I Process : Sending signal. PID: 687 SIG: 9
      
      and
      
      [    7.324554] type=1400 audit(1383601030.823:5): avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=192 comm="keystore" name="qseecom" dev="tmpfs" ino=7521 scontext=u:r:keystore:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:device:s0 tclass=chr_file
      
      This reverts commit 709d7183.
      
      Bug: 11518274
      2d8dcb73
  14. Oct 31, 2013
  15. Oct 29, 2013
  16. Oct 21, 2013
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Move unconfined domains out of permissive mode. · 353c72e3
      Nick Kralevich authored
      This change removes the permissive line from unconfined
      domains. Unconfined domains can do (mostly) anything, so moving
      these domains into enforcing should be a no-op.
      
      The following domains were deliberately NOT changed:
      1) kernel
      2) init
      
      In the future, this gives us the ability to tighten up the
      rules in unconfined, and have those tightened rules actually
      work.
      
      When we're ready to tighten up the rules for these domains,
      we can:
      
      1) Remove unconfined_domain and re-add the permissive line.
      2) Submit the domain in permissive but NOT unconfined.
      3) Remove the permissive line
      4) Wait a few days and submit the no-permissive change.
      
      For instance, if we were ready to do this for adb, we'd identify
      a list of possible rules which allow adbd to work, re-add
      the permissive line, and then upload those changes to AOSP.
      After sufficient testing, we'd then move adb to enforcing.
      We'd repeat this for each domain until everything is enforcing
      and out of unconfined.
      
      Change-Id: If674190de3262969322fb2e93d9a0e734f8b9245
      353c72e3
  17. May 20, 2013
    • repo sync's avatar
      Make all domains unconfined. · 77d4731e
      repo sync authored
      This prevents denials from being generated by the base policy.
      Over time, these rules will be incrementally tightened to improve
      security.
      
      Change-Id: I4be1c987a5d69ac784a56d42fc2c9063c402de11
      77d4731e
  18. May 15, 2013
  19. Nov 19, 2012
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      Update policy for Android 4.2 / latest master. · 61c80d5e
      Stephen Smalley authored
      
      Update policy for Android 4.2 / latest master.
      Primarily this consists of changes around the bluetooth subsystem.
      The zygote also needs further permissions to set up /storage/emulated.
      adbd service now gets a socket under /dev/socket.
      keystore uses the binder.
      
      Change-Id: I8c5aeb8d100313c75169734a0fa614aa974b3bfc
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      61c80d5e
  20. Aug 13, 2012
  21. Aug 10, 2012
  22. Jan 04, 2012
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