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  • # Domain for shell processes spawned by ADB or console service.
    
    type shell, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
    
    type shell_exec, exec_type, file_type;
    
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    # Create and use network sockets.
    net_domain(shell)
    
    
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    # Run app_process.
    
    # XXX Transition into its own domain?
    
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    app_domain(shell)
    
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    # logcat
    
    read_logd(shell)
    control_logd(shell)
    
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    # logcat -L (directly, or via dumpstate)
    allow shell pstorefs:dir search;
    allow shell pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
    
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    # logpersistd (nee logcatd) files
    
    userdebug_or_eng(`
      allow shell misc_logd_file:dir r_dir_perms;
      allow shell misc_logd_file:file r_file_perms;
    ')
    
    # Root fs.
    allow shell rootfs:dir r_dir_perms;
    
    
    # read files in /data/anr
    allow shell anr_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
    allow shell anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
    
    
    # Access /data/local/tmp.
    allow shell shell_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
    allow shell shell_data_file:file create_file_perms;
    allow shell shell_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
    
    allow shell shell_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
    
    # Read/execute files in /data/nativetest
    userdebug_or_eng(`
      allow shell nativetest_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
      allow shell nativetest_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
    ')
    
    
    # adb bugreport
    unix_socket_connect(shell, dumpstate, dumpstate)
    
    allow shell devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
    allow shell tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
    allow shell console_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
    
    allow shell input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
    
    allow shell input_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
    
    r_dir_file(shell, system_file)
    
    allow shell system_file:file x_file_perms;
    
    allow shell toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
    
    allow shell shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
    allow shell zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
    
    r_dir_file(shell, apk_data_file)
    
    # Set properties.
    
    set_prop(shell, ctl_bugreport_prop)
    
    set_prop(shell, ctl_dumpstate_prop)
    
    set_prop(shell, dumpstate_prop)
    
    set_prop(shell, debug_prop)
    set_prop(shell, powerctl_prop)
    
    
    # systrace support - allow atrace to run
    
    allow shell debugfs_tracing:dir r_dir_perms;
    allow shell debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
    
    allow shell debugfs_trace_marker:file getattr;
    
    allow shell atrace_exec:file rx_file_perms;
    
    userdebug_or_eng(`
      # "systrace --boot" support - allow boottrace service to run
      allow shell boottrace_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
      allow shell boottrace_data_file:file create_file_perms;
      set_prop(shell, persist_debug_prop)
    ')
    
    
    # allow shell to run dmesg
    allow shell kernel:system syslog_read;
    
    # allow shell access to services
    
    allow shell servicemanager:service_manager list;
    
    # don't allow shell to access GateKeeper service
    allow shell { service_manager_type -gatekeeper_service }:service_manager find;
    
    # allow shell to look through /proc/ for ps, top, netstat
    
    r_dir_file(shell, proc)
    
    r_dir_file(shell, proc_net)
    
    allow shell proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
    
    r_dir_file(shell, cgroup)
    
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    allow shell domain:dir { search open read getattr };
    allow shell domain:{ file lnk_file } { open read getattr };
    
    # statvfs() of /proc and other labeled filesystems
    # (yaffs2, jffs2, ext2, ext3, ext4, xfs, btrfs, f2fs, squashfs)
    allow shell { proc labeledfs }:filesystem getattr;
    
    # stat() of /dev
    allow shell device:dir getattr;
    
    
    # allow shell to read /proc/pid/attr/current for ps -Z
    allow shell domain:process getattr;
    
    
    # Allow pulling the SELinux policy for CTS purposes
    allow shell selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
    allow shell selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
    
    
    # enable shell domain to read/write files/dirs for bootchart data
    # User will creates the start and stop file via adb shell
    # and read other files created by init process under /data/bootchart
    allow shell bootchart_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
    allow shell bootchart_data_file:file create_file_perms;
    
    # Make sure strace works for the non-privileged shell user
    allow shell self:process ptrace;
    
    
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    # allow shell to get battery info
    allow shell sysfs_batteryinfo:file r_file_perms;
    
    allow shell sysfs:dir r_dir_perms;
    
    
    # Allow access to ion memory allocation device.
    allow shell ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
    
    
    #
    # filesystem test for insecure chr_file's is done
    # via a host side test
    #
    allow shell dev_type:dir r_dir_perms;
    allow shell dev_type:chr_file getattr;
    
    # /dev/fd is a symlink
    allow shell proc:lnk_file getattr;
    
    
    # Do not allow shell to hard link to any files.
    # In particular, if shell hard links to app data
    # files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
    # of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
    # bugs, so we want to ensure the shell user never has this
    # capability.
    neverallow shell file_type:file link;
    
    
    # limit shell access to sensitive char drivers to
    # only getattr required for host side test.
    neverallow shell {
      fuse_device
      hw_random_device
      kmem_device
    }:chr_file ~getattr;