- Sep 28, 2017
-
-
Dan Cashman authored
Bug: 37916906 Test: Builds 'n' boots. Change-Id: Ia1d86264446ebecc1ca79f32f11354921bc77668 Merged-In: I208ec6a864127a059fb389417a9c6b259d7474cb
-
- Sep 26, 2017
-
-
Dan Cashman authored
Bug: 37916906 Test: Builds 'n' boots. Change-Id: Ia1d86264446ebecc1ca79f32f11354921bc77668 Merged-In: I208ec6a864127a059fb389417a9c6b259d7474cb
-
- Sep 20, 2017
-
-
Tri Vo authored
proc files needed by fwk that were labeled: /proc/filesystems -> proc_filesystems /proc/mounts -> proc_mounts /proc/swaps -> proc_mounts Removed access to proc label from these domains: e2fs, fsck, fsck_untrusted, sdcardd e2fs: added access to proc_filesystems, proc_mounts, proc_swaps fsck: added access to proc_mounts, proc_swaps fsck_untrusted: added access to proc_mounts sdcardd: added access to proc_filesystems vold: added access to proc_filesystems, proc_mounts Bug: 66199084 Test: device boots without selinux denials to new labels or proc label. Change-Id: If0f19e22074419dab0b3a0c6f3a300ea8cb94523
-
- Jul 24, 2017
-
-
Jeff Vander Stoep authored
This attribute is being actively removed from policy. Since attributes are not being versioned, partners must not be able to access and use this attribute. Move it from private and verify in the logs that rild and tee are not using these permissions. Bug: 38316109 Test: build and boot Marlin Test: Verify that rild and tee are not being granted any of these permissions. Merged-In: I31beeb5bdf3885195310b086c1af3432dc6a349b Change-Id: I31beeb5bdf3885195310b086c1af3432dc6a349b (cherry picked from commit 76aab82c)
-
- May 15, 2017
-
-
Jeff Vander Stoep authored
This attribute is being actively removed from policy. Since attributes are not being versioned, partners must not be able to access and use this attribute. Move it from private and verify in the logs that rild and tee are not using these permissions. Bug: 38316109 Test: build and boot Marlin Test: Verify that rild and tee are not being granted any of these permissions. Change-Id: I31beeb5bdf3885195310b086c1af3432dc6a349b
-
- Feb 17, 2017
-
-
Nick Kralevich authored
To determine if it is safe to run fsck on a filesystem, e2fsck must first determine if the filesystem is mounted. To do that, e2fsck scans through /proc/mounts and collects all the mounted block devices. With that information, it runs stat() on each block device, comparing the major and minor numbers to the filesystem passed in on the command line. If there is a match, then the filesystem is currently mounted and running fsck is dangerous. Allow stat access to all block devices so that fsck can compare major/minor values. Addresses the following denials: avc: denied { getattr } for comm="e2fsck" path="/dev/block/sde5" dev="tmpfs" ino=15649 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:metadata_block_device:s0 tclass=blk_file permissive=0 avc: denied { getattr } for comm="e2fsck" path="/dev/block/sda25" dev="tmpfs" ino=15528 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:modem_block_device:s0 tclass=blk_file permissive=0 avc: denied { getattr } for comm="e2fsck" path="/dev/block/sda31" dev="tmpfs" ino=15552 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_block_device:s0 tclass=blk_file permissive=0 avc: denied { getattr } for comm="e2fsck" path="/dev/block/sdd3" dev="tmpfs" ino=15600 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:block_device:s0 tclass=blk_file permissive=0 Bug: 35324014 Bug: 33781554 Test: device boots and no SELinux denials. Change-Id: I5af4a334ec41952887914eec4eee5c60cc441a66
-
- Oct 06, 2016
-
-
dcashman authored
Divide policy into public and private components. This is the first step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform policies. The policy in the public directory will be exported for use in non-platform policy creation. Backwards compatibility with it will be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform version. Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy, and the need for attributes is minimal. For now, almost all types and avrules are left in public. Test: Tested by building policy and running on device. Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c
-
- Sep 10, 2016
-
-
Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Grant permissions observed. Bug: 28760354 Change-Id: Ie63cda709319bbf635ef7bffbba3477c2cccc11b
-
- Sep 09, 2016
-
-
Jeff Vander Stoep authored
This reverts commit 9c820a11. Bug: 31364540 Change-Id: I98a34bd32dd835e6795d31a90f16f4ccd691e6e5
-
- Aug 29, 2016
-
-
Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Grant permissions observed. (cherry picked from commit 9c820a11) Merged-in: Ifdead51f873eb587556309c48fb84ff1542ae303 Bug: 28760354 Change-Id: Ifdead51f873eb587556309c48fb84ff1542ae303
-
- Jun 06, 2016
-
-
Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Grant permissions observed. Bug: 28760354 Change-Id: Ifdead51f873eb587556309c48fb84ff1542ae303
-
- Feb 05, 2016
-
-
Nick Kralevich authored
Modify many "neverallow domain" rules to be "neverallow *" rules instead. This will catch more SELinux policy bugs where a label is assigned an irrelevant rule, as well as catch situations where a domain attribute is not assigned to a process. Change-Id: I5b83a2504c13b384f9dff616a70ca733b648ccdf
-
- Jan 27, 2016
-
-
Narayan Kamath authored
This reverts commit 0c7bc58e. bug: 26807309 Change-Id: I8a7b0e56a0d6f723508d0fddceffdff76eb0459a
-
- Jan 22, 2016
-
-
Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Remove from blkid, blkid_untrusted, fsck, fsck_untrusted, sdcardd and sgdisk. Tested by adding external sdcard with and without "adb shell sm set-force-adoptable true" command. Address the following denials: avc: denied { read } for name="swaps" dev="proc" ino=4026536590 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { open } for path="/proc/swaps" dev="proc" ino=4026536590 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { getattr } for path="/proc/swaps" dev="proc" ino=4026536590 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { read } for name="filesystems" dev="proc" ino=4026536591 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { open } for path="/proc/filesystems" dev="proc" ino=4026536591 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { getattr } for path="/proc/filesystems" dev="proc" ino=4026536591 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: I097e2ba5205e43f8ee613dae063f773a35ce3d73
-
- Nov 03, 2015
-
-
Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Motivation: Domain is overly permissive. Start removing permissions from domain and assign them to the domain_deprecated attribute. Domain_deprecated and domain can initially be assigned to all domains. The goal is to not assign domain_deprecated to new domains and to start removing domain_deprecated where it is not required or reassigning the appropriate permissions to the inheriting domain when necessary. Bug: 25433265 Change-Id: I8b11cb137df7bdd382629c98d916a73fe276413c
-
- Apr 01, 2015
-
-
Jeff Sharkey authored
vold works with two broad classes of block devices: untrusted devices that come in from the wild, and trusted devices. When running blkid and fsck, we pick which SELinux execution domain to use based on which class the device belongs to. Bug: 19993667 Change-Id: I44f5bac5dd94f0f76f3e4ef50ddbde5a32bd17a5
-