(cherry picked from commit 8486f4e6)

Grant observed permissions

Addresses:
init
avc:  granted  { use } for  pid=1 comm="init" path="/sys/fs/selinux/null" dev="selinuxfs" ino=22 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:kernel:s0 tclass=fd

mediaextractor
avc: granted { getattr } for pid=582 comm="mediaextractor" path="/proc/meminfo" dev="proc" ino=4026535447 scontext=u:r:mediaextractor:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_meminfo:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read } for pid=582 comm="mediaextractor" name="meminfo" dev="proc" ino=4026535447 scontext=u:r:mediaextractor:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_meminfo:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read open } for pid=582 comm="mediaextractor" path="/proc/meminfo" dev="proc" ino=4026535447 scontext=u:r:mediaextractor:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_meminfo:s0 tclass=file

uncrypt
avc: granted { getattr } for pid=6750 comm="uncrypt" path="/fstab.angler" dev="rootfs" ino=9809 scontext=u:r:uncrypt:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read } for pid=6750 comm="uncrypt" name="fstab.angler" dev="rootfs" ino=9809 scontext=u:r:uncrypt:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read open } for pid=6750 comm="uncrypt" path="/fstab.angler" dev="rootfs" ino=9809 scontext=u:r:uncrypt:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: Ibd51473c55d957aa7375de60da67cdc6504802f9

Grant permissions observed.

(cherry picked from commit 9c820a11)

Merged-in: Ifdead51f873eb587556309c48fb84ff1542ae303
Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: Ifdead51f873eb587556309c48fb84ff1542ae303

(cherry picked from commit e8a53dff)

With the breakup of mediaserver, distinguishing between
camera_device and video_device is meaningful. Only grant
cameraserver access to camera_device.

Bug: 28359909
Change-Id: I0ae12f87bac8a5c912f0a693d1d56a8d5af7f3f3

isolated_app can already write to a file. Apps may want to append
instead of write.

Fixes: 30984610
Change-Id: I7a90b3311dcaff597f07930ceea0a23b29b0df2d

Give debug versions the same rights as non-debug versions for
ART.

Change-Id: I9906d100c3857c3a87344ff37aabc53107562c61

Bug: 28746284
Change-Id: I59aa235ecba05e22aaa531e387a77f47267ac9ae

am: a67411c9

Change-Id: If2ab59c09b2ccf444281fdf9003e36119eb7295f

Bug: 28746284
Change-Id: Ib5e294402c549d8ed6764722220484c5655951a9

Ports check_seapp to pcre2.

Change-Id: If3faac5b911765a66eab074f7da2511624c3fc97

am: a15ea578  -s ours

Change-Id: I8acaaf29d6cd06291c45f3a1fb2e246718543922

Ports check_seapp to pcre2.

Merged-In: Ib9977326cfbb19ce143b04504f41afb884f2ec17
Bug: 24091652
Change-Id: Ib9977326cfbb19ce143b04504f41afb884f2ec17

am: c3774720

Change-Id: I7ffbc6c1d4213fe68c52ded884bd9db9f6b37fb1

Specifically we need init to relabel (/dev/device-mapper, /dev/block/dm-?)
and other files in /dev/block/* from tmpfs to dm_device and block_device
respectively.

BUG=27805372

Change-Id: I16af6e803f8e4150481137aba24d5406872f9c62

am: 89a8ed4e

Change-Id: I3733a74a23b3ece3a38fa2d7a2b3ea996f95c87f

am: c0937b6e

Change-Id: I06890bb6755d084f37bf6fb6564e4e1abeac8c06

Bug: http://b/30699558
Change-Id: Id9b213967ab290f45d1b8a5ab6712845ac9a0b69
Merged-In: Id9b213967ab290f45d1b8a5ab6712845ac9a0b69

Change-Id: I21dbd14d4e1bd89619e6fff91a85ed3fba02c324

The recovery flow for A/B devices allows to sideload an OTA downloaded
to a desktop and apply from recovery. This patch allows the "recovery"
context to perform all the operations required to apply an update as
update_engine would do in the background. These rules are now extracted
into a new attributte called update_engine_common shared between
recovery and update_engine.

Bug: 27178350
Change-Id: I97b301cb2c039fb002e8ebfb23c3599463ced03a

Change-Id: I2593e100bdad420d0d988fbaeb8d2ec259b8df1d

Change-Id: Ica9a16311075f5cc3744d0e0833ed876e201029f

Change-Id: I16706423534069f69bd0305ac500a9cd74db55a6

These APIs expose sensitive information via timing side channels. This
leaves access via the adb shell intact along with the current uses by
dumpstate, init and system_server.

The /proc/interrupts and /proc/stat files were covered in this paper:

https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2016/07/29/yet-another-android-side-channel/

The /proc/softirqs, /proc/timer_list and /proc/timer_stats files are
also relevant.

Access to /proc has been greatly restricted since then, with untrusted
apps no longer having direct access to these, but stricter restrictions
beyond that would be quite useful.

Change-Id: Ibed16674856569d26517e5729f0f194b830cfedd

am: 2b33112a

Change-Id: I08987ae7229ebbbbcf980be4aaef2eb8fb7e24da

boolean and setenforce macros are not used in base policy
and cannot be used in any policy, since they violate
neverallow rules.

Remove these from the policy.

Change-Id: Icc0780eaf06e95af36306031e1f615b05cb79869
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>

am: 19b6485f

Change-Id: I0574ab7e70a8b3d906a5b11368239d58d1d64e70

With v4.8+ kernels, CAP_WAKE_ALARM is needed to set
alarmtimers via timerfd (this change is likely to be
backported to stable as well).

However, with selinux enabled, we also need to allow
the capability on the system_server so this enables it.

Change-Id: I7cd64d587906f3fbc8a129d48a4db07373c74c7e
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>

am: aa2aa219

Change-Id: I5e1634a8c0cee6cb759e0acea086b68dbd21fb7e

Applications should not access /dev/input/* for events, but
rather use events handled via the activity mechanism.

Change-Id: I0182b6be1b7c69d96e4366ba59f14cee67be4beb
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>

Bug: http://b/30317429
Change-Id: I5c499c48d5e321ebdf588a162d29e949935ad8ee
Test: adb shell dmesg | grep ueventd

am: 362d6ff1

Change-Id: Ibe19ac1955bad48b5fa1db7ffada46aa78781781

Change-Id: I87b6797cd2bc9efafe2590e1f69d5787de99af07

Change-Id: Ia938d73b1a49b9ba4acf906df37095d21edee22e

Change-Id: I4c318efba76e61b6ab0be9491c352f281b1c2bff
Bug: 19160983