CTS includes general_sepolicy.conf built from this project. CTS then
tests this file's neverallow rules against the policy of the device
under test. Prior to this commit, neverallow rules which must be
enforced only for Treble devices we not included into
general_sepolicy.conf. As a result, these rules were not enforced for
Treble devices.

This commit fixes the issue as follows. Because CTS includes only one
policy, the policy now contains also the rules which are only for
Treble devices. To enable CTS to distinguish rules needed for all
devices from rules needed only on Treble devices, the latter rules are
contained in sections delimited with BEGIN_TREBLE_ONLY and
END_TREBLE_ONLY comments.

This commit also removes the unnecessary sepolicy.general target. This
target is not used anywhere and is causing trouble because it is
verifying neverallows of the policy meant to be used by CTS. This
policy can no longer be verified with checkpolicy without
conditionally including or excluding Treble-only neverallows.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Test: Device boots -- no new denials
Bug: 37082262
Change-Id: I15172a7efd9374543ba521e17aead1bdda7451bf

The CL splits /vendor labeling from /system. Which was allowing all
processes read, execute access to /vendor.

Following directories will remain world readable
 /vendor/etc
 /vendor/lib(64)/hw/

Following are currently world readable but their scope
will be minimized to platform processes that require access
 /vendor/app
 /vendor/framework/
 /vendor/overlay

Files labelled with 'same_process_hal_file' are allowed to be
read + executed from by the world. This is for Same process HALs and
their dependencies.

Bug: 36527360
Bug: 36832490
Bug: 36681210
Bug: 36680116
Bug: 36690845
Bug: 36697328
Bug: 36696623
Bug: 36806861
Bug: 36656392
Bug: 36696623
Bug: 36792803

All of the tests were done on sailfish, angler, bullhead, dragon
Test: Boot and connect to wifi
Test: Run chrome and load websites, play video in youtube, load maps w/
      current location, take pictures and record video in camera,
      playback recorded video.
Test: Connect to BT headset and ensure BT audio playback works.
Test: OTA sideload using recovery
Test: CTS SELinuxHostTest pass

Change-Id: I278435b72f7551a28f3c229f720ca608b77a7029
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

Test: works on internal marlin
Bug: 34274385
Change-Id: Idd35e5cdccb595b4e5994eb1d78fdeece0aec0a6

This change associates all domains which are clients of Allocator HAL
with hal_allocator_client and the, required for all HAL client
domains, halclientdomain.

This enables this commit to remove the now unnecessary hwallocator_use
macro because its binder_call(..., hal_allocator_server) is covered by
binder_call(hal_allocator_client, hal_allocator_server) added in this
commit.

Unfortunately apps, except isolated app, are clients of Allocator HAL
as well. This makes it hard to use the hal_client_domain(...,
hal_allocator) macro because it translates into "typeattribute" which
currently does not support being provided with a set of types, such as
{ appdomain -isolated_app }. As a workaround, hopefully until
typeattribute is improved, this commit expresses the necessary
association operation in CIL. private/technical_debt.cil introduced by
this commit is appended into the platform policy CIL file, thus
ensuring that the hack has effect on the final monolithic policy.

P. S. This change also removes Allocator HAL access from isolated_app.
Isolated app shouldn't have access to this HAL anyway.

Test: Google Play Music plays back radios
Test: Google Camera records video with sound and that video is then
      successfully played back with sound
Test: YouTube app plays back clips with sound
Test: YouTube in Chrome plays back clips with sound
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: Id00bba6fde83e7cf04fb58bc1c353c2f66333f92

On PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE devices, non-vendor domains (except vendor
apps) are not permitted to use Binder. This commit thus:
* groups non-vendor domains using the new "coredomain" attribute,
* adds neverallow rules restricting Binder use to coredomain and
  appdomain only, and
* temporarily exempts the domains which are currently violating this
  rule from this restriction. These domains are grouped using the new
  "binder_in_vendor_violators" attribute. The attribute is needed
  because the types corresponding to violators are not exposed to the
  public policy where the neverallow rules are.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Test: Device boots, no new denials
Test: In Chrome, navigate to ip6.me, play a YouTube video
Test: YouTube: play a video
Test: Netflix: play a movie
Test: Google Camera: take a photo, take an HDR+ photo, record video with
      sound, record slow motion video with sound. Confirm videos play
      back fine and with sound.
Bug: 35870313
Change-Id: I0cd1a80b60bcbde358ce0f7a47b90f4435a45c95

vndservicemanager is the context manager for binder services
that are solely registered and accessed from vendor processes.

Bug: 36052864
Test: vendorservicemanager runs
Merged-In: Ifbf536932678d0ff13d019635fe6347e185ef387
Change-Id: I430f1762eb83825f6cd4be939a69d46a8ddc80ff

ASAN builds may require additional permissions to launch processes
with ASAN wrappers. In this case, system_server needs permission to
execute /system/bin/sh.

Create with_asan() macro which can be used exclusively on debug
builds. Note this means that ASAN builds with these additional
permission will not pass the security portion of CTS - like any
other debug build.

Addresses:
avc: denied { execute } for name="sh" dev="dm-0" ino=571
scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_exec:s0
tclass=file

Test: lunch aosp_marlin-userdebug;
      cd system/sepolicy; mm SANITIZE_TARGET=address;
      Verify permissions granted using with_asan() are granted.
Test: lunch aosp_marlin-userdebug;
      cd system/sepolicy; mm;
      Verify permissions granted using with_asan() are not granted.
Test: lunch aosp_marlin-user;
      cd system/sepolicy; mm SANITIZE_TARGET=address;
      Verify permissions granted using with_asan() are not granted.
Bug: 36138508
Change-Id: I6e39ada4bacd71687a593023f16b45bc16cd7ef8

vndservicemanager is the context manager for binder services
that are solely registered and accessed from vendor processes.

Bug: 36052864
Test: vendorservicemanager runs
Change-Id: Ifbf536932678d0ff13d019635fe6347e185ef387

All previous users of this macro have been switched to
hal_server_domain macro.

Test: no hal_impl_domain in system/sepolicy/ and device/**/sepolicy
Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: I4a71b3fd5046c0d215b056f1cae25fe6bda0fb45

This switches Allocator HAL policy to the design which enables us to
identify all SELinux domains which host HALs and all domains which are
clients of HALs.

Allocator HAL is special in the sense that it's assumed to be always
binderized. As a result, rules in Camera HAL target hal_allocator_server
rather than hal_allocator (which would be the server and any client, if
the Allocator HAL runs in passthrough mode).

Test: Device boots up, no new denials
Test: YouTube video plays back
Test: Take photo using Google Camera app, recover a video, record a slow
      motion video
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: Ifbbca554ec221712361ee6cda94c82f254d84936

This adjusts the grants for recovery to make it explicit that recovery
can use the Boot Control HAL only in passthrough mode.

Test: Device boots up, no new denials
Test: Reboot into recovery, sideload OTA update succeeds
Test: Apply OTA update via update_engine:
      1. make dist
      2. Ensure device has network connectivity
      3. ota_call.py -s <serial here> out/dist/sailfish-ota-*.zip
Bug: 34170079

Change-Id: I0888816eca4d77939a55a7816e6cae9176713ee5

Allows the following denials:
     avc: denied { use } for pid=9099 comm="mediacodec" path="/data/tombstones/tombstone_08" dev="sda35" ino=877473 scontext=u:r:mediacodec:s0 tcontext=u:r:tombstoned:s0 tclass=fd permissive=1
     avc: denied { append } for pid=9099 comm="mediacodec" path="/data/tombstones/tombstone_08" dev="sda35" ino=877473 scontext=u:r:mediacodec:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tombstone_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

Bug: http://b/36156624
Test: killall -ABRT media.codec
Test: killall -ABRT media.extractor
Change-Id: I3dde1879b44e3e63c747a3ff8dd4bf213cb8afb6

Let mediacodec and mediaextractor talk directly to tombstoned to
generate tombstones/ANR traces.

Bug: http://b/35858739
Test: debuggerd -b `pidof media.codec`
Change-Id: I091be946d58907c5aa7a2fe23995597638adc896

 - compared to ro.boottime, this one does not pass time info

bug: 35178781
bug: 34274385
Test: reboot

Change-Id: I6a7bf636a3f201653e2890751d5fa210274c9ede

- hal clients checking hal_binderization prop also need to check
  ro.boottime.persistent_properties.

bug: 35178781
Test: reboot
Change-Id: I413c663537dc118e0492416e3e5a2af721b18107

This removes the compile-time deprecation warning about
hal_impl_domain macro. The warning was introduced in
86e87806f5777a7fc09ea962e694442297e4f8d6. We don't want to spam all
Android platform developers about something internal to the ongoing
SELinux policy restructuring.

Test: Policy compiles without any warnings
Test: Google Play Movies plays back movies (i.e., DRM HAL works)
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: Icbd4d1283196f7ccc84c2a041c5601113d3c9f21

This starts the switch for HAL policy to the approach where:
* domains which are clients of Foo HAL are associated with
  hal_foo_client attribute,
* domains which offer the Foo HAL service over HwBinder are
  associated with hal_foo_server attribute,
* policy needed by the implementation of Foo HAL service is written
  against the hal_foo attribute. This policy is granted to domains
  which offer the Foo HAL service over HwBinder and, if Foo HAL runs
  in the so-called passthrough mode (inside the process of each
  client), also granted to all domains which are clients of Foo HAL.
  hal_foo is there to avoid duplicating the rules for hal_foo_client
  and hal_foo_server to cover the passthrough/in-process Foo HAL and
  binderized/out-of-process Foo HAL cases.

A benefit of associating all domains which are clients of Foo HAL with
hal_foo (when Foo HAL is in passthrough mode) is that this removes the
need for device-specific policy to be able to reference these domains
directly (in order to add device-specific allow rules). Instead,
device-specific policy only needs to reference hal_foo and should no
longer need to care which particular domains on the device are clients
of Foo HAL. This can be seen in simplification of the rules for
audioserver domain which is a client of Audio HAL whose policy is
being restructured in this commit.

This commit uses Audio HAL as an example to illustrate the approach.
Once this commit lands, other HALs will also be switched to this
approach.

Test: Google Play Music plays back radios
Test: Google Camera records video with sound and that video is then
      successfully played back with sound
Test: YouTube app plays back clips with sound
Test: YouTube in Chrome plays back clips with sound
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: I2597a046753edef06123f0476c2ee6889fc17f20

Motivation:
Provide the ability to phase in new security policies by
applying them to apps with a minimum targetSdkVersion.

Place untrusted apps with targetSdkVersion<=25 into the
untrustd_app_25 domain. Apps with targetSdkVersion>=26 are placed
into the untrusted_app domain. Common rules are included in the
untrusted_app_all attribute. Apps with a more recent targetSdkVersion
are granted fewer permissions.

Test: Marlin builds and boots. Apps targeting targetSdkVersion<=25
run in untrusted_app_25 domain. Apps targeting the current development
build >=26 run in the untrusted_app domain with fewer permissions. No
new denials observed during testing.
Bug: 34115651
Bug: 35323421
Change-Id: Ie6a015566fac07c44ea06c963c40793fcdc9a083

Bug: 30989383
Bug: 34731101
Test: manual
Change-Id: Icf9d48568b505c6b788f2f5f456f2d709969fbeb

Create an event_log_tags_file label and use it for
/dev/event-log-tags.  Only trusted system log readers are allowed
direct read access to this file, no write access.  Untrusted domain
requests lack direct access, and are thus checked for credentials via
the "plan b" long path socket to the event log tag service.

Test: gTest logd-unit-tests, liblog-unit-tests and logcat-unit-tests
Bug: 31456426
Bug: 30566487
Change-Id: Ib9b71ca225d4436d764c9bc340ff7b1c9c252a9e

- Added set_prop to shell so that you can set it from shell.
- Added set_prop to sytem_app so that it can be updated in settings.

Bug: 34256441
Test: can update prop from Settings and shell. nfc and lights work with
ag/1833821 with persist.hal.binderization set to on and off. There are
no additional selinux denials.
Change-Id: I883ca489093c1d56b2efa725c58e6e3f3b81c3aa

Introduce the add_service() macro which wraps up add/find
permissions for the source domain with a neverallow preventing
others from adding it. Only a particular domain should
add a particular service.

Use the add_service() macro to automatically add a neverallow
that prevents other domains from adding the service.

mediadrmserver was adding services labeled mediaserver_service.
Drop the add permission as it should just need the find
permission.

Additionally, the macro adds the { add find } permission which
causes some existing neverallow's to assert. Adjust those
neverallow's so "self" can always find.

Test: compile and run on hikey and emulator. No new denials were
found, and all services, where applicable, seem to be running OK.

Change-Id: Ibbd2a5304edd5f8b877bc86852b0694732be993c
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>

This improves readability and consistency for HAL implementation
domains which have only one implementation.

Test: No change to policy according to sesearch
Test: No change to which types are associated with haldomain according to "sepolicy-analyze <sepolicy file> attribute haldomain"
Bug: 34180936
Change-Id: Ice599ea4971cdfbd8b835b1fd02ad1e14c7a0386

This marks all HAL domain implementations with the haldomain attribute
so that rules can be written which apply to all HAL implementations.

This follows the pattern used for appdomain, netdomain and
bluetoothdomain.

Test: No change to policy according to sesearch.
Bug: 34180936
Change-Id: I0cfe599b0d49feed36538503c226dfce41eb65f6

Bug: 30222631
Change-Id: I30ad019872881e21f61a53e4397112ea0e99688b

Test: make checkbuild, aosp_bullhead-userdebug boots.
Bug: 33192586

Change-Id: I386df8b6c04fb162f79a4409801ce3e882026ea8

Bug: 32123421
Test: full build/test of allocator hal using hidl_test
Change-Id: I253b4599b6fe6e7f4a2f5f55b34cdeed9e5d769b

Enabling/disabling sepolicy based on ENABLE_TREBLE is not granular
enough (ref: b/32978887 #4).

Bug: 32978887
Test: compiles, doesn't cause any additional denials on device. Nothing
depends on these things I'm removing.
Change-Id: I10acbde16e5e2093f2c9205ed79cd20caed7f44d

In order for hal clients to use IServiceManager::registerForNotifications,
the hwservicemanager needs to be able to call into client processes.

Test: WIP
Bug: 33383725
Change-Id: I59470e9cd5cbeafda010fedc0b91eeb41280e0a1

app_domain was split up in commit: 2e00e637 to
enable compilation by hiding type_transition rules from public policy.  These
rules need to be hidden from public policy because they describe how objects are
labeled, of which non-platform should be unaware.  Instead of cutting apart the
app_domain macro, which non-platform policy may rely on for implementing new app
types, move all app_domain calls to private policy.

(cherry-pick of commit: 76035ea0)

Bug: 33428593
Test: bullhead and sailfish both boot. sediff shows no policy change.
Change-Id: I4beead8ccc9b6e13c6348da98bb575756f539665

app_domain was split up in commit: 2e00e637 to
enable compilation by hiding type_transition rules from public policy.  These
rules need to be hidden from public policy because they describe how objects are
labeled, of which non-platform should be unaware.  Instead of cutting apart the
app_domain macro, which non-platform policy may rely on for implementing new app
types, move all app_domain calls to private policy.

Bug: 33428593
Test: bullhead and sailfish both boot. sediff shows no policy change.
Change-Id: I4beead8ccc9b6e13c6348da98bb575756f539665

In order to support platform changes without simultaneous updates from
non-platform components, the platform and non-platform policies must be
split.  In order to provide a guarantee that policy written for
non-platform objects continues to provide the same access, all types
exposed to non-platform policy are versioned by converting them and the
policy using them into attributes.

This change performs that split, the subsequent versioning and also
generates a mapping file to glue the different policy components
together.

Test: Device boots and runs.
Bug: 31369363
Change-Id: Ibfd3eb077bd9b8e2ff3b2e6a0ca87e44d78b1317

Never used.

Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: I0ce6c46bb05925a4b3eda83531b28f873b0c9b99

In particular, get rid of TIOCSTI, which is only ever used for exploits.

http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/09/26/14

Bug: 33073072
Bug: 7530569
Test: "adb shell" works
Test: "adb install package" works
Test: jackpal terminal emulator from
      https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm&hl=en
      works
Change-Id: I96b5e7059d106ce57ff55ca6e458edf5a4c393bf

Description stolen from
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/42a9699a9fa179c0054ea3cf5ad3cc67104a6162

Remove unused permission definitions from SELinux.
Many of these were only ever used in pre-mainline
versions of SELinux, prior to Linux 2.6.0.  Some of them
were used in the legacy network or compat_net=1 checks
that were disabled by default in Linux 2.6.18 and
fully removed in Linux 2.6.30.

Permissions never used in mainline Linux:
file swapon
filesystem transition
tcp_socket { connectto newconn acceptfrom }
node enforce_dest
unix_stream_socket { newconn acceptfrom }

Legacy network checks, removed in 2.6.30:
socket { recv_msg send_msg }
node { tcp_recv tcp_send udp_recv udp_send rawip_recv rawip_send dccp_recv dccp_send }
netif { tcp_recv tcp_send udp_recv udp_send rawip_recv rawip_send dccp_recv dccp_send }

Test: policy compiles and no boot errors (marlin)
Change-Id: Idaef2567666f80db39c3e3cee70e760e1dac73ec

|WITH_DEXPREOPT_PIC = false| will still cause code to be loaded from
/data.

Bug: 32970029
Test: On HiKey and Marlin:
Test: Add |WITH_DEXPREOPT_PIC = false|, see SELinux denial.
Test: Apply this CL, no SELinux denials.
Change-Id: I0a1d39eeb4d7f75d84c1908b879d9ea1ccffba74

When WITH_DEXPREOPT is set, the zygote does not need to execute
dalvikcache_data_file objects.

Bug: 32970029
Test: Add policy line inside macro, build with and without WITH_DEXPREOPT.
Test: HiKey builds, boots, no zygote denials.
Change-Id: I4dace93e8044267232f0f26cfe427fc250d351fb

Test: builds
Bug: 32243668
Change-Id: I1ad4b53003462e932cf80b6972db1520dc66d735

Test: builds
Change-Id: Idd1d90a89a9ecbb2738d6b483af0e8479e87aa15

Divide policy into public and private components.  This is the first
step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
policies.  The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
in non-platform policy creation.  Backwards compatibility with it will
be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
version.

Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
and the need for attributes is minimal.  For now, almost all types and
avrules are left in public.

Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.

Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c