Bug: 15313911
Change-Id: Ib7d39561a0d52632929d063a7ab97b6856f28ffe

Defines new device type persistent_data_block_device

This block device will allow storage of data that
will live across factory resets.

Gives rw and search access to SystemServer.

Change-Id: I298eb40f9a04c16e90dcc1ad32d240ca84df3b1e

Earlier changes had extended the rules, but some additional changes
are needed.

avc: denied { relabelfrom } for name="vmdl-723825123.tmp"
    dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=162910 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0
    tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0 tclass=dir

Bug: 14975160
Change-Id: I875cfc3538d4b098d27c7c7b756d1868a54cc976

We had disabled the neverallow rule when system_server was
in permissive_or_unconfined(), but forgot to reenable it.
Now that system_server is in enforcing/confined, bring it
back.

Change-Id: I6f74793d4889e3da783361c4d488b25f804ac8ba

Remove the auditallow statements related to keystore
in system_app and system_server.

Change-Id: I1fc25ff475299ee020ea19f9b6b5811f8fd17c28

Add keystore_key class and an action for each action supported
by keystore. Add policies that replicate the access control that
already exists in keystore. Add auditallow rules for actions
not known to be used frequently. Add macro for those domains
wishing to access keystore.

Change-Id: Iddd8672b9e9b72b45ee208e6eda608cc9dc61edc

system_server scans through /proc to keep track of process
memory and CPU usage. It needs to do this for all processes,
not just appdomain processes, to properly account for CPU and
memory usage.

Allow it.

Addresses the following errors which have been showing up
in logcat:

  W/ProcessCpuTracker(12159): Skipping unknown process pid 1
  W/ProcessCpuTracker(12159): Skipping unknown process pid 2
  W/ProcessCpuTracker(12159): Skipping unknown process pid 3

Bug: 15862412
Change-Id: I0a75314824404e060c6914c06a371f2ff2e80512

Introduce a net_radio_prop type for net. properties that can be
set by radio or system.
Introduce a system_radio_prop type for sys. properties that can be
set by radio or system.
Introduce a dhcp_prop type for properties that can be set by dhcp or system.
Drop the rild_prop vs radio_prop distinction; this was an early
experiment to see if we could separate properties settable by rild
versus other radio UID processes but it did not pan out.

Remove the ability to set properties from unconfineddomain.
Allow init to set any property.  Allow recovery to set ctl_default_prop
to restart adbd.

Change-Id: I5ccafcb31ec4004dfefcec8718907f6b6f3e0dfd
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

bug:15407087
Change-Id: I3dea9c1110583f11f093d048455a1cc739d05658

system_server needs to open /dev/snd and access files
within that directory. Allow it.

system_server need to parse the ALSA card descriptors after a USB device
has been inserted. This happens from USBService in system_server.

Addresses the following denial:

  system_server( 1118): type=1400 audit(0.0:19): avc: denied { search } for comm=5573625365727669636520686F7374 name="snd" dev="tmpfs" ino=8574 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:audio_device:s0 tclass=dir

and likely others

Change-Id: Id274d3feb7bf337f492932e5e664d65d0b8d05b8

As reported by sepolicy-analyze -D -P /path/to/sepolicy.
No semantic difference reported by sediff between the policy
before and after this change.

Deduplication of selinuxfs read access resolved by taking the
common rules to domain.te (and thereby getting rid of the
selinux_getenforce macro altogether).

Change-Id: I4de2f86fe2efe11a167e8a7d25dd799cefe482e5
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

The following commits added support for runtime resource overlays.

  New command line tool 'idmap'
  * 65a05fd56dbc9fd9c2511a97f49c445a748fb3c5
  Runtime resource overlay, iteration 2
  * 48d22323ce39f9aab003dce74456889b6414af55
  Runtime resource overlay, iteration 2, test cases
  * ad6ed950dbfa152c193dd7e49c369d9e831f1591

During SELinux tightening, support for these runtime resource
overlays was unknowingly broken. Fix it.

This change has been tested by hackbod and she reports that
everything is working after this change. I haven't independently
verified the functionality.

Test cases are available for this by running:
  * python frameworks/base/core/tests/overlaytests/testrunner.py

Change-Id: I1c70484011fd9041bec4ef34f93f7a5509906f40

Still not fixed. *sigh*

Addresses the following denial:

<4>[   40.515398] type=1400 audit(15842931.469:9): avc: denied { read } for pid=814 comm="system_server" name="profiles" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=105874 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_profiles_data_file:s0 tclass=dir

Change-Id: I705a4cc9c508200ace46780c18b7112b62f27994

86703051 wasn't complete. I thought
getattr on the directory wasn't needed but I was wrong. Not sure
how I missed this.

Addresses the following denial:

  <4>[   40.699344] type=1400 audit(15795140.469:9): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=1087 comm="system_server" path="/data/dalvik-cache/profiles" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=105874 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_profiles_data_file:s0 tclass=dir

Change-Id: Ibc176b2b00083bafaa91ab78d0f8dc1ca3c208b6

Remove /data/dalvik-cache/profiles from domain. Profiling information
leaks data about how people interact with apps, so we don't want
the data to be available in all SELinux domains.

Add read/write capabilities back to app domains, since apps need to
read/write profiling data.

Remove restorecon specific rules. The directory is now created by
init, not installd, so installd doesn't need to set the label.

Change-Id: Ic1b44009faa30d704855e97631006c4b990a4ad3

Add a service_mananger class with the verb add.
Add a type that groups the services for each of the
processes that is allowed to start services in service.te
and an attribute for all services controlled by the service
manager. Add the service_contexts file which maps service
name to target label.

Bug: 12909011
Change-Id: I017032a50bc90c57b536e80b972118016d340c7d

Need this for changing the max_cpufreq and min_cpufreq for the low power
mode.

Denials:
type=1400 audit(1402431554.756:14): avc: denied { write } for pid=854
comm="PowerManagerSer" name="scaling_max_freq" dev="sysfs" ino=9175
scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0
tclass=file

Change required for Change-Id: I1cf458c4f128818ad1286e5a90b0d359b6913bb8

Change-Id: Ic5ce3c8327e973bfa1d53f298c07dcea1550b646
Signed-off-by: Ruchi <Kandoi&lt;kandoiruchi@google.com>

Change-Id: I1ea20044bd6789dde002da7fc9613cfbf1ee2d23
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Addresses denials such as:
 avc: denied { read } for comm="Binder_6" path="/data/media/0/zedge/ringtone/love_tone_2014-ringtone-1665292.mp3" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=1534267 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file
 avc: denied { getattr } for comm="Binder_9" path="/data/media/0/zedge/ringtone/love_tone_2014-ringtone-1665292.mp3" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=1534267 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: I5e5744eecf2cbd4fc584db8584be4e9101bcb60c
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

The bugs that motivated bringing back the unlabeled allowall rules,
https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/94971/
should be resolved by the following changes:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/94966/
https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/96080/



Beyond those changes, installd needs to be able to remove package directories
for apps that no longer exist or have moved (e.g. to priv-app) on upgrades, so
allow it the permissions required for this purpose.  vold needs to be able
to chown/chmod/restorecon files in asec containers so allow it the
permissions to do so.  system_server tries to access all /data/data
subdirectories so permit it to do so.  installd and system_server
read the pkg.apk file before it has been relabeled by vold and therefore
need to read unlabeled files.

Change-Id: I70da7d605c0d037eaa5f3f5fda24f5e7715451dc
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Introduce wakelock_use(). This macro declares that a domain uses
wakelocks.

Wakelocks require both read-write access to files in /sys/power, and
CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND. This macro helps ensure that both capabilities and
file access are granted at the same time.

Still TODO: fix device specific wakelock use.

Change-Id: Ib98ff374a73f89e403acd9f5e024988f59f08115

Neither mediaserver nor system_server appear to require
direct access to graphics_device, i.e. the framebuffer
device.  Drop it.

Change-Id: Ie9d1be3f9071584155cddf248ea85e174b7e50a6
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Address denials such as:
 avc:  denied  { read } for  name="tombstones" dev="dm-0" ino=765537 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tombstone_data_file:s0 tclass=dir
 avc:  denied  { open } for  name="tombstones" dev="dm-0" ino=765537 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tombstone_data_file:s0 tclass=dir
 avc:  denied  { getattr } for  path="/data/tombstones/tombstone_00" dev="dm-0" ino=765538 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tombstone_data_file:s0 tclass=file
 avc:  denied  { read } for  name="tombstone_00" dev="dm-0" ino=765538 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tombstone_data_file:s0 tclass=file
 avc:  denied  { open } for  name="tombstone_00" dev="dm-0" ino=765538 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tombstone_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: Iae5a10bed9483589660b84a88b6b9f8f8e9a8f5c
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Drop rules on data_file_type attribute and replace with rules
on specific types under /data.

Change-Id: I5cbfef64cdd71b8e93478d9ef377689bf6dda192
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

This was originally to limit the ability to relabel files to
particular types given the ability of all domains to relabelfrom
unlabeled files.  Since the latter was removed by
Ied84f8b4b1a0896c1b9f7d783b7463ce09d4807b, this no longer serves
any purpose.

Change-Id: Ic41e94437188183f15ed8b3732c6cd5918da3397
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Only keystore itself should be reading / writing it's files.
Remove keystore file access from other SELinux domains, including
unconfined. Add neverallow rules to protect against regressions.
Allow init limited access to recurse into keystore's directory.

Change-Id: I0bb5de7804f4314997c16fac18507933014bcadf

See if we can remove these allow rules by auditing any granting
of these permissions.  These rules may be a legacy of older Android
or some board where the gpu device lived under /dev/graphics too.

Change-Id: I5c5d99ca97402de5196d9b6dfd249294f4d95baa
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

pstore contains /sys/fs/pstore/console-ramoops, which is the
replacement for /proc/last_kmsg. Both files are read by system_server
on startup. Allow access.

Addresses the following denials:

<12>[   53.836838] type=1400 audit(949060020.909:19): avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=1233 comm="Thread-119" name="/" dev="pstore" ino=10296 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:pstorefs:s0 tclass=dir
<12>[   53.856546] type=1400 audit(949060020.909:20): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=1233 comm="Thread-119" path="/sys/fs/pstore/console-ramoops" dev="pstore" ino=10297 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:pstorefs:s0 tclass=file
<12>[   53.878425] type=1400 audit(949060020.909:21): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=1233 comm="Thread-119" name="console-ramoops" dev="pstore" ino=10297 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:pstorefs:s0 tclass=file
<12>[   53.898476] type=1400 audit(949060020.909:22): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=1233 comm="Thread-119" path="/sys/fs/pstore/console-ramoops" dev="pstore" ino=10297 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:pstorefs:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: I7307da751961b242e68adb319da9c00192e77bbb

Resolves denials such as:
avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=752 comm="ActivityManager" name="stat" dev="proc" ino=1878 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:inputflinger:s0 tclass=file
avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=752 comm="ActivityManager" name="stat" dev="proc" ino=1878 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:inputflinger:s0 tclass=file
avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=752 comm="ActivityManager" name="214" dev="proc" ino=1568 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:inputflinger:s0 tclass=dir
avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=752 comm="ActivityManager" name="stat" dev="proc" ino=1878 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:inputflinger:s0 tclass=file
avc:  denied  { call } for  pid=187 comm="Binder_2" scontext=u:r:inputflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=binder

Change-Id: I099d7dacf7116efa73163245597c3de629d358c1
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Resolves denials such as:
avc:  denied  { set } for property=ctl.bugreport scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:ctl_bugreport_prop:s0 tclass=property_service

Change-Id: I6c3085065157f418fc0cd4d01fa178eecfe334ad
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Addresses denials such as:
avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1797 comm="logcat" name="logdr" dev="tmpfs" ino=7523 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:logdr_socket:s0 tclass=sock_file
avc:  denied  { connectto } for  pid=1797 comm="logcat" path="/dev/socket/logdr" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:logd:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket

Change-Id: Idc4f48519ca3d81125102e8f15f68989500f5e9e
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

system_server components such as ActivityManager and CpuTracker
try to access all /proc/pid directories, triggering denials on
domains that are not explicitly allowed to the system_server.
Silence these denials to avoid filling the logs with noise
and overwriting actual useful messages in the kernel ring buffer.

Change-Id: Ifd6f2fd63e945647570ed61c67a6171b89878617
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

The system_server has duplicate/overlapping rules regarding
/proc/pid access as well as a lack of clarity on the reason
for the different rules.  Deduplicate the rules and clarify
the purpose of different sets of rules.

Replace the rules granting /proc/pid access for all domains with
specific rules only for domains that we know should be accessible
by the system_server, i.e. all apps (appdomain) and the set of
native processes listed in com.android.server.Watchdog.NATIVE_STACKS_OF_INTEREST.

Change-Id: Idae6fc87e19e1700cdc4bdbde521d35caa046d74
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

libsepol.check_assertion_helper: neverallow on line 8857 violated by allow system_server sdcard_external:file { ioctl read write getattr lock append open };
Error while expanding policy
make: *** [out/target/product/manta/obj/ETC/sepolicy_intermediates/sepolicy] Error 1

Change-Id: I181707ed66bad3db56f9084b3d9ba161d13b34bd

As per:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/84130/3/system_server.te@240


it is unsafe to allow such access.

Add a neverallow rule to prohibit any rules on sdcard_type in the
future.

Change-Id: Ife714b65b07144eb6228a048a55ba82181595213
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Label /proc/sysrq-trigger and allow access.
Label /dev/socket/mtpd and allow access.

Resolves denials such as:
avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket

avc:  denied  { call } for  pid=1007 comm="Binder_8" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=binder

avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1024 comm="watchdog" name="sysrq-trigger" dev="proc" ino=4026533682 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file

avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=11567 comm="LegacyVpnRunner" name="mtpd" dev="tmpfs" ino=36627 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:socket_device:s0 tclass=sock_file

avc:  denied  { ptrace } for  pid=10924 comm=5369676E616C2043617463686572 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process

avc:  denied  { sigkill } for  pid=26077 comm="NativeCrashRepo" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process

avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1024 comm="android.bg" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_socket

avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[11467]" dev="sockfs" ino=11467 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket

avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[12076]" dev="sockfs" ino=12076 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserv
er:s0 tclass=udp_socket

avc:  denied  { getopt } for  pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" laddr=192.168.159.172 lport=51576 faddr=93.127.173.40 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket

avc:  denied  { getopt } for  pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" lport=15658 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket

avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[443742]"
dev="sockfs" ino=443742 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s
0 tclass=tcp_socket

avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[444842]" dev="sockfs" ino=444842 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket

avc:  denied  { setopt } for  pid=1326 comm="Binder_9" lport=16216 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket

avc:  denied  { setopt } for  pid=1676 comm="Binder_6" laddr=192.168.156.130 lport=51044 faddr=74.125.214.81 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket

avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=10915 comm="system_server" path="/dev/mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file

avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=10915 comm="system_server" name="mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file

avc:  denied  { unlink } for  pid=14866 comm="system_server" name="wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=285715 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file

avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket

avc:  denied  { getopt } for  pid=32300 comm="Binder_1" laddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 lport=4939 faddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 fport=53318 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket

avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=10840 comm="pool-17-thread-" path="socket:[205990]" dev="sockfs" ino=205990 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket

avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=20817 comm="dumpsys" path="/mnt/shell/emulated/0/aupt-output/bugreport-2014-02-22-11-17-16.txt.tmp" dev="fuse" ino=3100784040 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: I481ac26667b487031a5d3317b0a028a027a8e641
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

A number of binder_call rules are duplicated by other rules
written in terms of attributes/sets (e.g. appdomain, binderservicedomain).
Get rid of the duplicates.

Also use binder_use() in racoon.te rather than manually writing the
base rule for communicating with the servicemanager.

Change-Id: I5a459cc2154b1466bcde6eccef253dfcdcb44e0a
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

16011320 removed the getattr/getopt
support for system_server, which is needed to close the zygote socket.
See b/12061011 for details.

system_server still needs this rule, and it's expected to stay
permanently. Restore the rule and remove the comment about it eventually
being deleted.

Addresses the following denials:

<5>[   86.307639] type=1400 audit(1393376281.530:5): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=656 comm="main" path="socket:[7195]" dev=sockfs ino=7195 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
<5>[   86.307945] type=1400 audit(1393376281.530:6): avc:  denied  { getopt } for  pid=656 comm="main" path="/dev/socket/zygote" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket

Bug: 12114500
Change-Id: I47033766dea3ba2fdaa8ce9b4251370bd64aea6d

Now that all of /data outside of /data/data should be labeled
even on legacy devices as a result of
Ib8d9751a47c8e0238cf499fcec61898937945d9d, there
should be no reason to permit the system_server or zygote
execute access to unlabeled files.

This is the only remaining case where a type writable by
app domains can be executed by system services, so eliminating
it is desirable.

That said, I have not specifically tested the non-SE to SE
upgrade path to confirm that this causes no problems.

Change-Id: Ie488bd6e347d4a210806a3308ab25b00952aadb4
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Change-Id: I620d4aef84a5d4565abb1695db54ce1653612bce
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>