proc files needed by fwk that were labeled:
/proc/filesystems -> proc_filesystems
/proc/mounts -> proc_mounts
/proc/swaps -> proc_mounts

Removed access to proc label from these domains:
e2fs, fsck, fsck_untrusted, sdcardd

e2fs: added access to proc_filesystems, proc_mounts, proc_swaps
fsck: added access to proc_mounts, proc_swaps
fsck_untrusted: added access to proc_mounts
sdcardd: added access to proc_filesystems
vold: added access to proc_filesystems, proc_mounts

Bug: 66199084
Test: device boots without selinux denials to new labels or proc label.
Change-Id: If0f19e22074419dab0b3a0c6f3a300ea8cb94523

Use nice clean AIDL instead of dirty sockets.

avc: denied { call } for pid=603 comm="vdc" scontext=u:r:vdc:s0 tcontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0

Test: vdc cryptfs init_user0
Bug: 13758960
Change-Id: I8b0e63adad8c4c7e2b5e6aca48386d1b371ea6a5

This change is the bare minimum needed to publish a new vold
Binder service and move the simple "reset" call over to go through
the new interface.

The new rules here are mirrored on the existing installd rules, but
with a handful of neverallow rules relaxed due to funky interactions
with hal_client_domain().

Test: builds, boots
Bug: 13758960
Change-Id: Ia9522ea7a68698cb0edce7879abfbf22b9d67c76

Raw sockets usually imply advanced parsers that might
have flaws. If vold need such odd thing, force it to have
that in a other domain like filesystem checks. Debug
features like ptrace does not belong to vold.

Bug: 64791922
Test: Manual
Change-Id: I75c62d13f998621f80b2049bce0505442862bf0b

Hardening vold. Vold has much rights to system sensitive parts and
are started by init. Enforce this security.

Bug: 64791922
Test: Manual
Change-Id: I077d251d1eb7b7292e1a4a785093cb7bf5524a83

This attribute is being actively removed from policy. Since
attributes are not being versioned, partners must not be able to
access and use this attribute. Move it from private and verify in
the logs that rild and tee are not using these permissions.

Bug: 38316109
Test: build and boot Marlin
Test: Verify that rild and tee are not being granted any of these
      permissions.
Merged-In: I31beeb5bdf3885195310b086c1af3432dc6a349b
Change-Id: I31beeb5bdf3885195310b086c1af3432dc6a349b
(cherry picked from commit 76aab82c)

scontext=installd
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="Binder:1153_7" path="/data/user/0"
dev="sda13" ino=1097730 scontext=u:r:installd:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file

scontext=runas
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="run-as" path="/data/user/0"
dev="sda35" ino=942082 scontext=u:r:runas:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file

scontext=vold
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="vold" path="/data/data" dev="sda45"
ino=12 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0
tclass=lnk_file
avc: granted { read } for comm="secdiscard"
name="3982c444973581d4.spblob" dev="sda45" ino=4620302
scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0
tclass=file

Bug: 28760354
Test: Build
Change-Id: Id16c43090675572af35f1ad9defd4c368abc906b

When adopting SD cards, vold partitions and formats those devices;
this had been working fine with the older make_ext4fs utility, but
newer devices are switching over to mke2fs, which has a different
SELinux label.

avc: denied { execute } for name="mke2fs" dev="dm-0" ino=456 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
avc: denied { read open } for path="/system/bin/mke2fs" dev="dm-0" ino=456 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
avc: denied { execute_no_trans } for path="/system/bin/mke2fs" dev="dm-0" ino=456 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/system/bin/mke2fs" dev="dm-0" ino=456 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

Test: cts-tradefed run commandAndExit cts-dev --abi armeabi-v7a -m CtsAppSecurityHostTestCases -t android.appsecurity.cts.AdoptableHostTest
Bug: 36757864, 37436961
Change-Id: Ifb96dfca076ea58650eb32f89e850f20ae2ac102

This attribute is being actively removed from policy. Since
attributes are not being versioned, partners must not be able to
access and use this attribute. Move it from private and verify in
the logs that rild and tee are not using these permissions.

Bug: 38316109
Test: build and boot Marlin
Test: Verify that rild and tee are not being granted any of these
      permissions.
Change-Id: I31beeb5bdf3885195310b086c1af3432dc6a349b

Relabeling /vendor and /system/vendor to vendor_file removed
previously granted permissions. Restore these for non-treble devices.

Addresses:
avc: denied { execute_no_trans } for pid=2944 comm="dumpstate"
path="/system/vendor/bin/wpa_cli" dev="mmcblk0p10" ino=1929
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
tclass=file

And potentially some other bugs that have yet to surface.

Bug: 37105075
Test: build Fugu
Change-Id: I8e7bd9c33819bf8206f7c110cbce72366afbcef8

file_context files need to be explicitly labeled as they are now split
across system and vendor and won't have the generic world readable
'system_file' label.

Bug: 36002414
Test: no new 'file_context' denials at boot complete on sailfish
Test: successfully booted into recovery without denials and sideloaded
OTA update.
Test: ./cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info \
       --skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check --abi \
       arm64-v8a --module CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
       android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testAospFileContexts

Change-Id: I603157e9fa7d1de3679d41e343de397631666273
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

This is a special file that can be mounted as a loopback device to
exercise adoptable storage code on devices that don't have valid
physical media.  For example, they may only support storage media
through a USB OTG port that is being used for an adb connection.

avc: denied { read } for path="/data/misc/vold/virtual_disk" dev="sda35" ino=508695 scontext=u:r:kernel:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=0

Bug: 34903607
Change-Id: I84721ec0e9495189a7d850461875df1839826212

Per loop(4), this device is the preferred way of allocating new
loop devices since Linux 3.1.

avc: denied { read write } for name="loop-control" dev="tmpfs" ino=15221 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0

Bug: 34903607
Change-Id: I1f5f62cf0a1c24c6f6453100004812af4b8e1503

We simplified the way we track whether or not a dex file is used by
other apps. DexManager in the framework keeps track of the data and we
no longer need file markers on disk.

Test: device boots, foreign dex markers are not created anymore

Bug: 32871170
Change-Id: I464ed6b09439cf0342020ee07596f9aa8ae53b62

This switches Keymaster HAL policy to the design which enables us to
conditionally remove unnecessary rules from domains which are clients
of Keymaster HAL.

Domains which are clients of Keymaster HAL, such as keystore and vold
domains, are granted rules targeting hal_keymaster only when the
Keymaster HAL runs in passthrough mode (i.e., inside the client's
process). When the HAL runs in binderized mode (i.e., in another
process/domain, with clients talking to the HAL over HwBinder IPC),
rules targeting hal_keymaster are not granted to client domains.

Domains which offer a binderized implementation of Keymaster HAL, such
as hal_keymaster_default domain, are always granted rules targeting
hal_keymaster.

Test: Password-protected sailfish boots up and lock screen unlocks --
      this exercises vold -> Keymaster HAL interaction
Test: All Android Keystore CTS tests pass -- this exercises keystore ->
      Keymaster HAL interaction:
      make cts cts-tradefed
      cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info \
      --skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check --abi arm64-v8a \
      --module CtsKeystoreTestCases
Bug: 34170079

Change-Id: I2254d0fdee72145721654d6c9e6e8d3331920ec7

Grant observed uses of permissions being audited in domain_deprecated.

fsck
avc: granted { getattr } for path="/" dev="dm-0" ino=2 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=dir

keystore
avc: granted { read open } for path="/vendor/lib64/hw" dev="dm-1" ino=168 scontext=u:r:keystore:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir

sdcardd
avc: granted { read open } for path="/proc/filesystems" dev="proc" ino=4026532412 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file

update_engine
avc: granted { getattr } for path="/proc/misc" dev="proc" ino=4026532139 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read open } for path="/proc/misc" dev="proc" ino=4026532139 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read } for name="hw" dev="dm-1" ino=168 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir

vold
avc: granted { read open } for path="/vendor/lib64/hw" dev="dm-1" ino=168 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir

Test: Marlin builds and boots, avc granted messages no longer observed.
Bug: 35197529
Change-Id: Iae34ae3b9e22ba7550cf7d45dc011ab043e63424

This adds the premissions required for
android.hardware.keymaster@2.0-service to access the keymaster TA
as well as for keystore and vold to lookup and use
android.hardware.keymaster@2.0-service.

IT DOES NOT remove the privileges from keystore and vold to access
the keymaster TA directly.

Test: Run keystore CTS tests
Bug: 32020919

(cherry picked from commit 5090d6f3)

Change-Id: Ib02682da26e2dbcabd81bc23169f9bd0e832eb19

This neverallow addition addresses the renaming of files in exploits in
order to bypass denied permissions. An example of a similar use case of
using mv to bypass permission denials appeared in a recent project zero
ChromeOS exploit as one of the steps in the exploit chain.
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/12/chrome-os-exploit-one-byte-overflow-and.html

Additionally, vold and init both had permission sets that allowed them
to rename, but neither of them seem to need it. Therefore the rename
permission has also been removed from these two .te files.

Test: The device boots successfully
Change-Id: I07bbb58f058bf050f269b083e836c2c9a5bbad80

This adds the premissions required for
android.hardware.keymaster@2.0-service to access the keymaster TA
as well as for keystore and vold to lookup and use
android.hardware.keymaster@2.0-service.

IT DOES NOT remove the privileges from keystore and vold to access
the keymaster TA directly.

Test: Run keystore CTS tests
Bug: 32020919
Change-Id: I9467ee29232cc54b48a6dae8ae240656999f73bf

There is no reason for vold to have this permission, and a proper
auditallow rule has been used and monitored to ensure that nothing on
android uses this permission.

Bug: 26901147

Test: Phone boots
Change-Id: Id36ed2722348f433fe3d046a3429066338230fec

Vold shouldn't have this selinux permission, so this will be left in for
a few weeks to keep track of if removing it would be an issue to any
other processes. If not, then a follow-up CL will remove both the rule
and the auditallow

Test: This CL is a test in itself, auditallow rules shouldn't change
behavior of SELinux policy by themselves
Bug: 26901147
Change-Id: Ib076448863bd54278df59a3b514c9e877eb22ee5

Test: Device boots
Change-Id: I151c5fb6f56850eaa215e1a917ac9ad609dbdd4a

Divide policy into public and private components.  This is the first
step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
policies.  The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
in non-platform policy creation.  Backwards compatibility with it will
be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
version.

Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
and the need for attributes is minimal.  For now, almost all types and
avrules are left in public.

Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.

Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c

Remove the ioctl permission for most socket types. For others, such as
tcp/udp/rawip/unix_dgram/unix_stream set a default unprivileged whitelist
that individual domains may extend (except where neverallowed like
untrusted_app). Enforce via a neverallowxperm rule.

Change-Id: I15548d830f8eff1fd4d64005c5769ca2be8d4ffe

Grant permissions observed.

Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: Ie63cda709319bbf635ef7bffbba3477c2cccc11b

Fix file diffs.

Change-Id: Iac673c718b49779bba380e75ddd083caf6a2a1c3

This reverts commit 9c820a11.

Bug: 31364540
Change-Id: I98a34bd32dd835e6795d31a90f16f4ccd691e6e5

This reverts commit c71c6622.

Bug: 31364540
Change-Id: I3f4f132d4769e3cbc9d03ff908104a69f05bd2ef

Grant permissions observed.

(cherry picked from commit 9c820a11)

Merged-in: Ifdead51f873eb587556309c48fb84ff1542ae303
Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: Ifdead51f873eb587556309c48fb84ff1542ae303

Remove the ioctl permission for most socket types. For others, such as
tcp/udp/rawip/unix_dgram/unix_stream set a default unprivileged whitelist
that individual domains may extend (except where neverallowed like
untrusted_app). Enforce via a neverallowxperm rule.

Change-Id: I15548d830f8eff1fd4d64005c5769ca2be8d4ffe

Commit: b144ebab added the sysfs_usb
type and granted the read perms globally, but did not add write
permissions for all domains that previously had them.  Add the ability
to write to sysfs_usb for all domains that had the ability to write to
those files previously (sysfs).

Address denials such as:
type=1400 audit(1904.070:4): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=321 comm="ueventd" name="uevent" dev="sysfs" ino=1742 scontext=u:r:ueventd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_usb:s0 tclass=file permissive=0

Bug: 28417852
Change-Id: I4562ea73f2158ebefba74b58ca572f2176d1b849

Grant permissions observed.

Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: Ifdead51f873eb587556309c48fb84ff1542ae303

Bug: 27176738
Change-Id: Ib52bb94973d20591dd440cea42aadfa53d476848

Remove references to /data/security and the corresponding
type securitly_file.

Bug: 26544104
Change-Id: Iac00c293daa6b781a24c2bd4c12168dfb1cceac6

Vold needs to be able to query if the directory exists and
eventually to fix permissions and the owner.

Typical error:
W vold    : type=1400 audit(0.0:485): avc: denied { getattr } 
for path="/data/misc/profiles/cur/11/foreign-dex" dev="dm-2" 
ino=343857 scontext=u:r:vold:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:user_profile_foreign_dex_data_file:s0 tclass=dir 
permissive=0


Bug: 27517932
Change-Id: Iff10c864634baa97cc814916ee7495b262e0c7eb

Bug: 26719109
Bug: 26563023

Change-Id: Ie0ca764467c874c061752cbbc73e1bacead9b995

The labels for filesystem and files are assigned by vold with using
context= mount option.

Change-Id: I8a9d701a46a333093a27107fc3c52b17a2af1a94

In preparation of removing permissions from domain_deprecated.

Addresses:
avc: denied { read } for name="fstab.flounder" dev="rootfs" ino=4729 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file
avc: denied { open } for path="/fstab.flounder" dev="rootfs" ino=4729 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/fstab.flounder" dev="rootfs" ino=4729 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file

avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="mmcblk0p30" ino=2 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { open } for path="/cache" dev="mmcblk0p30" ino=2 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/cache" dev="mmcblk0p30" ino=2 ioctlcmd=5879 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=dir

avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="proc" ino=1 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { open } for path="/proc" dev="proc" ino=1 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=dir

avc: denied { read } for name="psched" dev="proc" ino=4026536519 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file
avc: denied { open } for path="/proc/157/net/psched" dev="proc" ino=4026536519 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/proc/157/net/psched" dev="proc" ino=4026536519 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: I8af7edc5b06675a9a2d62bf86e1c22dbb5d74370
avc: denied { read } for name="block" dev="sysfs" ino=2582 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { open } for path="/sys/block" dev="sysfs" ino=2582 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=dir

Bug: 22821100
Change-Id: I549abfd31f7286ad50be3adeadaf559816c0ee38

Used in system/vold/MoveTask.cpp

Addresses:
avc: denied { execute } for name="toolbox" dev="mmcblk0p29" ino=359 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
avc: denied { read open } for path="/system/bin/toolbox" dev="mmcblk0p29" ino=359 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
avc: denied { execute_no_trans } for path="/system/bin/toolbox" dev="mmcblk0p29" ino=359 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

Change-Id: I2eb6288aaed510ae5be0f3605088ace6b865ef83