Bug: 26719109
Bug: 26563023

Change-Id: Ie0ca764467c874c061752cbbc73e1bacead9b995

The labels for filesystem and files are assigned by vold with using
context= mount option.

Change-Id: I8a9d701a46a333093a27107fc3c52b17a2af1a94

Add permissions to dex2oat, introduce otapreopt binary and otadexopt
service.

Bug: 25612095
Change-Id: I80fcba2785e80b2931d7d82bb07474f6cd0099f7

Also narrowly specify the domain for the local transport's bookkeeping.

Bug 26834865

Change-Id: I2eea8a10f29356ffecabd8e102f7afa90123c535

/data/misc/bootstat.

BUG: 21724738
Change-Id: I2789f57cc8182af1a7c33672ef82297f32f54e2e

Shell user needs to be able to get current device battery_level via
/sys/class/power_supply/battery/capacity.  Create a global label and
corresponding policy for accessing this.  Rely on each device to label
the appropriate sysfs entry.

Bug: 26219114
Change-Id: I2c5ef489a9db2fdf7bbd5afd04278214b814351c

This permission was created mostly for dumpstate (so it can include
recovery files on bugreports when an OTA fails), but it was applied to
uncrypt and recovery as well (since it had a wider access before).

Grant access to cache_recovery_file where we previously granted access
to cache_file. Add auditallow rules to determine if this is really
needed.

BUG: 25351711
Change-Id: I07745181dbb4f0bde75694ea31b3ab79a4682f18

Address following denials:
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/sys/devices/virtual/block/zram0/disksize" dev="sysfs" ino=14958 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_zram:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
avc: denied { search } for name="zram0" dev="sysfs" ino=14903 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_zram:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
avc: denied { read } for name="mem_used_total" dev="sysfs" ino=14970 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_zram:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
avc: denied { write } for name="uevent" dev="sysfs" ino=14904 scontext=u:r:ueventd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_zram:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
avc: denied { open } for path="/sys/devices/virtual/block/zram0/uevent" dev="sysfs" ino=14904 scontext=u:r:ueventd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_zram:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
avc: denied { read } for pid=348 comm="vold" name="zram0" dev="sysfs" ino=15223 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_zram:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
avc: denied { search } for pid=3494 comm="ContactsProvide" name="zram0"dev="sysfs" ino=15223 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_zram:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0

Bug: 22032619
Change-Id: I40cf918b7cafdba6cb3d42b04b1616a84e4ce158

Start labeling the directory /sys/kernel/debug/tracing. The files
in this directory need to be writable to the shell user.

Remove global debugfs:file write access. This was added in the days
before we could label individual debugfs files.

Change-Id: I79c1fcb63b4b9b903dcabd99b6b25e201fe540a3

Add initial support for labeling files on /sys/kernel/debug.
The kernel support was added in https://android-review.googlesource.com/122130
but the userspace portion of the change was never completed until now.

Start labeling the file /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker . This
is the trace_marker file, which is written to by almost all processes
in Android. Allow global write access to this file.

This change should be submitted at the same time as the system/core
commit with the same Change-Id as this patch.

Change-Id: Id1d6a9ad6d0759d6de839458890e8cb24685db6d

Properties are now broken up from a single /dev/__properties__ file into
multiple files, one per property label.  This commit provides the
mechanism to control read access to each of these files and therefore
sets of properties.

This allows full access for all domains to each of these new property
files to match the current permissions of /dev/__properties__.  Future
commits will restrict the access.

Bug: 21852512

Change-Id: Ie9e43968acc7ac3b88e354a0bdfac75b8a710094

Bug: 24698874
Bug: 17173268
Change-Id: I8c502ae6aad3cf3c13fae81722c367f45d70fb18

The directory is to be used in eng/userdebug build to store method
traces (previously stored in /data/dalvik-cache/profiles).

Bug: 25612377

Change-Id: Ia4365a8d1f13d33ee54115dc5e3bf62786503993

Initial check in of empty autoplay_app.te policy file.

Create isAutoPlayApp input selector. Give this selector high precedence -
only below isSystemServer.

Add neverallow rule disallowing an app context with isAutoPlayApp=true from
running in a domain other than autoplay_app.

Change-Id: I1d06669d2f1acf953e50867dfa2b264ccaee29a4

1) Don't use the generic "system_data_file" for the files in /data/nativetest.
Rather, ensure it has it's own special label. This allows us to distinguish
these files from other files in SELinux policy.

2) Allow the shell user to execute files from /data/nativetest, on
userdebug or eng builds only.

3) Add a neverallow rule (compile time assertion + CTS test) that nobody
is allowed to execute these files on user builds, and only the shell user
is allowed to execute these files on userdebug/eng builds.

Bug: 25340994
Change-Id: I3e292cdd1908f342699d6c52f8bbbe6065359413

This CL adds the SELinux settings required to support tracing
during boot.
https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/157163/

BUG: 21739901
Change-Id: Ib3a7107776141ac8cf4f1ca06674f47a0d4b6ae0

Bug: 18068520
Bug: 21852542
Change-Id: I876b37ac31dd44201ea1c1400a7c2c16c6a10049

This reverts commit 2dabf174.

Change-Id: I7e35a6ea1b8d5958c65eb04a7c9a04ba807b1181

Bug: 18068520
Bug: 21852542
Change-Id: I080547c61cbaacb18e003a9b2366e2392a6521ff

Bug: 18068520
Bug: 21852542
Change-Id: I080547c61cbaacb18e003a9b2366e2392a6521ff

/proc/iomem is currently given the proc label but contains system information
which should not be available to all processes.

Bug: 22008387
Change-Id: I4f1821f40113a743ad986d13d8d130ed8b8abf2f

(cherry pick from commit 0d22c6ce)

- Enable logpersistd to write to /data/misc/logd
- Enable logpersistd to read from pstore to help complete any content
  lost by reboot disruption
- Enable shell readonly ability logpersistd files in /data/misc/logd
- Enable logcat -f when placed into logd context to act as a
  logpersistd (nee logcatd) agent, restrict access to run only in
  userdebug or eng

Bug: 19608716
Change-Id: I3209582bc796a1093c325c90068a48bf268e5ab5

- Enable logpersistd to write to /data/misc/logd
- Enable logpersistd to read from pstore to help complete any content
  lost by reboot disruption
- Enable shell readonly ability logpersistd files in /data/misc/logd
- Enable logcat -f when placed into logd context to act as a
  logpersistd (nee logcatd) agent, restrict access to run only in
  userdebug or eng

Bug: 19608716
Change-Id: I3209582bc796a1093c325c90068a48bf268e5ab5

Change-Id: Ibcb714248c28abf21272986facaade376dcbd7ef

Define an explicit label for /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches and grant to
the various people who need it, including vold which uses it when
performing storage benchmarks.

Also let vold create new directories under it's private storage area
where the benchmarks will be carried out.  Mirror the definition of
the private storage area on expanded media.

avc: denied { write } for name="drop_caches" dev="proc" ino=20524 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file permissive=0

Bug: 21172095
Change-Id: I300b1cdbd235ff60e64064d3ba6e5ea783baf23f

Bug:20182139
Change-Id: I1829a83c7d8e2698715e424a688a2753d65de868

Bug: 19483574
(cherry picked from commit 7d66f783)

Change-Id: If617e29b6fd36c88c157941bc9e11cf41329da48

Bug: 19483574
Change-Id: I7e4c0cf748d2b216dcb3aede3803883552b58b64

Use a more specific label for /data/misc/gatekeeper

Rearrange some other rules.

Change-Id: Ib634e52526cf31a8f0a0e6d12bbf0f69dff8f6b5

Added permission to SAP socket used to access the the RIL daemon

Change-Id: Ifbfb764f0b8731e81fb3157955aa4fda6120d846
Signed-off-by: Casper Bonde <c.bonde@samsung.com>

Provide a default label for binfmt_misc. This is not used by the
core policy, although it may be used in device specific policy.

Bug: 20152930
Change-Id: Id51d69333bfeda40720d0e65e1539fab0b6e1e95

On debuggable builds, system_server can request app heap dumps
by running something similar to the following commands:

  % adb shell am set-watch-heap com.android.systemui 1048576
  % adb shell dumpsys procstats --start-testing

which will dump the app's heap to /data/system/heapdump. See
framework/base commit b9a5e4ad30c9add140fd13491419ae66e947809d.

Allow this behavior.

Addresses the following denial:

  avc: denied { write } for path="/data/system/heapdump/javaheap.bin" dev="dm-0" ino=150747 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=0

Bug: 20073185
Change-Id: I4b925033a5456867caf2697de6c2d683d0743540

Expanded storage supports a subset of the features of the internal
data partition.  Mirror that policy for consistency.  vold is also
granted enough permissions to prepare initial directories.

avc: denied { write } for name="ext" dev="tmpfs" ino=3130 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
avc: denied { add_name } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
avc: denied { create } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
avc: denied { setattr } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=7243 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
avc: denied { mounton } for path="/mnt/ext/57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=7243 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1

avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/ext" dev="tmpfs" ino=3130 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1

avc: denied { setattr } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=4471 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/expand/57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b/media" dev="dm-0" ino=145153 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1

avc: denied { rmdir } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=6380 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1

avc: denied { create } for name="tmp" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
avc: denied { setattr } for name="tmp" dev="dm-0" ino=72578 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1

Bug: 19993667
Change-Id: I73c98b36e7c066f21650a9e16ea82c5a0ef3d6c5

Creates new directory at /data/misc/vold for storing key material
on internal storage.  Only vold should have access to this label.

Change-Id: I7f2d1314ad3b2686e29e2037207ad83d2d3bf465

An upcoming platform release is redesigning how external storage
works.  At a high level, vold is taking on a more active role in
managing devices that dynamically appear.

This change also creates further restricted domains for tools doing
low-level access of external storage devices, including sgdisk
and blkid.  It also extends sdcardd to be launchable by vold, since
launching by init will eventually go away.

For compatibility, rules required to keep AOSP builds working are
marked with "TODO" to eventually remove.

Slightly relax system_server external storage rules to allow calls
like statfs().  Still neverallow open file descriptors, since they
can cause kernel to kill us.

Here are the relevant violations that this CL is designed to allow:

avc: denied { search } for name="user" dev="tmpfs" ino=7441 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/user/0" dev="tmpfs" ino=6659 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { write } for name="user" dev="tmpfs" ino=6658 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { add_name } for name="10" scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { create } for name="10" scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { setattr } for name="10" dev="tmpfs" ino=11348 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=3131 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self" dev="tmpfs" ino=6659 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c522,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self" dev="tmpfs" ino=11348 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c522,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { open } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { write } for name="data" dev="tmpfs" ino=11979 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { add_name } for name="com.google.android.music" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { create } for name="com.google.android.music" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { use } for path="socket:[8297]" dev="sockfs" ino=8297 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd
avc: denied { read write } for path="socket:[8297]" dev="sockfs" ino=8297 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=netlink_kobject_uevent_socket
avc: denied { read } for path="pipe:[8298]" dev="pipefs" ino=8298 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file
avc: denied { write } for path="pipe:[8298]" dev="pipefs" ino=8298 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file
avc: denied { mounton } for path="/storage/emulated" dev="tmpfs" ino=8913 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=7444 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self/primary" dev="tmpfs" ino=7447 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file
avc: denied { read } for name="primary" dev="tmpfs" ino=7447 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/user" dev="tmpfs" ino=7441 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { read } for name="disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file
avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/block/vold/disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/dev/block/vold/disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file
avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="fuse" ino=0 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { open } for path="/storage/public:81F3-13EC" dev="fuse" ino=0 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { write } for name="data" dev="fuse" ino=2 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { add_name } for name="com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { create } for name="com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file
avc: denied { read } for name="public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file
avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file
avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file
avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[3264]" dev="pipefs" ino=3264 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd
avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[3264]" dev="pipefs" ino=3264 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd
avc: denied { search } for name="block" dev="tmpfs" ino=2494 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:block_device:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4200]" dev="pipefs" ino=4200 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd
avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4200]" dev="pipefs" ino=4200 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd
avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=3131 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { search } for name="media_rw" dev="tmpfs" ino=3127 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_media_rw_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { getattr } for path="pipe:[3648]" dev="pipefs" ino=3648 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file
avc: denied { use } for path="/dev/pts/12" dev="devpts" ino=15 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd
avc: denied { use } for path="/dev/pts/12" dev="devpts" ino=15 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd
avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4182]" dev="pipefs" ino=4182 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd

Change-Id: Idf3b8561baecf7faa603fac5ababdcc5708288e1

Add selinux rules to allow file level encryption to work

Change-Id: I1e4bba23e99cf5b2624a7df843688fba6f3c3209

Add selinux rules to allow file level encryption to work

Change-Id: I1e4bba23e99cf5b2624a7df843688fba6f3c3209

- allow access for /data/system/packages.xml.
- deprecate access to /dev/logd_debug (can use /dev/kmsg for debugging)
- allow access to /dev/socket/logd for 'logd --reinit'

Bug: 19681572
Change-Id: Iac57fff1aabc3b061ad2cc27969017797f8bef54

Revert the tightening of /proc/net access. These changes
are causing a lot of denials, and I want additional time to
figure out a better solution.

Addresses the following denials (and many more):

  avc: denied { read } for comm="SyncAdapterThre" name="stats" dev="proc" ino=X scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file
  avc: denied { read } for comm="facebook.katana" name="iface_stat_fmt" dev="proc" ino=X scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file
  avc: denied { read } for comm="IntentService[C" name="if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=X scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file
  avc: denied { read } for comm="dumpstate" name="iface_stat_all" dev="proc" ino=X scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

This reverts commit 0f0324cc
and commit 99940d1a

Bug: 9496886
Bug: 19034637
Change-Id: I436a6e3638ac9ed49afbee214e752fe2b0112868

allow the bootchart to create dir and files at init,
also allow user to create the stop and start file under
/data/bootchart directory to start and stop bootchart

Change-Id: Icfee8dcd17366383eef00fbe3139744bf4427a6b
Signed-off-by: Yongqin Liu <yongqin.liu@linaro.org>