The previous selinux rules obtained via audit2allow didn't really
work with the case of apps connecting to the producer socket,
despite all the allow rules being correctly in place.
This was failing our CTS tests.

The reason for the failure (see denials pasted below) is due to
Multi Level Security (for multi-user), which was still preventing
apps form a different level to connect to the traced producer
socket and write to the shmem buffers they get passed back.
This CL tags the objects being accessed as mlstrusted.
CTS tests pass with this CL.

Denials:
avc: denied { write } for pid=8545 comm="traced_probes" name="traced_producer" dev="tmpfs" ino=23629 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:traced_producer_socket:s0 tclass=sock_file permissive=1
avc: denied { write } for pid=8545 comm="traced_probes" name="traced_producer" dev="tmpfs" ino=23629 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:traced_producer_socket:s0 tclass=sock_file permissive=1
avc: denied { connectto } for pid=8545 comm="traced_probes" path="/dev/socket/traced_producer" scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:r:traced:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket permissive=1
avc: denied { connectto } for pid=8545 comm="traced_probes" path="/dev/socket/traced_producer" scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:r:traced:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket permissive=1
avc: denied { write } for pid=8545 comm="traced_probes" path=2F6D656D66643A706572666574746F5F73686D656D202864656C6574656429 dev="tmpfs" ino=104483 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:traced_tmpfs:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

Change-Id: I1598bc0b07bf39b8d0420b66caf06a4ca884f383
Bug: 73340039
Test: CtsPerfettoTestCases

Bug: 73660835
Test: With the other commit on this topic, clearing all trace files via
the app works properly.

Change-Id: I27a4a5a14d9afe817683f1b046a644648a84badc

To upload configs and download output, this line
is needed.

Bug: 72961153
Test: The statsd cts test passes
Change-Id: I0943cc841881dd5d15e24ba444b146087a81bf96

This reverts commit bf0c2a59.

Bug:68126425
Test: No apps affected by not being able to run in shell domain
Change-Id: I8b93eecd023fbb392a98253d721dad75f79b61f4
Merged-In: I8b93eecd023fbb392a98253d721dad75f79b61f4

This is to allow to leave audit trails in dmesg to cross-correlate
kernel panics with perfetto ftrace activity.

Bug: 73340039
Change-Id: I575a537553adc75378783c37c84350581250614d

These denials seem to be caused by a race with the process that labels
the files.  While we work on fixing them, hide the denials.

Bug: 68864350
Bug: 70180742
Test: Built policy.
Change-Id: I58a32e38e6384ca55e865e9575dcfe7c46b2ed3c

In this architecture, the system_server instructs the zygote to fork a
child-zygote to be the webview_zygote. The system_server tells this new
zygote to listen for fork requests on a random abstract unix socket of
its choosing.

A follow-up CL will remove the rules for starting webview_zygote via
init.

Bug: 63749735
Test: m
Test: Launch "Third-party licenses" activity from Settings, and it
      renders correctly via the WebView.
Merged-In: I864743943c11c18de386010ecd4b616721cb9954
Change-Id: I1c352e47b66eca3a3fa641daa6ecc3e7a889b54e

This is needed to allow it to log audit events, e.g. cert
validation failure.

Bug: 70886042
Test: manual, attempt connecting to EAP-TLS wifi with bad cert.
Merged-In: Ia1b0f3c6e02697fdb5018082d5c851f116013fb1
Change-Id: Ia1b0f3c6e02697fdb5018082d5c851f116013fb1

The intent of this flag is to disable tests during early device
bringup so that vendor drops can occur without build breakages.
When SELINUX_IGNORE_NEVERALLOWS=true also disable labeling tests
sepolicy_tests, and treble_sepolicy_tests.

Bug: 73322735
Test: build, verify known tests failures do not cause build breakage.
Change-Id: I3e7165938d4e34c066bfa0a20e68b7e02dae4a24

Bug: 30561479

Test: Booted on walleye and verified that read denials of the property
Test: do not generate warnings.
Change-Id: I61a4a7d3a360a6d27d8986eb8f3f9662272233b1
(cherry picked from commit 2f35f5ca)

Test: n/a
Change-Id: I7041cc0f17ece86c01db1d9c17f68b58473cf27c

CTS tests need to be able to call, from hostside:
adb shell cmd stats dump-report (and others)
On a user build, this will fail because of an selinux policy violation
from shell. This cl fixes this by granting shell permission.

Similarly, Settings needs to communicate with statsd, so
system_app-statsd binder calls are given permission.

Bug: 72961153
Bug: 73255014
Test: run cts-dev -m CtsStatsdHostTestCases -t android.cts.statsd.atom.HostAtomTests
Test: manual confirmation
Change-Id: I6589ab4ef5c91a4a7f78eb97b63d9bb43e3d8f02

Allows the traced_probes daemon to access the core ftrace
functionalities on user builds. Specifically this involves:
- Whitelisting the per_cpu/ subdirectory to access:
  1) trace_pipe_raw file to allow perfetto to read the raw
     ftrace buffer (rather than the text-based /trace endpoint)
  2) cpuX/stats and cpuX/buffer_size_kb that allow to
     tune the buffer size per-cpu pipe and to get basic
     statistics about the ftrace buffer (#events, overruns)
- Whitelistiing the full event directories rather than the
  /enable files. This gives also access to the /format files
  for the events that are already enabled on user builds.
  /format files simply describe the memory layout
  of the binary logs. Example: https://ghostbin.com/paste/f8m4k

This still does NOT allow enabling the events labeled as
"_debug" (mostly events that return activity on inodes).
We'll deal with that separately as soon as we get a POC
of inode resolution and a sensible blacklist/whitelist model.

Bug: 70942310
Change-Id: Ic15cca0a9d7bc0e45aa48097a94eadef44c333f8

This should fix presubmit tests.

Bug: 68319037
Test: Built policy.
Change-Id: I0c3bc08c9b114e7a3737cdb3005fb59b2df47d55

This should fix presubmit tests.

Bug: 72550646
Test: Built policy.
Change-Id: Ib17d2a5e1635ff661d39d14169652f88b7a6e4f5

Bug: 72809699
Test: build
Change-Id: Ifb66ad13557af7d2dc6d3ef823e326a5fba51b24

This should fix presubmit tests.

Bug: 73128755
Test: Built policy.
Change-Id: Ie389de04360090594e627e629a59a60092dda6ca

Restrictions introduced in vendor init mean that new devices
may not no longer exempt vendor init from writing to system_data_file.
This means we must introduce a new label for /data/vendor which
vendor_init may write to.

Bug: 73087047
Test: build and boot Taimen and Marlin. Complete SUW, enroll fingerprint
    No new denials.

Change-Id: I65f904bb28952d4776aab947515947e14befbe34

* changes:
  Use PLATFORM_SEPOLICY_COMPAT_VERSIONS
  Move PLATFORM_SEPOLICY_VERSION to make/core/config.mk

This is a list of sepolicy versions that the framework supports.

Test: builds and boots

Bug: 67920434
Change-Id: I0f408fa3967214b47a64101760dbbb2542023dcf

Test: m framework_compatibility_matrix.xml -j
Test: device boots

Bug: 67920434
Bug: 69390067

Change-Id: I3461873c22f704b9bbaa3a4e6f7e1df34d6b61a3

Bug: 72878750
Test: build sepolicy
Change-Id: Ifa6822e042beed0e5971c85155aa526912807c8a

And grant explicit exemption from system_executes_vendor_violators
neverallow rules.

This does not change the policy, but is needed to test the violator
attribute for emptiness.

Bug: 72662597
Test: build sepolicy
Change-Id: Iba79bb42e1381b221fe0dc53470f62f8267a4791