This is unused by core policy and by any device policy except for hikey.

Test: device boots
Test: no denials ever collected
Change-Id: I36a6790499e4aeedd808457b43fd72370fa48e53

Because I'm nitpicky.

Test: policy compiles
Change-Id: I4d886d0d6182d29d7b260cf1f142c47cd32eda29

Test: no denials showing up in log collection
Test: device boots
Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: I089cfcf486464952fcbb52cce9f6152caf662c23

Remove domain_deprecated and add denials picked up by log collection.

Addresses the following auditallow messages:

  avc: granted { search } for comm="debuggerd" name="arm" dev="sda35"
  ino=57521 scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0
  tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0 tclass=dir

  avc: granted { read } for comm="debuggerd"
  path="/data/app/dji.pilot-Z6Q2X6YjYNN2Ag8otZTCdg==/lib/arm/libtpnsWatchdog.so"
  dev="sda35" ino=57854 scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0
  tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0 tclass=file

  avc: granted { getattr } for comm="debuggerd64"
  path="/data/app/com.google.android.youtube-2/lib/arm64/libcronet.so"
  dev="sda35" ino=1384657 scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0
  tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0 tclass=file

  avc: granted { read open } for comm="debuggerd"
  path="/data/app/dji.pilot-We9wJivxEqhzfdtQrNFvaA==/lib/arm/libtpnsWatchdog.so"
  dev="sda35" ino=57575 scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0
  tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 28760354
Test: Device boots
Test: No unexpected denials in denial collection logs.
Change-Id: I1ae6203e37ddd4a19551d8063d26071ac20f2f3e

After a series of recent commits, installd has fully migrated over
to Binder, and all socket-based communication has been removed.

Test: builds, boots, apps install fine, pre-OTA dexopt works
Bug: 13758960, 30944031
Change-Id: Ia67b6260de58240d057c99b1bbd782b44376dfb5

app_domain was split up in commit: 2e00e637 to
enable compilation by hiding type_transition rules from public policy.  These
rules need to be hidden from public policy because they describe how objects are
labeled, of which non-platform should be unaware.  Instead of cutting apart the
app_domain macro, which non-platform policy may rely on for implementing new app
types, move all app_domain calls to private policy.

(cherry-pick of commit: 76035ea0)

Bug: 33428593
Test: bullhead and sailfish both boot. sediff shows no policy change.
Change-Id: I4beead8ccc9b6e13c6348da98bb575756f539665

Addresses the following denial:

avc: denied { ioctl } for comm="top" path="/dev/pts/0" dev="devpts"
ino=3 ioctlcmd=5402 scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:devpts:s0
tclass=chr_file permissive=0

Bug: 33073072
Bug: 7530569
Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: If9178d29f2295be46bb118df00ebf73a6ebc9f81

This functionality is being used by priv_apps shipped as part of
Android. Don't drop execute_no_trans as we haven't seen any denials here
yet.

Addresses the following auditallow messages:

avc: granted { execute } for comm="GELServices-0"
path="/data/data/com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox/files/velour/dex_cache/Ji1opKyKASKEOKNQUu1QyWw_1.jar/Ji1opKyKASKEOKNQUu1QyWw_1.dex"
dev="dm-2" ino=1196939 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768
tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file

avc: granted { execute } for comm="CTION_IDLE_MODE"
path="/data/data/com.google.android.gms/snet/dalvik-cache/snet.dex"
dev="dm-2" ino=1114262 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768
tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file

avc: granted { execute } for comm="lowpool[3]"
path="/data/data/com.google.android.gms/files/libAppDataSearchExt_arm64_v8a.so"
dev="dm-2" ino=1688320 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768
tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file

avc: granted { execute } for comm="Binder:9196_2"
path="/data/data/com.google.android.gms/app_dg_cache/1FECE961A655634046D6AB5E18FE6F74212FBEA6/lib/libdC14BB7282EA1.so"
dev="dm-2" ino=1893474 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768
tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file

avc: granted { execute } for comm="Binder:13170_1"
path="/data/data/com.google.android.gms/app_fb/f.dex" dev="dm-2"
ino=1810720 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768
tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file

Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: I63358697b07c8f620b999e666791f4f385bab776

Bug: 33388095
Test: Builds and boots.
Change-Id: Ief9064a16fc733bed54eb76f509ff5aaf5db4baf

Test: No media_rw_data_file related app denials
Change-Id: I1a977db09379f9a3e5bc52c597df12f52929ad19

Make all platform tyeps public to start to prevent build breakage in any devices
that may have device-specific policy using these types.  Future changes will
need to be carefully made to ensure we properly limit types for use by
non-platform policy.

Test: Builds
Change-Id: I7349940d5b5a57357bc7c16f66925dee1d030eb6

webview_zygote needs to preload the WebView implementation, which may be
an installed APK, so must be able to read and execute code from inside
the APK.

Also add additional neverallow assertions to strengthen some
restrictions on this domain.

Test: WebView apps work after installing a WebView APK.
Bug: 21643067
Change-Id: I58aedc5e0a25259e2e20c70d4260579a354b6789

In order to support platform changes without simultaneous updates from
non-platform components, the platform and non-platform policies must be
split.  In order to provide a guarantee that policy written for
non-platform objects continues to provide the same access, all types
exposed to non-platform policy are versioned by converting them and the
policy using them into attributes.

This change performs that split, the subsequent versioning and also
generates a mapping file to glue the different policy components
together.

Test: Device boots and runs.
Bug: 31369363
Change-Id: Ibfd3eb077bd9b8e2ff3b2e6a0ca87e44d78b1317

am: fed665ed

Change-Id: I0d6037fb73845cc012609d769b8a0bb009536848

am: cb5f4a3d

Change-Id: I5b019efd007c4037757ea9940a629876733186bd

Most of this CL mirrors what we've already done for the "netd" Binder
interface, while sorting a few lists alphabetically.

Migrating installd to Binder will allow us to get rid of one of
the few lingering text-based command protocols, improving system
maintainability and security.

Test: builds, boots
Bug: 13758960, 30944031
Change-Id: I59b89f916fd12e22f9813ace6673be38314c97b7

system/core commit 6a70ded7bfa8914aaa3dc25630ff2713ae893f80 (later
amended by 107e29ac1b1c297a0d4ee35c4978e79f47013e2c indicated that logd
doesn't want it's memory accessible by anyone else. Unfortunately,
setting DUMPABLE isn't sufficient against a root level process such with
ptrace. Only one such process exists, "debuggerd".

Block debuggerd from accessing logd's memory on user builds. Userdebug
and eng builds are unaffected.  Add a neverallow rule (compile time
assertion + CTS test) to prevent regressions.

Bug: 32450474
Test: Policy compiles.
Change-Id: Ie90850cd91846a43adaa0871d239f894a0c94d38

am: 8ee06cc4

Change-Id: I870f2084bd6f483c8e1537a73259e0d0a45f3a07

Broke the dragon build:

libsepol.report_failure: neverallow on line 304 of system/sepolicy/public/domain.te (or line 8638 of policy.conf) violated by allow kernel device:chr_file { create setattr };
libsepol.check_assertions: 1 neverallow failures occurred
Error while expanding policy

This reverts commit ed0b4eb3.

Change-Id: I5d55ab59ed72ce7c19a10ddbb374f9f3b3fae4fd

am: 4868f377

Change-Id: I3c57e833dd736ac87718d9e95e0a02e3048de979

am: 2c222c1e

Change-Id: I89d6c56ce6d29dfb184f9eb95aaaa49909e25b44

By default, files created in /dev are labeled with the "device" label
unless a different label has been assigned. The direct use of this
generic label is discouraged (and in many cases neverallowed) because
rules involving this label tend to be overly broad and permissive.

Today, generically labeled character devices can only be opened, read,
or written to by init and ueventd.

  $ sesearch --allow -t device -c chr_file -p open,read,write out/target/product/marlin/root/sepolicy
  allow init device:chr_file { setattr read lock getattr write ioctl open append };
  allow ueventd device:chr_file { read lock getattr write ioctl open append };

this is enforced by the following SELinux neverallow rule (compile time
assertion + CTS test):

  neverallow { domain -init -ueventd } device:chr_file { open read write };

Start auditallowing ueventd access to /dev character device files with the
default SELinux label. This doesn't appear to be used, but let's prove it.
While ueventd is expected to create files in /dev, it has no need to open
most of the files it creates.

Note, however, that because ueventd has mknod + setfscreate permissions,
a malicious or compromised ueventd can always create a device node under
an incorrect label, and gain access that way.

The goal of this change is to prove that no process other than init are
accessing generically labeled files in /dev.

While I'm here, tighten up the compile time assertion for
device:chr_file to include more permissions.

Test: policy compiles + device boots with no granted messages.
Change-Id: Ic98b0ddc631b49b09e58698d9f40738ccedd1fd0

am: a24d7f53

Change-Id: Ia27cb54e53bbd755adaf588fb4bb2f948ba3d255

am: c27c23fb

Change-Id: I28f0ec1eac5fa78ca1268089954c190c0e38b188

Only init and ueventd have any access to /dev/port, and neither should
have any use for it. As it stands, leaving port in just represents
additional attack surface with no useful functionality, so it should be
removed if possible, not only from Pixel devices, but from all Android
devices.

Test: The phone boots successfully

Bug:33301618
Change-Id: Iedc51590f1ffda02444587d647889ead9bdece3f

In general, apps shouldn't be executing data from their writable data
directories. Allowing this is a security risk and use cases for this are
almost always anti-patterns where saner alternatives are available such
as using one of the standard systems for shipping libraries (extracted
by the package manager or aligned/uncompressed in the apk) or using the
existing package system to handle plugins. It's reasonable for the
untrusted_app domain to have this (not just for backwards compatibility)
for priv_app should be held to a higher standard.

Ideally, untrusted apps would be able to opt-in to disabling this and
then the default could then be switched at a new API level. It could do
more than just hardening apps not requiring it by having documentation
explain the risks and offer alternatives to reduce 'legitimate' use. The
base system could disable it for all of the bundled untrusted apps.

Change-Id: I4efcfaf01c6b6c33c39e98c22a1934e8892e2147