Test: mmm system/sepolicy -- no warnings
Bug: 3716915
Change-Id: I76886c2d09a70cbe6dc707dd0599217407bb63f7

Renderscript drivers are loaded from /vendor/lib64 by following the
/system/vendor symlink. This change fixes a couple of things.
- Allows all domains access to follow the symlink
- Restores app domain permissions for /vendor for non-treble devices
- Allow app domains to peek into /vendor/lib64, but NOT grant 'execute'
  permissions for everything. Since RS drivers can be loaded into any
  process, their vendor implementation and dependencies have been
  marked as 'same process HALs' already.

Bug: 37169158
Test: Tested on sailfish (Treble) & Angler (non-treble)
      ./cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsRenderscriptTestCases \
      --skip-device-info --skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check \
      --abi arm64-v8a
      Result: Tests Passed: 743 Tests Failed: 0

Change-Id: I36f5523381428629126fc196f615063fc7a50b8e
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

The concept of VNDK-stable set is gone because they no longer need to be
stable across several Android releases. Instead, they are just small set
of system libraries (other than Low-Level NDK) that can be used by
same-process HALs. They need to be stable only during an Android release
as other VNDK libraries. However, since they are eligible for double
loading, we still need to distinguish those libs from other VNDK
libraries. So we give them a name vndk-sp, which means VNDK designed for
same-process HALs.

Bug: 37139956
Test: booting successful with vndk-sp libs in /vendor/lib(64)?/vndk-sp
Change-Id: I892c4514deb3c6c8006e3659bed1ad3363420732

Vndk-stable libs are system libs that are used by same process HALs.
Since same process HALs can be loaded to any process, so are vndk-stable
libs.

Bug: 37138502
Test: none, because the directory is currently empty and thus this is
no-op. sailfish builds and boots.

Change-Id: I67a2c8c2e4c3517aa30b4a97dc80dc2800e47b5a

Effectively removes TODOs and finalizes the initial solution to allow
all domains access to 'vendor_file'.

Bug: 36681074
Test: Build and boot sailfish (no policy changes in the CL)

Change-Id: I50c05e20175c5273b34901809d967dd3e48bdb0e
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

All accesses to /vendor/app within platform include permissions to read
symlinks in the location. This rule is redundant now.

Bug: 36806861
Test: Boot sailfish and find no denials for 'vendor_app_file'

Change-Id: Ic17a67521cff6717d83b78bb4ad8e21e772f6d4f
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

/vendor/framework is now designated location for vendor's platform
libraries. The directory is thus only made available for 'dex2oat'
coredomain.

Bug: 36680116
Test: Boot sailfish & angler and launch gApps, dialer w/ no denials for
      'vendor_framework_file'

Change-Id: I24c2ec30f836330005a972ae20d839bef9dcb8aa
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

The change makes 'vendor_overlay_file' accessible only to few platform
domains like idmap, system_server, zygote and appdomain.

The overlay files contains RROs (runtime resource overlays)

Bug: 36681210
Test: Boot sailfish (treble device) from wiped flashall
Test: Connect to wifi and launch chrome to load few websites.
Test: Launch camera and record + playback video

Change-Id: I3596ca89ad51d0e7d78c75121f22ea71209ee332
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

The change makes 'vendor_app_file' accessible only to few platform
domains like dex2oat, idmap, installd, system_server and appdomain.

Bug: 36681210
Test: Boot sailfish (treble device) from wiped flashall
Test: Connect to wifi and launch chrome to load few websites.
Test: Launch camera and record + playback video

Change-Id: Ib8757fedbf2e19c8381c8cd0f8f2693b2345534b
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

The CL splits /vendor labeling from /system. Which was allowing all
processes read, execute access to /vendor.

Following directories will remain world readable
 /vendor/etc
 /vendor/lib(64)/hw/

Following are currently world readable but their scope
will be minimized to platform processes that require access
 /vendor/app
 /vendor/framework/
 /vendor/overlay

Files labelled with 'same_process_hal_file' are allowed to be
read + executed from by the world. This is for Same process HALs and
their dependencies.

Bug: 36527360
Bug: 36832490
Bug: 36681210
Bug: 36680116
Bug: 36690845
Bug: 36697328
Bug: 36696623
Bug: 36806861
Bug: 36656392
Bug: 36696623
Bug: 36792803

All of the tests were done on sailfish, angler, bullhead, dragon
Test: Boot and connect to wifi
Test: Run chrome and load websites, play video in youtube, load maps w/
      current location, take pictures and record video in camera,
      playback recorded video.
Test: Connect to BT headset and ensure BT audio playback works.
Test: OTA sideload using recovery
Test: CTS SELinuxHostTest pass

Change-Id: I278435b72f7551a28f3c229f720ca608b77a7029
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

Add selinux policies for init script and shell script to unzip a tar
containing ASAN libraries on boot.

Bug: 36458146
Test: m && m SANITIZE_TARGET=address
Test: manual (build steps for tar missing)
Change-Id: I5c3cb233aae93ee9985431090af902b0e3c1b0a7
(cherry picked from commit 0b743050)
Merged-In: I5c3cb233aae93ee9985431090af902b0e3c1b0a7

Vendor and system components are only allowed to share files by
passing open FDs over HIDL. Ban all directory access and all file
accesses other than what can be applied to an open FD such as
ioctl/stat/read/write/append.

This commit asserts that core components marked with attribute
coredomain may only access core data types marked with attribute
core_data_file_type.

A temporary exemption is granted to domains that currently rely on
access.

(cherry picked from commit cd97e710)

Bug: 34980020
Test: build Marlin policy
Change-Id: I2f0442f2628fbac1f2f7aa5ddf2a13e16b2546cc

/data/misc/zoneinfo is provided by libc and is considered to be
VNDK stable. Grant read access to all domains and exempt from
neverallow rules asserting no vendor access to core data types.

Bug: 36730929
Test: Marlin Policy builds
Change-Id: I13766a661d6314f5393639fc20f1ab55d802f35f

This futher restricts neverallows for sockets which may be exposed as
filesystem nodes. This is achieved by labelling all such sockets
created by core/non-vendor domains using the new coredomain_socket
attribute, and then adding neverallow rules targeting that attribute.

This has now effect on what domains are permitted to do. This only
changes neverallow rules.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 36577153

(cherry picked from commit cf2ffdf0)

Change-Id: Iffeee571a2ff61fb9515fa6849d060649636524e

This tightens neverallows for looking up Binder servicemanager
services from vendor components. In particular, vendor components,
other than apps, are not permitted to look up any Binder services.
Vendor apps are permitted to look up only stable public API services
which is exactly what non-vendor apps are permitted to use as well.
If we permitted vendor apps to use non-stable/hidden Binder services,
they might break when core components get updated without updating
vendor components.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 35870313

Change-Id: I47d40d5d42cf4205d9e4e5e5f9d0794104efc28f

This reverts commit 5c09d123.

Broke the build

Bug: 35870313
Test: source build/envsetup.sh && lunch marlin-userdebug && m -j40
Change-Id: I71c968be6e89462fd286be5663933552d478f8bf

This tightens neverallows for looking up Binder servicemanager
services from vendor components. In particular, vendor components,
other than apps, are not permitted to look up any Binder services.
Vendor apps are permitted to look up only stable public API services
which is exactly what non-vendor apps are permitted to use as well.
If we permitted vendor apps to use non-stable/hidden Binder services,
they might break when core components get updated without updating
vendor components.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 35870313
Change-Id: I949d62b3528cadb4bfe6f5985c25d1f497df0d5a

We don't want to prevent access from vendor platform apps to system app
data. The issue with the referencing system_app explicitly in
neverallows is that vendor platform apps which need sandboxes similar to
system_app cannot be placed under system_app without modifying the
policy for all platform apps.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Change-Id: Ic0052602c31be4d74b02eeea129e2d8bfbd9c8d3

split property context file in vendor and sytem were left untouched by
the recent changes. This was working accidentally because they were
still accessible to all domains as 'system_file'.

Bug: 36002573
Test: Boot sailfish to observe no new denials.
Test: 'adb sideload' OTA on sailfish successfully

Change-Id: I5bec058b59db83d2a431e9f7e91c5a09af7d2942
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

Unescaped apostrophe is not permitted inside macros.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy -- no warnings
Bug: 34980020
Change-Id: I893a41508d8b62975771967fd6e40e50d188c7c1

Vendor and system components are only allowed to share files by
passing open FDs over HIDL. Ban all directory access and all file
accesses other than what can be applied to an open file:
stat/read/write/append.

This commit marks core data types as core_data_file_type and bans
access to non-core domains with an exemption for apps. A temporary
exemption is also granted to domains that currently rely on
access with TODOs and bug number for each exemption.

Bug: 34980020
Test: Build and boot Marlin. Make phone call, watch youtube video.
      No new denials observed.
Change-Id: I320dd30f9f0a5bf2f9bb218776b4bccdb529b197

In f5446eb1 I forgot to let violators
of "no Binder in vendor" rule keep their access to /dev/binder. This
commit fixes the issue.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 35870313
Bug: 36657020
Change-Id: I3fc68df1d78e2a2da94ac9bf036a51923e3a9aae

On PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE devices, non-vendor domains (coredomain) and
vendor domain are not permitted to connect to each other's sockets.
There are two main exceptions: (1) apps are permitted to talk to other
apps over Unix domain sockets (this is public API in Android
framework), and (2) domains with network access (netdomain) are
permitted to connect to netd.

This commit thus:
* adds neverallow rules restricting socket connection establishment,
* temporarily exempts the domains which are currently violating this
  rule from this restriction. These domains are grouped using the new
  "socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators" attribute. The attribute
  is needed because the types corresponding to violators are not
  exposed to the public policy where the neverallow rules are.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 36613996
Change-Id: I458f5a09a964b06ad2bddb52538ec3a15758b003

On PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE devices, non-vendor domains (except vendor
apps) are not permitted to use Binder. This commit thus:
* groups non-vendor domains using the new "coredomain" attribute,
* adds neverallow rules restricting Binder use to coredomain and
  appdomain only, and
* temporarily exempts the domains which are currently violating this
  rule from this restriction. These domains are grouped using the new
  "binder_in_vendor_violators" attribute. The attribute is needed
  because the types corresponding to violators are not exposed to the
  public policy where the neverallow rules are.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Test: Device boots, no new denials
Test: In Chrome, navigate to ip6.me, play a YouTube video
Test: YouTube: play a video
Test: Netflix: play a movie
Test: Google Camera: take a photo, take an HDR+ photo, record video with
      sound, record slow motion video with sound. Confirm videos play
      back fine and with sound.
Bug: 35870313
Change-Id: I0cd1a80b60bcbde358ce0f7a47b90f4435a45c95

vndservicemanager is the context manager for binder services
that are solely registered and accessed from vendor processes.

Bug: 36052864
Test: vendorservicemanager runs
Merged-In: Ifbf536932678d0ff13d019635fe6347e185ef387
Change-Id: I430f1762eb83825f6cd4be939a69d46a8ddc80ff

vndservicemanager is the context manager for binder services
that are solely registered and accessed from vendor processes.

Bug: 36052864
Test: vendorservicemanager runs
Change-Id: Ifbf536932678d0ff13d019635fe6347e185ef387

Let mediacodec and mediaextractor talk directly to tombstoned to
generate tombstones/ANR traces.

Bug: http://b/35858739
Test: debuggerd -b `pidof media.codec`
Change-Id: I091be946d58907c5aa7a2fe23995597638adc896

perf_event_max_sample_rate is needed to be read for native profiling,
otherwise CTS test can fail on devices with kernel >= 4.4. Before this CL,
the file is not readable from untrusted_app domain. This CL makes it readable
from both shell domain and untrusted_app domain.

Bug: http://b/35554543
Test: build and test on marlin.
Change-Id: Id118e06e3c800b70a749ab112e07a4ec24bb5975

We need more time to investigate the effect that this change will
have on DRM solutions. Until the investigation is done, revert.

This reverts commit 38d3eca0.

Bug: 30146890
Bug: 20013628
Bug: 35323421
Change-Id: I5ad69ef5ee12081ce7fc0a8440712f7f8f77cf16
Test: policy compiles.

Drop support for execmod (aka text relocations) for newer API versions.
Retain it for older app APIs versions.

Bug: 30146890
Bug: 20013628
Bug: 35323421
Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: Ie54fdb385e9c4bb997ad6fcb6cff74f7e32927bb

Addresses:
denied { getattr } for pid=155 comm="keystore" path="/vendor"
dev="mmcblk0p6" ino=1527 scontext=u:r:keystore:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file

On devices without an actual vendor image, /vendor is a symlink to
/system/vendor. When loading a library from this symlinked vendor,
the linker uses resolve_paths() resulting in an lstat(). This
generates an selinux denial. Allow this lstat() so that paths can
be resolved on devices without a real vendor image.

Bug: 35946056
Test: sailfish builds
Change-Id: Ifae11bc7039047e2ac2b7eb4fbcce8ac4580799f

Label /proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_bits so it is only readable and writable by
init. This also tightens the neverallow restrictions for proc_security.

Bug: 33563834
Test: run cts -m CtsPermissionTestCases -t \
      android.permission.cts.FileSystemPermissionTest#testProcfsMmapRndBitsExistsAndSane

Change-Id: Ie7af39ddbf23806d4ffa35e7b19d30fec7b6d410

To determine if it is safe to run fsck on a filesystem, e2fsck
must first determine if the filesystem is mounted. To do that,
e2fsck scans through /proc/mounts and collects all the mounted
block devices. With that information, it runs stat() on each block
device, comparing the major and minor numbers to the filesystem
passed in on the command line. If there is a match, then the filesystem
is currently mounted and running fsck is dangerous.
Allow stat access to all block devices so that fsck can compare
major/minor values.

Addresses the following denials:

avc: denied { getattr } for comm="e2fsck" path="/dev/block/sde5"
dev="tmpfs" ino=15649 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:metadata_block_device:s0 tclass=blk_file
permissive=0

avc: denied { getattr } for comm="e2fsck" path="/dev/block/sda25"
dev="tmpfs" ino=15528 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:modem_block_device:s0 tclass=blk_file permissive=0

avc: denied { getattr } for comm="e2fsck" path="/dev/block/sda31"
dev="tmpfs" ino=15552 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:system_block_device:s0 tclass=blk_file permissive=0

avc: denied { getattr } for comm="e2fsck" path="/dev/block/sdd3"
dev="tmpfs" ino=15600 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:block_device:s0 tclass=blk_file permissive=0

Bug: 35324014
Bug: 33781554
Test: device boots and no SELinux denials.
Change-Id: I5af4a334ec41952887914eec4eee5c60cc441a66

Motivation:
Provide the ability to phase in new security policies by
applying them to apps with a minimum targetSdkVersion.

Place untrusted apps with targetSdkVersion<=25 into the
untrustd_app_25 domain. Apps with targetSdkVersion>=26 are placed
into the untrusted_app domain. Common rules are included in the
untrusted_app_all attribute. Apps with a more recent targetSdkVersion
are granted fewer permissions.

Test: Marlin builds and boots. Apps targeting targetSdkVersion<=25
run in untrusted_app_25 domain. Apps targeting the current development
build >=26 run in the untrusted_app domain with fewer permissions. No
new denials observed during testing.
Bug: 34115651
Bug: 35323421
Change-Id: Ie6a015566fac07c44ea06c963c40793fcdc9a083

Bug: http://b/32123312
Test: mm && boot
Change-Id: I6550fbe2bd5f9f5a474419b483b0f786d4025e88

The rules for the two types were the same and /data/app-ephemeral is
being removed. Remove these types.

Test: Builds
Change-Id: I520c026395551ad1362dd2ced53c601d9e6f9b28

There are many character files that are unreachable to all processes
under selinux policies. Ueventd and init were the only two domains that
had access to these generic character files, but auditing proved there
was no use for that access. In light of this, access is being completely
revoked so that the device nodes can be removed, and a neverallow is
being audited to prevent future regressions.

Test: The device boots
Bug: 33347297
Change-Id: If050693e5e5a65533f3d909382e40f9c6b85f61c

Since it was introduced it caused quite a few issues and it spams the
SElinux logs unnecessary.

The end goal of the audit was to whitelist the access to the
interpreter. However that's unfeasible for now given the complexity.

Test: devices boots and everything works as expected
      no more auditallow logs

Bug: 29795519
Bug: 32871170
Change-Id: I9a7a65835e1e1d3f81be635bed2a3acf75a264f6

bug:32815560
Change-Id: I494141b47fcd2e7e0cc02aa58d8df9a222060b3f

This neverallow addition addresses the renaming of files in exploits in
order to bypass denied permissions. An example of a similar use case of
using mv to bypass permission denials appeared in a recent project zero
ChromeOS exploit as one of the steps in the exploit chain.
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/12/chrome-os-exploit-one-byte-overflow-and.html

Additionally, vold and init both had permission sets that allowed them
to rename, but neither of them seem to need it. Therefore the rename
permission has also been removed from these two .te files.

Test: The device boots successfully
Change-Id: I07bbb58f058bf050f269b083e836c2c9a5bbad80