type=1400 audit(1501520483.066:14): avc: denied { write } for pid=3330
comm=4173796E635461736B202331 name="property_service" dev="tmpfs"
ino=10749 scontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:property_socket:s0
tclass=sock_file permissive=0

Test: No sepolicy denials
Bug: 64010793
Change-Id: I8d73e8e19cd4d0a8c61f1f184820c53e5cc2b6d6

The only file in /proc/<pid>/ that is world writeable is
/proc/<pid>/timerslack_ns so granting selinux write permission to
a process's /proc/<pid>/ file only allows writing to timerslack_ns
(unless the process is running as system UID).

Addresses denials such as:
avc: denied { write } for comm="Binder:1117_2" name="timerslack_ns"
dev="proc" ino=27908 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0
tcontext=u:r:priv_app:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

Bug: 30675296
Test: build
Change-Id: I2cee8ce73a0dc05d771881c36da2fde5411859fb

long live domain.te!

Remove all references.

Bug: 28760354
Test: build
Merged-In: I99953ecc7d275fdbe8e56d8f47a27d1f9e1cc09a
Change-Id: I99953ecc7d275fdbe8e56d8f47a27d1f9e1cc09a

avc: denied { read } for pid=1704 comm="top" name="stat" dev="proc" ino=4026532297 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_stat:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
avc: denied { read } for pid=1636 comm="dumpstate" name="lcd-backlight" dev="sysfs" ino=16592 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_leds:s0 tclass=lnk_file permissive=0
avc: denied { call } for pid=2230 comm="dumpsys" scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:r:installd:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0
avc: denied { create } for pid=1700 comm="ip" scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tclass=netlink_xfrm_socket permissive=0

Bug: 62410287
Bug: 35350306
Change-Id: I65be3678c64214ebeb544e0e155bce88b21adf02
Signed-off-by: Tim Kryger <tkryger@google.com>

Clean up the remaining granted permissions in domain_deprecated.

avc: granted { read open } for comm="uncrypt"
path="/sys/firmware/devicetree/base/firmware/android/fstab/compatible"
dev="sysfs" ino=17591 scontext=u:r:uncrypt:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="uncrypt"
path="/sys/firmware/devicetree/base/firmware/android/compatible"
dev="sysfs" ino=17583 scontext=u:r:uncrypt:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file

vc: granted { read open } for comm="update_engine"
path="/sys/firmware/devicetree/base/firmware/android/fstab" dev="sysfs"
ino=17258 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0
tclass=dir
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="update_engine"
path="/sys/firmware/devicetree/base/firmware/android/fstab/compatible"
dev="sysfs" ino=17259 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 28760354
Test: build
Change-Id: Id318ce84894c1001361923f5205de093a15c1e6a

Relax neverallow rule restricting binder access to/from netd so that
netd can export hwbinder services to vendor components.

Continue to disallow app access to netd via binder.

Bug: 36682246
Test: build
Change-Id: I8e558ea1add6c36b966ec1da204062ea82df3f3f

This should improve performance, as file_contexts is slower than
genfs_contexts.

Bug: 62413700
Test: Built, flashed, and booted Sailfish.  Verified that the
files have the correct context and that wifi, web, and atrace work.

Merged-In: Ia28707ec565a0792bc882fbffe9e8ab9968535f5
Change-Id: I9546f3af3c95e3443684ae4764881b69987611ef

Allows groups to be mounted at /dev/memcg

Addresses:
avc: denied { associate } for comm="init" name="memcg"
scontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tmpfs:s0
tclass=filesystem permissive=0

Bug: 64067152
Test: build
Change-Id: Ic8f641e841fe09c8f7fd487ed67cf0ab4860a1cc

type=1400 audit(0.0:6): avc: denied { read } for comm="Thread-5"
name="cache" dev="dm-0" ino=13 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file permissive=0

Bug: 64067152
Test: build
Change-Id: Ie90c0343a834aa87b7ded41f503e05d9b63b3244

Remove "granted" logspam. Grante the observed permissions to the
individual processes that need them and remove the permission from
domain_deprecated.

avc: granted { read open } for comm="ndroid.settings"
path="/proc/version" dev="proc" ino=4026532081
scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { getattr } for comm=4173796E635461736B202332
path="/proc/pagetypeinfo" dev="proc" ino=4026532129
scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file

avc: granted { read open } for comm="uncrypt" path="/proc/cmdline"
dev="proc" ino=4026532072 scontext=u:r:uncrypt:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file

avc: granted { read open } for comm="update_engine"
path="/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id" dev="proc" ino=15852829
scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file

avc: granted { read open } for comm="tiveportallogin"
path="/proc/vmstat" dev="proc" ino=4026532130
scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0
tclass=file

This change is specifically not granting the following since it
should not be allowed:
avc: granted { read open } for comm="crash_dump64"
path="/proc/filesystems" dev="proc" ino=4026532416
scontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read } for comm="crash_dump64" name="filesystems"
dev="proc" ino=4026532416 scontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="crash_dump64"
path="/proc/filesystems" dev="proc" ino=4026532416
scontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 64032843
Bug: 28760354
Test: build
Change-Id: Ib309e97b6229bdf013468dca34f606c0e8da96d0

Logs indicate that all processes that require access already have it.

Bug: 28760354
Test: build
Change-Id: I8533308d0e5f9bf20e542f8435d70ba7755b4938

To support libartd test runs.

Bug: 15735795
Bug: 62087184
Test: m
Test: manual tests with libartd
Change-Id: I33a12198566f5d979207e1edd4460b839a0f55f1

The comment in the policy implied this was already the case, but it
wasn't actually being used and appears to have been removed. This will
now be required by a framework change, so actually add the rule to allow
it.

Bug: 19061358
Test: verify that WebViewLoader process doesn't die from selinux denial
Change-Id: Ib1ed9138a83660ae343e0b665cdfadccdd0c6c97

This attribute is being actively removed from policy. Since
attributes are not being versioned, partners must not be able to
access and use this attribute. Move it from private and verify in
the logs that rild and tee are not using these permissions.

Bug: 38316109
Test: build and boot Marlin
Test: Verify that rild and tee are not being granted any of these
      permissions.
Merged-In: I31beeb5bdf3885195310b086c1af3432dc6a349b
Change-Id: I31beeb5bdf3885195310b086c1af3432dc6a349b
(cherry picked from commit 76aab82c)

The types need to be exported so userdebug system.img
can still build the policy with a user vendor.img at boot time.
All permissions and attributes for these types are still kept under
conditional userdebug_or_eng macro

Bug: 37433251
Test: Boot sailfish-user build with generic_arm64_ab system.img on
      sailfish and make sure sepolicy compilation succeeds

Change-Id: I98e8428c414546dfc74641700d4846edcf9355b1
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit 35e308cf)

scontext=installd
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="Binder:1153_7" path="/data/user/0"
dev="sda13" ino=1097730 scontext=u:r:installd:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file

scontext=runas
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="run-as" path="/data/user/0"
dev="sda35" ino=942082 scontext=u:r:runas:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file

scontext=vold
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="vold" path="/data/data" dev="sda45"
ino=12 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0
tclass=lnk_file
avc: granted { read } for comm="secdiscard"
name="3982c444973581d4.spblob" dev="sda45" ino=4620302
scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0
tclass=file

Bug: 28760354
Test: Build
Change-Id: Id16c43090675572af35f1ad9defd4c368abc906b

Allow mediacodec/mediaextractor to write to system_server pipes during
ANR dumps.

Addresses the following denials:
avc: denied { write } for comm="mediaextractor" path="pipe:[1177610]" dev="pipefs" ino=1177610 scontext=u:r:mediaextractor:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=fifo_file permissive=0
avc: denied { write } for comm="omx@1.0-service" path="pipe:[1175808]" dev="pipefs" ino=1175808 scontext=u:r:mediacodec:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=fifo_file permissive=0

Bug: http://b/63801592
Test: treehugger
Change-Id: I944b1fa76c70402607ccd903be17dbddeaa73201

To be replaced by commit 1e149967
seapp_context: explicitly label all seapp context files

Test: build policy
Change-Id: I8d30bd1d50b9e4a55f878c25d134907d4458cf59
Merged-In: I0f0e937e56721d458e250d48ce62f80e3694900f

This is needed for timerslack functionality which should be present in
most kernels going forward

Test: system_server can write to cameraserver files
Change-Id: I85797128b1467d92eb354364de8eb60f8e45c931

The denial message:
update_engine: type=1400 audit(0.0:15213): avc: denied { getattr } for
path="/postinstall" dev="dm-0" ino=38 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:postinstall_mnt_dir:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0

update_engine: type=1400 audit(0.0:15214): avc: denied { sys_rawio } for
capability=17 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:r:update_engine:s0
tclass=capability permissive=0

auditd  : type=1400 audit(0.0:15213): avc: denied { getattr } for
comm="update_engine" path="/postinstall" dev="dm-0" ino=38
scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:postinstall_mnt_dir:s0
tclass=dir permissive=0

update_engine: [0428/070905:ERROR:utils.cc(716)] Error stat'ing /postinstall: Permission denied

Bug: 37760573
Test: apply an update and UE reads postinstall_mnt_dir without denial.
Change-Id: I55506f5e8544233f60ccf7c1df846c9c93946a25

This was previously relying on domain_deprecated rules deleted in
change I588a1e7ea7ef984907b79a5a391efb2dcd6e6431.

Bug: 28760354
Test: unbreaks networking on AOSP bullhead
Change-Id: I873e1f08f72104dee7509e45b1db0b284ca56085

Kernel commit f9df6458218f4fe ("selinux: export validatetrans
decisions") introduced a /sys/fs/selinux/validatetrans pseudo file
for use by userspace file system servers and defined a new validatetrans
permission to control its use.

Define the new permission in the Android SELinux policy.
This change only defines the new permission; it does not allow it
to any domains by default.

This avoids a kernel message warning about the undefined permission on
the policy load, ala:
SELinux:  Permission validate_trans in class security not defined in policy.

Test: Policy builds

Change-Id: Ib922a83b7d8f94905207663a72f7a1bc3db8d2c2
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

This change must only be submitted when device-specific policies
have been reverted.

This reverts commit 07e631d2.

Bug: 17613910
Test: builds
Change-Id: Ie33e293107bf1eba2498f2422d941544c76b8cad
Merged-In: I356c39a5dc955b3d7c28d8c7baf2887a17beb272

Allow wrapped app to send pid back to zygote.

Bug: 63566721
Bug: 63635227
Test: lunch angler-userdebug && m
Test: lunch angler-user && m
Test: lunch angler-user && m && fastboot flashall && m cts && cts-tradefed run commandAndExit cts-dev -m CtsWrapWrapDebugTestCases
Change-Id: Ie1b41c3eb124aa5ee321c124d0121a0e965f0f0e

Logs indicate that these rules have already been moved to the
domains that need them.

Bug: 28760354
Test: build
Merged-In: I588a1e7ea7ef984907b79a5a391efb2dcd6e6431
Change-Id: I588a1e7ea7ef984907b79a5a391efb2dcd6e6431

Observed audited access to rootfs moved to individual domains in
commit a12aad45

Bug: 28760354
Test: build
Change-Id: Ie5e991d66668e70df69f21334032be6d574bf5c8

Grant audited permissions collected in logs.

tcontext=platform_app
avc: granted { getattr } for comm=496E666C6174657254687265616420
path="/" dev="dm-0" ino=2 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768
tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=dir

tcontext=system_app
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="android:ui" path="/" dev="dm-0"
scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=dir
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="android:ui" path="/" dev="dm-0"
scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=dir

tcontext=update_engine
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="update_engine" path="/" dev="dm-0"
ino=2 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0
tclass=dir
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="update_engine" path="/fstab.foo"
dev="dm-0" ino=25 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read open } for comm="update_engine" path="/fstab.foo"
dev="dm-0" ino=25 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 28760354
Test: build
Change-Id: I6135eea1d10b903a4a7e69da468097f495484665

Allow lmkd to access /dev/memcg once again.

Test: lmkd can access memcg
bug: 36588803
Change-Id: I1f46b438050d95cebd2fcc495938192305fc9fc9

Logs indicate that all processes that require read access
have already been granted it.

Bug: 28760354
Test: build policy
Merged-In: I5826c45f54af32e3d4296df904c8523bb5df5e62
Change-Id: I5826c45f54af32e3d4296df904c8523bb5df5e62