Some file types used as domain entrypoints were missing the
exec_type attribute.  Add it and add a neverallow rule to
keep it that way.

Change-Id: I7563f3e03940a27ae40ed4d6bb74181c26148849
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

These device nodes were specific to crespo / Nexus S and
if ever needed again, should be re-introduced in the per-device
sepolicy, not here.

Change-Id: I8366de83967974122c33937f470d586d49c34652
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

per the discussion in https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/65063/1/zygote.te
adjust the comment in this file.

Change-Id: I8db31e22ec34493442bc8e86bcd0bc0136b7bae4

This was a mistaken attempt to fix bug 10498304, but it didn't
actually have any impact. Revert.

This reverts commit fc2bd01b.

Bug: 10498304

This is now possible due to the kernel change to support
setting security contexts on rootfs inodes.

Change-Id: I2a9aac1508eceabb92c3ae8eb5c63a16b28dda6f
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

The type was already defined and used in type transitions for cases
where the gps socket is created at runtime by gpsd, but on some devices
it is created by init based on an init.<board>.rc socket entry and therefore
needs a file_contexts entry.

Before:
$ ls -Z /dev/socket/gps
srw-rw---- gps      system            u:object_r:device:s0 gps

After:
$ ls -Z /dev/socket/gps
srw-rw---- gps      system            u:object_r:gps_socket:s0 gps

Change-Id: I8eef08d80e965fc4f3e9dd09d4fa446aaed82624
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Otherwise it gets left in the general device type, and we get denials such
as:
type=1400 msg=audit(1379617262.940:102): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=579 comm="mDnsConnector" name="mdns" dev="tmpfs" ino=3213 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:device:s0 tclass=sock_file

This of course only shows up if using a confined system_server.

Change-Id: I2456dd7aa4d72e6fd15b55c251245186eb54a80a
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

* changes:
  write_klog also requires write permission to the directory.
  Allow access to /data/security/current symbolic link.

This CL completes the renaming of domain system to system_server by
removing the "system" typealias that was temporarily added to avoid
breaking the build while the rename CLs are landing.

Change-Id: I05d11571f0e3d639026fcb9341c3476d44c54fca

This is a follow-up CL to the extraction of "system_app" domain
from the "system" domain which left the "system" domain encompassing
just the system_server.

Since this change cannot be made atomically across different
repositories, it temporarily adds a typealias "server" pointing to
"system_server". Once all other repositories have been switched to
"system_server", this alias will be removed.

Change-Id: I90a6850603dcf60049963462c5572d36de62bc00

Change-Id: I9652284bd34d07bd47e2e7df66fcbe5db185ab3f
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Change-Id: I153b0aa8a747d6c79839d06fc04b3923eacfa213
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

system_app is for apps that run in the system UID, e.g. Settings.
system is for the system_server.
Split them into separate files and note their purpose in the comment
header of each file.

Change-Id: I19369abc728ba2159fd50ae6b230828857e19f10
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Change-Id: I6b27418507ebd0113a97bea81f37e4dc1de6da14
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Remove sys_nice capability from domains; this does not appear to be necessary
and should not be possible in particular for app domains.  If we encounter
specific instances where it should be granted, we can add it back on a
per-domain basis.  Allow it explicitly for the system_server.  Unconfined
domains get it via unconfined_domain() and the rules in unconfined.te.

Change-Id: I9669db80a04a90a22241b2fbc5236a28dcde8c6e
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

* changes:
  Do not permit appdomain to create/write to download_file.
  Remove duplicated rules between appdomain and isolated_app.

3.4 goldfish kernel supports sysfs labeling so we no longer need this.

Change-Id: I77514a8f3102ac8be957c57d95e7de7d5901f69d
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Otherwise we have different security contexts but the same DAC
permissions:
-rw-rw-rw- root     root              u:object_r:sysfs_writable:s0 process_name
-rw-rw-rw- root     root              u:object_r:sysfs:s0 state
-rw-rw-rw- root     root              u:object_r:sysfs:s0 symbol

This change fixes denials such as:
type=1400 msg=audit(1379096020.770:144): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=85 comm="SurfaceFlinger" name="symbol" dev="sysfs" ino=47 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: I261c7751da3778ee9241ec6b5476e8d9f96ba5ed
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

The comment says that apps can read downloaded files, but the
file_type_auto_trans() macro expands to permit create/write access.
Also we don't need a type transition when staying in the same type
as the parent directory so we only truly need allow rules here.
Hence, we remove file_type_auto_trans() altogether, and add an allow
rule for search access to the directory.  If create/write access is
truly required, then we can just change the allow rules to use
rw_dir_perms and create_file_perms.

Change-Id: Icd71c9678419442cfd8088317317efd4332f9b4a
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

r_dir_file(appdomain, isolated_app) was in both app.te and isolated_app.te;
delete it from isolated_app.te.
binder_call(appdomain, isolated_app) is a subset of binder_call(appdomain, appdomain); delete it.

Change-Id: I3fd90ad9c8862a0e4dad957425cbfbc9fa97c63f
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

$ sepolicy-check -s untrusted_app -t mediaserver -c binder -p call -P out/target/product/manta/root/sepolicy
Match found!

Also removed loading of initial SIDs as that is not required for
this functionality and it leaks memory as it is never freed.
valgrind now reports no leaks.

Change-Id: Ic7a26fd01c57914e4e96db504d669f5367542a35
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Fixes the following denial:

<5>[28362.335293] type=1400 audit(1378991198.292:24): avc:  denied  { execute } for  pid=1640 comm="facebook.katana" path="/data/data/com.facebook.katana/app_libs/libfb_jpegturbo.so" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=652556 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: I4a515610149f06f0c49194feb6bc96e9b3080c12

Apps attempting to write to /dev/random or /dev/urandom currently
succeed, but a policy violation is logged. These two Linux RNG
devices are meant to be written to by arbitrary apps. Thus, there's
no reason to deny this capability.

Bug: 10679705

Change-Id: Ife401f1dd2182889471eef7e90fcc92e96f9c4d6

This enables installd to uninstall or clear data of installed apps
whose data directory contains unusual file types, such as FIFO.

Bug: 10680357

(cherry picked from commit 839af9ed)

Change-Id: I5715f7d6d3214896ad0456d614b052cf5fb79eef

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Change-Id: Ic500af7b9dac6a9b6401e99c3d162913e9989d9b
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

This breaks the ability for users to have certs in many
directories. Currently the design is to allow keys.conf
to specify arbitrary locations for pem files, relative to
the root of the Android tree. If users want to have a
common prefix on all the keys, then they can export
DEFAULT_SYSTEM_DEV_CERTIFICATE, and make that an environment
variable in their keys.conf file.

Signed-off-by: William Roberts <wroberts@tresys.com>

Change-Id: I23455b891206cab6eca7db08ff3c28283f87c640
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <wroberts@tresys.com>

For additional context-

The denials related to init_tmpfs are of the form:

denied  { read } for  pid=12315 comm=""dboxed_process0"" path=2F6465762F6173686D656D2F64616C76696B2D68656170202864656C6574656429 dev=""tmpfs"" ino=9464 scontext=u:r:isolated_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:init_tmpfs:s0 tclass=file

(the path above is "/dev/ashmem/dalvik-heap (deleted)")

The denials related to executing things from the dalvik cache are of the form:

enied  { execute } for  pid=3565 comm=""dboxed_process0"" path=""/data/dalvik-cache/system@app@Chrome.apk@classes.dex"" dev=""mmcblk0p28"" ino=105983 scontext=u:r:isolated_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=file

The denials related to isolated_app and the init socket are:

denied  { getattr } for  pid=3824 comm=""Binder_2"" path=""socket:[14059]"" dev=""sockfs"" ino=14059 scontext=u:r:isolated_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:init:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket

The getopt denials for the aforementioned socket are:

denied  { getopt } for  pid=3824 comm=""Binder_2"" path=""/dev/socket/dumpstate"" scontext=u:r:isolated_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:init:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket

Change-Id: I3c57702e2af5a779a7618da9aa40930e7f12ee49

At this point, we still don't understand the root cause of
bug 10290009, or if it's even a real bug.  Rollback
29d0d406 so we an get a device
in this state and figure out the root cause of this problem.

This reverts commit 29d0d406.

Bug: 10290009

Change-Id: Ie0947f79c63f962220d3c9316c5d5d82f677821f

This fixes another bug encountered while taking bugreports.

Bug: 10498304
Change-Id: Ie33e869ccd28c5461f4f3736c078b2a865aa7cdd

Bug: 10498304
Change-Id: I312665a2cd09fa16ae3f3978aebdb0da99cf1f74

* commit 'cec3c1e4':
  Add capabilities to Zygote to fix valgrind.

* commit 'e0362602':
  Add capabilities to Zygote to fix valgrind.

Change-Id: I898bb4ee8fdb95b48e58c98bffdb381b03c719bb

Bug: 10455872
Change-Id: I98885e8cd1e4f9ab0d3e2af6d79b078a000db539