This commit marks system_server and app domains (except isolated_app)
as clients of Graphics Allocator HAL. This makes the policy cleaner
and prepares ground for restricting access to HwBinder services.

Test: Play video in YouTube app and in Google Chrome YouTube web page
Test: Using Google Camera app, take an HDR+ photo, a conventional
      photo, record a video with sound and a slow motion video with
      sound, then check that photos look good and videos play back
      fine, including sound.
Bug: 34454312
Change-Id: Iea04d38fa5520432f06af94570fa6ce16ed7979a

The new binder_call() lines had to be added
because this change removes mediacodec from
binderservicedomain (on full-treble), hence
domains that could previously reach mediacodec
with binder_call(domain, binderservicedomain)
now need explicit calls instead.

Test: Youtube, Netflix, Maps, Chrome, Music
Change-Id: I3325ce20d9304bc07659fd435554cbcbacbc9829

Since hal_graphics_composer_default is now no longer
a member of binderservicedomain, these domains would
no longer be able to use filedescriptors from it.

Bug: 36569525
Bug: 35706331
Test: marlin boots, YouTube, Maps, Camera, video
Change-Id: I4c110cf7530983470ae079e4fbc8cf11aa0fab7f

Renderscript drivers are loaded from /vendor/lib64 by following the
/system/vendor symlink. This change fixes a couple of things.
- Allows all domains access to follow the symlink
- Restores app domain permissions for /vendor for non-treble devices
- Allow app domains to peek into /vendor/lib64, but NOT grant 'execute'
  permissions for everything. Since RS drivers can be loaded into any
  process, their vendor implementation and dependencies have been
  marked as 'same process HALs' already.

Bug: 37169158
Test: Tested on sailfish (Treble) & Angler (non-treble)
      ./cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsRenderscriptTestCases \
      --skip-device-info --skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check \
      --abi arm64-v8a
      Result: Tests Passed: 743 Tests Failed: 0

Change-Id: I36f5523381428629126fc196f615063fc7a50b8e
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

We should give appdomain the access to the /vendor/framework directory
since the jar in the directory is not dexopt-ed.AFAIK, jars which are
not in the bootclasspath are not dexopt-ed by default.

Bug: b/37129319
Test: built and confirmed that embms.apk not crashed

Change-Id: Ic2b1eef472f2fba53e26403dde8ad9ede8105a03

The change makes 'vendor_overlay_file' accessible only to few platform
domains like idmap, system_server, zygote and appdomain.

The overlay files contains RROs (runtime resource overlays)

Bug: 36681210
Test: Boot sailfish (treble device) from wiped flashall
Test: Connect to wifi and launch chrome to load few websites.
Test: Launch camera and record + playback video

Change-Id: I3596ca89ad51d0e7d78c75121f22ea71209ee332
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

The change makes 'vendor_app_file' accessible only to few platform
domains like dex2oat, idmap, installd, system_server and appdomain.

Bug: 36681210
Test: Boot sailfish (treble device) from wiped flashall
Test: Connect to wifi and launch chrome to load few websites.
Test: Launch camera and record + playback video

Change-Id: Ib8757fedbf2e19c8381c8cd0f8f2693b2345534b
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

This change associates all domains which are clients of Allocator HAL
with hal_allocator_client and the, required for all HAL client
domains, halclientdomain.

This enables this commit to remove the now unnecessary hwallocator_use
macro because its binder_call(..., hal_allocator_server) is covered by
binder_call(hal_allocator_client, hal_allocator_server) added in this
commit.

Unfortunately apps, except isolated app, are clients of Allocator HAL
as well. This makes it hard to use the hal_client_domain(...,
hal_allocator) macro because it translates into "typeattribute" which
currently does not support being provided with a set of types, such as
{ appdomain -isolated_app }. As a workaround, hopefully until
typeattribute is improved, this commit expresses the necessary
association operation in CIL. private/technical_debt.cil introduced by
this commit is appended into the platform policy CIL file, thus
ensuring that the hack has effect on the final monolithic policy.

P. S. This change also removes Allocator HAL access from isolated_app.
Isolated app shouldn't have access to this HAL anyway.

Test: Google Play Music plays back radios
Test: Google Camera records video with sound and that video is then
      successfully played back with sound
Test: YouTube app plays back clips with sound
Test: YouTube in Chrome plays back clips with sound
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: Id00bba6fde83e7cf04fb58bc1c353c2f66333f92

Test: no relevant denials on marlin while booting
Test: no relevant denials on angler while booting
Bug: 36278706
Change-Id: Ieba79e1c8fca4f74c63bc63e6dd0bdcf59204ca2

Prevent app domains (processes spawned by zygote) from acquiring
locks on files in /system. In particular, /system/etc/xtables.lock
must never be lockable by applications, as it will block future
iptables commands from running.

Test: device boots and no obvious problems.
Change-Id: Ifd8dc7b117cf4a622b30fd4fffbcab1b76c4421b

Test: Boots, runs
Bug: 32713782
Change-Id: Ia58db3c4c0159482f08e72ef638f3e1736095918

Apps should be able to access the configstore HAL since framework
libraries which are loaded into app process can call configstore.

Letting apps have direct access to this HAL is OK because: 

(1) the API of this HAL does not make clients provide any sensitive 
information to the HAL, which makes it impossible for the HAL to 
disclose sensitive information of its clients when the HAL is 
compromised, 

(2) we will require that this HAL is binderized (i.e., does not run 
inside the process of its clients), 

(3) we will require that this HAL runs in a tight seccomp sandbox 
(this HAL doesn't need much access, if at all) and,

(4) we'll restrict the HALs powers via neverallows.

Test: apps can use configstore hal.

Change-Id: I04836b7318fbc6ef78deff770a22c68ce7745fa9

Test: take a screenshot
Test: run CTS ImageReaderTest
Bug: 36194109

(cherry picked from commit 49ed0cd6)

Change-Id: I331bce37b35e30084ba9f7ecd063a344a79c5232

Test: take a screenshot
Test: run CTS ImageReaderTest
Bug: 36194109

Change-Id: I5db2addd726a66140b707d2d23d3480efcaa90bd

We simplified the way we track whether or not a dex file is used by
other apps. DexManager in the framework keeps track of the data and we
no longer need file markers on disk.

Test: device boots, foreign dex markers are not created anymore

Bug: 32871170
Change-Id: I464ed6b09439cf0342020ee07596f9aa8ae53b62

Add FD accessing rules related to media,gralloc and ashmem.
Also move a few rules to where they belong.

Change-Id: I0bff6f86665a8a049bd767486275740fa369da3d

Apps definitely need access to ion ioctls. Remove audit statement.

Test: build marlin
Bug: 35715385
Change-Id: I777d3e9a88065a5f711315a7da6d63587744b408

untrusted_v2_app is basically a refinement of untrusted_app with legacy
capabilities removed and potentially backwards incompatible changes.

This is not currently hooked up to anything.

Bug: 33350220
Test: builds
Change-Id: Ic9fad57476bc2b6022b1eaca8667bf6d844753c2

Bug: 31399200
Test: Compiles
Change-Id: Ifb347a985df5deb85426a54c435c4a9c0248cb57

Bug: 30989383
Bug: 34731101
Test: manual
Change-Id: Icf9d48568b505c6b788f2f5f456f2d709969fbeb

The implementation for NETLINK_FIREWALL and NETLINK_IP6_FW protocols
was removed from the kernel in commit
d16cf20e2f2f13411eece7f7fb72c17d141c4a84 ("netfilter: remove ip_queue
support") circa Linux 3.5.  Unless we need to retain compatibility
for kernels < 3.5, we can drop these classes from the policy altogether.

Possibly the neverallow rule in app.te should be augmented to include
the newer netlink security classes, similar to webview_zygote, but
that can be a separate change.

Test: policy builds

Change-Id: Iab9389eb59c96772e5fa87c71d0afc86fe99bb6b
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Since it was introduced it caused quite a few issues and it spams the
SElinux logs unnecessary.

The end goal of the audit was to whitelist the access to the
interpreter. However that's unfeasible for now given the complexity.

Test: devices boots and everything works as expected
      no more auditallow logs

Bug: 29795519
Bug: 32871170
Change-Id: I9a7a65835e1e1d3f81be635bed2a3acf75a264f6

This leaves only the existence of appdomain attribute as public API.
All other rules are implementation details of this attribute's policy
and are thus now private.

Test: Device boot, apps (untrusted_app, system_app, platform_app,
      priv_app) work fine. No new denials.
Bug: 31364497

Change-Id: Ie22e35bad3307bb9918318c3d034f1433d51677f

In order to support platform changes without simultaneous updates from
non-platform components, the platform and non-platform policies must be
split.  In order to provide a guarantee that policy written for
non-platform objects continues to provide the same access, all types
exposed to non-platform policy are versioned by converting them and the
policy using them into attributes.

This change performs that split, the subsequent versioning and also
generates a mapping file to glue the different policy components
together.

Test: Device boots and runs.
Bug: 31369363
Change-Id: Ibfd3eb077bd9b8e2ff3b2e6a0ca87e44d78b1317