New types and files labeled with them:
1. proc_abi:
  /proc/sys/abi/swp

2. proc_dirty:
  /proc/sys/vm/dirty_background_ratio
  /proc/sys/vm/dirty_expire_centisecs

3. proc_diskstats:
  /proc/diskstats

4. proc_extra_free_kbytes:
  /proc/sys/vm/extra_free_kbytes

5. proc_hostname:
  /proc/sys/kernel/domainname
  /proc/sys/kernel/hostname

6. proc_hung_task:
  /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs

7. proc_max_map_count:
  /proc/sys/vm/max_map_count

8. proc_panic:
  /proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_oops

9. proc_sched:
  /proc/sys/kernel/sched_child_runs_first
  /proc/sys/kernel/sched_latency_ns
  /proc/sys/kernel/sched_rt_period_us
  /proc/sys/kernel/sched_rt_runtime_us
  /proc/sys/kernel/sched_tunable_scaling
  /proc/sys/kernel/sched_wakeup_granularity_ns

10. proc_uptime:
  /proc/uptime

Files labeled with already existing types:
1. proc_perf:
  /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid

2. proc_sysrq:
  /proc/sys/kernel/sysrq

3. usermodehelper:
  /proc/sys/kernel/core_pipe_limit

Changes to init domain:
1. Removed access to files with 'proc' label.
2. Added access to newly introduced types + proc_kmsg.

Bug: 68949041
Test: walleye boots without denials from u:r:init:s0.
Test: system/core/init/grab-bootchart.sh does not trigger denials from
u:r:init:s0
Change-Id: If1715c3821e277679c320956df33dd273e750ea2

Bug: 68949041
Test: device builds, boots, no denials from init.

Change-Id: Iedefac8d70512fd614ca06117f42a7887f6ab649

Bug: 62378620
Test: Android in Chrome OS can call uevent_kernel_recv() and not fail
      with EIO.
Test: bullhead networking still works

Change-Id: I4dd5d2148ee1704c4fa23d7fd82d1ade19b58cbd

Test: boot sailfish with no audit when writing to page-cluster
Change-Id: I2bfebdf9342594d66d95daaec92d71195c93ffc8

Bug: 37916906
Test: Builds 'n' boots.
Change-Id: Ia1d86264446ebecc1ca79f32f11354921bc77668
Merged-In: I208ec6a864127a059fb389417a9c6b259d7474cb

avc:  denied  { relabelto } for  pid=1 comm="init" name="misc" dev="tmpfs" ino=3855 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:misc_block_device:s0 tclass=lnk_file

If misc partition is used during early mount, it will carry a label of
tmpfs (instead of block_device), which will fail restorecon with the
above denial.

Bug: 65378733
Test: Build and flash a target that uses misc in early mount. No longer
      observe the above denial.
Change-Id: I44cd43dbd2a8a4f9f423ebc8ac0dd046b167ef72

Add /dev/kmsg_debug on userdebug devices, to allow crash_dump to log
crashes to dmesg when logd isn't up yet (or is the one crashing).

Bug: http://b/36574794
Test: stop tombstoned; crasher; dmesg
Change-Id: I6ffe11bc613e88198893e82712719522b74fe1be

This should improve performance, as file_contexts is slower than
genfs_contexts.

Bug: 62413700
Test: Built, flashed, and booted Sailfish.  Verified that the
files have the correct context and that wifi, web, and atrace work.

Merged-In: Ia28707ec565a0792bc882fbffe9e8ab9968535f5
Change-Id: I9546f3af3c95e3443684ae4764881b69987611ef

In libprocessgroup, we want to only send signals once to processes,
particularly for SIGTERM.  We must send the signal both to all
processes within a POSIX process group and a cgroup.  To ensure that
we do not duplicate the signals being sent, we check the processes in
the cgroup to see if they're in the POSIX process groups that we're
killing.  If they are, we skip sending a second signal.  This requires
getpgid permissions, hence this SELinux change.

avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process permissive=1

Bug: 37853905
Bug: 62418791
Test: Boot, kill zygote, reboot
Change-Id: Ib6c265dbaac8833c47145ae28fb6594ca8545570
(cherry picked from commit c59eb4d8)

In libprocessgroup, we want to only send signals once to processes,
particularly for SIGTERM.  We must send the signal both to all
processes within a POSIX process group and a cgroup.  To ensure that
we do not duplicate the signals being sent, we check the processes in
the cgroup to see if they're in the POSIX process groups that we're
killing.  If they are, we skip sending a second signal.  This requires
getpgid permissions, hence this SELinux change.

avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process permissive=1

Bug: 37853905
Bug: 62418791
Test: Boot, kill zygote, reboot
Change-Id: Ib6c265dbaac8833c47145ae28fb6594ca8545570

This reverts commit a015186f.

Bug: http://b/62101480
Change-Id: I8e889e3d50cf1749168acc526f8a8901717feb46

In the init scripts for socket, the type can have a suffix of
"+cred" to request that the socket be bound to report SO_PASSCRED
credentials on socket transactions.  Here we add socket setopt
to selinux rules.

Test: gTest logd-unit-tests --gtest_filter=logd.statistics right after boot
      (fails without logd.rc change)
Bug: 37985222
Change-Id: I37cdf7eea93c3e8fa52964e765eaf3007e431b1f

This adds neverallow rules which enforce the prohibition on
communication between framework and vendor components over VendorBinder.
This prohibition is similar in spirit to the one for Binder
communications.

Most changes consist of adding neverallow rules, which do not affect
runtime behavior. The only change which does affect runtime behavior
is the change which takes away the right of servicemanager domain to
transfer Binder tokens to hwservicemanager and vndservicemanager. This
grant was there by accident (because it was overly broad) and is not
expected to be needed: servicemanager, hwservicemanager, and
vndservicemanager are not supposed to be communicating with each
other.

P. S. The new neverallow rules in app_neverallows.te are covered by
the new rules in domain.te. The rules were nevertheless added to
app_neverallows.te for consistency with other *Binder rules there.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 37663632
Change-Id: I7c2ae23924bf0f2fed3f1e3a8d4d603129286329

Bug: 36463595
Test: Boot sailfish and make sure all vendor services that are shell scripts
      work. (Checke exited status)

Change-Id: I3d1d564114a914dec8179fb93a9e94493c2808da
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

These were previously in device specific sepolicies.
They should be in core sepolicy to reflect their
use by a core init file, init.usb.configfs.rc.

Addresses denial:

init    : type=1400 audit(0.0:135): avc: denied { unlink } for name="f1"
dev="configfs" ino=10923 scontext=u:r:init:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:configfs:s0 tclass=lnk_file permissive=0

Test: denial addressed
Change-Id: I869892f9d0c311b727462fb380f4160feb986215

Add /dev/kmsg_debug on userdebug devices, to allow crash_dump to log
crashes to dmesg when logd isn't up yet (or is the one crashing).

Bug: http://b/36574794
Test: stop tombstoned; crasher; dmesg
Change-Id: I249e11291c58fee77098dec3fd3271ea23363ac9

The CL splits /vendor labeling from /system. Which was allowing all
processes read, execute access to /vendor.

Following directories will remain world readable
 /vendor/etc
 /vendor/lib(64)/hw/

Following are currently world readable but their scope
will be minimized to platform processes that require access
 /vendor/app
 /vendor/framework/
 /vendor/overlay

Files labelled with 'same_process_hal_file' are allowed to be
read + executed from by the world. This is for Same process HALs and
their dependencies.

Bug: 36527360
Bug: 36832490
Bug: 36681210
Bug: 36680116
Bug: 36690845
Bug: 36697328
Bug: 36696623
Bug: 36806861
Bug: 36656392
Bug: 36696623
Bug: 36792803

All of the tests were done on sailfish, angler, bullhead, dragon
Test: Boot and connect to wifi
Test: Run chrome and load websites, play video in youtube, load maps w/
      current location, take pictures and record video in camera,
      playback recorded video.
Test: Connect to BT headset and ensure BT audio playback works.
Test: OTA sideload using recovery
Test: CTS SELinuxHostTest pass

Change-Id: I278435b72f7551a28f3c229f720ca608b77a7029
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

sepolicy files need to be explicitly labeled as they are now split
cross system and vendor and won't have the generic world readable
'system_file' or 'rootfs' label.

Bug: 36527360
Test: no new 'sepolicy_file' denials at boot complete on sailfish
Test: successfully booted into recovery without denials and sideloaded
      OTA update.
Test: Launch 'chrome' and succesfully load a website.
Test: Launch Camera and take a picture.
Test: Launch Camera and record a video, succesfully playback recorded
      video

Change-Id: I6fe8ba31588c2d75521c6e2b0bf7e6d6eaf80a19
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

file_context files need to be explicitly labeled as they are now split
across system and vendor and won't have the generic world readable
'system_file' label.

Bug: 36002414
Test: no new 'file_context' denials at boot complete on sailfish
Test: successfully booted into recovery without denials and sideloaded
OTA update.
Test: ./cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info \
       --skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check --abi \
       arm64-v8a --module CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
       android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testAospFileContexts

Change-Id: I603157e9fa7d1de3679d41e343de397631666273
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

Bug: 35979722
Test: angler boot with UART on and set sys.wifitracing.started to 0 after boot
Test: no more avc errors on debugfs
Change-Id: I91d98428aaec915b3206535559a0c096e6de1603

Fix restorecon failue on second call

Bug: 35803475
Test: angler boot with UART on and set sys.wifitracing.started to 0 after boot
Change-Id: Ia5496fcba031616297fa0a4c0f45e3ece0b4d662

early mounted block device are created by 'init' in its first stage, so
the following restorecon() now finds device nodes and their corresponding
symlinks. The CL adds rule to make sure the block and
system_block_devices can be relabeled by init in this case.

Bug: 35792677
Bug: 27805372

Test: tested ota using 'adb sideload' on sailfish

Change-Id: I7d9d89878919c1267bf3c74f0cdbb4367b5ad458
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

Previously, we'd restricted WifiService's use of
the kernel's tracing feature to just userdebug_or_eng
builds.

This restriction was in place because the feature
had not yet been reviewed from a privacy perspective.
Now that the feature has passed privacy review, enable
the feature on all builds.

Note that other safeguards remain in place (on all
builds):
- The set of events to be monitored is configured by
  init, rather than WifiService (part of system_server).
  This privilege separation prevents a compromised
  system_server from tracing additional information.
- The trace events are kept only in RAM, until/unless
  WifiService receives a dump request. (This would happen,
  for example, in the case of adb dumpsys, or generating
  a bugreport.)

Bug: 35679234
Test: manual (see below)

Manual test details:
- flash device
- connect device to a wifi network
$ adb shell dumpsys wifi | grep rdev_connect
  [should see at least one matching line]

Change-Id: I85070054857d75177d0bcdeb9b2c95bfd7e3b6bc

For early mount we end up creating the device nodes for partitions
under /dev/block before selinux is initialized. Which means, that
restorecon_recursive on /dev/block will have to relabel these nodes
and their symlinks.

This change adds the rule to allow init do the same.

b/27805372

Test: boot marlin / sailfish with early mount device node creation
but mount partitions using the default 'mountall' without any selinux
denials.

Change-Id: Ib9335f3f961d485d2120a175dbdbf85d6f70b160
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

On boot, Android runs restorecon on a number of virtual directories,
such as /sys and /sys/kernel/debug, to ensure that the SELinux labels
are correct. To avoid causing excessive boot time delays, the restorecon
code aggressively prunes directories, to avoid recursing down directory
trees which will never have a matching SELinux label.

See:
* https://android-review.googlesource.com/93401
* https://android-review.googlesource.com/109103

The key to this optimization is avoiding unnecessarily broad regular
expressions in file_contexts. If an overly broad regex exists, the tree
pruning code is ineffective, and the restorecon ends up visiting lots of
unnecessary directories.

The directory /sys/kernel/debug/tracing contains approximately 4500
files normally, and on debuggable builds, this number can jump to over
9000 files when the processing from wifi-events.rc occurs. For
comparison, the entire /sys/kernel/debug tree (excluding
/sys/kernel/debug/tracing) only contains approximately 8000 files. The
regular expression "/sys/kernel(/debug)?/tracing/(.*)?" ends up matching
a significant number of files, which impacts boot performance.

Instead of using an overly broad regex, refine the regex so only the
files needed have an entry in file_contexts. This list of files is
essentially a duplicate of the entries in
frameworks/native/cmds/atrace/atrace.rc .

This change reduces the restorecon_recursive call for /sys/kernel/debug
from approximately 260ms to 40ms, a boot time reduction of approximately
220ms.

Bug: 35248779
Test: device boots, no SELinux denials, faster boot.
Change-Id: I70f8af102762ec0180546b05fcf014c097135f3e

auditallows have been in place for a while, and no obvious denials.
Remove domain_deprecated from init.te

While I'm here, clean up the formatting of the lines in
domain_deprecated.te.

Bug: 28760354
Test: policy compiles and device boots. No obvious problems.
Change-Id: Ia12e77c3e25990957abf15744e083eed9ffbb056

Init has access to a number of character devices inherited via
domain.te. Exclude those character devices from the auditallow
logging.

In addition, init has access to a number of character devices explicitly
listed in init.te. Exclude those from auditallow logging too.

Addresses various auditallow spam, including:

avc: granted { read open } for comm="init" path="/dev/urandom"
dev="tmpfs" ino=1197 scontext=u:r:init:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:random_device:s0 tclass=chr_file

avc: granted { read open } for comm="init" path="/dev/ptmx" dev="tmpfs"
ino=1294 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:ptmx_device:s0
tclass=chr_file

avc: granted { read } for comm="init" name="keychord" dev="tmpfs"
ino=1326 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:keychord_device:s0
tclass=chr_file

avc: granted { read open } for comm="init" path="/dev/keychord"
dev="tmpfs" ino=1326 scontext=u:r:init:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:keychord_device:s0 tclass=chr_file

and others not covered above.

Bug: 35197529
Bug: 33347297
Test: policy compiles and no auditallow denials.
Change-Id: Id869404a16c81c779943e9967eb32da226b6047e

Test: Device boots
Change-Id: I2fb0a03c9ed84710dc2db7b170c572a2eae45412

There are many character files that are unreachable to all processes
under selinux policies. Ueventd and init were the only two domains that
had access to these generic character files, but auditing proved there
was no use for that access. In light of this, access is being completely
revoked so that the device nodes can be removed, and a neverallow is
being audited to prevent future regressions.

Test: The device boots
Bug: 33347297
Change-Id: If050693e5e5a65533f3d909382e40f9c6b85f61c

The event log tag service uses /dev/event-log-tags, pstore and
/data/misc/logd/event-log-tags as sticky storage for the invented
log tags.

Test: gTest liblog-unit-tests, logd-unit-tests & logcat-unit-tests
Bug: 31456426
Change-Id: Iacc8f36f4a716d4da8dca78a4a54600ad2a288dd

Create an event_log_tags_file label and use it for
/dev/event-log-tags.  Only trusted system log readers are allowed
direct read access to this file, no write access.  Untrusted domain
requests lack direct access, and are thus checked for credentials via
the "plan b" long path socket to the event log tag service.

Test: gTest logd-unit-tests, liblog-unit-tests and logcat-unit-tests
Bug: 31456426
Bug: 30566487
Change-Id: Ib9b71ca225d4436d764c9bc340ff7b1c9c252a9e

This neverallow addition addresses the renaming of files in exploits in
order to bypass denied permissions. An example of a similar use case of
using mv to bypass permission denials appeared in a recent project zero
ChromeOS exploit as one of the steps in the exploit chain.
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/12/chrome-os-exploit-one-byte-overflow-and.html

Additionally, vold and init both had permission sets that allowed them
to rename, but neither of them seem to need it. Therefore the rename
permission has also been removed from these two .te files.

Test: The device boots successfully
Change-Id: I07bbb58f058bf050f269b083e836c2c9a5bbad80

Revise policy, to allow init and system_server to configure,
clear, and read kernel trace events. This will enable us to
debug certain WiFi failures.

Note that system_server is restricted to only accessing
a wifi-specific trace instance. (Hence, system_server is
not allowed to interfere with atrace.) Moreover, even for
the wifi trace instance, system_server is granted limited
permissions. (system_server can not, e.g., change which
events are traced.)

Note also that init and system_server are only granted these
powers on userdebug or eng builds.

The init.te and system_server.te changes resolve the
following denials:

// Denials when wifi-events.rc configures tracing
{ write } for pid=1 comm="init" name="instances" dev="debugfs" ino=755 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ add_name } for pid=1 comm="init" name="wifi" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ create } for pid=1 comm="init" name="wifi" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ write } for pid=1 comm="init" name="tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ write } for pid=1 comm="init" name="buffer_size_kb" dev="debugfs" ino=18061 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

// Denials when system_server sets up fail-safe
// (auto-terminate tracing if system_server dies)
{ search } for pid=882 comm="system_server" name="instances" dev="debugfs" ino=755 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ read } for pid=882 comm="system_server" name="free_buffer" dev="debugfs" ino=18063 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ open } for pid=882 comm="system_server" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/free_buffer" dev="debugfs" ino=18063 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ getattr } for pid=882 comm="system_server" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/free_buffer" dev="debugfs" ino=18063 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

// Denials when system_server toggles tracing on or off
// (WifiStateMachine is a thread in system_server)
{ search } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" name="instances" dev="debugfs" ino=755 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ write } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" name="tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ open } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ getattr } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ write } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" name="tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ open } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ getattr } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

// Denials when system_server reads the event trace
// (This happens in response to a dumpsys request)
{ search } for pid=3537 comm="Binder:882_B" name="instances" dev="debugfs" ino=755 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ read } for pid=3537 comm="Binder:882_B" name="trace" dev="debugfs" ino=18059 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ open } for pid=3537 comm="Binder:882_B" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/trace" dev="debugfs" ino=18059 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ getattr } for pid=3537 comm="Binder:882_B" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/trace" dev="debugfs" ino=18059 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ write } for pid=3537 comm="Binder:882_B" name="trace" dev="debugfs" ino=18059 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

Bug: 27254565
Test: manual
Manual test:
- Build this CL along with CL:322337
- Verify that system boots, and that we can connect to GoogleGuest.
  (Testing of actual trace functionality with require some more
  patches in frameworks/opt/net/wifi.)
$ adb root && adb shell dmesg | egrep 'avc: denied.+debugfs'

Change-Id: Ib6eb4116549277f85bd510d25fb30200f1752f4d

It seems likely that there is no reason to keep around a number of
devices that are configured to be included into the pixel kernels. Init
and ueventd should be the only processes with r/w access to these
devices, so auditallow rules have been added to ensure that they aren't
actually used.

/dev/keychord was given its own type since it's one of the few character
devices that's actually legitimately used and would cause log spam in
the auditallow otherwise.

Bug: 33347297
Test: The phone boots without any apparent log spam.

Change-Id: I3dd9557df8a9218b8c802e33ff549d15849216fb

Allow init to send userspace generated SELinux denials to the kernel
audit subsystem.

Test: "setprop asdf asdf" from the unprivileged adb shell user
      generated an SELinux denial processed by logd.
Bug: 27878170
Change-Id: I0ecd0601408bbda8227802c13689f98e507282d1

- transition to logpersist from init
- sort some overlapping negative references
- intention is to allow logpersist to be used by vendor
  userdebug logging

Test: gTest liblog-unit-tests, logd-unit-tests & logcat-unit-tests
Bug: 30566487
Change-Id: I7806f5a2548cbe0c1f257a0ba2855f2eb69d8e7c

init switch from a setcon() based transition to an exec() based
transition in bug 19702273. Fixup stale comment.

Test: comment only change. Policy compiles.
Bug: 19702273
Change-Id: I6e1b4b3680193453adafa8952a7ea343d2977505

Only init and ueventd have any access to /dev/port, and neither should
have any use for it. As it stands, leaving port in just represents
additional attack surface with no useful functionality, so it should be
removed if possible, not only from Pixel devices, but from all Android
devices.

Test: The phone boots successfully

Bug:33301618
Change-Id: Iedc51590f1ffda02444587d647889ead9bdece3f

urandom_device and random_device have the exact same security
properties. Collapse them into one type.

Test: device boots and /dev/urandom is labeled correctly.
Change-Id: I12da30749291bc5e37d99bc9422bb86cb58cec41

Fixes: 32061937
Test: install/uninstall and verified no denials
Change-Id: I487727b6b32b1a0fb06ce66ed6dd69db43c8d536