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  1. Dec 03, 2015
    • Jeff Vander Stoep's avatar
      Further restrict access to tun_device · e555f4b9
      Jeff Vander Stoep authored
      Remove bluetooth's access to tun_device. Auditallow rule demonstrates
      that it's not used.
      
      Strengthen the neverallow on opening tun_device to include all Apps.
      
      Bug: 24744295
      Change-Id: Iba85ba016b1e24c6c12d5b33e46fe8232908aac1
      e555f4b9
  2. Nov 03, 2015
    • Jeff Vander Stoep's avatar
      Create attribute for moving perms out of domain · d22987b4
      Jeff Vander Stoep authored
      Motivation: Domain is overly permissive. Start removing permissions
      from domain and assign them to the domain_deprecated attribute.
      Domain_deprecated and domain can initially be assigned to all
      domains. The goal is to not assign domain_deprecated to new domains
      and to start removing domain_deprecated where it is not required or
      reassigning the appropriate permissions to the inheriting domain
      when necessary.
      
      Bug: 25433265
      Change-Id: I8b11cb137df7bdd382629c98d916a73fe276413c
      d22987b4
  3. Oct 23, 2015
    • Jeff Vander Stoep's avatar
      audit untrusted_app access to mtp_device · 7b8f9f15
      Jeff Vander Stoep authored
      android.process.media moved to priv_app. Add audit rule to test if
      untrusted_app still requires access or if some/all permissions may
      be removed.
      
      Bug: 25085347
      Change-Id: I13bae9c09bd1627b2c06ae84b069778984f9bd5d
      7b8f9f15
    • Jeff Vander Stoep's avatar
      Temporarily downgrade to policy version number · 0fc831c3
      Jeff Vander Stoep authored
      Temporarily move from policy version 30 to 29 until device kernels
      and prebuilts are all upgraded to the accepted upstream version of
      the selinux ioctl command whitelisting code.
      
      (cherry picked from commit 89765083)
      
      Bug: 22846070
      
      Change-Id: I31d1e80aaee164cf41a2f01c6ca846a000898ef4
      0fc831c3
  4. Oct 19, 2015
  5. Oct 16, 2015
    • Jeff Vander Stoep's avatar
      Remove untrusted_app access to cache · 68748c21
      Jeff Vander Stoep authored
      neverallow access to untrusted_app and isolated app
      
      Access to cache is a system|signature permission. Only
      priv/system/platform apps should be allowed access.
      
      Change-Id: I7ebd38ce6d39950e74c0a164479bc59e694c852d
      68748c21
  6. Oct 14, 2015
    • Jeff Vander Stoep's avatar
      Remove permissions for untrusted_app · 0d186fcf
      Jeff Vander Stoep authored
      Privileged apps now run in the priv_app domain. Remove permissions
      from untrusted_app that were originaly added for GMS core, Finsky, and
      Play store.
      
      Bug: 22033466
      Change-Id: Ibdce72ad629bfab47de92ac19542e8902e02c8be
      0d186fcf
  7. Oct 13, 2015
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Remove ptrace from app.te · de11f501
      Nick Kralevich authored
      Remove ptrace from app.te, and only add it to the app domains
      which explicitly require it.
      
      Change-Id: I327aabd154ae07ce90e3529dee2b324ca125dd16
      de11f501
  8. Oct 07, 2015
    • Jeff Vander Stoep's avatar
      Do not allow untrusted_app to open tun_device · de53051a
      Jeff Vander Stoep authored
      Third party vpn apps must receive open tun fd from the framework
      for device traffic.
      
      neverallow untrusted_app open perm and auditallow bluetooth
      access to see if the neverallow rule can be expanded to include
      all of appdomain.
      
      Bug: 24677682
      Change-Id: I68685587228a1044fe1e0f96d4dc08c2adbebe78
      de53051a
  9. Sep 10, 2015
    • dcashman's avatar
      Allow untrusted_app to list services. · 0b764ae9
      dcashman authored
      CTS relies on the ability to see all services on the system to make sure
      the dump permission is properly enforced on all services.  Allow this.
      
      Bug: 23476772
      Change-Id: I144b825c3a637962aaca59565c9f567953a866e8
      0b764ae9
  10. Jul 29, 2015
  11. Jul 28, 2015
  12. Jun 05, 2015
    • Jeff Vander Stoep's avatar
      restrict app access to socket ioctls · de9b5301
      Jeff Vander Stoep authored
      Create a macro of unprivileged ioctls including
      - All common socket ioctls except MAC address
      - All wireless extensions ioctls except get/set ESSID
      - Some commonly used tty ioctls
      
      Bug: 21657002
      Change-Id: Ib08be9cb70d08c1fa2c8bddbae519e7c2df5293c
      de9b5301
  13. May 19, 2015
    • Jeff Sharkey's avatar
      Allow MediaProvider to traverse /mnt/media_rw. · 6e1f405c
      Jeff Sharkey authored
      As an optimization, platform components like MediaProvider may choose
      to shortcut past the FUSE daemon and return open file descriptors
      directly pointing at the underlying storage device.
      
      Now that we have a specific label for /mnt/media_rw, we need to grant
      search access to untrusted apps like MediaProvider.  The actual
      access control is still managed by POSIX permissions on that
      directory.
      
      avc: denied { search } for name="media_rw" dev="tmpfs" ino=4150 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_media_rw_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
      
      Bug: 21017105
      Change-Id: I6d51939668b39b43b91b1f0c24c98bc2205bf511
      6e1f405c
  14. May 15, 2015
  15. May 13, 2015
  16. May 06, 2015
  17. May 05, 2015
  18. Apr 29, 2015
    • Alex Klyubin's avatar
      Expand access to gatekeeperd. · ab5cf668
      Alex Klyubin authored
      This enables access to gatekeeperd for anybody who invokes Android
      framework APIs. This is necessary because the AndroidKeyStore
      abstraction offered by the framework API occasionally communicates
      with gatekeeperd from the calling process.
      
      (cherry picked from commit effcac7d)
      
      Bug: 20526234
      Change-Id: I450242cd085259b3f82f36f359ee65ff27bebd13
      ab5cf668
    • Alex Klyubin's avatar
      Expand access to gatekeeperd. · effcac7d
      Alex Klyubin authored
      This enables access to gatekeeperd for anybody who invokes Android
      framework APIs. This is necessary because the AndroidKeyStore
      abstraction offered by the framework API occasionally communicates
      with gatekeeperd from the calling process.
      
      Bug: 20526234
      Change-Id: I3362ba07d1a7e5f1c47fe7e9ba6aec5ac3fec747
      effcac7d
  19. Apr 18, 2015
  20. Apr 09, 2015
    • dcashman's avatar
      Enforce more specific service access. · bd7f5803
      dcashman authored
      Move the remaining services from tmp_system_server_service to appropriate
      attributes and remove tmp_system_server and associated logging:
      
      registry
      restrictions
      rttmanager
      scheduling_policy
      search
      sensorservice
      serial
      servicediscovery
      statusbar
      task
      textservices
      telecom_service
      trust_service
      uimode
      updatelock
      usagestats
      usb
      user
      vibrator
      voiceinteraction
      wallpaper
      webviewupdate
      wifip2p
      wifi
      window
      
      Bug: 18106000
      Change-Id: Ia0a6d47099d82c53ba403af394537db6fbc71ca0
      bd7f5803
  21. Apr 08, 2015
    • dcashman's avatar
      Enforce more specific service access. · 03a6f64f
      dcashman authored
      Move the following services from tmp_system_server_service to appropriate
      attributes:
      
      network_management
      network_score
      notification
      package
      permission
      persistent
      power
      print
      processinfo
      procstats
      
      Bug: 18106000
      Change-Id: I9dfb41fa41cde72ef0059668410a2e9eb1af491c
      03a6f64f
  22. Apr 07, 2015
    • dcashman's avatar
      Enforce more specific service access. · 91b7c67d
      dcashman authored
      Move the following services from tmp_system_server_service to appropriate
      attributes:
      
      jobscheduler
      launcherapps
      location
      lock_settings
      media_projection
      media_router
      media_session
      mount
      netpolicy
      netstats
      
      Bug: 18106000
      Change-Id: Ia82d475ec41f658851f945173c968f4abf57e7e1
      91b7c67d
    • dcashman's avatar
      Enforce more specific service access. · 3cc6fc5f
      dcashman authored
      Move the following services from tmp_system_server_service to appropriate
      attributes:
      
      diskstats
      display
      dreams
      dropbox
      ethernet
      fingerprint
      graphicstats
      hardware
      hdmi_control
      input_method
      input_service
      
      Bug: 18106000
      Change-Id: Iadd8aab9e78d9d39fb00cf0b5a95fa1927d02095
      3cc6fc5f
    • dcashman's avatar
      Enforce more specific service access. · d4c78f4b
      dcashman authored
      Move the following services from tmp_system_server_service to appropriate
      attributes:
      
      battery
      bluetooth_manager
      clipboard
      commontime_management
      connectivity
      content
      country_detector
      device_policy
      deviceidle
      
      Bug: 18106000
      Change-Id: I0d0f2a075c0509a783631d88ba453ac13399cdf2
      d4c78f4b
  23. Apr 06, 2015
    • dcashman's avatar
      Assign app_api_service attribute to services. · 4cdea7fc
      dcashman authored
      Assign the alarm, appwidget, assetatlas, audio, backup and batterystats services
      the appropriate service access levels and move into enforcing.
      
      Bug: 18106000
      Change-Id: If3210bb25f3076edfdb6eec36ef6521ace1bd8d7
      4cdea7fc
  24. Apr 03, 2015
    • dcashman's avatar
      Assign app_api_service attribute to services. · b075338d
      dcashman authored
      Move accessibility, account, appops and activity services into enforcing with
      app_api_service level of access, with additional grants to mediaserver and
      isolated app.
      
      Bug: 18106000
      Change-Id: I1d5a79b9223026415f1690e8e9325ec4c270e3dd
      b075338d
    • dcashman's avatar
      Add system_api_service and app_api_service attributes. · d12993f0
      dcashman authored
      System services differ in designed access level.  Add attributes reflecting this
      distinction and label services appropriately.  Begin moving access to the newly
      labeled services by removing them from tmp_system_server_service into the newly
      made system_server_service attribute.  Reflect the move of system_server_service
      from a type to an attribute by removing access to system_server_service where
      appropriate.
      
      Change-Id: I7fd06823328daaea6d6f96e4d6bd00332382230b
      d12993f0
  25. Apr 01, 2015
    • dcashman's avatar
      Record observed service accesses. · 8af4e9cb
      dcashman authored
      Get ready to switch system_server service lookups into enforcing.
      
      Bug: 18106000
      Change-Id: Iefd4b2eee6cdd680f5ab423d15cc72a2a30e27cf
      8af4e9cb
  26. Mar 27, 2015
    • John Reck's avatar
      Add graphicsstats service · e8064afb
      John Reck authored
      Change-Id: I156b139b57f46c695ece35b7b26a3087d87b25df
      e8064afb
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Don't grant hard link capabilities by default. · 85ce2c70
      Nick Kralevich authored
      Modify create_file_perms and create_dir_perms so it doesn't have
      the "link" permission. This permission controls whether hard links
      are allowed or not on the given file label. Hard links are a common
      source of security bugs, and isn't something we want to support by
      default.
      
      Get rid of link_file_perms and move the necessary permissions into
      create_file_perms and create_dir_perms. Nobody is using this macro,
      so it's pointless to keep it around.
      
      Get rid of unlink on directories. It returns EISDIR if you attempt to
      do it, independent of SELinux permissions.
      
      SELinux domains which have a need for hard linking for a particular
      file type can add it back to their permission set on an as-needed basis.
      
      Add a compile time assertion (neverallow rule) for untrusted_app.
      It's particularly dangerous for untrusted_app to ever have hard
      link capabilities, and the neverallow rule will prevent regressions.
      
      Bug: 19953790
      Change-Id: I5e9493d2bf5da460d074f0bc5ad8ba7c14dec6e0
      85ce2c70
  27. Mar 13, 2015
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      neverallow untrusted_app as a mlstrustedsubject. · eaece936
      Stephen Smalley authored
      
      Assigning mlstrustedsubject to untrusted_app would undermine
      the per-user isolation model being enforced via levelFrom=user
      in seapp_contexts and the mls constraints.  There is no direct
      way to specify a neverallow on attribute assignment, but this
      makes use of a particular property of the fork permission to
      prevent ever adding mlstrustedsubject to untrusted_app.
      
      A similar restriction for app_data_file and mlstrustedobject
      is also important for the same reason, but cannot be expressed
      as a neverallow.
      
      Change-Id: I5170cadc55cc614aef0cd5f6491de8f69a4fa2a0
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      eaece936
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      Move allow rules before neverallow rules. · b8caf7fd
      Stephen Smalley authored
      
      There were a few instances where allow rules were appended
      after the neverallow rules stanza in the .te file.  Also
      there were some regular allow rules inserted into the CTS-specific
      rules section of app.te.  Just move the rules as appropriate.
      Should be no change in policy.
      
      Change-Id: Iec76f32d4b531d245bbf5dd9f621a71ff5c71f3e
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      b8caf7fd
  28. Mar 06, 2015
    • dcashman's avatar
      Record observed bluetooth service access. · bb3cef44
      dcashman authored
      Bug: 18106000
      Change-Id: I80b574f73d53439dd710ccdb8f05cc2f9e9a10b4
      bb3cef44
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      allow untrusted_app read /data/anr/traces.txt · 1aafc4c7
      Nick Kralevich authored
      The GMS core feedback agent runs as untrusted_app, and needs
      the ability to read /data/anr/traces.txt to report ANR information.
      
      Allow all untrusted_apps to read /data/anr/traces.txt so that GMS core
      can access it.
      
      Longer term, we need to move GMS core into it's own domain, but that's
      a longer term change.
      
      Addresses the following denial:
      
      W/ndroid.feedback(17825): type=1400 audit(0.0:68004): avc: denied { read } for name="traces.txt" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=325762 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:anr_data_file:s0 tclass=file
      
      (cherrypick from commit e2547c3b)
      
      Bug: 18504118
      Bug: 18340553
      Change-Id: I8b472b6ab7dfe2a73154033e0a088b8e26396fa8
      1aafc4c7
  29. Mar 05, 2015
  30. Mar 03, 2015
    • dcashman's avatar
      Record observed system_server servicemanager service requests. · 23f33615
      dcashman authored
      Also formally allow dumpstate access to all services and grant system_server
      access to address the following non-system_server_service entries:
      
      avc:  granted  { find } for service=drm.drmManager scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:drmserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
      avc:  granted  { find } for service=nfc scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:nfc_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
      
      Bug: 18106000
      Change-Id: Iad16b36acf44bce52c4824f8b53c0e7731c25602
      23f33615
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