Sdcardfs does not use a userspace daemon, so the secontext
is currently the caller's when accessing files. This can be
removed if sdcardfs is modified to change the secontext before
calling into the lower filesystem.

Bug: 32735101
Test: Run any app that falls under isolated_app.
Test: See bug for example
Change-Id: I9433aa0f14ff0d5a518249079e07f57e55b09bcf

app_domain was split up in commit: 2e00e637 to
enable compilation by hiding type_transition rules from public policy.  These
rules need to be hidden from public policy because they describe how objects are
labeled, of which non-platform should be unaware.  Instead of cutting apart the
app_domain macro, which non-platform policy may rely on for implementing new app
types, move all app_domain calls to private policy.

(cherry-pick of commit: 76035ea0)

Bug: 33428593
Test: bullhead and sailfish both boot. sediff shows no policy change.
Change-Id: I4beead8ccc9b6e13c6348da98bb575756f539665

In order to support platform changes without simultaneous updates from
non-platform components, the platform and non-platform policies must be
split.  In order to provide a guarantee that policy written for
non-platform objects continues to provide the same access, all types
exposed to non-platform policy are versioned by converting them and the
policy using them into attributes.

This change performs that split, the subsequent versioning and also
generates a mapping file to glue the different policy components
together.

Test: Device boots and runs.
Bug: 31369363
Change-Id: Ibfd3eb077bd9b8e2ff3b2e6a0ca87e44d78b1317

Lock in the gains we've made so far in restricting access to generically
labeled /proc files. There's more we can do here, but let's avoid
inadvertent regressions.

Test: policy compiles. Only compile time assertions added.
Bug: 26813932
Change-Id: If354c2ddc1c59beed7f0eb4bcbd3f0d9971c3b8a

Allow isolated apps to read/write/append/lock already open sdcard
file descriptors passed to it by normal app processes. isolated_apps are
used by processes like Google drive when handling untrusted content.

Addresses the following denial:

  audit(0.0:1508): avc: denied { read } for
  path="/storage/emulated/0/Download/02-corejava.pdf" dev="fuse" ino=310
  scontext=u:r:isolated_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0
  tclass=file permissive=0

This partially reverts the tightening added in
ce4b5eea.

Add a TODO to consider removing isolated_apps ability to write or append
to files on the sdcard. This limits the damage that can occur should the
isolated_app process be compromised.

Bug: 32896414
Test: Policy compiles. Rule add only, so no possibility of breakage.
Change-Id: Ia128569608fc9c872c90e6c380106b7c81eb7b6f

The webview_zygote is a new unprivileged zygote and has its own sockets for
listening to fork requests. However the webview_zygote does not run as root
(though it does require certain capabilities) and only allows dyntransition to
the isolated_app domain.

Test: m
Test: angler boots

Bug: 21643067
Change-Id: I89a72ffe6dcb983c4a44048518efd7efb7ed8e83

Remove and neverallow isolated_app access to external storage and
USB accessories.

Test: aosp_angler-userdebug builds
Bug: 21643067
Change-Id: Ie912706a954a38610f2afd742b1ab4b8cd4b1f36

Divide policy into public and private components.  This is the first
step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
policies.  The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
in non-platform policy creation.  Backwards compatibility with it will
be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
version.

Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
and the need for attributes is minimal.  For now, almost all types and
avrules are left in public.

Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.

Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c

isolated_app can already write to a file. Apps may want to append
instead of write.

Fixes: 30984610
Change-Id: I7a90b3311dcaff597f07930ceea0a23b29b0df2d

Address denials:
avc: denied { read } for name="meminfo" dev="proc" ino=4026544360 scontext=u:r:isolated_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_meminfo:s0 tclass=file permissive=0

Bug: 28722489
Change-Id: I3c55bd95bb82ec54e88e9e9bc42d6392a216a936

(cherry picked from commit 6ba383c5)

Restrict unix_dgram_socket and unix_stream_socket to a whitelist.
Disallow all ioctls for netlink_selinux_socket and netlink_route_socket.

Neverallow third party app use of all ioctls other than
unix_dgram_socket, unix_stream_socket, netlink_selinux_socket,
netlink_route_socket, tcp_socket, udp_socket and rawip_socket.

Bug: 28171804
Change-Id: Icfe3486a62fc2fc2d2abd8d4030a5fbdd0ab30ab

Add a neverallow rule (compile time assertion + CTS test) that
isolated_apps and untrusted_apps can't do anything else but append
to /data/anr/traces.txt. In particular, assert that they can't
read from the file, or overwrite other data which may already be
in the file.

Bug: 18340553
Bug: 27853304

(cherry picked from commit 369cf8cd)

Change-Id: Ib33e7ea0342ad28e5a89dfffdd9bc16fe54d8b3d

Add a neverallow rule (compile time assertion + CTS test) that
isolated_apps and untrusted_apps can't do anything else but append
to /data/anr/traces.txt. In particular, assert that they can't
read from the file, or overwrite other data which may already be
in the file.

Bug: 18340553
Bug: 27853304
Change-Id: I249fe2a46401b660efaa3f1102924a448ed750d5

It's okay for isolated apps to connect to the webview update service to
find out which APK is WebView. This enables isolated renderer processes
to load their code from the WebView APK.

Change-Id: Ia287280a994dbd852b4f630da5548e7b6cf4e08f

Bluetooth uses the tun device for tethering. Allow access.

  STEPS TO REPRODUCE:
  0. Have two devices to test on, say Device A and Device B
  1. On Device A, Go to settings ->Bluetooth .
  2. Turn on the Bluetooth .
  3. Pair it with device B
  4. Tap on the paired device

  OBSERVED RESULTS:
  -Bluetooth share crash is observed with "Bluetooth share has stopped"
  error message
  -Unable to use Bluetooth tethering due to this issue

  EXPECTED RESULTS:
  No crash and Bluetooth devices should be able to connect for tethering

Addresses the following denial:

com.android.bluetooth: type=1400 audit(0.0:131): avc: denied { open }
for comm=425420536572766963652043616C6C path="/dev/tun" dev="tmpfs"
ino=12340 scontext=u:r:bluetooth:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tun_device:s0
tclass=chr_file permissive=0

Bug: 27372573

(cherry picked from commit 9a1347ee)

Change-Id: Ibd16e48c09fe80ebb4f3779214de3b4806c12497

Bluetooth uses the tun device for tethering. Allow access.

  STEPS TO REPRODUCE:
  0. Have two devices to test on, say Device A and Device B
  1. On Device A, Go to settings ->Bluetooth .
  2. Turn on the Bluetooth .
  3. Pair it with device B
  4. Tap on the paired device

  OBSERVED RESULTS:
  -Bluetooth share crash is observed with "Bluetooth share has stopped"
  error message
  -Unable to use Bluetooth tethering due to this issue

  EXPECTED RESULTS:
  No crash and Bluetooth devices should be able to connect for tethering

Addresses the following denial:

com.android.bluetooth: type=1400 audit(0.0:131): avc: denied { open }
for comm=425420536572766963652043616C6C path="/dev/tun" dev="tmpfs"
ino=12340 scontext=u:r:bluetooth:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tun_device:s0
tclass=chr_file permissive=0

Bug: 27372573
Change-Id: I07724d8d68ffcdda691f1179787a4f40a0ab1c73

and as a consequence open up for other appdomains (e.g. platform_app)
to write system properties.

Change-Id: Ie6ad4d17247165564456e5b0d78f705a82cdcde7

Exempt bluetooth which has net_admin capability.

Allow Droidguard to access the MAC address - droidguard runs in
priv_app domain.

Change-Id: Ia3cf07f4a96353783b2cfd7fc4506b7034daa2f1

From self to domain

Change-Id: I97aeea67a6b66bc307715a050cf7699e5be9715e

Grant untrusted_app and isolated_app unpriv_sock_perms, neverallow
priv_sock_perms to disallow access to MAC address and ESSID.

Change-Id: Idac3b657a153e7d7fdc647ff34b876a325d759b3

This reverts commit 2ea23a6e.

Change-Id: I5e9efa56d74ab22030611cab515e050e0bb77aca

This reverts commit 2ea23a6e.

Change-Id: I5e9efa56d74ab22030611cab515e050e0bb77aca

Grant untrusted_app and isolated_app unpriv_sock_perms, neverallow
priv_sock_perms to disallow access to MAC address and ESSID.

Change-Id: Idac3b657a153e7d7fdc647ff34b876a325d759b3

Motivation: Domain is overly permissive. Start removing permissions
from domain and assign them to the domain_deprecated attribute.
Domain_deprecated and domain can initially be assigned to all
domains. The goal is to not assign domain_deprecated to new domains
and to start removing domain_deprecated where it is not required or
reassigning the appropriate permissions to the inheriting domain
when necessary.

Bug: 25433265
Change-Id: I8b11cb137df7bdd382629c98d916a73fe276413c

Temporarily move from policy version 30 to 29 until device kernels
and prebuilts are all upgraded to the accepted upstream version of
the selinux ioctl command whitelisting code.

(cherry picked from commit 89765083)

Bug: 22846070

Change-Id: I31d1e80aaee164cf41a2f01c6ca846a000898ef4

neverallow access to untrusted_app and isolated app

Access to cache is a system|signature permission. Only
priv/system/platform apps should be allowed access.

Change-Id: I7ebd38ce6d39950e74c0a164479bc59e694c852d

Remove ptrace from app.te, and only add it to the app domains
which explicitly require it.

Change-Id: I327aabd154ae07ce90e3529dee2b324ca125dd16

Temporarily move from policy version 30 to 29 until device kernels
and prebuilts are all upgraded to the accepted upstream version of
the selinux ioctl command whitelisting code.

Bug: 22846070

Change-Id: I31d1e80aaee164cf41a2f01c6ca846a000898ef4

service_manager_local_audit_domain was used to fine tune the service_manager
auditallow rules when introducing the service_manager SELinux rules.  This is no
longer needed.

(cherry-pick of commit: eab26faa)

Bug: 21656807
Change-Id: Ia042a887e7bf9eb2a2b08b8d831e68dfe6395f75

service_manager_local_audit_domain was used to fine tune the service_manager
auditallow rules when introducing the service_manager SELinux rules.  This is no
longer needed.

Bug: 21656807
Change-Id: Ia042a887e7bf9eb2a2b08b8d831e68dfe6395f75

Create a macro of unprivileged ioctls including
- All common socket ioctls except MAC address
- All wireless extensions ioctls except get/set ESSID
- Some commonly used tty ioctls

Bug: 21657002
Change-Id: Ib08be9cb70d08c1fa2c8bddbae519e7c2df5293c

Bug: 17471434
Bug: 18609318
Change-Id: Idb3ed8ada03dbc07f35e74fd80cb989c8e6808bc

Chrome's WebSQL implementation works by running sqlite in the
sandboxed renderer process, and sqlite expects to be able to
call flock() on the database file.

Bug: 20134929
Change-Id: Id33a2cd19b779144662056c6f3aba3365b0a2a54

Get ready to switch system_server service lookups into enforcing.

Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Iefd4b2eee6cdd680f5ab423d15cc72a2a30e27cf

isolated apps should only be able to access 2 services.
Remove access permissions for services inappropriately added,
and add a neverallow rule to prevent regressions.

Change-Id: I2783465c4a22507849b2a64894fb76690a27bc01

Chrome team recommends reverting this patch and introducing
it into a future version of Android, to avoid potential
compatibility issues.

This reverts commit 9de62d6f.

Bug: 17471434
Bug: 18609318
Change-Id: I9adaa9d0e4cb6a592011336e442e9d414dbac470

Chrome team recommends reverting this patch and introducing
it into a future version of Android, to avoid potential
compatibility issues.

This reverts commit 9de62d6f.

Bug: 17471434
Bug: 18609318
Change-Id: I3086cb8a8d7142b1eadce622f7e87a4c3426b6bf

Temporarily give every system_server_service its own
domain in preparation for splitting it and identifying
special services or classes of services.

Change-Id: I81ffbdbf5eea05e0146fd7fd245f01639b1ae0ef

All domains are currently granted list and find service_manager
permissions, but this is not necessary.  Pare the permissions
which did not trigger any of the auditallow reporting.

Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Ie0ce8de2af8af2cbe4ce388a2dcf4534694c994a

Only allow it to read/write/stat already open app data files
received via Binder or local socket IPC.

Change-Id: Ie66f240e109410a17aa93d9d5dea4c2b87d47009
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>