HAL policy defines how the platform and a given HAL interact, but not how the
HAL is implemented.  This policy should be represented as an attribute that all
processes implementing the HAL can include.

Bug: 32123421
Test: Builds.
Change-Id: I17e5612c0835773c28e14f09e2ce7bdc3f210c15

This reverts commit 1f329465.

Bug: 32973182
Change-Id: Ic0277b38b0249710a4f1fc362e777f3880ff096b

Test: Device boots
Change-Id: I151c5fb6f56850eaa215e1a917ac9ad609dbdd4a

external/toybox commit a583afc812cf7be74ebab72294c8df485908ff04 started
having dmesg use /dev/kmsg, which is unreadable to the unprivileged
shell user. Revoke syslog(2) to the shell user for consistency.

The kernel dmesg log is a source of kernel pointers, which can leak
kASLR information from the kernel. Restricting access to kernel
information will make attacks against Android more difficult. Having
said that, dmesg information is still available from "adb bugreport", so
this change doesn't completely shutdown kernel info leaks.

This change essentially reverts us to the state we were in between Nov 8
2011 and May 27 2014. During that almost 3 year period, the unprivileged
shell user was unable to access dmesg, and there was only one complaint
during that time.

References:
* https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/f9557fb
* https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/sepolicy/+/f821b5a

TODO: Further unify /dev/kmsg permissions with syslog_read permissions.

Test: policy compiles, no dmesg output
Change-Id: Icfff6f765055bdbbe85f302b781aed2568ef532f

Grant boot_control_hal permissions to the hal_boot service;
update_engine and update_verifier can call that service rather
than using those permissions themselves.

Bug: 31864052
Test: `bootctl set-active-boot-slot 1`
Change-Id: I5188bc32e7933d4a0f5135b3246df119d3523d69

su is an appdomain, and as such, any auditallow statements applicable to
appdomain also apply to su. However, su is never enforced, so generating
SELinux denials for such domains is pointless. Exclude su from
ion_device auditallow rules.

Addresses the following auditallow spam:

  avc: granted { ioctl } for comm="screencap" path="/dev/ion" dev="tmpfs"
  ino=10230 ioctlcmd=4906 scontext=u:r:su:s0
  tcontext=u:object_r:ion_device:s0 tclass=chr_file

Test: policy compiles
Change-Id: I2e783624b9e53ad365669bd6f2d4db40da475a16

Allow isolated apps to read/write/append/lock already open sdcard
file descriptors passed to it by normal app processes. isolated_apps are
used by processes like Google drive when handling untrusted content.

Addresses the following denial:

  audit(0.0:1508): avc: denied { read } for
  path="/storage/emulated/0/Download/02-corejava.pdf" dev="fuse" ino=310
  scontext=u:r:isolated_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0
  tclass=file permissive=0

This partially reverts the tightening added in
ce4b5eea.

Add a TODO to consider removing isolated_apps ability to write or append
to files on the sdcard. This limits the damage that can occur should the
isolated_app process be compromised.

Bug: 32896414
Test: Policy compiles. Rule add only, so no possibility of breakage.
Change-Id: Ia128569608fc9c872c90e6c380106b7c81eb7b6f

Bug: 29970149
Test: None
Change-Id: I59f49f3bf20d93effde5e1a9a3c1ed64fbecb7a8

Test: Verify that HTTP and HTTPS connections from ephemeral apps do not
cause denials.
Change-Id: I0ce25602906e63ec55d5b5869445f2aec10900cb

Allow SurfaceFlinger to call into IComposer, and vice versa for
IComposerCallback.

Specifically,

hwbinder_use(...) for
avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_composer:s0 tcontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=1
avc: denied { transfer } for scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_composer:s0 tcontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=1

binder_call(..., surfaceflinger) for
avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_composer:s0 tcontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tclass=binder permissive=1

allow ... gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms for
avc: denied { read write } for name="kgsl-3d0" dev="tmpfs" ino=14956 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_composer:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1
avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/kgsl-3d0" dev="tmpfs" ino=14956 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_composer:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1
avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/dev/kgsl-3d0" dev="tmpfs" ino=14956 ioctlcmd=940 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_composer:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1

allow ... ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms for
avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/dev/ion" dev="tmpfs" ino=15014 ioctlcmd=4900 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_composer:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:ion_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1

allow ... graphics_device ... for
avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/dev/graphics/fb0" dev="tmpfs" ino=15121 ioctlcmd=5380 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_composer:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:graphics_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1

allow ... ...:fd use for
avc: denied { use } for path="anon_inode:dmabuf" dev="anon_inodefs" ino=12794 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_composer:s0 tcontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator_service:s0 tclass=fd permissive=1
avc: denied { use } for path="anon_inode:sync_fence" dev="anon_inodefs" ino=12794 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_composer:s0 tcontext=u:r:bootanim:s0 tclass=fd permissive=1
avc: denied { use } for path="anon_inode:sync_fence" dev="anon_inodefs" ino=12794 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_composer:s0 tcontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tclass=fd permissive=1
avc: denied { use } for path="anon_inode:sync_fence" dev="anon_inodefs" ino=12794 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_composer:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tclass=fd permissive=1

binder_call(surfaceflinger, ...) for
avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:hal_graphics_composer:s0 tclass=binder permissive=1
avc: denied { transfer } for scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:hal_graphics_composer:s0 tclass=binder permissive=1
avc: denied { use } for path="anon_inode:sync_fence" dev="anon_inodefs" ino=12794 ioctlcmd=3e02 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:hal_graphics_composer:s0 tclass=fd permissive=1
avc: denied { use } for path="anon_inode:sync_fence" dev="anon_inodefs" ino=12794 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:hal_graphics_composer:s0 tclass=fd permissive=1

allow bootanim ...:fd use for
avc: denied { use } for path="anon_inode:sync_fence" dev="anon_inodefs" ino=11947 scontext=u:r:bootanim:s0 tcontext=u:r:hal_graphics_composer:s0 tclass=fd permissive=1

Bug: 32021609
Test: make bootimage
Change-Id: I036cdbebf0c619fef7559f294f1865f381b17588

Allow SurfaceFlinger to call into IAllocator, and allow everyone to access
IAllocator's fd.

Specifically,

hwbinder_use(...) for
avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=1
avc: denied { transfer } for scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=1

allow ... ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms for
avc: denied { read } for name="ion" dev="tmpfs" ino=15014 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:ion_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1
avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/ion" dev="tmpfs" ino=15014 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:ion_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1
avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/dev/ion" dev="tmpfs" ino=15014 ioctlcmd=4900 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:ion_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1

allow ... gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; for
avc: denied { read write } for name="kgsl-3d0" dev="tmpfs" ino=14956 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1
avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/kgsl-3d0" dev="tmpfs" ino=14956 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1
avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/dev/kgsl-3d0" dev="tmpfs" ino=14956 ioctlcmd=940 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1

binder_call(surfaceflinger, ...) for
avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tclass=binder permissive=1

allow ... ...:fd use for
avc: denied { use } for path="anon_inode:dmabuf" dev="anon_inodefs" ino=12794 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tclass=fd permissive=1

Bug: 32021161
Test: make bootimage
Change-Id: Ie7700142313407ac438c43dd1a85544dc4c67f13

Fixes: 32061937
Test: install/uninstall and verified no denials
Change-Id: I487727b6b32b1a0fb06ce66ed6dd69db43c8d536

This property is never used.

Test: policy compiles
Change-Id: I43ace92950e1221754db28548031fbbfc0437d7a

The webview_zygote is a new unprivileged zygote and has its own sockets for
listening to fork requests. However the webview_zygote does not run as root
(though it does require certain capabilities) and only allows dyntransition to
the isolated_app domain.

Test: m
Test: angler boots

Bug: 21643067
Change-Id: I89a72ffe6dcb983c4a44048518efd7efb7ed8e83

Sort the entries in property.te. This will make it slightly easier to
read, and avoids merge conflicts by discouraging the common practice of
adding entries to the bottom of this file.

Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: I87ae96b33156dba73fb7eafc0f9a2a961b689853

Allow the system_server to change. Allow the zygote to read it as well.

Test: Have system_server set a property
Change-Id: Ie90eec8b733fa7193861026a3a6e0fb0ba5d5318

Test: Flashed device and verified no update_verifier permission denials
Change-Id: I5de063c202aefef399645b153f68ff7909989eba
Signed-off-by: Connor O'Brien <connoro@google.com>

The underlying ioctl denial was fixed in device-specific policy.
It's not needed in core policy.

A search of SELinux denials shows no reported denials, other than the
ones showing up on marlin.

This reverts commit ec3285cd.

(cherrypicked from commit 863ce3e7)

Test: AndroiTS GPS Test app shows GPS data, no SELinux denials.
Bug: 32290392
Change-Id: I1ba7bad43a2cdd7cdebbe1c8543a71eee765621d

Addresses the following auditallow spam:

avc: granted { read open } for comm="profman"
path="/system/lib/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1368 scontext=u:r:profman:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file

avc: granted { read open } for comm="debuggerd64"
path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1897
scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file

avc: granted { getattr } for comm="debuggerd64"
path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1837
scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file

Test: Policy compiles. Not a tightening of rules.
Change-Id: I501b0a6a343c61b3ca6283647a18a9a15deddf2a

Bug: 32022261
Test: manual
Change-Id: I664a3b5c37f6a3a36e4e5beb91b384a9599c83f8

Allow installd to read through files, directories, and symlinks
on /system. This is needed to support installd using files in
/system/app and /system/priv-app

Addresses the following auditallow spam:

avc: granted { getattr } for comm="installd"
path="/system/app/Bluetooth/lib/arm/libbluetooth_jni.so"
dev="mmcblk0p41" ino=19 scontext=u:r:installd:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file

avc: granted { getattr } for comm="installd"
path="/system/priv-app/MtpDocumentsProvider/lib/arm64/libappfuse_jni.so"
dev="dm-0" ino=2305 scontext=u:r:installd:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file

avc: granted { read open } for comm="installd"
path="/system/priv-app/TelephonyProvider" dev="mmcblk0p43" ino=1839
scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir

avc: granted { read } for comm="installd" name="Velvet" dev="mmcblk0p43"
ino=1841 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0
tclass=dir

avc: granted { read open } for comm="installd"
path="/system/priv-app/GoogleOneTimeInitializer" dev="mmcblk0p43"
ino=1778 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0
tclass=dir

avc: granted { read open } for comm="installd"
path="/system/app/PlayAutoInstallConfig" dev="mmcblk0p43" ino=112
scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir

Test: policy compiles
Change-Id: I5d14ea2cd7d281f949d0651b9723d5b7fae2e1f2

Adding back the binder permission to access keystore from
wpa_supplicant. This was removed by mistake in the previous patch
(commit#: 6caeac) to add hwbinder permissions.

Denials in logs:
11-03 14:37:54.831  9011  9011 I auditd  : type=1400 audit(0.0:1490):
avc: denied { call } for comm="wpa_supplicant" scontext=u:r:wpa:s0
tcontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0
11-03 14:37:54.831  9011  9011 W wpa_supplicant: type=1400
audit(0.0:1490): avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:wpa:s0
tcontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0
11-03 14:37:55.838  9011  9011 I ServiceManager: Waiting for service
android.security.keystore...
11-03 14:37:55.834  9011  9011 I auditd  : type=1400 audit(0.0:1491):
avc: denied { call } for comm="wpa_supplicant" scontext=u:r:wpa:s0
tcontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0
11-03 14:37:55.834  9011  9011 W wpa_supplicant: type=1400
audit(0.0:1491): avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:wpa:s0
tcontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0
11-03 14:37:56.838  9011  9011 I ServiceManager: Waiting for service
android.security.keystore...
11-03 14:37:56.834  9011  9011 I auditd  : type=1400 audit(0.0:1492):
avc: denied { call } for comm="wpa_supplicant" scontext=u:r:wpa:s0
tcontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0
11-03 14:37:56.834  9011  9011 W wpa_supplicant: type=1400
audit(0.0:1492): avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:wpa:s0
tcontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0
11-03 14:37:57.839  9011  9011 I ServiceManager: Waiting for service
android.security.keystore...
11-03 14:37:57.834  9011  9011 I auditd  : type=1400 audit(0.0:1493):
avc: denied { call } for comm="wpa_supplicant" scontext=u:r:wpa:s0
tcontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0
11-03 14:37:57.834  9011  9011 W wpa_supplicant: type=1400
audit(0.0:1493): avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:wpa:s0
tcontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0

Bug: 32655747
Test: Compiles. Will send for integration testing.
Change-Id: Ic57a5bf0e6ea15770efc0d09f68d04b2db9ec1b8

Finish NAN -> Aware rename process. Removes old NAN service.

Bug: 32263750
Test: device boots and all Wi-Fi unit-tests pass
Change-Id: I2f0d9595efea2494b56074752194e7a6e66070f2

Add Aware service - new name for NAN. But do not remove NAN
yet. Enables smooth transition.

Bug: 32263750
Test: device boots and all Wi-Fi unit-tests pass
Change-Id: Ieb9f1ebf1d2f31ee27f228562b4601023da5282d

Bug: 32290392
Test: Builds.
Change-Id: I46e8af202b41131cfc9bb280f04a214859c9b0de

Bug: 31180823
Test: reduced sepolicy errors
Change-Id: Ibfba2efa903adec340e37abec2afb3b94a262678
Signed-off-by: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>

Bug: 31177288
Test: reduced sepolicy errors
Change-Id: I29556276ee14c341ac8f472875e6b69f903851ff
Signed-off-by: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>

Bug: 32022100
Test: end to end
Change-Id: I5dd9b64c98a5c549fdaf9e47d5a92fa6963370c7

Test: N/A
Change-Id: Ib3c85118bf752152f5ca75ec13371073fc2873cc