Denials:
04-12 12:42:47.795   903   903 W traced_probes: type=1400 audit(0.0:5684): avc: denied { search } for name="1376" dev="proc" ino=204553 scontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app_27:s0:c512,c768 tclass=dir permissive=0
04-12 12:42:47.795   903   903 W traced_probes: type=1400 audit(0.0:5685): avc: denied { search } for name="1402" dev="proc" ino=204554 scontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tclass=dir permissive=0
04-12 12:42:47.801   903   903 W traced_probes: type=1400 audit(0.0:5686): avc: denied { search } for name="1496" dev="proc" ino=204557 scontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c85,c256,c512,c768 tclass=dir permissive=0
04-12 12:42:47.805   903   903 W traced_probes: type=1400 audit(0.0:5687): avc: denied { search } for name="1758" dev="proc" ino=204563 scontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tcontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tclass=dir permissive=0

Bug: 77955286

Change-Id: If0985d3ddd7d14c2b139be1c842c9c8df99b90db

Bug: 75987246
Test: succeeded builing and tested with taimen
Change-Id: I2d8bc91c305e665ed9c69459e51204117afb3eee

Addresses:
avc: denied { find } for
interface=android.hardware.tetheroffload.config::IOffloadConfig
scontext=u:r:system_server:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:default_android_hwservice:s0
tclass=hwservice_manager

Bug: 77855688
Test: build/boot Sailfish, turn on tethering, no selinux denial
Change-Id: I97cae0928b5311a4da41d19cbd5c863c3137a49f

We have seen crash_dump denials for radio_data_file,
shared_relro_file, shell_data_file, and vendor_app_file.  This commit
widens an existing dontaudit to include them as well as others that we
might see.

Bug: 77908066
Test: Boot device.
Change-Id: I9ad2a2dafa8e73b13c08d0cc6886274a7c0e3bac
(cherry picked from commit a3b3bdbb)

We often see the following denials:

avc: denied { sys_rawio } for comm="update_engine" capability=17 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tclass=capability permissive=0
avc: denied { sys_rawio } for comm="boot@1.0-servic" capability=17 scontext=u:r:hal_bootctl_default:s0 tcontext=u:r:hal_bootctl_default:s0 tclass=capability permissive=0

These are benign, so we are hiding them.

Bug: 37778617
Test: Boot device.
Change-Id: Iac196653933d79aa9cdeef7670076f0efc97b44a
(cherry picked from commit bf4afae1)

am: 8966b8e5

Bug: 74435522
Test: traceur can share to betterbug
Change-Id: Ic24196b6a4050696d92f18a6879c569ccf5eaec7
(cherry picked from commit f66fd522)

avc: denied { read } for comm="batterystats-wo" name="show_stat" dev="sysfs"
scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 77816522
Test: build
Change-Id: I50a9bfe1a9e4df9c84cf4b2b4aedbb8f82ac94cd

Bug: 73405145
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsMediaTestCases -t android.media.cts.AudioRecordTest#testRecordNoDataForIdleUids
Change-Id: I09bdb74c9ecc317ea090643635ca26165efa423a

This is originally allowed in healthd but the permission
was not transfered to health HAL. A typical health HAL
implementation is likely to write battery info to kernel
logs.

Test: device has battery kernel logs with health HAL
      but without healthd

Bug: 77661605

Change-Id: Ib3b5d3fe6bdb3df2a240c85f9d27b863153805d2

This is needed to be able to scan the labels we have
permission on.

Denial:

04-06 12:52:22.674   874   874 W traced_probes: type=1400 audit(0.0:10314): avc: denied { search } for name="backup" dev="sda45" ino=6422529 scontext=u:r:traced_probes:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:backup_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0

Bug: 73625480

cherry-picked from aosp/658243
Change-Id: I52f3865952004bfc6fe22c488d768276866f8ae1
Merged-In: I52f3865952004bfc6fe22c488d768276866f8ae1

cgroupfs doesn't allow files to be created, so this can't be needed.

Also remove redundant neverallow and dontaudit rules. These are now
more broadly handled by domain.te.

Bug: 74182216

Test: Denials remain silenced.

Change-Id: If7eb0e59f567695d987272a2fd36dbc251516e9f

This allows system_server to access it for determining battery stats
(see KernelMemoryBandwidthStats.java).

batterystats-wo: type=1400 audit(0.0:429): avc: denied { read } for name="show_stat" dev="sysfs" ino=48071 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file permissive=0

Bug: 72643420
Bug: 73947096

Test: Denial is no longer present.
Change-Id: Ibe46aee48eb3f78fa5a9d1f36602c082c33036f7

Bug: 72177715
Test: flash device and check incident output
Change-Id: I16c172caec235d985a6767642134fbd5e5c23912
(cherry picked from commit 985db6d8)

avc: denied { read } for name="ext4" dev="sysfs" ino=32709
scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0
tclass=dir permissive=0 b/72749888
avc: denied { read } for name="state" dev="sysfs" ino=51318
scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768
tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_android_usb:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
b/72749888

Bug: 72749888
Test: build/boot taimen-userdebug. No more logspam
Change-Id: Ic43d1c8b71e1e5e0e6f9af1e03816c4084120e7e

* changes:
  Test that /proc files have proc_type attribute.
  Assert types labeled in genfs_contexts have correct attributes

Bug: 74182216
Test: build sailfish, walleye, etc policy
Change-Id: Ia1c6b67ac93ed6e88c50c1527b48275365bf5fd5
Merged-In: Ia1c6b67ac93ed6e88c50c1527b48275365bf5fd5
(cherry picked from commit 4c80c2ca)

Types in sysfs should have the sysfs_type attribute, types in
debugfs and tracefs should have the debugfs_type attribute.

TODO: Test that files in procfs have the proc_type attribute.
TODO: Assert these tests in CTS.

Bug: 74182216
Test: build - these are build-time tests.
Change-Id: Icf0ff2a26c05f94da421ba23df0b92d8eef906bf
Merged-In: Icf0ff2a26c05f94da421ba23df0b92d8eef906bf
(cherry picked from commit 1b828444)

Because applications should be able to set the receive
timeout on UDP encapsulation sockets, we need to allow
setsockopt(). getsockopt() is an obvious allowance as
well.

Bug: 68689438
Test: compilation
Change-Id: I2eaf72bcce5695f1aee7a95ec03111eca577651c

Change-Id: Id7823a3130443107beb4d97426807a6395cf6930
related-to-bug:74607984
test:adb bugreport and check for drm trace dumps

A default value of persist.sys.sf.native_mode could be set by SoC
partners in some devices including some pixels.
So it should have vendor_init_settable accessibility.

Bug: 74266614
Test: succeeded building and tested with a pixel device with
PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY_OVERRIDE=true.

Change-Id: I5d7a029f82505983d21dc722541fb55761a8714d
Merged-In: I5d7a029f82505983d21dc722541fb55761a8714d
(cherry picked from commit 0dc35873)

Update for debugfs labeling changes.

Update for simpleperf behavior with stack traces (temp file).

(cherry picked from commit c8fe29ff)

Bug: 73175642
Test: m
Test: manual - run profiling, look for logs
Merged-In: Ie000a00ef56cc603f498d48d89001f566c03b661
Change-Id: Ie000a00ef56cc603f498d48d89001f566c03b661

This reverts commit 942500b9.

Bug: 75287236
Test: boot a device
Merged-In: If81a2d2a46979ffbd536bb95528c3b4ebe3483df
Change-Id: If81a2d2a46979ffbd536bb95528c3b4ebe3483df
(cherry picked from commit a6d9d6b6)

Bug: 75968642
Test: manual testing to check for sepolicy violation
Cherry-picked from aosp/652222

Change-Id: Idc83669feaf9fd17bed26f89dfce33e3f2f5424f

The netutils_wrapper is a process used by vendor code to update the
iptable rules on devices. When it update the rules for a specific chain.
The iptable module will reload the whole chain with the new rule. So
even the netutils_wrapper do not need to add any rules related to xt_bpf
module, it will still reloading the existing iptables rules about xt_bpf
module and need pass through the selinux check again when the rules are
reloading. So we have to grant it the permission to reuse the pinned
program in fs_bpf when it modifies the corresponding iptables chain so
the vendor module will not crash anymore.

Test: device boot and no more denials from netutils_wrapper
Bug: 72111305
Change-Id: I62bdfd922c8194c61b13e2855839aee3f1e349be
(cherry picked from aosp commit 2623ebcf)